Rhode Island Coalition Against Domestic Violence et al v. Blanche et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
RHODE ISLAND COALITION
AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, et
al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
TODD BLANCHE, et al.
Defendants.
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C.A. No. 25-cv-279-MRD-AEM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Melissa R. DuBose, United States District Judge.
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Relief under 5 U.S.C.
§ 705, which the Court is evaluating using the preliminary injunction standard. ECF
No. 53.1 For the following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion.
BACKGROUND
The Court assumes the reader’s familiarity with the background underlying
this dispute and the factual milieu that the Court provided in its August 8, 2025
Memorandum and Order.
	See ECF No. 34 at 1-9. 	As a brief reminder, this action
involves a challenge brought by seventeen non-profit organizations seeking to
invalidate a list of conditions that the Office on Violence Against Women (“the Office”)
1 Plaintiffs originally sought a temporary restraining order when they filed this
motion. 	ECF No. 53 at 1. Notwithstanding this request, the Court chose to resolve
Plaintiffs’ motion as a request for a preliminary injunction and set a briefing schedule
accordingly. 	Text Order (Feb. 25, 2026). 	As a result, the Court will refer to this
motion as “Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion.”
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sought to impose on grant programs authorized by the Violence Against Women Act
(“VAWA”).2 Like other federal statutes, Congress regularly reauthorizes funding for
grant programs that fall within VAWA’s purview in an effort to target the adverse
effects stemming from violent crimes committed against women.
Id. at 2-3. In order
to administer these grant programs, VAWA created the Office and housed it within
the 	Department 	of 	Justice 	(“DOJ”) 	so 	that 	DOJ 	could 	administer 	these
Congressionally 	funded 	programs 	consistent 	with 	their 	requirements.
	Id.
Previously, 	Defendants 	attempted 	to 	impose 	a 	host 	of 	purportedly 	unlawful
conditions on VAWA’s grant programs and this Court prevented their imposition
after it determined that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed in demonstrating that
Defendants violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) by engaging in
arbitrary and capricious agency action.
Id. at 21-22, 26-27.
Here, however, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants have attempted to impose
additional conditions on
different grant programs that also seek to remedy harm
caused by violence perpetrated against women.3 ECF No. 53-1 at 9-14. Specifically,
Plaintiffs assert that Defendants issued grant awards containing new, previously
2 Plaintiffs brought this action against then-Attorney General Pam Bondi in her
official capacity along with the Department of Justice’s subcomponents and their
officials that administer VAWA’s grant programs. 	This Memorandum and Order
refers to them as “Defendants.” 	Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche has been
substituted as Ms. Bondi’s interim successor.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
3 Unlike the prior grants, DOJ’s Office of Justice Programs administers the grants at
issue here. 	ECF No. 53-1 at 9-11. 	Along with their Emergency Motion, Plaintiffs
moved to amend their Complaint in order to contest the most recent conditions, which
this Court granted over Defendants’ objection. Text Order (Apr. 8, 2026).
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unannounced conditions preventing grantees from using funds to provide domestic
violence assistance services to a “removable alien” pursuant to the Immigration and
Nationality Act or any other “unlawfully present” person in the United States.
	Id.
Plaintiffs also seek to preliminarily enjoin, and ultimately invalidate, a separate
grant certification requirement asking grantees to confirm that they do not engage in
diversity, 	equity, 	or 	inclusion 	(“DEI”) 	activities 	that 	violate 	federal 	anti-
discrimination laws.4 Moreover, Plaintiffs contend that the DEI Condition requires
recipients to represent that their compliance with it is “material” to the award for the
purpose of the False Claims Act (“FCA”).5
With 	respect 	to 	the 	grants 	themselves, 	Plaintiffs 	challenge 	Defendants’
attachment of these Conditions to the following three grant programs: (1) grants
provided by the Victims of Crime Act (“VOCA”); (2) additional VOCA grants that
provide services for victims of crimes; and (3) Pet Shelter grants that provide funding
for both survivors of domestic violence
and their pets.6 As outlined above, Plaintiffs’
4 In this Memorandum and Order, the Court will refer to the immigration-related
condition as the “Immigration Condition,” the DEI condition as the “DEI Condition,”
and the two of them collectively as the “Conditions.”
5 	Individuals 	and 	entities 	may 	face 	FCA 	liability 	when 	the 	government 	can
demonstrate that they “knowingly present, or cause to be presented, a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval” or when they “knowingly make use or
cause to be made or used, a false record or statement
material to a false or fraudulent
claim.” 	31 	U.S.C. 	§ 	3729(a)(1)(A), 	(B) 	(citation 	modified) 	(emphasis 	added).
Defendants’ grant condition effectively asks Plaintiffs to concede that operating an
unlawful DEI program — whatever that may mean — would automatically constitute
a violation of the materiality element of the FCA.
6 Congress found that people may refuse to leave a household where someone subjects
them to domestic violence because they do not wish to leave a pet in that abusive
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Emergency Motion asks the Court to preliminarily enjoin the imposition of these
grant Conditions as well as stay them pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 705. In support of these
requests, Plaintiffs contend that these Conditions: (1) violate the APA because they
exceed Defendants’ statutory authority; (2) violate the APA because Defendants
engaged in arbitrary and capricious action in imposing these Conditions; (3) violate
the APA as contrary to law; (4) violate the APA as contrary to the Constitution; (5)
violate the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution as unconstitutionally vague; and (6)
violate the First Amendment to the Constitution.7
LEGAL STANDARD
Litigants 	seeking 	a 	preliminary 	injunction 	must 	demonstrate: 	(1) 	their
likelihood on the success of the merits of their claim; (2) irreparable harm if the Court
does not issue the injunction; (3) that the balance of equities tips in their favor; and
(4) that the injunction is in the public’s interest.
	Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 	In the context of the APA, courts consider factors three
and four together, presumably because the plaintiff has brought an action against the
government itself and the public’s interest is already accounted for when balancing
the relative equities.
See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). 	Importantly,
household.
	See H.R. Conf. Rep. 115-1072 at 778 (2018). 	Congress evidently
authorized this funding in order to incentivize survivors of domestic violence to leave
a household where someone subjects them to abuse.
7 Plaintiffs appear to limit their First Amendment challenge to the DEI Condition.
See ECF No. 53-1 at 35-37.
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“likelihood of success is the main bearing wall of the four-factor framework.”
Ross-
Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 102 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1996).
Section 705 of the APA provides the following: “On such conditions as may be
required and to the extent necessary to prevent irreparable injury, the reviewing
court . . . may issue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective
date of an agency action or to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the
review proceedings.” 	5 U.S.C § 705. 	Although we have not yet received definitive
guidance from either the Supreme Court or the First Circuit, courts typically use the
same factors governing their assessment of a preliminary injunction when they
review a request for relief pursuant to Section 705.
	See, e.g., Immigrant Defs. Law
Ctr. v. Noem, No. 25-2581, 2025 WL 2017247, at *4 (9th Cir. July 18, 2025);
Mass.
Fair Hous. Ctr. v. HUD, 496 F. Supp. 3d 600, 609-12 (D. Mass. 2020) (applying the
preliminary injunction factors and granting a stay pursuant to 5. U.S.C. § 705).
DISCUSSION
A. Threshold Issues
Separate 	from 	the 	merits 	of 	Plaintiffs’ 	APA 	and 	constitutional 	claims,
Defendants first argue that (1) Plaintiffs lack standing to contest the application of
some of these Conditions; (2) Defendants’ imposition of the Conditions does not
constitute a “final agency action” pursuant to the APA; and (3) Defendants maintain
an effectively unreviewable level of discretion to impose the Conditions. 	All three
arguments fail, and the Court will address each of them in turn.
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Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs lack standing and contend that Plaintiffs
may not challenge the grant Conditions that they are subject to as
sub-awardees
because states receive the grants from Defendants in the first instance who then pass
them on to Plaintiffs. ECF No. 58 at 27-28. In order to establish standing, “the party
who invokes a federal court’s authority must show that (1) [s]he or []he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the challenged conduct; (2)
the injury can fairly be traced to that conduct; and (3) the injury likely will be
redressed by a favorable decision from the court.”
	N.H. Right to Life Pol. Action
Comm. v. Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 1996). 	According to Defendants, the idea
that a given state could decline to impose the Conditions on Plaintiffs as sub-
awardees destroys the nexus between the relief they seek and the Court’s ability to
redress the harm they have allegedly suffered. ECF No. 58 at 27-28.
Here, Plaintiffs have established standing to challenge the Conditions both
as direct recipients of these grants and as sub-awardees. 	While Defendants argue
that
some of these grants passed through states, which then awarded them to two of
the plaintiff organizations here, not all grants at issue in this case are subject to this
framework. 	As Plaintiffs point out, some Plaintiffs directly received grants subject
to the DEI Condition and the Immigration Condition, and this direct relationship
alone provides all Plaintiffs with standing here.
	Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477,
489 (2023) (“If at least one plaintiff has standing, the suit may proceed.”) (citation
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omitted). 	Based on the fact that at least some of Plaintiffs here are directly subject
to these grant Conditions, Defendants’ standing argument fails.8
Defendants next argue that these grant Conditions do not constitute a “final
agency action” as defined by the APA. ECF No. 58 at 28-39;
see 5 U.S.C. § 704. As
this Court has previously determined in the context of the prior conditions challenged
in this case, Defendants’ imposition of the Conditions here constitutes a final agency
action. 	ECF No. 34 at 13-15. 	Specifically, the Court once again concludes that
Defendants’ adoption of the Conditions qualifies as discrete agency action that
“mark[s] the consummation of [Defendants’] decisionmaking process” and that
Defendants’ imposition of them determines Plaintiffs’ rights, their obligations, and
has attendant legal consequences.
See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997).
Moreover, Defendants fail to argue that anything about their imposition of the
Conditions here would alter the Court’s prior determination.
	See ECF No. 58 at 28-
29. The Court therefore rejects this argument as well.
Finally, Defendants argue that the Court lacks the ability to review the
Conditions because the APA provides Defendants with the exclusive discretion to
8 In any event, the Court alternatively determines that a sufficient, fairly-traceable
causal nexus exists between the harm Plaintiffs face — the imposition of these
Conditions — and Defendants’ conduct — namely, creating these Conditions in the
first instance and asking states to apply them to the sub-awardee Plaintiffs.
	See
Wine and Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 418 F.3d 36, 45 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The
requirement that an alleged injury be fairly traceable to the defendant’s action does
not mean that the defendant’s action must be the final link in the chain of events
leading up to the alleged harm. Nor does that requirement exclude injuries produced
by coercive effect upon the action of someone else.”) (citation modified). 	The Court
therefore determines that it may properly evaluate the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims
without running afoul of the standing doctrine on this basis as well.
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impose them. 	ECF No. 58 at 29-32. 	As with Defendants’ previous argument, the
Court has already rejected this contention in its prior Memorandum & Order
granting 	Plaintiffs 	relief 	pursuant 	to 	Section 	705. 	ECF 	No. 	34 	at 	15-17.
Nevertheless, Defendants urge us to conduct a new analysis of these grant programs
because Plaintiffs’ motion “involves different statutes with different terms[.]” 	ECF
No. 58 at 29.
While courts cannot review agency action that Congress commits to their
discretion “by law,” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), the Supreme Court has interpreted this lack
of authority in a narrow manner and has instead determined that courts may not
review agency action in “those rare circumstances when the relevant statute is drawn
so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the
agency’s exercise of discretion.”
	Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 771-72
(2019) (cleaned up). 	As the Court has previously explained, “the determination of
grant terms and conditions is not a category of decision traditionally committed to
exclusive agency discretion.” ECF No. 34 at 16 (citing
Biden v. Missouri, 595 U.S. 87
(2022)). Moreover, each of the three grant programs at issue here set forth eligibility
criteria that allow the Court to determine whether Defendants properly used their
discretion.
	See 34 U.S.C. §§ 20103(a)-(c), 20111(c)(3), 20127(1)-(5). 	The Court
therefore 	rejects 	Defendants’ assertion 	that 	they have exclusive, 	unreviewable
discretion to impose these Conditions.
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B. Likelihood of Success
Plaintiffs contend that they will likely succeed on the merits because, among
other theories, Defendants have imposed these conditions in an arbitrary and
capricious manner. Specifically, Plaintiffs have pointed out that Defendants appear
to have failed to justify these grant Conditions
at all. 	ECF No. 53-1 at 27-28.
Moreover, Defendants effectively concede this point when they assert that their
rationale for these conditions is “self-evident on its face.” ECF No. 58 at 37. As this
Court has already repeatedly noted, Defendants must set forth the specific facts that
support the decision-making process that took place and their failure to do so strongly
supports a determination that the events that took place constitute arbitrary and
capricious action.
See Ohio v. EPA, 603 U.S. 279, 292 (2024). Rather than relying on
the supposed self-evidentiary nature of their behavior, Defendants must demonstrate
that 	they 	took 	reasonable 	actions 	when 	considering 	whether 	to 	impose 	these
Conditions while offering a reasonable explanation justifying their behavior.
Id.
Critically, Courts determine that agencies engage in arbitrary and capricious
behavior when they determine that the agency “entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem.”
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 46 (1983) (determining that an agency acted
arbitrarily and capriciously when it failed to substantively consider its decision to
revise automobile safety standards and noting that the reviewing court may not
backfill the agency’s rational for taking that action). 	Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion
and Defendants’ briefing in opposition has provided the Court with an extremely
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narrow view of the overall decision-making process that took place here. Specifically,
the Conditions appear to have resulted from what Defendants describe as a change
in “funding priorities.” ECF No. 58 at 37-38. Nevertheless, the Court’s review reveals
that Defendants appear to have wholly failed to consider the amount of time and
effort that Plaintiffs would need to undertake in order to comply with the Conditions
and whether Plaintiffs could do so without violating other statutory mandates.
Rather than providing clear — or any — guidance and establishing workable
standards to assist with compliance, Defendants instead expect Plaintiffs to fend for
themselves 	which 	leaves 	Plaintiffs 	potentially 	exposed 	to 	unintentional
noncompliance accusations in the future. 	ECF No. 58 at 37. 	Without a sufficient
explanation for their imposition of the Conditions, Defendants’ actions here serve as
the hallmark of unreasoned decisionmaking and therefore warrants preliminary
relief. 	Therefore, 	the 	Court 	determines 	that 	Plaintiffs 	have 	demonstrated 	a
likelihood of success on this aspect of their APA claim.9
C. Irreparable Harm, the Equities, and the Public Interest
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ attempt to impose the Conditions subjects
them to irreparable harm. 	ECF No. 53-1 at 37. 	Specifically, they argue that
Defendants’ actions have forced them to either: (1) accept the purportedly unlawful
9 Consistent with its prior Memorandum and Order, this Court limits its evaluation
of Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success to their arbitrary and capricious claim and therefore
need not substantively evaluate the other statutory and constitutional claims at issue
in this action at this time.
	See ECF No. 34 at 19, 20, 22. 	Specifically, the Court’s
conclusion on this issue obviates the need for it to address either Plaintiffs’ or
Defendants’ statutory arguments and the remaining First and Fifth Amendment
claims at this time.
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Conditions; or (2) sacrifice federal funding needed to carry out their organizations’
missions.
	Id. 	In response, Defendants remind the Court that a preliminary
injunction constitutes an extraordinary remedy, that Plaintiffs’ claimed harm rests
on improper speculation and a misunderstanding of the manner in which Defendants
will implement these Conditions, and that Plaintiffs only seek monetary relief. ECF
No. 58 at 44-48. 	Recently, the First Circuit has confirmed the principle that the
effects arising from a loss of federal funding may constitute irreparable harm in the
context of a request for a preliminary injunction.
	New York v. Trump, 171 F.4th 1,
24-25 (1st Cir. 2026);
see also New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 804 F. Supp. 3d 294,
330 (D.R.I. 2025) (“In life-or-death scenarios, time of crisis when someone faces
domestic violence, homelessness, or a mental health crisis, it practically goes without
saying that there can be no do over and no redress if services are unlawfully denied
or if someone suffers for it. That of course constitutes irreparable harm.”).
Here, Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they will face irreparable harm from
the imposition of the Conditions. Specifically, the Court acknowledges the immediate
and longstanding reputational harm that would result from Plaintiffs’ attempt to
obtain immigration information from recent survivors of domestic violence along with
the chaos and inevitable chilling effect that will arise from the likely haphazard, trial-
and-error approach that Plaintiffs would need to take in order to learn how the
current Executive Administration will evaluate — or prosecute — a program that
involves DEI-related components. 	Moreover, the Court has reached this same
conclusion regarding the prior conditions that it halted in its prior Memorandum and
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Order. ECF No. 34 at 22-23. As a result, the Court determines that the downstream
effects faced by Plaintiffs constitute irreparable harm in this matter as well.
Similarly, the Court determines that the equities and public interest favor
Plaintiffs. 	As outlined above, the Court has already enjoined Defendants’ prior
attempt to impose VAWA grant conditions during the pendency of this action and its
decision to do so here is in line with its prior course of action. 	On the contrary,
permitting Defendants to impose these Conditions will create a substantial amount
of upheaval as Plaintiffs would need to quickly develop methods to comply with these
less-than-well-defined Conditions.
	See United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401
U.S. 715, 726 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“A government has no legitimate
interest in upholding an unconstitutional [law].”) 	Therefore, the Court determines
that Plaintiffs have satisfied the requisite criteria needed to receive a preliminary
injunction and are therefore entitled to a preliminary stay of the implementation of
the Conditions pursuant to § 705.
D. Scope of Relief and Bond
Finally, Defendants seek to limit the scope of Plaintiffs’ requested relief.
Specifically, Defendants argue that, if the Court enjoins the Conditions, it must do so
as narrowly as possible in order to avoid the Supreme Court’s limitations outlined in
Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831 (2025). 	ECF No. 58 at 48-51. 	Notwithstanding
their request, Defendants mischaracterize the law. In
CASA, the Supreme Court did
not offer any guidance on how the limitations it placed on nationwide injunctions
works in the context of the APA.
Id. at 847 n.10 (“Nothing we say today resolves the
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distinct question of whether the Administrative Procedure Act authorizes federal
courts to vacate federal agency action.”). 	While the Supreme Court did not answer
this APA question, the Court can undoubtedly enjoin Defendants from imposing these
Conditions on Plaintiffs themselves.
	See id. at 854 (noting that a district court may
enjoin unlawful activity taking place within the state it sits). 	Notwithstanding its
authority to do so, the Court will nevertheless preliminarily stay Defendants’
implementation 	of 	these 	Conditions 	pursuant 	to 	Section 	705 	of 	the 	APA.10
Accordingly, the Court finds it “necessary and appropriate” to postpone the effective
date 	and 	implementation 	of 	the 	Conditions 	pending 	the 	conclusion 	of 	these
proceedings. 5 U.S.C. § 705.
Separately, Defendants have asked the Court to require Plaintiffs to post a
bond pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). ECF No. 58 at 51. However, the Court finds
this unnecessary based on its decision to administratively stay the conditions
pursuant to Section 705.
	See § 705 (directing the Court ordering relief to consider
“such 	conditions 	as 	may 	be 	required and 	to 	the 	extent 	necessary 	to 	prevent
irreparable injury”).
10 The Court acknowledges that its March 3, 2026 text order indicated it would
consider Plaintiffs’ motion as one for preliminary injunction. 	After considering the
completed briefing and given the same analysis required when evaluating parties’
arguments for an administrative stay vs. a preliminary injunction, the Court
concludes that issuing a preliminary stay pursuant to § 705 is the appropriate relief
to grant in order to remain consistent with the relief granted earlier in this case.
See
ECF No. 34 at 26-27;
see also California v. Kennedy, 802 F. Supp. 3d 273, 281 (D.
Mass. 2025) (acknowledging that a § 705 stay is evaluated pursuant to the same
standard as that the one governing a preliminary injunction).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have demonstrated
their entitlement to preliminary relief pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 705. 	Plaintiffs’
Emergency Motion is GRANTED. ECF No. 53.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Melissa R. DuBose
United States District Judge
April 17, 2026
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