Raduano et al v. Testa

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
WILLIAM J. FLYNN, as Trustee of the
Elaine M. Raduano Revocable Trust -
2018, ex. rel. THE ESTATE OF
ELAINE M. RADUANO,
Plaintiff,
v.
MAR-CIA TESTA, individually and in
her capacity as Executrix of the Estate
of Elaine M. Raduano,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
C.A. No. 23-101-JJM-PAS
ORDER
The question before the Court is whether the sole beneficiary of a trust, which
is the residual beneficiary of a will, is a necessary party to this dispute about whether
an investment account should be included in the estate inventory. Before the Court
is Defendant Mar-cia Testa’s Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(7), arguing that
Michelle Raduano, the beneficiary of the Trust, is an indispensable party such that
the case should be dismissed under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
for failure to join a required party. ECF No. 35.
I. 	FACTS
Michelle Raduano (“Michelle”) and Mar-cia Testa (“Mar-cia”) are sisters, and
the surviving children of the late Elaine Raduano (“Mrs. Raduano”). 	Mrs. Raduano
owned assets in a Morgan Stanley Account that were transferred in 2017 to a joint
brokerage account with “rights of survivorship” at Fidelity Brokerage Services
Case 1:23-cv-00101-JJM-PAS Document 41 Filed 08/06/26 Page 1 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
(“Fidelity Account”) in the name of Mrs. Raduano and her daughter Mar-cia. 	No
cash, securities, bonds, and other assets belonging to Mar-cia were used to open
and/or fund the Fidelity Account. It is alleged that Mrs. Raduano’s signatures on the
Fidelity Account opening documents and the box checking “right of survivorship”
were not made by Mrs. Raduano.
On November 20, 2018, Mrs. Raduano executed her Last Will and Testament,
which included a provision on jointly held accounts. It stated:
IV. JOINT ACCOUNTS. 	Any bank account or security in my name
together with that of another person and in which solely my funds have
been deposited was established for convenience only and shall be added
to the residue of my estate.
The year after executing her will, Mrs. Raduano directed her attorney to prepare, and
she then executed, the Elaine Raduano Revocable Trust - 2018 (“Trust”). 	At
Paragraph IV of the Trust, entitled “AT MY DEATH,” Mrs. Raduano confirmed that
“my daughter, Mar-cia Testa” was the “co-owner [of] my principal brokerage account
for convenience purposes only and not with the intent that she inherit the entire
proceeds thereof.” The Trust confirmed the intention in Mrs. Raduano’s will that the
Fidelity Account was intended to be captured into the residue of her estate.
Mrs. Raduano passed away in 2020. 	In accordance with her will, the
Portsmouth Probate Court appointed Mar-cia as the Executrix of the Estate, and the
will was admitted to probate without objection. Mar-cia filed with the Probate Court
a “Universal Inventory” that valued her entire mother’s estate at $21,975. 	The
inventory makes no reference to the Fidelity Account. Neither the Fidelity Account
Case 1:23-cv-00101-JJM-PAS Document 41 Filed 08/06/26 Page 2 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
nor the cash and/or assets used to fund that account are a part of the res of the Estate
subject to the Probate Court’s jurisdiction.
William J. Flynn, in his capacity as Trustee, filed this complaint, alleging that
Mrs. Raduano’s testamentary intention was to leave an estate with essentially three
major assets: an apartment building in Cambridge, Massachusetts, a home on Indian
Avenue in Portsmouth, Rhode Island, and the Fidelity Account. 	It was Elaine’s
intention to distribute her assets upon her own death as follows: Mar-cia, who lived
in Massachusetts and was, with her husband, in the real estate business, would
inherit the Cambridge apartment building. Michelle, who lived at the Indian Avenue
residence with her mother, would inherit that home and the Fidelity Account.
Mr. Flynn alleges that the plain language in Mrs. Raduano’s will is that the joint
account was to be part of the residue of her Estate, and that, in violation her fiduciary
duties 	as 	Executrix, 	Mar-cia 	has 	claimed 	ownership 	of 	the 	Fidelity 	Account,
personally and exclusively.
In his Amended Complaint, Mr. Flynn, in his capacity as Trustee, “seeks to
void the account opening documents, recover the Fidelity Account for the Estate, and
have those funds pass through the Estate to the Trust, and to Michelle as the Trust’s
sole beneficiary.” 	ECF No. 35-1 at 3.1 	Mar-cia moves to dismiss the Trustee’s
1 Mar-cia previously moved to dismiss the case, ECF No. 7, which the Court
granted without prejudice. 	ECF No. 15. 	Mr. Flynn moved to reopen the case, ECF
No. 18, and to amend his complaint, ECF No. 19, and the Court granted both motions.
ECF No. 29.
Case 1:23-cv-00101-JJM-PAS Document 41 Filed 08/06/26 Page 3 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(7) alleging that it should be dismissed for
failure to join Michelle as a beneficiary of the Estate of Elaine Raduano. ECF No. 35.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to join a required party, the complaint
must demonstrate that “a lawsuit is proceeding without particular parties whose
interests are central to the suit.”
Picciotto v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 512 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir.
2008). 	This requires the Court to decide “whether considerations of efficiency and
fairness, growing out of the particular circumstances of the case, require that a
particular person be joined as a party.”
Pujol v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 877 F.2d
132, 134 (1st Cir. 1989). The Court accepts Mr. Flynn’s complaint allegations as true
and views them in the light most favorable to him.
	Gargano v. Liberty Int’l
Underwriters, Inc., 572 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2009).
To determine whether a party should be joined, the Court must first determine
whether the party is a “necessary” party.
	Pujol, 877 F.2d at 134. A person qualifies
as necessary if complete relief cannot be granted in the party’s absence, or if the
person is “so situated” that disposing of the action without the party may “impair or
impede the person’s ability to protect that interest” or create a “substantial risk” of
incurring inconsistent obligations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Mar-cia bases her motion on Rule 19, which focuses on joining parties who are
necessary to the action. Mr. Flynn addresses these arguments in opposition, but he
also raises Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 in arguing against dismissal. Rule 17
Case 1:23-cv-00101-JJM-PAS Document 41 Filed 08/06/26 Page 4 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
determines who may be a party and what governs their capacity to sue. He asserts
that Rule 17 allows him to bring this case as a Trustee without the ultimate
beneficiary – in this case, Michelle – as a named plaintiff. 	The Court will start its
discussion here.
A. 	Rule 17
“[A]ll civil actions must be ‘prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest.’”
	Sawyer Bros., Inc. v. Island Transporter, LLC, 887 F.3d 23, 34 (1st Cir.
2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)). An exception to this general requirement applies
to the trustee of an express trust. Rule 17 gives a trustee of an express trust the right
to “sue in their own names without joining the person for whose benefit the action is
brought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(1)(E). Because Mr. Flynn is acting in his capacity as
a Trustee of the Estate, he asserts that Rule 17 allows him to bring this suit on behalf
of the Estate without Michelle.
The Court agrees. 2 Mr. Flynn’s role as Trustee permits him to bring this suit
under the exception stated in Rule 17. Moreover, a purpose of Rule 17(a) is to “protect
a defendant from facing a subsequent similar action brought by one not a party to the
present proceeding and to ensure that any action taken to judgment will have its
2 State law also supports Mr. Flynn’s argument. 	Under Rhode Island law, a
“legally interested party” may start an action on behalf of an Estate to recover if the
executor fails to act. 	R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-18-17. 	The legally interested person can
recover any property which they may believe “should be recovered for the benefit of
the estate.”
	Id. 	Mr. Flynn is a legally interested party because he has a legally
protected interest in the residue of the Estate.
	See id. 	Since the portion of the
Fidelity Account that Michelle would receive is contingent on it first passing through
the Estate, Michelle’s interest is contingent and thus not a legally protected interest.
United States v. San Juan Bay Marina, 239 F.3d 400, 406 (1st Cir. 2001).
Case 1:23-cv-00101-JJM-PAS Document 41 Filed 08/06/26 Page 5 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
proper effect as res judicata.”
	Prevor-Mayorsohn Caribbean, Inc., v. P.R. 	Marine
Mgmt., Inc., 620 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1980). 	The risk of incurring inconsistent
obligations does not apply here because Mr. Flynn, as Trustee, acts on behalf of the
Estate as an agent for its beneficiaries and “principals are bound by judgments
entered in actions properly litigated by their agents on their behalf.”
Id.
Mar-cia attempts to distinguish Rule 17 to show that it does not apply in this
case. 	She cites
Markham v. Fay as precedent that, where disputes exist between
beneficiaries or creditors, the trust’s beneficiaries should be involved in the litigation
unless the trustee can fully protect the beneficiary’s interest without conflict. 74 F.3d
1347, 1355 (1st Cir. 1996). 	But here, there is no dispute among beneficiaries or
creditors. In fact, there is only one beneficiary, so it is hard to conceive how she could
conflict with herself.3 	The Court has consistently found that Mr. Flynn is fulfilling
his fiduciary duty to the Trust to recover its assets and has acted in the best interest
of the Trust. 	The Court also notes that Michelle, like the beneficiary in
Markham,
can intervene at any time, but has not opted to so far.
Id. Thus, the Court finds that
Mr. Flynn is a proper plaintiff here under Rule 17.
B. 	Rule 19
Relying on Rule 19, Mar-cia argues that Michelle is an indispensable party to
this case because she is the sole beneficiary of the Trust which will receive the Fidelity
Account and that Mr. Flynn cannot accurately represent Michelle’s interests here.
3 Mar-cia asserts that Michelle merely does not want to pursue this lawsuit
against her sister.
Case 1:23-cv-00101-JJM-PAS Document 41 Filed 08/06/26 Page 6 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
Rule 19(a) requires a person to be joined when either the Court cannot grant complete
relief in the party’s absence, or if disposing of the action without that person will
impede their ability to protect that interest or create inconsistent obligations for the
Court. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 19;
San Juan Bay Marina, 239 F.3d at 406 (“a party is
necessary under Rule 19(a) only if they claim a ‘legally protected interest’ relating to
the subject matter of the action.”).
This dispute is between the Estate and a beneficiary of the Estate, the Trust.
Mr. Flynn seeks to recover the funds to distribute them accordingly, not to change
Michelle’s relationship with the Trust or alter the Trust itself.
	See Carey v. Brown,
92 U.S. 171, 172 (1875). Mr. Flynn’s role as Trustee allows him to bring suit on behalf
of the Trust to recover money, without affecting any relations with the “cestuis que
trust.”
	Id.;
see Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 107 (A.L.I. 2012) (a trustee may
“maintain 	a 	proceeding 	against 	a 	third 	party 	on 	behalf 	of 	the 	trust 	and 	its
beneficiaries” and “the trustee is normally the appropriate person to bring (and decide
whether to bring) an action against a third party on behalf of the trust.”). 	For the
funds to reach Michelle, the Trustee must ensure that they first pass through the
estate. Whether those funds flow to Michelle is incidental to that goal.
	See Prevor-
Mayorsohn Caribbean, Inc., 620 F.2d at 4.
Furthermore, complete relief can be granted in Michelle’s absence because
disposing of this action without Michelle present will neither impede her ability to
protect her interest nor will it create inconsistent obligations for the Court. Michelle
Case 1:23-cv-00101-JJM-PAS Document 41 Filed 08/06/26 Page 7 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
is not the party with a legally protected interest; as the Trustee, Mr. Flynn is.4 R.I.
Gen. Laws § 33-18-17. 	And Michelle will be bound to the outcome of this lawsuit
because Mr. Flynn is acting in his capacity as Trustee.
Id. Thus, the Court finds that
Michelle is not a necessary party to protect the Trust’s interest.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court DENIES Mar-cia’s Motion to Dismiss. 	ECF
No. 35.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/John J. McConnell, Jr.
______________________________
John J. McConnell, Jr.
Chief Judge
United States District Court
August 6, 2026
4 Further, Michelle is not the sole beneficiary, as the “Residue Clause”
designates, the “residue of [Ms. Raduano’s] estate, real and personal to the trustee
then serving.” ECF No. 1, Exhibit 2, at 2. Therefore, Mr. Flynn would be a residual
beneficiary of the Trust even though, in this suit, he is suing in his capacity as
Trustee.
Case 1:23-cv-00101-JJM-PAS Document 41 Filed 08/06/26 Page 8 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>