Petrucci v. Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
ALEXANDRA PETRUCCI,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 24-cv-205-JJM-AEM
ORDER
Plaintiff Alexandra Petrucci has filed breach-of-contract and bad-faith claims
against her former insurance company, Defendant Allstate Fire and Casualty
Insurance Company (“Allstate”). 	ECF No. 1 at 6-9. 	She now moves for partial
summary judgment on the issue of liability on her breach-of-contract claim. 	ECF
No. 34. Allstate opposes Ms. Petrucci’s motion and argues, among other things, that
it was untimely filed. ECF No. 36 at 3-4.
Allstate’s position is correct. In a pretrial scheduling order, the Court initially
instructed the parties to file dispositive motions in this case by June 20, 2025.
	See
Pretrial Scheduling Order (Aug. 22, 2024). 	This deadline was first extended to
August 19, 2025, pursuant to a joint motion by the parties.
	See ECF No. 17; Text
Order (Feb. 21, 2025). 	Ms. Petrucci thereafter moved for a second extension of the
scheduling order deadline (ECF No. 23), which the Court also granted.
	See Text
Order (Apr. 21, 2025). 	The new deadline for dispositive motion was set for
December 5, 2025.
Id.
Case 1:24-cv-00205-JJM-AEM Document 39 Filed 04/08/26 Page 1 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
A few months later, Ms. Petrucci moved for a third extension of the scheduling
order deadline. ECF No. 27. Once again, the Court granted that motion and set the
new dispositive motions deadline for March 5, 2026.
See Text Order (July 23, 2025).
This time, the Court clearly stated that “No Further Extensions of this Deadline will
be Granted.”
Id.
March 5th came and went without either party filing a motion or requesting
another extension of the deadline. 	Indeed, the Court issued a trial order the very
next day, instructing the parties to meet and confer in anticipation of trial.
See ECF
No. 33.
Remarkably, 	on 	March 9, 	2026, 	Ms. 	Petrucci 	filed 	a 	Motion 	for 	Partial
Summary Judgment. ECF No. 34. The motion failed to provide the Court with any
explanation for her untimely filing. It was not until Allstate pointed out this issue in
its Response,
see ECF No. 36 at 3-4, that Ms. Petrucci’s counsel acknowledged the
motion’s untimeliness and stated that it was due to “inadvertence and a calendaring
error.” ECF No. 38 at 1. Even so, Ms. Petrucci contends that the Court should rule
on the substance of her motion because “the late filing did not prejudice [Allstate].”
Id.
Ms. Petrucci’s position is not well taken. It is well established that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure “endow trial judges with formidable case-management
authority,” and “[t]his authority specifically includes—indeed, mandates—setting
deadlines for the filing of pretrial motions.”
Rosario-Diaz v. Gonzalez, 140 F.3d 312,
315 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(2));
see also Perez-Cordero v. Wal-
Case 1:24-cv-00205-JJM-AEM Document 39 Filed 04/08/26 Page 2 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
Mart P.R., 440 F.3d 531, 533 (1st Cir. 2006). “In the era of burgeoning case loads and
thronged dockets,” these deadlines are indeed “an essential tool for handling civil
litigation.”
Tower Ventures, Inc. v. Westfield, 296 F.3d 43, 45 (1st Cir. 2002). “What
is more, litigants have an unflagging duty to comply with clearly communicated case-
management orders.”
Rosario-Diaz, 140 F.3d at 315.
“[A] litigant who ignores a case-management deadline does so at [her] peril.”
Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f)). “Consequently, when noncompliance occurs, the court
may choose from a broad universe of possible sanctions.”
	Tower Ventures, 296 F.3d
at 46. 	Among these sanctions is “the preclusion of untimely summary judgment
motions . . . .”
	Rosario-Diaz, 140 F.3d at 315 (citing
Guzmán-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz,
98 F.3d 664, 668 (1st Cir. 1996));
see also Kam-O’Donoghue v. Tully, No. 16-11054-
MLW, 	2018 	WL 	2163664, 	at 	*33 	(D. 	Mass. 	Mar. 	29, 	2018),
	report 	and
recommendation adopted in part and modified in part, 2019 WL 4273686, at *1 (D.
Mass. Sept. 10, 2019) (striking defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment
because it was untimely filed and defendant offered “no compelling explanation for
[his] delinquency”);
Bradley v. Cruz, No. 1:13-cv-12927-IT, 2017 WL 3238228, at *2
(D. Mass. July 31, 2017) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment as
untimely filed).
In this case, the Court finds denial of Ms. Petrucci’s motion to be warranted.
The Court previously extended the parties’ deadline to file dispositive motions three
separate times. 	It was also made clear that the Court would not be granting any
further extensions. Ms. Petrucci nevertheless filed her Motion for Partial Summary
Case 1:24-cv-00205-JJM-AEM Document 39 Filed 04/08/26 Page 3 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
Judgment four days after the deadline’s expiration. This filing was not accompanied
by so much as an explanation for Ms. Petrucci’s noncompliance with the scheduling
order.
In her Reply, Ms. Petrucci asks the Court to pay no mind to this issue because
“the late filing did not prejudice [Allstate].” 	ECF No. 38 at 1. 	However, while
prejudice to the opposing party is relevant to a litigant’s request to modify the
scheduling order, it “is not the dominant criterion.”
O’Connell v. Hyatt Hotels of P.R.,
357 F.3d 152, 155 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing
Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975
F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992));
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). 	Here, Ms. Petrucci did not
even request another extension of the scheduling order deadline before she filed her
motion.
The First Circuit has further observed that “violation of a scheduling order
may be excused if good cause exists for the offender’s failure to comply.”
	Tower
Ventures, 296 F.3d at 46-47 (citing
Robson v. Hallenbeck, 81 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996)).
Ms. Petrucci’s counsel1 offers that “the late filing was due to inadvertence and a
calendaring error.” 	ECF No. 38 at 1. 	Unfortunately, this does not provide a
“compelling explanation for [the] delinquency.”
	Rosario-Diaz, 140 F.3d at 315;
see
also Tower Ventures, 296 F.3d at 47 (holding that plaintiff’s attorney’s reason for
1 The Court recognizes that this error cannot fairly be attributed to Ms.
Petrucci herself. 	Nevertheless, “[a]ttorneys represent clients, and as a general rule
an attorney’s blunder binds her client.”
Rosario-Diaz, 140 F.3d at 315 (citing
Link v.
Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-36 (1962);
Thibeault v. Square D Co., 960 F.2d
239, 246 (1st Cir. 1992)).
Case 1:24-cv-00205-JJM-AEM Document 39 Filed 04/08/26 Page 4 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
missing a scheduling deadline due to “unexpected delays” was a “conclusory reply
[that] was wholly uninformative” and “explain[ed] nothing”).
The Court’s scheduling orders must be enforced, and the Court will not permit
unexcused procrastination. 	Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the Court DENIES
Ms. Petrucci’s Motion for Patrial Summary Judgment as untimely filed. ECF No. 34.
Trial will be set for this fall.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/John J. McConnell, Jr.
_________________________________
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR.
Chief Judge
United States District Court
April 8, 2026
Case 1:24-cv-00205-JJM-AEM Document 39 Filed 04/08/26 Page 5 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>