United States of America v. Amore

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
GREGG M. AMORE, in his official
capacity as Secretary of State for the
State of Rhode Island,
Defendant.
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C.A. No. 25-cv-00639-MSM-PAS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Mary S. McElroy, United States District Judge.
On September 8, 2025, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) sent
a letter to Rhode Island Secretary of State Gregg Amore requesting an unredacted
electronic copy of Rhode Island’s statewide voter registration list. (ECF No. 2-2 at 5–
7.) 	This list would include the last four digits of registered voters’ Social Security
numbers and their Rhode Island driver’s license numbers.
	Id. at 5. 	DOJ has, over
the last year, made similar demands to nearly every other state. 	When Secretary
Amore 	refused 	to 	provide 	a 	voter 	registration 	list 	containing 	that 	sensitive
information, the United States sued. (ECF No. 1.)
Before the Court is the United States’ Motion to Compel Production (EFC No.
2) of an unredacted copy of Rhode Island’s voter registration list. 	Also before the
Court are the Motions to Dismiss of Secretary Amore (ECF No. 26), Intervenors
Common Cause, Catherine Saunders, Stuart Waldman, and Julia Sanches (ECF No.
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25), and Intervenors SEIU District 1199NE, the Rhode Island Alliance for Retired
Americans, Carolyn Betensky, and Michael “Zack” Mezera (ECF No. 28) (collectively,
“Defendants”). 	For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the United States’
Motion to Compel Production (ECF No. 2) and GRANTS Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss (ECF Nos. 25; 26; 28).
I. 	BACKGROUND
The Elections Clause of the United States Constitution provides: “The Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time
by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of [choosing]
Senators.” 	U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 	The authority delegated to the states in
managing 	elections 	includes 	the 	authority 	to 	oversee 	“notices, 	registration,
supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices,
counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of
election returns.”
	Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932). 	Thus, except where
federal law provides otherwise, states have substantial discretion in regulating
elections, including maintaining voter registration lists.
	See Arizona v. Inter Tribal
Council of Arizona, Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2013).
Two federal laws require each state to undertake a “reasonable effort” to
maintain the accuracy and currency of its statewide voter registration list. First, the
National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”), 52 U.S.C. § 20501
et seq., requires states
to “conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of
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ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters” who die or change their
residence, as well as to send confirmation notices to voters following any change in
residence.
	Id. § 20507(a)–(f). To facilitate public oversight, each covered state must
“maintain for at least 2 years and shall make available for public inspection and,
where available, photocopying at a reasonable cost, all records concerning the
implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the
accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters,” subject to specific exemptions.
Id. at § 20705(i). Nothing in the NVRA “prohibits the appropriate redaction of
uniquely or highly sensitive personal information” from voting registration records.
Pub. Int. Legal Found., Inc. v. Bellows, 92 F.4th 36, 56 (1st Cir. 2024) (collecting
cases).
Second, the Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”), 52 U.S.C. § 20901,
et seq.,
requires 	each 	state 	to 	develop 	a 	single, 	computerized 	official 	statewide 	voter
registration list that includes a unique identifier for reach registered voter.
	Id. §
21083(a)(1)(A). As part of this requirement, states must also adopt a “system of file
maintenance that makes a reasonable effort to remove registrants who are ineligible
to vote from the official list of eligible voters.”
Id. at § 21083(a)(4)(A). HAVA has no
public disclosure requirements and provides DOJ with no subpoena authority.
	See
id. § 21111. 	HAVA expressly provides that the “specific choices on the methods of
complying with [its] requirements . . . shall be left to the discretion of the State.”
Id.
21085.
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In 2005, the Rhode Island Secretary of State implemented a statewide central
voter register called the Central Voter Registration System (“CVRS”). R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 17-6-1.2. 	A person seeking to register to vote must complete a Voter Registration
Form, which collects a range of confidential and sensitive personally identifiable
information. 	410-RICR-20-00-19.5(A). 	No voter may have more than one voter
registration. 	R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-9.1-19. 	Registrants must confirm their United
States citizenship, residence in Rhode Island, and that they are at least 16 years of
age.
	Id. §§ 17-9.1-11, 17-9.1-33. 	Registrants must provide a Rhode Island driver’s
license or State ID card number or the last four digits of their Social Security number.
410-RICR-20-00-19.5(A)(1)(d)(1). All registrants must “swear or affirm” that they are
a U.S. citizen, live at the address listed on the form, and will be at least eighteen
years old before voting in next general election. 410-RICR-20-00-19.5(A)(1)(k). These
attestations 	must 	be 	signed 	under 	penalty 	of 	perjury, 	and 	Rhode 	Island 	law
criminalizes providing false voter registration information. R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-9.1-
12.
Rhode Island uses several different methods to prevent duplication, confirm
residence, 	and 	remove 	deceased 	or 	otherwise 	ineligible 	voters 	from 	its 	voter
registration list. 	Voter information, which is by default automatically updated
anytime a voter updates their address with the Rhode Island Department of Motor
Vehicles, is electronically transmitted daily to the CVRS. 	R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-9.1-
7(d). 	An online voter registration portal allows citizens to update their voter
information at any time.
	Id. § 17-9.1-34. The state requires each city or town’s local
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board to confirm registered voters’ addresses through the mail, and it engages in a
confirmation process where mailed confirmation forms are returned as undeliverable.
Id. 	§§ 	17-9.1-25, 	17-9.1-26. 	Rhode 	Island 	verifies 	voter 	information 	through
verification mailings conducted each year.
Id. § 17-9.1-27(b).
The Rhode Island Office of the State Registrar of Vital Records electronically
transmits a list of deceased persons eighteen years of age or older monthly,
see id. §
23-3-5(a)(6); 100-RICR-20-00-5(C)(2), and local boards of canvassers update the list
using information provided by the federal Social Security Administration’s Death
Master File,
see R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-10-1(c). 	Rhode Island participates in the
Electronic 	Registration 	Information 	Center 	(“ERIC”), 	which 	uses 	a 	variety 	of
datasets, including state voter registration and DMV records, to determine the
accuracy of states’ voter rolls.
See ECF No. 2-1 at 11 (acknowledging Rhode Island’s
participation in ERIC). 	Rhode Island also updates the CVRS to ensure that people
who are ineligible to vote because they are incarcerated for a felony conviction are
removed from the voter registration list. 	100-RICR-20-00-2(2.4)(C)(1-2); 100 RICR-
20-00-5(C)(3).
In its September 8, 2025, letter to Secretary Amore (the “Demand Letter”),
DOJ stated that the purpose of its demand for an unredacted copy of Rhode Island’s
statewide voter registration list was “to ascertain Rhode Island’s compliance with the
list maintenance requirements of the NVRA and the HAVA.” (ECF No. 2-2 at 6.) The
Demand Letter did not identify any facts suggesting that Rhode Island has not
complied with the NVRA and HAVA, and it did not otherwise expressly identify any
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factual basis for DOJ’s demand.
	See id. 	The Demand Letter states that DOJ’s
authority to request Rhode Island’s voter registration list was made pursuant to (1)
“the Attorney General’s authority under Section 11 of the NVRA to bring enforcement
actions”; (2) HAVA . . . via Section 401, which makes the Attorney General solely
responsible for actions to enforce HAVA’s computerized statewide voter registration
list requirements”; and (3) Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (“CRA”), 52 U.S.C.
§ 20701,
et seq. Id. at 5–6.
In response to the Demand Letter, on September 16, 2025, Secretary Amore
sent a letter to DOJ offering to supply DOJ with a copy of Rhode Island’s publicly
available voter registration list but declining to supply the unredacted information
specified by DOJ in its demand.
	Id. at 9–10. Secretary Amore’s response contended
that the authorities cited by DOJ did not authorize its demand.
	Id. 	Specifically,
Secretary Amore asserted that the CRA “allows access to voter records only in
connection with an investigation into the infringement or denial of constitutional
voting rights” which was not the purpose stated in DOJ’s letter.
Id. at 10.
The United States filed suit against Secretary Amore in his official capacity on
December 	2, 	2025, 	alleging 	that 	his 	refusal 	to 	provide 	the 	unredacted 	voter
registration list violated the CRA. 	(ECF No. 1.) 	That same day, the United States
filed a Motion to Compel Production (ECF No. 2), requesting the Court order
Secretary Amore turn over the unredacted voter registration lists pursuant to a
“special statutory proceeding” purportedly authorized by the CRA.
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The Court subsequently granted unopposed Motions to Intervene (ECF Nos. 5;
15) by two groups of Intervenors. The first group consists of Common Cause—a “non-
partisan, good-government organization dedicated to grassroots voter engagement in
Rhode Island”—and three Rhode Island voters. (ECF No. 5 at 8.) The second group
consists 	of 	SEIU 	District 	1199NE 	and 	the 	Rhode 	Island 	Alliance 	for 	Retired
Americans—Rhode Island membership-based organizations asserting an interest in
preventing sensitive personal information on Rhode Island’s statewide voter list from
being disclosed to the federal government—and two Rhode Island voters. Secretary
Amore and the Intervenors all move to dismiss the United States’ Complaint. (ECF
Nos. 25; 26; 28.)
The Court held a hearing on the parties’ Motions on March 26, 2026.
See ECF
No. 47 (hearing transcript). 	In that hearing, the United States proposed that its
unprecedented demands for unredacted voting rolls are the result of its “trust but
verify” approach to the states’ list maintenance efforts.
	Id. at 49. 	Despite some
references to a 2024 Election Assistance Commission report purportedly showing that
Rhode Island could conduct more kinds of voter registration list audits than it
currently does,
see id. at 46, 68, 86, the United States acknowledged that the Demand
Letter stated no factual basis for DOJ’s request,
id. at 63.
While the present Motions were pending, four other federal district courts
issued decisions on nearly identical cases brought by the United States seeking
unredacted voter registration information from California, Oregon, Michigan, and
Massachusetts.
See United States v. Weber, No. 2:25-CV-09149-DOC-ADS, 2026 WL
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118807 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2026);
United States v. Oregon, No. 6:25-CV-01666-MTK,
2026 WL 318402 (D. Or. Feb. 5, 2026);
United States v. Benson, No. 1:25-CV-1148,
2026 WL 362789 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 10, 2026);
United States v. Galvin, No. CV 25-
13816-LTS, 2026 WL 972129 (D. Mass. Apr. 9, 2026). 	All four courts dismissed the
United States’ lawsuits.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
The parties dispute the appropriate standard of review for this case. According
to the United States, it is entitled under Title III of the CRA to a “special statutory
proceeding” on its Motion to Compel Production, under which the Court is restricted
to a “severely limited” inquiry. (ECF No. 33 at 5.) Title III’s text does not expressly
provide 	for 	such 	a 	proceeding 	and 	instead 	provides 	that 	district 	courts 	have
jurisdiction over voting records demands “by appropriate process.” 52 U.S.C. § 20705.
The sole support for the United States’ position is a line of Fifth Circuit cases from
the 1960s, most notably
Kennedy v. Lynd, 306 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1962).
Defendants argue that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern this case,
and that DOJ is not entitled to any sort of summary or abbreviated procedures for
obtaining the information it seeks. (ECF No. 23–26.) The Court agrees. Two years
after
Lynd—a decision that is not binding on this Court and is steeped in the context
of 1960s racial discrimination in voter registration—the Supreme Court held that a
demand made pursuant to a similar statute authorizing the production of documents
by “appropriate process” could be challenged “on any appropriate ground,” and that
the Government was required to show that they had met all of the statutory criteria
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for their request.
	See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57–58 (1964);
see also
Weber, 2026 WL 118807, at *8 (“Contrary to the position the DOJ takes, Title III
cannot transform an election records request by the federal government from an
ordinary civil action into an action comparable to an order to show cause.”);
United States v. Oregon, 2026 WL 318402, at *8 (“The Supreme Court’s holding
in
Powell squarely rejects Plaintiff’s contention and reliance on
Lynd.”).1
As such, the appropriate standard of review for this case is that common to
motions to dismiss brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under that standard,
to avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must set forth a “plausible claim.” The reviewing court
must assume the truth of all “well-pleaded facts and give the plaintiff the benefit of
all reasonable inferences therefrom.”
Thomas v. Rhode Island, 542 F.3d 944 (1st Cir.
2008). 	However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Defendants challenge the United States’ demand as failing to state a claim
under Title III of the CRA, exceeding the scope of production required by the CRA,
and in violation of both state and federal privacy laws. 	(ECF No. 26-1 at 25–50.)
1 The Court also shares the
United States v. Oregon court’s doubt that
Lynd could be
applicable here where—unlike
Lynd, which “appears to contemplate an application
directly to the court for the records—the United States “made an affirmative choice
to file a complaint and proceed through ordinary litigation.” 2026 WL 318402, at *8
(citing
Lynd, 306 F.2d at 225).
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Because this case is resolved by the first of these grounds, the Court focuses its
analysis there.
To begin, the Court turns to the context of Title III of the CRA, as explained in
Weber:
Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 was passed during the Jim Crow
era, when persistent voter suppression was preventing Black Americans
from voting. States were utilizing literacy tests, arbitrary registration
tactics, voter ID laws, and poll taxes to keep minorities away from the
ballot. Black Americans risked intimidation and violence every time
they tried to access the polls. 	To hide their complicity in voter
suppression, state officials destroyed the records of Black Americans
who had registered to vote, as well as those denied the opportunity to
register. The bipartisan Commission on Civil Rights lamented in 1958
that even when records were not destroyed, states refused to turn them
over, thwarting efforts by the federal government to investigate whether
there was a pattern and practice of disenfranchising Black Americans.
Title III was enacted directly in response to these concerns, requiring
states to retain and preserve all records pertaining to voter registration,
voting applications, and payments of poll taxes.
2026 WL 118807 at *1.
Based on this context, Title III’s purpose is to enable the federal government
to detect voting-related racial discrimination.
Id. at *8. To accomplish this, Title III
sets out certain requirements regarding federal election records, and penalizes the
theft, destruction, or alteration of those records.
See 52 U.S.C. §§ 20701, 20702. Title
III further authorizes the Attorney General to compel the production of those voting
records upon a written demand.
Id. § 20703.
At issue in this case is whether the Attorney General may use § 20703 to
demand voting records for purposes unrelated to voting-related racial discrimination.
The statute itself does not cabin its application solely to that context. 	But it does
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impose one crucial requirement on any voting records demand by the Attorney
General: the demand “shall contain a statement of the basis and the purpose
therefore.”
Id.
The United States’ position is that “the basis for the demand was Title III of
the [CRA],” and that “the purpose was ‘to ascertain Rhode Island’s compliance with
the list maintenance requirements of the NVRA and HAVA.’” (ECF No. 33 at 4.) But
the Court finds that neither the basis nor the purpose proposed by the United States
for its demand is legally sufficient to support a claim under Title III.
First, the Court agrees with
Weber,
United States v. Oregon, and
Galvin that
the “basis” contemplated by Title III is a factual, not legal basis.
	See Weber, 2026
WL 118807, at *9;
United States v. Oregon, 2026 WL 318402, at *8–9;
Galvin, 2026
WL 972129, at *4.2 	To read “basis” as meaning a legal basis would conflate that
requirement with the required statement of the demand’s “purpose.” As explained in
United States v. Oregon, “[i]f the purpose is to investigate violations of a statute, the
basis must be something else; the statute underlying the investigation is nothing
more than a component of the purpose.” 2026 WL 318402, at *9;
see also Galvin, 2026
WL 972129, at *5 (“If Congress sought to direct the Attorney General to include a
citation to Title III in demand letters, requiring the letter to contain a ‘statement of
2
Benson also appears to have contemplated “basis” as meaning a factual basis, but—
unlike here—the demand letter there actually did contain at least some factual basis
for the records request.
	See 2026 WL 362789, at *8 (reviewing how DOJ’s demand
letter “pointed to several purported anomalies within Michigan’s voter registration
data: a high percentage of registered voters, a low confirmation notice rate, a low
voter removal rate, and a high duplicate registration rate”).
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the basis and the purpose therefor’ would not be the obvious way to do so.”). 	While
the United States suggests that Title III essentially authorizes factually groundless
“fishing expeditions,”
see ECF No. 47 at 63, Congress could not have intended Title
III to be interpreted in this redundant and circular manner.
This reading is consistent with the line of Fifth Circuit cases, most notably
Lynd, upon which the United States presses the Court to rely here. 	In
Lynd, for
example, the court noted that the Attorney General’s demand letter made the
following statement of basis and purpose:
This demand is based upon information in the possession of the Attorney
General tending to show that distinctions on the basis of race or color
have been made with respect to registration and voting within your
jurisdiction.
The purpose of this demand is to examine the aforesaid records in order
to ascertain whether or not violations of Federal law in regard to
registration and voting have occurred
306 F.2d at 226 n.6;
see also id. at 226 (referring to the “factual foundation for, or the
sufficiency of, the Attorney General’s ‘statement of the basis and the purpose’
contained in the written demand”).
	Lynd thus seems to contemplate a factual basis
and a legal purpose under Title III.
With that understanding, the Court finds that the Attorney General’s demand
lacks a legally sufficient basis to satisfy Title III’s requirements. 	Absent from the
demand are any factual allegations suggesting that Rhode Island may be violating
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the list maintenance requirements of the NVRA and HAVA, let alone the CRA. This
alone would be enough to foreclose judicial enforcement of the demand.3
Following
Galvin’s dismissal of the United States’ suit in Massachusetts, the
United States requested that, should the Court follow
Galvin, DOJ be permitted leave
to send Secretary Amore a “curing elaboration letter” presumably containing some
factual basis for its Title III demand. But even were the Demand Letter to contain a
factual basis, it would still fail to state a claim under Title III because it lacks a legally
sufficient purpose. The Court again finds itself in agreement with both
Weber and
United States v. Oregon in determining that Congress cannot have intended Title III
as permitting such a demand based on a statement of
any purpose.
See Weber, 2026
WL 118807, at *9 (noting that the fact that Title III precedes the NVRA means that
it cannot have been passed “as a tool for NVRA compliance”);
United States v. Oregon,
2026 WL 318402, at *9–10 (“If
any purpose—regardless of its relationship to the
purposes of the statute itself—would suffice, then the requirement of stating the
demand’s purpose would serve no function.”) (emphasis in original).
Instead, the Court finds persuasive
United States v. Oregon’s conclusion that,
“[r]eading Title III’s text within its larger statutory and historical context, and
consistent with . . . case law and legislative history . . . the ‘purpose’ required in a
3 This would likely be true even were the Court to apply the “special statutory
proceeding” described in
Lynd. Based on
Lynd, the United States proposes that the
Court’s review is limited to,
inter alia, assessing the following question: “did the
Attorney General make a written demand for federal records stating the basis and
purpose.” 	(ECF No. 33 at 5) (citing
Lynd, 306 F.2d at 225–26). 	But if the written
demand contains
no statement of a basis within the meaning of 52 U.S.C. § 20703—
that is, a factual basis—then that threshold requirement is not satisfied.
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demand for records under Title III must relate to a purpose of investigating violations
of individuals’ voting rights.” 	2026 WL 318402, at *10. 	With that established, the
purpose stated in the Attorney General’s demand—purportedly, to ensure compliance
with the NVRA and HAVA—does not plausibly relate to individual voting rights. As
such, even were the Court to grant DOJ leave to send its requested “curing
elaboration letter” containing a factual basis for its allegation that Rhode Island
might be falling short of its obligations under the NVRA or HAVA, that letter would
remain legally insufficient to support a Title III records demand because its purpose
would fall outside Title III’s intended scope.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Neither the NVRA nor HAVA authorize DOJ to conduct the kind of fishing
expedition it seeks here. 	As such, for the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the
United States’ Motion to Compel Production (ECF No. 2) and GRANTS Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 25; 26; 28).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
Mary S. McElroy
United States District Judge
April 17, 2026
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