Wongbay v. Balise T, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
MENWON WONGBAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
BALISE TOYOTA OF WARWICK
(BALISE T, LLC), alias,
Defendants.
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C.A. No. 22-cv-00458-MSM-LDA
O R D E R
Mary S. McElroy, United States District Judge.
On December 28, 2022, the plaintiff, Menwon Wongbay (“Wongbay”), filed suit
against her former employer Balise Toyota of Warwick (“Balise”) alleging violations
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq. (“Title VII”), the
Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I.G.L. § 25-5-1
et seq. (“RIFEPA”),
the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act of 1990, R.I.G.L. § 42-112-1
et seq. (“RICRA”), and
the Rhode Island Payment of Wages Act, R.I.G.L. § 28-14-1
et seq. Balise has moved
for partial dismissal of certain claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 11.) The Court received no response from the plaintiff
before the March 21, 2023, deadline and none has been filed since that time.
When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all well-
pleaded factual allegations in the claims and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the nonmoving party. 	“The complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to
state a plausible claim.”
	Medina-Velázquez v. Hernández-Gregorat, 767 F.3d 103,
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108 (1st Cir. 2014). “When deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, ‘the mere fact that a motion to
dismiss is unopposed does not relieve the district court of the obligation to examine
the complaint itself to see whether it is formally sufficient to state a claim.’”
Pomerleau v. W. Springfield Pub. Sch., 362 F.3d 143, 145 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting
Vega–Encarnacion v. Babilonia, 344 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2003)).
Balise 	has 	moved 	to 	dismiss 	claims 	alleging 	discrimination 	relating 	to
ethnicity from Count I of the Complaint as well as claims alleging discrimination
relating to ethnicity and age in Counts II and III. Balise argues that the plaintiff has
failed to assert exhaustion of administrative remedies on those claims. The plaintiff
alleges in her Complaint that “[o]n or about October 12th, 2021, Plaintiff filed a
Charge of Discrimination with the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights
(“RICHR”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) against
Defendant alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color, retaliation, and a hostile
workplace.” 	(ECF No. 1 ¶ 7.) 	There is no claim that she filed a charge of
discrimination with the RICHR or the EEOC with respect to either ethnicity or age.
Title VII requires exhaustion of administrative remedies as a pre-condition to
suing in federal court.
	See Brown v. Gen. Serv. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832, (1976);
Jensen v. Frank, 912 F.2d 517, 520 (1st Cir. 1990). Exhaustion “is one among related
doctrines—including abstention, finality, and ripeness—that govern the timing of
federal-court decision making.”
	McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992).
Federal court complaints are generally limited to the charge filed with the EEOC
though the “exact wording of the charge of discrimination need not presage with
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literary exactitude the judicial pleadings which may follow” as long as “the claims set
forth in the civil complaint come within the scope of the EEOC investigation which
can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.”
	Fantini v.
Salem State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2009).
Similarly, 	the 	RIFEPA 	requires 	an 	aggrieved 	employee 	to 	exhaust
administrative remedies by filing a charge with the Rhode Island Commission for
Human Rights (“RICHR”) prior to commencing civil action. 	R.I.G.L. § 28-5-24.1(a).
If conciliation does not succeed the aggrieved employee may request a right to sue in
court and once the RICHR has granted the right to sue, “the proceedings are
terminated, and the administrative remedies have been exhausted.”
	Barber v.
Verizon New England, Inc., No. 05–390, 2005 WL 3479834, at *2 (D.R.I. Dec. 20,
2005). 	The aggrieved employee may then commence civil action and the complaint
must be “‘reasonably within the scope of an agency investigation of those’ made in the
administrative charge.”
	Baez v. Elec. Boat Corp., No. 15-509, 2016 WL 3976359, at
*2 (D.R.I. May 16, 2016) (quoting
Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456, 464
(1st Cir. 1996)).
The plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC and the RICHR
on or about October 12, 2021, in which she alleged “discrimination on the basis of
race, color, retaliation, and a hostile workplace.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 7.) In Count I of her
Complaint, Ms. Wongbay includes a claim for discrimination based on ethnicity,
which was not included in the EEOC administrative charge. In Count II, she includes
claims of discrimination based on ethnicity and age, which were also not included in
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the RICHR administrative charge. 	Ms. Wongbay did not oppose the Motion to
Dismiss and failed to assert in her Complaint that the ethnicity and age claims were
included in her administrative charges. 	She also failed to assert that ethnicity and
age claims reasonably grew from the EEOC investigation or that the claims were
reasonably within the scope of the RICHR investigation.
See Fantini, 557 F.3d 22 at
27;
Baez, 2016 WL 3976359, at *2.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Ms. Wongbay has failed to exhaust EEOC
administrative remedies for her ethnicity claim in Count I and failed to exhaust
RICHR administrative remedies for ethnicity and age claims in Count II. 	Those
claims therefore are dismissed.
Balise next asserts that for her RICRA claim in Count III, the plaintiff’s
allegations are outside the scope of the statute of limitations, which it contends is one
year. 	But the statute of limitations for commencing a civil action for violation of
RICRA is three years. 	R.I.G.L. § 42-112-2. 	The plaintiff was terminated on March
15, 2021 and filed this suit on December 28, 2022—well within the three-year statute
of limitations. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 25.)
Moreover, RICRA does not have an administrative exhaustion requirement, so
any failure to assert ethnicity and age to the RICHR is irrelevant to the plaintiff’s
RICRA claim.
See Ward v. City of Pawtucket Police Dep’t, 639 A.2d 1379, 1382 (R.I.
1994);
Richardson v. Whitmarsh Corp., No. 07-309 ML, 2009 WL 5178075, at *15
(D.R.I. Dec. 29, 2009). 	Thus, the plaintiffs claim of violation of RICRA because of
discrimination based on ethnicity and age are timely and properly before the Court.
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For 	these 	reasons, 	Balise’s 	Partial 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	(ECF 	No. 	11) 	is
GRANTED as to ethnicity claims in Count I and ethnicity and age claims in Count II
but DENIED as to the ethnicity and age claims in Count III.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Mary S. McElroy
United States District Judge
August 3, 2023
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