Mello v. Vesey et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
JOSHUA MELLO,
Plaintiff,
v.
TIMOTHY VESEY, in his individual
and official capacity as Principal of
Western Hills Middle School;
CRANSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS;
CRANSTON SCHOOL
DEPARTMENT; JEANNINE NOTA-
MASSE, in her official capacity as
Superintendent; NORMA COLE, in
her official capacity as Assistant
Superintendent; RICHARD
WILLETTE, in his individual and
official capacities as Guidance
Counselor at Western Hills Middle
School; ROXANNE GUSTAFSON, in
her official capacity as Executive
Director of Curriculum, Assessments,
and Grants for Cranston Public
Schools; DONNA-MARIE FRAPPIER,
in her official capacity as Chief
Technology Officer for Cranston
Public Schools; MICHAEL SIMPSON,
in his official capacity as Executive
Director of Pupil Personnel Services
for Cranston Public Schools; JOE
BALDUCCI, in his official capacity as
Chief Financial Officer for Cranston
Public Schools; ZAC FERRELL, in his
official capacity as Executive Director
of Secondary Programs for Cranston
Public Schools; CRANSTON SCHOOL
COMMITTEE, in its official capacity
as the governing body of Cranston
Public Schools; TONYA MORENA, in
her individual capacity,
Defendants.
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No. 25-cv-520-JJM-AEM
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ORDER
Plaintiff Joshua Mello filed this suit against Cranston Public Schools and
multiple individual actors1 (hereinafter “Defendants”) involved in what he alleges are
constitutional, federal, and state law violations rooted in Defendants’ refusal to honor
Mr. Mello’s parental decision to opt his daughter, a Cranston Public School student,
out of participating in certain surveys and the allegedly retaliatory conduct in the
aftermath. 	Mr. Mello filed an Amended Complaint2 and Defendants now move to
dismiss all claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim. 	ECF No. 13. 	Three Defendants also argue that they are entitled to
qualified immunity on three claims.
1 Mr. Mello sued Timothy Vesey (Principal, Western Hills Middle School);
Cranston Public Schools; Jeannine Nota-Massie (Superintendent, Cranston Public
Schools); Norma Cole (Asst. Superintendent, Cranston Public Schools); Richard
Willette 	(Guidance 	Counselor), 	Roxanne 	Gustafson 	(Executive 	Director 	of
Curriculum, Assessments, and Grants for Cranston Public Schools); Donna-Marie
Frappier (Chief Technology Officer for Cranston Public Schools); Michael Simpson
(Executive Director of Pupil Personnel Services for Cranston Public Schools); Joe
Balducci (Chief Financial Officer for Cranston Public Schools); Zac Ferrell (Executive
Director of Secondary Programs for Cranston Public Schools); and the Cranston
School Committee.
2 The Amended Complaint added and individual capacity claim against Tonya
Morena, 	his 	daughter’s 	mother. 	Upon 	an 	in 	forma 	pauperis 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) screening, the Court dismissed Ms. Morena from the case.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Mr. Mello’s claims arise out of his decision in October 2022 3 to opt his daughter
out of most4 school surveys, screenings, assessments, and data collection programs at
her Cranston school. At that time, Mr. Mello wrote to Principal Vesey and indicated
that he did not want his daughter to participate. 	Mr. Vesey reached out to
Ms. Morena to inform her of Mr. Mello’s opt-out decision regarding their daughter.
He and Ms. Morena have an equal custody agreement giving them an equal role in
making parenting decisions.5 She disagreed with the opt-out and Mr. Vesey informed
Mr. Mello that Cranston would not honor his opt-out request without a Family Court
order. Mr. Mello alleges that Defendants administered the Satchel Pulse6 survey to
his daughter against his wishes.
Mr. Mello filed a complaint with the Rhode Island Commissioner of Education
Angélica Infante-Green, informing her that Cranston Public Schools and Mr. Vesey
were violating his parental rights under the Protection of Pupils’ Rights Amendment
3 Several years earlier, Mr. Mello told the school that he did not want his
daughter to participate in two different surveys and the school administrators
honored that directive.
4 Mr. Mello did agree to let his daughter take Xello surveys after consulting
with Mr. Vesey and Mr. Willette.
5 Mr. Mello and his ex-wife parent in accordance with a Family Court order
that designates them as having equal custodial authority. The Order states in part
“Each party agrees to cooperate and coparent the minor child with the other. * * *
Each party is a fit and proper person to be joint custodial parents to the minor child.
The parties shall work out a parenting time schedule together.”
6 The Satchel Pulse survey is designed to gather feedback on students’ social-
emotional 	learning 	skills, 	helping 	educators 	understand 	and 	support 	their
development in a school environment.
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(“PPRA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1232h, which lists seven categories of information that school
surveys cannot ask about without a parent’s permission. 	Mr. Mello requested
intervention to halt the unlawful survey practices. He also filed a complaint with the
United 	States 	Department 	of 	Education 	(“DoE”). 	Post-complaints, 	Mr. 	Mello
requested the survey questions, which Defendants refused to provide. 	Upon its
review of the survey and investigation, the DoE determined that Cranston did not
violate the PPRA because the survey did not wade into any of the proscribed
categories. 	It did, however, conclude that where Cranston faced two different
directives from co-equal parents, it should have honored the decision of the objecting
parent where the court order indicated the parents were on equal footing, decision-
making-wise.
During the same school year, Mr. Mello alleges that Mr. Vesey summoned a
police presence to a concert his daughter was performing in at Cranston High School
West.7 	School Resource Officer John Rocchio wore a body–worn camera and
Mr. Mello alleges that his presence was meant to intimidate him from asserting his
parental right to opt-out of surveys and to retaliate against him for doing so.
In response to these alleged violations, Mr. Mello issued a 30-day demand
letter to Superintendent Nota-Masse, demanding redress, corrective policies, and
7 Mr. Mello has had a contentious relationship with several administrators in
the 	Cranston 	Public 	Schools, 	resulting 	in 	police 	involvement 	and 	a 	no-
contact/restraining order restricting Mr. Mello from being present at Western Hills
Middle School. 	This is Mr. Mello’s seventh lawsuit filed in this District in the last
two years. Those incidents are irrelevant here except that this history informed some
of Defendants’ conduct leading to this lawsuit.
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compensation. His demand was ignored. He filed this suit, alleging that by ignoring
his directives, requiring a new Family Court order when an operative one already
existed, refusing to allow him to inspect the survey questions, and conspiring with
police to intimidate him from exercising his rights, each Defendant violated his rights
under PPRA, the Constitution, and Rhode Island state law.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint must
contain enough factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.
	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The Court
must accept Plaintiffs’ allegations as true and construe them in the light most
favorable to them.
	Gargano v. Liberty Int’l Underwriters, 572 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir.
2009).
“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be granted only if, when viewed in this manner,
the pleading shows no set of facts which could entitle plaintiff to relief.”
	Gooley v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 45-48 (1957)). 	These “minimal requirements are not tantamount to nonexistent
requirements. The threshold may be low, but it is real, and it is the plaintiff’s burden
to take the step which brings his case safely into the next phase of the litigation.”
Gooley, 851 F.2d at 514. 	“[A] plaintiff . . . is . . . required to set forth factual
allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary
to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.”
	Id. at 515. 	“If the factual
allegations in the complaint are too meager, vague, or conclusory to remove the
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possibility of relief from the realm of mere conjecture, the complaint is open to
dismissal.”
SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 442 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing
Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Mr. Mello brings the following claims: violation of his parental rights under
the PPRA, 20 U.S.C. § 1232h (Counts I, V8 ); violation of his Fourteenth Amendment
rights (Count II); a municipal liability claim against Cranston under
Monell (Count
III); First Amendment retaliation (Count VI); Civil Conspiracy under § 1983 and
Rhode Island law (Counts VII, VIII); and tortious interference with parental rights9
(Count IX). All Defendants move to dismiss all claims for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. 	But four Defendants, Mr. Vesey, Ms. Cole, Ms. Nota-
Massie, and Mr. Willette, move to dismiss Counts I, II, and V relating to the PPRA
under the qualified immunity defense. Because the Supreme Court has emphasized
“the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in
litigation,” the Court will address that argument as to those three Defendants first.
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam).
8 Defendants point out that Mr. Mello does not list a Count IV in his Amended
Complaint and refers in their briefing to Count V as Count IV. 	Because the Court
finds the renumbering of claims confusing, it will refer to the counts as Mr. Mello
does, omitting any reference to a Count IV.
9 Count IX was against Ms. Moreno only. 	Because the Court dismissed her
from the Amended Complaint, this count is also dismissed.
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A. 	PPRA and Fourteenth Amendment – Counts I, II, V
Qualified immunity “balances two important interests—the need to hold public
officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield
officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties
reasonably.”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Qualified immunity does
not, however, “shield public officials who, from an objective standpoint, should have
known that their conduct was unlawful.”
Pagán v. Calderón, 448 F.3d 16, 31 (1st Cir.
2006) (citing
Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 193 (1984)).
To determine whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity, the
Court first asks, “whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged ... make out a violation
of a constitutional right.”
	See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. If the answer is “yes,” then
the Court asks, “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of
defendant’s alleged misconduct.”
Id. (citation omitted). The Court may consider the
second inquiry first and grant immunity “without undertaking the ‘essentially
academic exercise’ of ascertaining whether the specific facts depict a constitutional
violation if ‘it is plain that a constitutional right is not clearly established.’”
Haley v.
City of Bos., 657 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting
Pearson, 555. U.S. at 237).
A right is “clearly established” and a public official “may be held liable for
violating a constitutional right only if ‘[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently
clear [such] that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
that right.’”
Haley, 657 F.3d at 48 (quoting
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987)). 	The court looks at “whether the contours of the right would have been
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‘sufficiently well-defined at the critical time’ and, if so, ‘whether it would have been
clear to an objectively reasonable official, situated similarly to [the defendants], that
the actions taken or omitted contravened the clearly established right.’”
	Haley, 657
F.3d at 48 (quoting
Limone v. Condon, 372 F.3d 39, 48 (1st Cir. 2004)).
Mr. Mello’s Count I alleges that Defendants disregarded his opt-out request
under 20 U.S.C. § 1232h(b) and conditioned its compliance with his request on
obtaining a new Family Court order; Count II alleges that Defendants violated his
Fourteenth Amendment rights by overriding his decision to opt his daughter out of
surveys; and Count V alleges that Defendants failed to provide him with the survey
questions despite his requests. 	Defendants Nota-Masse, Vesey, Cole, and Willette
argue that they are immune from these claims because they could not have known
that they were violating Mr. Mello’s rights by overriding any of his directives because
the survey did not ask questions about subjects10 prohibited in the statute.
In considering whether the right alleged was clearly established, the Court
considers the outcome of Mr. Mello’s complaint to the DoE. In its decision, the DoE
10 The PPRA states that a student does not have to reveal information about
(1) 	political 	affiliations; 	(2) 	mental 	and 	psychological 	problems 	potentially
embarrassing to the student or his family; (3) sex behavior and attitudes; (4) illegal,
anti-social, self-incriminating and demeaning behavior; (5) critical appraisals of other
individuals with whom respondents have close family relationships; (6) legally
recognized 	privileged 	or 	analogous 	relationships, 	such 	as 	those 	of 	lawyers,
physicians, and ministers; or (7) income (other than that required by law to determine
eligibility for participation in a program or for receiving financial assistance under
such program), unless the student is an adult or an emancipated minor and consents
or their parent consents. 20 U.S.C. § 1232h(b).
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confirmed that the “Survey did not ask the Student questions implicating any of
PPRA’s Protected Areas”… “PPRA would not be applicable, and the district would not
have been required to notify parents in advance of the survey, afford the Parent the
opportunity to opt the Student out of participation in the survey, nor act on the
Parent’s request to do so.”
	See ECF No. 10-1 at 13. 	Because the DoE determined
that Defendants did not violate PPRA by administering the survey without consent,
the right was not clearly established so the Court cannot conclude that Defendants
should 	have 	known 	that 	they 	were 	violating 	any 	of 	Mr. 	Mello’s 	rights 	in
administering the survey to his daughter. 	Because the Court finds that Mr. Vesey,
Ms. Cole, Ms. Nota-Masse, and Mr. Willette are entitled to qualified immunity11 for
Counts I, II, and V, it dismisses those counts.
The Court will move on to the remaining claims in Counts III, VII, and VIII.
B.	
Monell claim – Count III
Mr. Mello brings a municipal liability claim under
Monell v. Department of
Social Services, alleging that Defendants had in place and followed an official policy
or 	custom 	that 	violated 	his 	constitutional 	rights. 	436 	U.S. 	658, 	692 	(1978).
11 Defendants argue in the alternative that Mr. Mello’s claims under the PPRA
fail because that statute does not provide for a private right of action. While there is
no First Circuit precedent indicating as such, the Court believes that the Supreme
Court’s logic in
Gonzaga University v. Doe relating to the Family Education Rights
and Privacy Act (“FERPA”) would lead to the conclusion that the PPRA also does not
provide an individually enforceable right. 536 U.S. 273, 287 (2002) (no private right
of action where Congress did not evidence intent to create one).
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Defendants point to the Amended Complaint, arguing that dismissal is appropriate
because Mr. Mello fails to identify any city policy or custom and does not state a claim.
A municipality “may be liable under [section 1983] if the governmental body
itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’
to such deprivation.”
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (quoting
Monell,
436 U.S. at 692). “However, municipalities are not vicariously liable under section
1983 for the actions of their non-policymaking employees.”
	Haley, 657 F.3d at 51
(citing
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997)).
“Thus, a plaintiff who brings a section 1983 action against a municipality bears the
burden of showing that, ‘through its
deliberate conduct, the municipality was the
‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.”
	Id. (quoting
Brown, 520 U.S. at 404
(emphasis in original)). A plaintiff must “identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that
caused the plaintiff’s injury.”
Id. at 403 (quoting
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
In attempting to support his
Monell claim, Mr. Mello seems to argue that
Defendants’ decision to ignore his opt-out directive was not a single occurrence, but
part of a Cranston Public School policy and custom that, as applied, violated his
rights. 	Mr. Mello’s specific allegations focus on the rejection of his demand letter,
Defendants’ disregard for his parental rights by failing to enforce PPRA and parental
consent protections under the Fourteenth Amendment and state law, and district
administrators’ failure to implement and enforce parental opt-outs. 	ECF No. 10
¶¶ 48, 50.
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Considering these allegations, the Court finds that each is based on a single
incident – his opt-out request leading to Mr. Vesey’s decision to consult with
Ms. Moreno. “[P]roof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient
to impose liability under
Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it
was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be
attributed to a municipal policymaker.”
	See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,
823-24 (1985). Other than a conclusory allegation, Mr. Mello fails to identify a policy
or 	custom 	attributable 	to 	a 	specific 	individual 	policymaker 	where 	Defendants
deliberately acted to ignore parental survey opt-out requests involving survey
containing questions about categories of information prohibited by the PPRA.
Moreover, 	Mr. 	Mello 	also 	alleges 	that 	he 	previously 	requested 	that 	his
daughter be opted out of at least two surveys and Defendants honored that request.
ECF No. 10 ¶ 19. The fact that, a year earlier, Defendants allowed Mr. Mello to opt
his daughter out, rules out the inference that Cranston has a policy or custom of
ignoring parental rights or directives. 	Thus, the Court finds that Mr. Mello’s
Amended Complaint fails to allege a
Monell claim so Count III is dismissed.
C. 	First Amendment Retaliation – Count VI
Mr. Mello alleges that Defendants retaliated against him for exercising his
parental rights by inviting a police presence to his child’s concert to intimidate and
harass him. Defendants move to dismiss, arguing that the conduct he alleges caused
his injuries is not constitutionally protected so he does not have a First Amendment
retaliation claim.
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To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, Mr. Mello must first allege that
his conduct was constitutionally protected.
	Powell v. Alexander, 391 F.3d 1, 17 (1st
Cir. 2004). 	Once he passes that hurdle, he must allege that this constitutionally
protected conduct was a “‘substantial factor’… a ‘motivating factor’ for the alleged
retaliatory decision.”
Id. The focus then shifts to the defendant who “may then avoid
a finding of liability by show[ing] ‘it would have reached the same decision… even in
the absence of the protected conduct.”
Id. (quoting
Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
Mr. Mello alleges that Mr. Vesey and Officer Rocchio “engaged in retaliatory
conduct by treating Plaintiff’s attendance at his daughter’s school concert as a
security threat, requesting police surveillance, and planning for body-worn camera
monitoring and patrol supervision specifically because Plaintiff’s daughter was a
participant in the concert. 	Defendant Vesey’s solicitation of law enforcement and
Officer Rocchio’s execution of that request had no legitimate basis and were intended
to chill Plaintiff’s exercise of his parental and constitutional rights.” ECF No. 10 ¶ 57.
He alleges that he “suffered fear of further retaliation, intimidation, harm, including
emotional distress, reputational injury, and the chilling of his exercise of parental
and constitutional rights.”
Id. ¶ 59.
Entering school property is not a constitutionally protected right.
See Ware v.
Cranston Pub. Schs., C.A. No. 24-348JJM, 2025 WL 1549422, at *6 (D.R.I. May 30,
2025),
	report and recommendation adopted, No. 24-cv-348-JJM-LDA, 2025 WL
2052641 (D.R.I. July 22, 2025) (collecting cases). 	“[P]arents, as members of the
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public, do not have a constitutional right to access school buildings and school officials
have broad discretion in restricting such visitors.”
	Ware, 2025 WL 1549422, at *6
(citing
	Hannemann 	v. 	S. 	Door 	Cnty. 	Sch. 	Dist., 	673 	F.3d 	746, 	755 	(7th 	Cir.
2012);
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972)). And
the Court notes that Mr. Mello does not allege that he was prevented from entering
the school to attend his daughter’s concert or that any incident occurred before,
during, or after the concert due to Officer Rocchio’s presence.
Mr. Mello also does not allege any causal connection between his opt-out
request and Officer Rocchio’s presence at the concert. 	Mr. Mello made his request;
Mr. Vesey consulted with the child’s co-equal parent and followed her decision.
Mr. Mello raised his concerns with the federal and state DoE, and the review process
went on without incident. 	Independently, Mr. Vesey asked Officer Rocchio to be
present at the school event, which, as Defendants note, is very typical for a school
resource officer. Other than the fact that the opt-out request and concert occurred in
the same school year, the Amended Complaint contains no allegations from which an
inference can be drawn that one thing had to do with the other. Therefore, Mr. Mello’s
allegations of First Amendment retaliation fail to state a claim. The Court dismisses
Count VI.
D. 	§ 1983 Conspiracy – Count VII
In Count VII, Mr. Mello alleges that Mr. Vesey, Mr. Willette, and Ms. Morena
conspired to deprive him of his Fourteenth Amendment rights “to direct the care,
custody, and upbringing of his child” by ignoring his opt-out request in favor of
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Ms. Morena’s decision. ECF No. 10 ¶ 62. Defendants move to dismiss, arguing that
Mr. Mello fails to allege that an agreement existed between them to violate his
constitutional rights.
To survive a motion to dismiss a civil rights conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must
allege “a combination of two or more persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful
act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means, the principal element of which is
an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong against or injury upon another,
and an overt act that results in damages.”
	Est. of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d
155, 178 (1st Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). “The plaintiff must allege facts that show
defendants knew ‘the essential nature and general scope’ of a particular plan, ‘or at
the least that the parties decided to act interdependently, each actor deciding to act
only because he was aware that the others would act similarly.’”
Sánchez v. Foley,
972 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2020) (citations omitted).
Here, Mr. Mello alleges that “Defendants Vesey, Willette, and Morena reached
an agreement and a meeting of the minds, the purpose of which was to deprive
Plaintiff of his Fourteenth Amendment parental rights by unlawfully disregarding
his valid PPRA opt-out. This agreement was executed through a series of overt acts,
including but not limited to: (a) Defendant Vesey’s solicitation of a contrary opinion
from Defendant Morena; (b) Defendant Morena’s intentional provision of a contrary
opinion with the knowledge it would be used to nullify Plaintiff’s directive; and (c) the
subsequent administration of the survey to Plaintiff’s child with the knowledge and
acquiescence of Defendant Willette.” 	ECF No. 10 ¶ 61.
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This is not enough. Plaintiff has put forth no direct or circumstantial evidence
to support the inference that Mr. Vesey, Mr. Willette, and Ms. Morena entered into
an agreement to inflict a wrong on him. 	As the Court ruled when it dismissed
Ms. Morena from the Amended Complaint, “Mr. Mello points only to Ms. Morena’s
exercising her own parental rights but that fact alone is insufficient to warrant an
inference that she reached a meeting of the minds with Cranston officials to deprive
Mr. Mello of his rights under the PPRA.”
	See Text Order, Feb. 19, 2026. 	And his
allegations against Mr. Vesey and Mr. Willette are similarly flawed – he alleges that
Mr. Vesey asked Ms. Moreno about the opt-out decision and Mr. Wilette knew that
he did. Because Ms. Morena has equal parental rights under the Family Court order,
she would have an equal say in whether her daughter participated in surveys, so
Mr. Vesey was within his authority to consult her as well. 	Defendants honored
Ms. Morena’s decision 12 over Mr. Mello but he fails to allege that they agreed to
violate his parental rights in honoring hers. 	Because Count VII in his Amended
Complaint 	relies 	only 	on 	conclusory 	allegations, 	speculation, 	and 	improbable
inferences, Mr. Mello’s § 1983 conspiracy claim fails. The Court dismisses Count VII.
E. 	Civil Conspiracy – Count VIII
Mr. Mello alleges that Mr. Vesey and Ms. Morena formed an agreement to
commit an unlawful act by violating the express terms of the April 28, 2021 Family
12 The DoE did tell Cranston that, while the survey administered did not
violate the PPRA, it should have deferred to the decision to opt-out where two co-
equal parents disagreed on the education decision. 	ECF No. 10-1 at 10-13. 	This
observation does not inform a decision on the viability of a conspiracy claim though.
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Court order, which vested him with equal and joint custodial authority, and to violate
his rights under R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-21-21.1. ECF No. 10 ¶ 65. 	The object of the
conspiracy, he alleges, was to unlawfully strip Mr. Mello of his decision-making
authority regarding his child’s education and exposure to sensitive surveys.
Under Rhode Island law, “[a] civil conspiracy claim requires the specific intent
to do something illegal or tortious.”
	Guilbeault v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 84 F.
Supp. 2d 263, 268 (D.R.I. 2000);
	See, e.g.,
	Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Anchor Media
Television, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 16, 45 (D.R.I. 1993),
aff’d, 45 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1995);
Stubbs v. Taft, 88 R.I. 462, 149 A.2d 706, 708-709 (1959). 	A properly alleged civil
conspiracy claim requires a valid underlying intentional tort theory.
	Guilbeault, 84
F. Supp. 2d at 268.
Reviewing the Amended Complaint as a whole, the Court concludes that
Mr. Mello does not allege an agreement between Mr. Vesey and Ms. Morena. 	The
Court dismissed Ms. Morena from this lawsuit because it found that she was
exercising her parental rights and that alone was not enough to infer that she
intended to conspire with Mr. Vesey to deprive Mr. Mello of his parental rights. He
also does not allege an underlying tort to provide a basis for an alleged conspiracy.
As such, Mr. Mello’s state law civil conspiracy claim fails, and the Court dismisses
Count VIII.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. ECF
No. 13. Judgment shall enter for all the Defendants on all counts.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/John J. McConnell, Jr.
_________________________________
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR.
Chief Judge
United States District Court
May 20, 2025
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