United States of America v. Hatch et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	C.A. No. 22-332 WES
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RICHARD H. HATCH, JR., et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
___________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Senior District Judge.
Before 	the 	Court 	are 	the 	United 	States’ 	Response 	to 	the
Court’s Order to Show Cause and Motion for Reconsideration of the
Court’s 	June 	6, 	2025 	Order 	(the 	“Government’s 	Motion”), 	Dkt. 	No.
111, 	and 	Pro 	Se 	Defendant 	Richard 	H. 	Hatch, 	Jr.’s 	Motion 	for
Reconsideration 	of 	Interlocutory 	Summary 	Judgment 	Order 	Against
Him 	on 	Counts 	One 	and 	Two 	(“Defendant’s 	Motion”), 	Dkt. 	No. 	114.
For 	the 	reasons 	below, 	the 	Court 	denies 	both 	the 	Government’s
Motion and Defendant’s Motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are well known. 	For those who wish to
familiarize 	themselves 	with 	the 	background 	of 	this 	dispute, 	the
Court’s Amended Memorandum and Order, Dkt. No. 107, describes the
failure of Defendant Richard Hatch (“Mr. Hatch”) to pay the taxes
associated with the one million dollars in winnings that he earned
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as the first successful contestant on the reality television show
“Survivor”; 	his 	resulting 	incarceration 	based 	on 	his 	failure 	to
pay 	his 	taxes; 	and 	the 	ongoing 	efforts 	of 	Plaintiff 	the 	United
States 	of 	America 	(the 	“Government”) 	to 	recover 	the 	outstanding
balance 	of 	Mr. 	Hatch’s 	unpaid 	debt 	from 	both 	Mr. 	Hatch 	and
Defendant 	Kristin 	M. 	Hatch 	(“Ms. 	Hatch”)(collectively,
“Defendants”). 	As 	a 	result, 	the 	Court 	will 	refrain 	from 	fully
reciting the facts and procedural history of this matter and will
instead 	provide 	the 	background 	necessary 	to 	understanding 	the
instant dispute.
Following 	Mr. 	Hatch’s 	conviction, 	the 	Government 	brought 	an
action 	seeking 	to 	collect 	on 	the 	unpaid 	tax 	debt. 	See 	generally
Compl., Dkt. No. 1. 	Count One of the Government’s Complaint seeks
a 	judgment 	reducing 	Mr. 	Hatch’s 	unpaid 	federal 	tax 	liabilities
into a civil judgment pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7402(a). 	Id. ¶¶ 24-
32. 	The 	Court’s 	Amended 	Memorandum 	and 	Order 	granted 	summary
judgment in the Government’s favor on this count. 	Am. Mem. & Order
29. 	Count 	Two 	has 	presented 	a 	host 	of 	additional 	challenges 	for
the 	Government. 	Specifically, 	Count 	Two 	seeks: 	(1) 	the 	Court’s
validation 	of 	its 	liens 	on 	Mr. 	Hatch’s 	delinquent 	tax 	debt 	as
authorized 	by 	26 	U.S.C. 	§ 	6321; 	and 	(2) 	an 	order 	pursuant 	to
26 U.S.C. § 7403 enforcing those liens and authorizing the sale of
property located at 21 Annandale Road, Newport, Rhode Island (“21
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Annandale”), 	and 	23 	Annandale 	Road, 	Newport, 	Rhode 	Island 	(“23
Annandale”).1 	Compl. ¶¶ 33-64, B, E.
While 	the 	Court’s 	Amended 	Memorandum 	and 	Order 	granted
summary judgment and validated the Government’s liens pursuant to
26 U.S.C. § 6321, it refrained from entering summary judgment with
respect 	to 	the 	enforcement 	of 	those 	liens. 	Am. 	Mem. 	& 	Order 	29.
Instead, the Court raised concerns regarding the timeliness of the
Government’s 	ability 	to 	seek 	this 	relief 	and 	ordered 	it 	to 	show
cause as to why it should not have summary judgment entered against
it. 	See Text Order (June 5, 2025). 	As referenced above, both the
Government and Mr. Hatch moved for reconsideration of the Amended
Memorandum and Order.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards
To 	succeed 	on 	a 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment, 	a 	movant 	must
demonstrate 	that 	no 	genuine 	issue 	exists 	as 	to 	any 	material 	fact
and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 	See Boykin
v. Genzyme Therapeutic Prods., LP, 93 F.4th 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2024)
(citing 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	56(a)). 	“The 	summary 	judgment 	ritual 	is
standard 	fare: 	once 	the 	movant 	adumbrates 	an 	absence 	of 	evidence
1 	Mr. 	Hatch 	and 	Ms. 	Hatch 	jointly 	acquired 	23 	Annandale 	in
2002. 	Pl./Countercl. 	Def. 	USA’s 	Statement 	Undisputed 	Material
Facts 	(“Gov’t’s 	SUMF”) 	¶¶ 	70-74, 	Dkt. 	No. 	62. 	Prior 	to 	this
acquisition, Mr. Hatch also owned 21 Annandale. 	Id. ¶¶ 21-22, 42.
Following 	a 	period 	of 	financial 	hardship, 	Mr. 	Hatch 	transferred
both properties to Ms. Hatch. 	Id. ¶¶ 57, 86.
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to 	support 	the 	nonmoving 	party’s 	case, 	the 	burden 	shifts 	to 	the
nonmovant to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact.” 	Id. 	(citation 	modified). 	Importantly, 	“to 	carry 	this
burden, 	the 	nonmovant 	cannot 	simply 	rely 	on 	evidence 	that 	is
conjectural 	or 	problematic 	but, 	rather, 	must 	present 	definite,
competent evidence.” 	Id. (citation modified).
Separately, 	to 	prevail 	on 	a 	motion 	for 	reconsideration, 	a
party 	ordinarily 	must 	demonstrate 	either 	that 	new, 	previously
unavailable, and important evidence has surfaced or that the Court
premised its original judgment on a manifest error of law or fact.
See 	Caribbean 	Mgmt. 	Grp., 	Inc. 	v. 	Erikon 	LLC, 	966 	F.3d 	35, 	44-45
(1st 	Cir. 	2020). 	Additionally, 	“[a]s 	long 	as 	the 	district 	court
has 	not 	‘misapprehended 	some 	material 	fact 	or 	point 	of 	law,’ 	a
motion 	for 	reconsideration 	is 	rarely 	‘a 	promising 	vehicle 	for
revisiting 	a 	party’s 	case 	and 	rearguing 	theories 	previously
advanced and rejected.’” Id. 	(quoting Palmer v. Champion Mortg.,
465 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2006)). 	Finally, the denial of a motion
for 	reconsideration 	is 	reviewed 	for 	an 	abuse 	of 	discretion. 	Id.
(citing 	Guadalupe-Báez 	v. 	Pesquera, 	819 	F.3d 	509, 	518 	(1st 	Cir.
2016)).
B. The Government’s Response to the Court’s Show Cause Order
The Court’s review of the record and the arguments submitted
by 	the 	Government 	reveal 	that 	it 	has 	successfully 	shown 	cause 	as
to 	why 	the 	Court 	should 	not 	enter 	summary 	judgment 	against 	it
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concerning the enforcement of the lien against 21 Annandale and 23
Annandale. 	Furthermore, 	the 	Court 	declines 	to 	accept 	the
Government’s 	invitation 	to 	reconsider 	its 	Amended 	Memorandum 	and
Order 	and 	reaffirms 	its 	decision 	to 	deny 	summary 	judgment 	on 	the
enforcement of its lien on 21 Annandale.2
Although 	the 	Amended 	Memorandum 	and 	Order 	expressed 	doubt
regarding the timeliness of the Government’s request to authorize
the sale of 21 Annandale, the Court determines that the Government
has successfully demonstrated its ability to seek this relief when
it did. 	Specifically, the Court declines to apply the statute of
limitations 	contained 	in 	the 	Rhode 	Island 	Uniform 	Voidable
Transactions 	Act 	(“UVTA”) 	and 	determines 	that 	the 	Government 	is
not time-barred from seeking relief pursuant to this statute. 	See
Ruthardt v. United States, 303 F.3d 375, 384 (1st Cir. 2002) (“The
Supreme 	Court 	long 	ago 	held 	that 	(presumptively) 	claims 	of 	the
United States as sovereign cannot be defeated by state statutes of
limitation. 	We 	say 	‘presumptively’ 	because 	Congress 	can 	provide
otherwise.”) 	(citation 	omitted). 	Moreover, 	Defendants 	have 	not
articulated 	a 	cognizable 	argument 	against 	this 	conclusion. 	See
generally 	Def.’s 	Reply 	Gov’t’s 	Mot., 	Dkt. 	No. 	112; 	Def.’s 	Reply
2 	The 	Government 	concedes 	that 	a 	genuine 	issue 	of 	material 	fact
exists 	regarding 	the 	source 	of 	income 	used 	to 	purchase 	23
Annandale. 	Pl.’s 	Resp. 	Order 	Show 	Cause 	7, 	Dkt. 	No. 	111. 	As 	a
result, the Court leaves this aspect of its Amended Memorandum and
Order undisturbed.
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Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. No. 113. 	As a result, the Court determines that
the 	statute 	of 	limitations 	contained 	within 	the 	UVTA 	does 	not
present 	an 	obstacle 	to 	the 	Government’s 	attempt 	to 	enforce 	its
liens against 21 Annandale or 23 Annandale.
Notwithstanding 	this 	determination, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	a
genuine 	dispute 	of 	material 	fact 	remains 	regarding 	whether 	Mr.
Hatch 	fraudulently 	transferred 	21 	Annandale 	to 	Ms. 	Hatch 	and
therefore 	rejects 	the 	Government’s 	request 	to 	reconsider 	its
Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment 	on 	this 	aspect 	of 	Count 	Two.
Specifically, 	the 	record 	is 	replete 	with 	factual 	disputes
regarding 	the 	circumstances 	surrounding 	the 	Hatches’ 	intent 	and
their ultimate decision to transfer 21 Annandale and 23 Annandale.
See 	generally 	Pl./Countercl. 	Def. 	USA’s 	Stmt. 	Disp. 	Facts, 	Dkt.
No. 68. 	When viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
parties, 	a 	determination 	from 	the 	Court 	regarding 	these 	issues
cannot take place on summary judgment. 	See Stepanischen v. Merchs.
Despatch 	Transp. 	Corp., 	722 	F.2d 	922, 	928 	(1st 	Cir. 	1983) 	(“In
cases 	where, 	as 	here, 	the 	state 	of 	mind 	of 	one 	of 	the 	parties 	is
crucial to the outcome of the case, resort to summary judgment is
vested 	with 	more 	than 	the 	usual 	difficulty. 	Under 	such
circumstances, 	jury 	judgments 	about 	credibility 	are 	typically
thought to be of special importance. 	Thus courts are particularly
cautious 	about 	granting 	summary 	judgment 	in 	such 	cases.”).
Consequently, 	the 	Court 	declines 	to 	revisit 	its 	prior 	denial 	of
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the 	Government’s 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	on 	this 	aspect 	of
Count Two.
C. Mr. Hatch’s Motion for Reconsideration
Similarly, 	the 	Court 	rejects 	Mr. 	Hatch’s 	attempt 	to 	seek
reconsideration 	of 	its 	Amended 	Memorandum 	and 	Order. 	As 	he 	has
done 	before, 	Mr. 	Hatch 	uses 	his 	Motion 	for 	Reconsideration 	as 	an
improper opportunity to reargue the merits of his prior conviction
and attempts to convince the Court that he lacks any responsibility
for 	his 	failure 	to 	pay 	his 	incomes 	taxes. 	See 	Def.’s 	Mot. 	5-22.
However, 	Mr. 	Hatch’s 	endeavor 	to 	reargue 	the 	merits 	of 	his
conviction 	falls 	outside 	of 	the 	criteria 	that 	the 	Court 	may
permissibly 	consider 	on 	a 	motion 	for 	reconsideration. 	See
Caribbean 	Mgmt. 	Grp., 	966 	F.3d 	at 	44-45. 	As 	a 	result, 	the 	Court
declines 	to 	review 	the 	arguments 	contained 	in 	Mr. 	Hatch’s 	motion
and denies his Motion for Reconsideration.3
III. CONCLUSION
Based 	on 	the 	foregoing, 	the 	Court 	concludes 	that 	the
Government has successfully demonstrated that the Court should not
3 In any event, Mr. Hatch appears to argue that the Supreme Court’s
opinion 	in 	Moore 	v. 	United 	States, 	602 	U.S. 	572 	(2024) 	absolves
him of criminal liability arising out of his failure to pay taxes
associated with his income. 	See Def.’s Mot. 9-12. 	However, Moore
concerns 	Congress’s 	ability 	to 	tax 	either 	an 	entity 	or 	its
shareholders 	in 	the 	context 	of 	an 	entity’s 	undistributed 	income.
602 U.S. at 589-90. It provides no support for Mr. Hatch’s dubious
argument that the federal government lacks the authority to collect
income taxes from individuals who earn wages in the private sector.
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grant 	summary 	judgment 	against 	it; 	and 	the 	Court 	DENIES 	both 	the
Government’s 	Motion 	for 	Reconsideration, 	Dkt. 	No. 	111, 	and 	Mr.
Hatch’s 	Motion 	for 	Reconsideration, 	Dkt. 	No. 	114. 	Inasmuch 	as 	a
trial is necessary to resolve the factual dispute, this case shall
be 	returned 	to 	the 	clerk’s 	office 	on 	reassignment 	to 	another
district judge.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________
William E. Smith
Senior District Judge
Date: October 21, 2025
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