Rollick, Jr. v. Palmer et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
ROBERT A. ROLLICK, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
JEFFREY PALMER; UNITED YACHT
SALES, LLC; and CHRISTIAN
GUTHRIE,
Defendants.
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C.A. No. 1:25-cv-00589-MSM-PAS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Mary S. McElroy, United States District Judge.
Before the Court is defendant Christian Guthrie’s Motion to Dismiss plaintiff
Robert A. Rollick, Jr.’s Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. (ECF No. 4.)
I. 	BACKGROUND
From approximately 2021 to 2025, Mr. Rollick “lived and worked in the
Massachusetts/Rhode Island coastal region—principally Fall River, Massachusetts
and the Newport/Tiverton, Rhode Island area[.]” (ECF No. 5 at 2.) 	Mr. Rollick lists
his home address in Tiverton, Rhode Island. 	He operated as a yacht broker in
markets including “the New England region,” New York, and Florida. (ECF No. 5 at
2, 5.) Mr. Rollick brokered the sale of a boat from a seller to Mr. Guthrie. (ECF No.
1-1 ¶ 6.) However, this transaction went awry and became the subject of litigation in
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Florida.1 Mr. Rollick subsequently filed a complaint in Rhode Island Superior Court
in Newport County. (ECF No. 1-1.) He asserted several claims against Mr. Guthrie
including fraud, misrepresentation, defamation, and civil conspiracy. 	(ECF No. 1-1
at 4.) Mr. Guthrie removed the case to this Court and now moves to dismiss alleging
lack of personal jurisdiction. (ECF Nos. 1; 4.) For the following reasons, Mr. Guthrie’s
motion is GRANTED.
II. 	MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
When challenged, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that a federal court
has the authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over any out-of-state defendant.
Chen v. U.S. Sports Acad., Inc., 956 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 2020). 	When a party
challenges personal jurisdiction through a Rule 12(b)(2) motion and the Court has
not held an evidentiary hearing, it applies the prima facie standard.
	Motus, LLC v.
CarData Consultants, Inc., 23 F.4th 115, 121 (1st Cir. 2022). 	Under this standard,
the Court “acts not as a factfinder, but as a data collector” in determining “whether
the plaintiff has proffered facts that, if credited, would support all findings essential
to personal jurisdiction.”
	Chen, 956 F.3d at 51 (citation modified). 	We draw the
relevant facts from “the pleadings and whatever supplemental filings (such as
affidavits) are contained in the record, giving credence to the plaintiff's version of
genuinely contested facts.”
	Baskin-Robbins Franchising LLC v. Alpenrose Dairy,
1 The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida entered a final
judgment finding Mr. Rollick liable for defrauding the seller during the vessel
transaction. 	(ECF 	No. 	4-9.) 	He 	has 	also 	been 	charged 	with 	third-degree
embezzlement by the State of Florida. (ECF No. 4-10.)
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Inc., 825 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 2016). But we do not consider conclusory allegations or
farfetched inferences.
Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 142 F.3d
26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. Personal Jurisdiction Generally
“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment constrains a State's
authority to bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts.”
	Walden v.
Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014). “To exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant, the defendant must ‘have certain minimum contacts with [the state] such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’”
	Vapotherm, Inc. v. Santiago, 38 F.4th 252, 258 (1st Cir. 2022)
(quoting
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1940)).
Rhode Island’s long-arm statute authorizes Rhode Island courts to exercise
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the
United States Constitution. 	When the basis for federal jurisdiction is diversity of
citizenship, the federal court acts as “the functional equivalent of a state court sitting
in the forum state.”
	See Astro-Med, Inc. v. Nihon Kohden Am., Inc., 591 F.3d 1, 8
(1st Cir. 2009). 	Therefore, this Court need only decide whether the assertion of
personal jurisdiction accords with due process principles.
	See Donatelli v. Nat'l
Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 461 (1st Cir. 1990).
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B. Specific Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court recognizes two kinds of personal jurisdiction: general
jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.
	Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist.
Court, 592 U.S. 351, 358 (2021). Mr. Rollick has conceded that Rhode Island courts
cannot exercise general jurisdiction over Mr. Guthrie. This Court’s analysis therefore
turns to specific jurisdiction.
A court may assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if the
plaintiff establishes that 1) [the] claim directly arises out of or relates to the
defendant’s forum-state activities; (2) the defendant’s contacts with the forum state
represent a purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in that state,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of that state’s laws and rendering the
defendant’s involuntary presence in that state’s courts foreseeable; and (3) the
exercise of jurisdiction is ultimately reasonable.
	Scottsdale Cap. Advisors Corp. v.
The Deal, LLC, 887 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 2018);
see also Daynard v. Ness, Motley,
Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 60 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[T]his circuit
divides the constitutional analysis into three categories: relatedness, purposeful
availment, and reasonableness.”) “Failure to make any one of these showings dooms
any effort to establish specific personal jurisdiction.”
Scottsdale Cap., 887 F.3d at 20.
Here, where “the alleged facts are less tangible than physical presence,” there
is the possibility for the “natural blurring of the relatedness and purposeful availment
inquiries.”
Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips Fund, 196 F.3d 284, 289 (1st Cir.
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1999). 	As the purposeful availment inquiry is dispositive, the Court focuses its
analysis on this prong.
C. Purposeful Availment
Requiring a party to have purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of
conducting business in the state before personal jurisdiction is established ensures
“the exercise of jurisdiction is essentially voluntary and foreseeable.”
	Knox v.
MetalForming, Inc., 914 F.3d 685, 691 (1st Cir. 2019). Jurisdiction cannot be based
on a defendant’s “random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts[.]”
Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (citation modified).
Mr. Rollick argues that Mr. Guthrie’s “admission” that the “underlying vessel
transaction occurred entirely in the Northeast” is “dispositive.” (ECF No. 5 at 6–7.)
That is not the case. Here, none of Mr. Guthrie’s conduct occurred in or was directed
at Rhode Island. The vessel transaction occurred outside of Rhode Island. “Plaintiff
acted from Massachusetts,” “[t]he buyer resided in New Jersey,” “the seller resided
in New York,” and “[d]elivery of the vessel occurred in New Jersey,” while Mr. Rollick
worked for a Florida yacht broker and held a Florida brokerage license. 	(ECF Nos.
1-1 ¶ 7; 4-4.) Mr. Rollick also concedes that the banking transactions occurred out of
state, “in the New England region.” (ECF No. 5 at 3.)
Mr. 	Rollick 	seeks 	to 	rely 	on 	Mr. 	Guthrie’s 	alleged 	comment 	on
“TheHullTruth.com,” to support this Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. 	Guthrie posted a comment: “recently worked with Robbie [R]ollick of
United Yacht Sales and recommended anyone stays away from him. 	He has since
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been terminated by United[,]” (ECF No. 6-2 at 75.) 	The post’s only connection to
Rhode Island is that it mentioned Mr. Rollick, who operated a brokerage in the New
England region at the time. The website is a general, national online boating forum,
not a Rhode Island website nor is it a website that focuses on Rhode Island.
According 	to 	Mr. 	Rollick 	this 	post 	caused 	him 	“[n]ational 	internet
defamation.”2 (ECF No. 5 at 4.) Mr. Rollick’s arguments in support of his claim for
specific jurisdiction can best be summarized as asserting that he was a broker
working in part in the “Rhode Island/New England coastal market,” and that Mr.
Guthrie’s actions caused him and his brokerage some harm in Rhode Island. 	(ECF
No. 5 at 1.) 	However, asserting that a defendant’s actions in different states and
online had trickle-down effects on a plaintiff doing business in Rhode Island is
insufficient to satisfy specific personal jurisdiction.
	See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S.
277, 278 (2014);
see also Phillips Exeter, 196 F.3d at 290 (“The mere existence of a
contractual relationship between an out-of-state defendant and an in-state plaintiff
does not suffice, in and of itself, to establish jurisdiction in the plaintiff's home state.”)
Mr. Rollick’s assertion that he remained a resident of Rhode Island during his
interactions with Mr. Guthrie,3 and his assertion that Mr. Guthrie knew he lived or
operated in Rhode Island add nothing to his assertion of personal jurisdiction. Mere
knowledge that the plaintiff is living or operating in a particular state is insufficient.
2 Mr. Rollick claims Mr. Guthrie accused him of “stealing client funds” but this claim
is contradicted by the exhibit Plaintiff references and attaches. (ECF No. 5 at 4.)
3 It appears Mr. Rollick also used a Key West, Florida address at the time of the vessel
transaction dispute. (ECF No. 6-1 at 170.)
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See Guo v. Tomkiewicz, No. 23-CV-342-MSM-LDA, 2024 WL 2391125, at *2 (D.R.I.
May 23, 2024).
In defamation cases, courts also assess whether a defendant’s actions were
expressly aimed at the forum state.
McCarty v. Doe, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145494,
at *15 (D. Mass. Aug. 15, 2024) (citing
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984). Here
Mr. Rollick provides no support for his claim that Mr. Guthrie expressly aimed his
post on “TheHullTruth.com” at his operations in Rhode Island rather than generally,
commenting on 	his experience with Mr. Rollick as a broker in New York.
	See
Sensitech Inc. v. Limestone FZE, 548 F. Supp. 3d 244, 256-257 (D. Mass. 2021)
(“defamatory ‘effect’ [within a forum] by itself is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction
over a foreign defendant. 	Rather . . . the victim of the defamatory statement must
demonstrate that its author intended the libel to be felt in the forum state”) (quoting
Noonan v. Winston Co., 902 F. Supp. 298, 305 (1st Cir. 1995))
.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Mr. Rollick’s failure to sufficiently allege and proffer facts from which a court
could conclude that Mr. Guthrie purposefully availed himself of the privilege of
conducting 	activities 	in 	Rhode 	Island 	dooms 	his 	effort 	to 	establish 	specific
jurisdiction. 	As a result, the Court GRANTS Mr. Guthrie’s Motion to Dismiss for
Lack 	of 	Personal 	Jurisdiction. 	(ECF 	No. 	4.) 	Because 	this 	dismissal 	is 	on
jurisdictional grounds, it is made without prejudice.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
________________________________
Mary S. McElroy
United States District Judge
March 9, 2026
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