Office of the Child Advocate v. Providence School Department

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
OFFICE OF THE CHILD ADVOCATE
ON BEHALF OF JANE DOE,
Plaintiff,
v.
PROVIDENCE PUBLIC SCHOOL
DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.
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25-cv-649-JJM-AEM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., United States District Court Chief Judge.
Plaintiff Office of the Child Advocate (“OCA”) brings this action on behalf of
minor Jane Doe (“Jane”), seeking judicial review of an administrative decision in
which a hearing officer determined that OCA lacked standing to file a due process
complaint under 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a). 	OCA filed this Complaint against the
Defendant Providence Public School Department’s (“PPSD”) claiming that PPSD was
violating minor Jane Doe’s rights under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (“IDEA”), specifically 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3).
PPSD has filed a Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of
standing. 	ECF No. 12. 	This motion addresses the question of first impression:
whether the Rhode Island OCA can act as a “parent” under the IDEA. For the reasons
below, the Court answers that question, “Yes,” and denies PPSD’s Motion to Dismiss.
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I. 	BACKGROUND1
A. Factual Background
Jane has been in the custody of the Rhode Island Department of Children
Youth and Families (“DCYF”) and placed in foster care with relatives since an early
age. 	She had qualified for special education including in-classroom support. 	She
exited special education in the fifth grade. 	At her prior school district, Jane was
denied a renewed referral for special education evaluation, stating it did not suspect
a qualifying disability. Later, the district agreed to evaluate Jane for a Section 504
plan.
Jane transferred to Providence and therefore came under the PPSD. 	PPSD
convened a referral meeting but denied Jane eligibility for special education without
reviewing the clinical evaluation. 2 OCA objected, citing procedural violations under
the IDEA, but no corrective action was taken. 	OCA then requested that PPSD
reconvene the referral team and PPSD did not respond. 	OCA continued to monitor
Jane’s case and concluded that her rights under federal law were being violated,
which resulted in OCA’s request for a hearing on behalf of Jane.
B. Procedural History
Before the filing of this Complaint, DCYF asked the Rhode Island Department
of Education (“RIDE”) to appoint a “surrogate parent” for Jane parent and Teresa
1 The following facts are drawn from the OCA’s Complaint and attached
exhibits and are accepted as true for purposes of the Motion to Dismiss.
	See McKee
v. Cosby, 874 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2017).
2 The meeting was conducted by counsel rather than a local education agency
representative and lasted about five minutes.
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Barros was appointed. 	OCA soon became involved in Jane’s care while she was in
state custody. 	Katelyn Medeiros, in her capacity as Child Advocate for the Rhode
Island OCA, filed a due process complaint against PPSD on Jane’s behalf, listing the
surrogate parent as Jane’s guardian. At the time the complaint was filed, PPSD was
Jane’s current school district and the local education agency responsible for her
education. 	RIDE participated as amicus curiae in the underlying administrative
proceedings.
PPSD moved to dismiss the due process complaint claiming OCA lacked
standing. OCA opposed the motion. 3 The hearing officer granted PPSD’s motion to
dismiss, concluding that OCA lacked standing to bring the complaint on Jane’s
behalf. This lawsuit ensued.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss for lack of standing is properly characterized as a motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1). 	A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.
Justiniano v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 876 F.3d 14, 21 (1st Cir. 2017). 	When evaluating a
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), granting such a
motion “is appropriate only when the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true, do
not justify the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction.”
Muniz-Rivera v. United States,
326 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2003). “When a district court considers a Rule 12(b)(1) motion,
3 The parties also disputed whether RIDE could participate as amicus curiae,
which the hearing officer allowed.
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it must credit the plaintiff’s well-pled factual allegations and draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”
	Merlonghi v. United States, 620 F.3d 50, 54 (1st
Cir. 2010).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. IDEA
1. 	Overview
Congress enacted the IDEA to help states provide educational services to
children with disabilities.
	See C.G. ex rel. A.S. v. Five Town Cmty. Sch. Dist., 513
F.3d 279, 284 (1st Cir. 2008);
see also Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49,
52 (2005). 	The statute conditions the receipt of federal funding on a state’s
compliance with its obligation to provide all children with disabilities a “free
appropriate public education” (“FAPE”).
	See Parent/Pro. Advoc. League v. City of
Springfield, 934 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2019) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)). 	FAPE
requires that school districts furnish special education in the form of “specially
designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of” the child, as
well as related services that “may be required to assist a child with a disability to
benefit from special education.” 	20 U.S.C. § 1401(26), (29);
Fry v. Napoleon Cmty.
Sch., 580 U.S. 154, 158 (2017). The Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) is the
IDEA’s primary mechanism for ensuring that children with disabilities receive a
FAPE.
Id. “[T]he services offered in an IEP amount to a FAPE if they are ‘reasonably
calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s
circumstances.’”
C.D. by & through M.D. v. Natick Pub. Sch. Dist., 924 F.3d 621, 624-
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25 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist.
RE-1, 580 U.S. 386, 399 (2017)).
2. 	Standing Requirements
IDEA allows a “parent” of a child with a disability to file a complaint “with
respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational
placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such
a child.” 	20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). 	If a dispute arises between parents and a school
district concerning the application of IDEA to a particular child, the statute requires
the state to provide an impartial hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A).
For purposes of IDEA, a “parent” is defined as (1) “a natural, adoptive, or foster
parent of a child”; (2) “a guardian”; or (3) “an individual acting in the place of a natural
or adoptive parent (including a grandparent, stepparent, or other relative) with whom
the child lives, or an individual who is legally responsible for the child’s welfare.” 20
U.S.C. § 1401(23)(A)-(C);
see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.30(a).
B. OCA’s Basis for Standing Under the IDEA
OCA 	claims 	standing 	under 	the 	IDEA 	because 	its 	statutory 	mandate
functionally places it within the IDEA’s definition of a “parent.” Under Rhode Island
law, the Child Advocate
may “[t]ake all possible action including, but not limited to,
programs of public education, legislative advocacy, and formal legal action, to secure
and ensure the legal, civil, and special rights of children.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-73-7
(emphasis added). Relying on this broad grant of authority, OCA further argues that
it qualifies as “an individual who is legally responsible for the child’s welfare” within
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the meaning of 20 U.S.C. § 1401(23), and its implementing regulation, 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.30(a)(4). On that basis, OCA maintains that they have standing to initiate due
process proceedings to vindicate Jane’s educational rights.
C. Multiple 	Individuals 	May 	Qualify 	As 	a 	“Parent” 	Under 	20 	U.S.C.
§ 1401(23)(C)
PPSD argues that only a “parent” may file a due process complaint under
IDEA, and that Teresa Barros is the only individual with standing to do so on behalf
of Jane. They also argue that the IDEA regulations expressly exclude the State from
acting as a “parent” when the child is a ward of the State. OCA does not dispute that
Ms. Barros qualifies as a parent under IDEA. 	Rather, it argues that there are two
parties who both qualify as a “parent” under the language of 34 C.F.R. § 300.30.
The statutory text of 20 U.S.C. § 1401(23) reflects congressional intent to
recognize more than one person as a “parent” for purposes of the Act. 4
	See Q.T. on
behalf of H.P.-B. v. Pottsgrove Sch. Dist., 70 F.4th 663, 667 (3d Cir. 2023) (“The text
of the statute does indicate an unambiguous congressional intent to qualify multiple
persons as parents for purposes of the IDEA.”). So, PPSD’s argument that Ms. Barros
is the only person authorized to bring such an action is unavailing.
PPSD’s argument that 34 C.F.R. § 300.30(a)(3) expressly precludes the State
from serving as a “parent” when the child is a ward of the State is also unpersuasive.
OCA is not the “State” under the statute. 	The provision at issue refers to “[a]
guardian … (but not the State if the child is a ward of the State).” 	34 C.F.R.
4 The text does not provide any language signaling Congress’ intent to only
include person(s) with “close” relationships or who live with the child.
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§ 300.30(a)(3). 	The operative term in this clause is “guardian,” which is defined as
an individual “generally authorized to act as the child’s parent, or authorized to make
educational decisions for the child.” 	34 C.F.R. § 300.30(3). 	OCA lacks authority to
obtain guardianship over children in state care. DCYF is the only welfare agency in
Rhode Island vested with such authority. OCA does not assert itself as a guardian,
rather it asserts that it is “legally responsible for the child’s welfare” thus giving it
standing as a parent under the IDEA.
Furthermore, a “ward of the State” is defined as “a child who, as determined
by the State where the child resides, is – (1) a foster child; (2) a ward of the State; or
(3) in the custody of a public child welfare agency.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.45. Again, DCYF
is the only agency responsible for child welfare in Rhode Island. The OCA, who is
appointed 	by 	the 	Governor 	with 	the 	advice 	and 	consent 	of 	the 	Senate, 	acts
independently 	of 	the 	DCYF 	and 	serves 	a 	supervisory 	and 	oversight 	function
responsible for children’s welfare. The Child Advocate’s duties include ensuring that
children in protective care are informed of their rights, reviewing DCYF procedures
and placements, and “[r]ecommend[ing] changes in the procedures for dealing with
juvenile problems and the systems for providing child care and treatment.” R.I. Gen.
Laws § 42–73–7(1)–(5).
Thus, DCYF, not OCA, constituted the “State” for purposes of the statute.
Because DCYF is not the party challenging standing here, and OCA is not excluded
under 34 C.F.R. § 300.30(a)(3), PPSD’s argument fails.
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D. OCA Has Standing as a “Parent” Under 20 U.S.C. § 1401(23)(C)
PPSD also argues that although the Complaint states they are “legally
responsible” for Jane’s welfare and therefore entitled to file a due process complaint,
they have not alleged enough facts to establish that OCA falls within the definition
of “parent” under 34 C.F.R. § 300.30. 	While state law grants OCA the authority to
initiate formal legal action, the determinative question is one of federal law: Whether
the IDEA’s reference to responsibility for a child’s “welfare” encompasses such
authority. The Court concludes that it does.
OCA is an independent state agency created by the Rhode Island General
Assembly with a formal, statutory mandate to protect the legal rights of children in
custody and care of the state.
	See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-73-7. 	By statute, OCA’s
responsibilities expressly encompass educational rights. OCA monitors each child in
the care of DCYF to protect their legal rights and ensure their safety, including their
physical, mental, medical, educational, and behavioral needs while in out-of-home
placements.
See id. OCA has the right to intervene in any case where a child’s safety,
education, and physical and mental welfare are not being met, and if a resolution
cannot be reached, OCA can initiate litigation on the child’s behalf.
Because the First Circuit has not addressed whether a state-chartered child
advocacy office with a statutory mandate over a child’s welfare qualifies as a “parent”
under 20 U.S.C. § 1401(23)(C), this Court must resolve the question by reference to
the text and remedial purpose of the IDEA. 	Congress defined “parent” broadly to
include not only natural and adoptive parents, but also guardians, surrogate parents,
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and any individual otherwise legally responsible for the child’s welfare. 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 1401(23)(A)-(D). 	This definition reflects Congress’s intent to ensure that children
with disabilities are not deprived of an enforceable advocate under the statute, and
yes, even multiple authorized advocates.
OCA itself recognizes IDEA as the governing federal statute for children’s
educational rights and includes educational advocacy within its mission. 	R.I. OCA,
Frequently Asked Questions (recognizing IDEA as the governing federal statute for
IEPs), https://childadvocate.ri.gov/node/136. 	To hold that an entity vested by the
Rhode Island General Assembly with responsibility over the welfare and educational
interests of children in state custody is not “legally responsible for the child’s welfare”
under IDEA would construe “parent” too narrowly. Such a construction conflicts with
the statute’s purpose and the Supreme Court’s instruction in
Winkelman v. Parma
City Sch. District, that IDEA’s provisions must be construed to ensure that the rights
the statute creates are enforceable by those closest to the child’s interests. 550 U.S.
516 (2007).
Thus, OCA has standing to pursue this action as a “parent” within the meaning
of IDEA because it is an entity “legally responsible for the child’s welfare” under 20
U.S.C. § 1401(23)(C).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant PPSD’s Motion to Dismiss,
ECF No. 12, and finds that the Rhode Island Office of the Child Advocate has
standing to bring this claim on Jane Doe’s behalf.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/John J. McConnell, Jr.
_________________________________
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR.
Chief Judge
United States District Judge
April 20, 2026
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