United Nurses Association of California/Union of Healthcare Professionals et al v. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
UNITED NURSES ASSOCIATION OF
CALIFORNIA/UNION OF
HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS;
LABORERS’ INTERNATIONAL
UNION OF NORTH AMERICA
LOCAL 1322; LABORERS’
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
NORTH AMERICA LOCAL 1029;
LABORERS’ INTERNATIONAL
UNION OF NORTH AMERICA
LOCAL 572; INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL
WORKERS LOCAL 415; WISCONSIN
FEDERATION OF NURSES AND
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS, LOCAL
500, AFT, AFL-CIO; and
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE
WORKERS LOCAL 1998,
Plaintiffs,
v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS; DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, in
his official capacity as Secretary of the
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs;
and DONALD J. TRUMP, in his
official capacity as President of the
United States,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
C.A. No. 25-cv-674-MRD-PAS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Melissa R. DuBose, United States District Judge.
Seven unions commenced this cause of action to challenge the termination of
their collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”) with the Department of Veterans
Case 1:25-cv-00674-MRD-PAS Document 16 Filed 03/27/26 Page 1 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
Affairs (“VA”). The Plaintiffs represent approximately 2,800 VA employees. ECF No.
10-1 at 8. As recounted in greater detail in this Court’s Memorandum & Order issued
March 13, 2026 addressing a separate challenge by different union plaintiffs to
related executive action,
see Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. Local 2305 v. United States
Dep’t of Veterans Affs., No. 25-CV-583-MRD-PAS, 2026 WL 709856, at *1–2 (D.R.I.
Mar. 13, 2026) (“
AFGE”), President Trump signed an executive order on March 27,
2025, excluding the VA and other federal agencies from the previously statutorily
protected right to collective bargaining. 	Assuming the reader’s familiarity with the
details recounted in
AFGE, the Court will only set the table for this Memorandum &
Order with the basic, necessary items to provide some broad context.
In March 2025, President Trump exercised the authority granted to him in 5
U.S.C. § 7103(b)(1) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute
(“FSLMRS”) and issued Executive Order 14,251 (the “EO”). 	Guzynski Decl. Ex. 2,
ECF No. 10-2 at 130–134. 	A couple of weeks later, Secretary Collins exercised the
authority granted to him in Section 4 of the EO and suspended the application of the
EO to several unions, including the Plaintiffs in this case (the “Suspension Order”).
Guzynski Decl. Ex. 6, ECF No. 10-2 at 157. With the Suspension Order in place, the
Plaintiffs’ relationship with the VA did not change and Plaintiffs’ members continued
to enjoy all the benefits of their union membership. 	Mem. in Support of Mot. for
Preliminary Inj., ECF No. 10-1 at 16. 	On November 13, 2025, however, after
“[h]aving further considered the delegation of authority provision under Section 4 of
the [EO] and the statutory authority under 5 U.S.C. § 7103(b)(1),” Secretary Collins
Case 1:25-cv-00674-MRD-PAS Document 16 Filed 03/27/26 Page 2 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
rescinded the Suspension Order (the “Rescission Order”).
	Id. at 17; Guzynski Decl.
Ex. 7, ECF No. 10-2 at 159. The VA subsequently notified each Plaintiff that, moving
forward, none would be recognized as an exclusive representative at the VA and the
CBAs and other agreements they had in place with the VA were terminated. 	ECF
No. 10-1 at 18;
see, e.g., Suster Decl. Ex. 2, ECF No. 10-3 at 59.1 The VA employees
who lost their collectively bargained labor rights include nurses at VA medical
centers, housekeeping, kitchen, and facility maintenance staff. ECF No. 10-1 at 17.
The Defendants told the employees previously covered by a Plaintiff union that the
VA managers would follow VA policies for all employment matters.
Id. at 18; Pilchard
Decl. ¶ 24 & Ex. 5, ECF No. 10-7.
This 	cause 	of 	action 	challenges 	the 	Rescission 	Order 	as 	arbitrary 	and
capricious as well as contrary to law in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A, C).2 	Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 20–22. 	Before the Court is the
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, requesting that the Rescission Order be
stayed or preliminarily set aside on the basis of these two claims. ECF No. 10 at 2.
1 Each plaintiff provided a copy of the termination letter from the VA; each
letter is identical in content.
	See ECF Nos. 10-3 Ex. 2; 10-4 Ex. 3; 10-5 Ex. 3; 10-6
Ex. 3; 10-7 Ex. 2; 10-8 Ex. 2.
2 A subset of the Plaintiffs also claim that all the Defendants’ actions were
ultra vires and in violation of their Procedural Due Process and federal contract
property rights under the Fifth Amendment. Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 22–24. Those
claims are not at issue for the purposes of ruling on the motion pending before the
Court.
Case 1:25-cv-00674-MRD-PAS Document 16 Filed 03/27/26 Page 3 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
I. 	LEGAL STANDARD
To prevail on their motion for preliminary injunction, the Plaintiffs “must
establish” that they are: (1) “likely to succeed on the merits”; (2) “likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief”; (3) “the balance of equities tips
in [its] favor”; and (4) “an injunction is in the public interest.”
	Doe v. Trump, 157
F.4th 36, 46 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S.
7, 20 (2008)). When the Government is the opposing party, factors three and four are
considered together.
Does 1-6 v. Mills, 16 F.4th 20, 37 (1st Cir. 2021).
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Preliminary Issues
The Defendants contend that there are two reasons why the Court should not
adjudicate 	this 	pending 	motion. 	Before 	the 	Court 	addresses 	the 	preliminary
injunction factors, it explains why it is not persuaded by either reason.
1. 	Staying the case
The 	Defendants 	kick 	off 	their 	opposition 	to 	the 	motion 	for 	preliminary
injunction by asking this Court to stay this litigation until the appellate challenges
to the constitutionality of the EO in the Ninth and D.C. Circuits are resolved. Opp’n
to Mot. for Preliminary Inj., ECF No. 13 at 27. 	The D.C. Circuit Court has heard
appeals from the D.C. District Court’s two grants of motions for preliminary
injunction in favor of union plaintiffs; each case challenged the EO as an ultra vires
act on the part of President Trump.
	See D.C. Cir. Case Nos. 25-5157, 25-5184. 	An
opinion on the merits of those appeals is forthcoming. After the Defendants here filed
Case 1:25-cv-00674-MRD-PAS Document 16 Filed 03/27/26 Page 4 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
their opposition to this motion, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion vacating the
preliminary injunction the Northern California District Court had entered in favor of
union plaintiffs on their claim that the EO was an act of retaliation against them in
violation of the First Amendment.
Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v. Trump, 167
F.4th 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2026). The Defendants contend that a stay is appropriate
because the resolution of those cases on appeal would narrow the issues here by
resolving the Plaintiffs’ challenge to the EO.
Id. The Plaintiffs are not on board with
this idea, asserting that they will suffer prejudice from a stay as they continue to
endure irreparable harm if the Rescission Order is left in place while the other cases
are litigated. Reply, ECF No. 15 at 29, 32.
The longstanding rule governing whether one cause of action will be stayed
pending the resolution of another case emphasizes the broad discretion a district
court has to weigh the competing interests at play.
Taunton Gardens Co. v. Hills, 557
F.2d 877, 879 (1st Cir. 1977) (citing
Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248
(1936)). “[T]here is a heavy burden on the party requesting a stay to justify requiring
‘a litigant in one cause . . . to stand aside while a litigant in another settles the rule
of law that will define the rights of both,’” while also recognizing an efficiency in
suspending one case when the resolution of another, “even if it should not dispose of
all the questions involved, would certainly narrow the issues in the pending case and
assist in the determination of the questions of law involved.”
Id. (quoting
Landis, 299
U.S. at 253–54, 255).
Case 1:25-cv-00674-MRD-PAS Document 16 Filed 03/27/26 Page 5 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
This Court acknowledges that some of the Plaintiffs’ claims in this case
challenge the EO directly. One of these claims, for example, challenges the EO as an
ultra vires act, just like the cases under way in D.C. But unlike the D.C. cases, the
pending motion for preliminary injunction here is focused only on the Rescission
Order and therefore a stay prior to the adjudication of this motion is neither
necessary nor just. Because the Plaintiffs would be unfairly prejudiced by a stay at
this juncture, the Defendants’ request for a stay is denied, but without prejudice.
2. 	Claim channeling
The Defendants assert their oft-repeated defense that the district court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ claims because the FSLMRS requires
these claims to be raised to the Federal Labor Relations Authority (“FLRA”) rather
than filed in a federal district court. 	ECF No. 13 at 31–38. 	This Court recently
explained in detail why it disagrees with this defense,
see AFGE, 2026 WL 709856,
*2–4, and incorporates its reasoning from the March 13 Memorandum & Order in full
here because it has been given no reason to retread this ground. The Defendants do
not posit any alternative reason why channeling is required here. They, in fact, admit
in their brief in opposition that the Rescission Order excludes Plaintiffs’ members
from FSLMRS coverage. ECF No. 13 at 19. The bottom line is that the Court is not
persuaded that it must cede jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ claims to the FLRA.
Case 1:25-cv-00674-MRD-PAS Document 16 Filed 03/27/26 Page 6 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
B. 	Likelihood of Success on the Merits
1. 	APA Arbitrary and Capricious3
Agency action is arbitrary and capricious in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) if
it is not reasonable and reasonably explained.
	Ohio v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 603 U.S.
279, 292 (2024). 	The federal courts’ “well-worn arbitrary-and-capricious standard
ensures 	that 	an 	administrative 	agency 	‘examine[d] 	the 	relevant 	data 	and
articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made.’”
	FDA v. Wages & White Lion Invs.,
L.L.C., 604 U.S. 542, 567 (2025) (quoting
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States,
Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). When asked to
review agency action, the courts must defer to the agency’s decision and “may not
substitute its own policy judgment for that of the agency.”
	Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n
v. Prometheus Radio Project, 592 U.S. 414, 423 (2021). When an agency changes its
position on a given policy, it must “provide a reasoned explanation for the change,”
show some “awareness” that their action represents a change in “position,” and
“consider ‘serious reliance interests.’”
Wages & White Lion Invs., L.L.C., 604 U.S. at
568 (quoting
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 221–222 (2016)). That
said, the Supreme Court has also been clear that an agency does not need to prove
that the new reasons are better than the reasons for the prior policy unless the “new
3 The Defendants do not oppose this motion on the basis that the Rescission
Order is not a final agency action subject to judicial review under the APA, 5 U.S.C.
§ 704.
	See generally, ECF No. 13. 	The Court agrees with the Plaintiffs’ reasoning
about how the Rescission Order qualifies as a final agency action.
See ECF No. 10-1
at 21–22.
Case 1:25-cv-00674-MRD-PAS Document 16 Filed 03/27/26 Page 7 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those which underlay its prior
policy[,] or when its prior policy has engendered serious reliance interests that must
be taken into account.”
	F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515
(2009). In those cases, “a reasoned explanation is needed for disregarding facts and
circumstances” that were at the root of “the prior policy.”
Id. at 516.
The 	Supreme 	Court 	and 	First 	Circuit 	have 	also 	clearly 	explained 	that
“[j]udicial review of agency action is limited to the grounds that the agency invoked
when it took the action.”
Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Kennedy, 164 F.4th 28, 34 (1st Cir. 2026)
(order of court) (quoting
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591
U.S. 1, 20 (2020) (citation modified)). “It is a bedrock principle of administrative law
that a court reviewing agency action may consider only the agency’s explanation
given at the time the relevant decision was made, as opposed to its post hoc rationale.”
Melone v. Coit, 100 F.4th 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2024) (citing
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S.
80, 87–88 (1943)).
The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants’ failure to provide any explanation
for 	the 	Rescission 	Order 	beyond 	having 	“further 	considered 	the 	delegation 	of
authority provision in section 4 of [the EO] and the statutory authority under
[§ 7103(b)(1)]” falls far short of the expectation that an agency provide a reasoned
explanation for changing its mind about these unions’ CBAs. ECF No. 10-1 at 23–25.
The Defendants counter that their explanation (quoted in its entirety above) was
sufficient under the case law for the Court to conclude that they met their obligations
under the APA. ECF No. 13 at 41–42. In reply, the Plaintiffs emphasize that to allow
Case 1:25-cv-00674-MRD-PAS Document 16 Filed 03/27/26 Page 8 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
the Defendants’ vague explanation here to count as a reasoned or reasonable
explanation or to meet the requirements for a change to a previously announced
policy would be to obliterate any justification requirement pursuant to the APA. ECF
No. 15 at 18.
The vague phrase “having further considered” the law governing the authority
to take an action or make a decision does not come close to being a “reasoned
explanation.” The Court notes that the Defendants have not provided this Court with
any contemporaneously published or articulated statements made at the time of the
Rescission Order that specifically highlight or explain that national security concerns
were the impetus for the termination decision. In the sole declaration filed in support
of their response in opposition to the motion, the Defendants list several ways in
which terminating the CBAs removed existing “obstacles” to “the VA’s ability to
address 	employees 	with 	national 	security-related 	duties 	who, 	nevertheless,
demonstrate performance or conduct issues” and therefore resolved the negative
impact of the CBAs on the VA’s national security work. 	Therit Decl. ¶ 16, ECF No.
13-1 at 9. To the extent that this list can be viewed as an explanation for how or why
Chapter 71 could no longer be applied to the unions “in a manner consistent with
national security requirements and considerations,” § 7103(b)(1), the case law is clear
that post-hoc rationalizations are insufficient to justify an agency’s reversal in course
or new action,
see Melone, 100 F.4th at 31. 	Furthermore, the Defendants have not
provided any exhibits to support the paragraph in the declaration stating the
Defendants made a final decision to issue the Rescission Order after weeks of
Case 1:25-cv-00674-MRD-PAS Document 16 Filed 03/27/26 Page 9 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
planning and consideration.
See Therit Decl. ¶ 5. Instead, as the Plaintiffs point out,
the Court is left with the fact that the Plaintiffs’ CBAs were left intact for almost
eight months after President Trump authorized the VA to terminate CBAs governing
its employees.
	See ECF No. 10-1 at 17. 	With no attempt to explain the changed
decision about exempting some unions from the reach of the EO other than a
variation of “we changed our mind,” the Court is compelled to conclude that, on the
record before it, the Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its
claim that the Rescission Order was an arbitrary and capricious action.
	See Wages
& White Lion Invs., L.L.C., 604 U.S. at 568.4
C. 	Irreparable Harm
In this second factor of the preliminary injunction calculus, the Court considers
whether the Plaintiffs have shown that “they are ‘
likely to suffer irreparable harm in
the absence of preliminary relief.’”
Trump, 157 F.4th at 80 (quoting
Winter, 555 U.S.
at 20). 	“A finding of irreparable harm must be grounded on something more than
conjecture, surmise, or a party’s unsubstantiated fears of what the future may have
in store.”
	Charlesbank Equity Fund II v. Blinds To Go, Inc., 370 F.3d 151, 162 (1st
Cir. 2004).
4 The Plaintiffs also argue that the Rescission Order is contrary to law (and
therefore in violation of APA § 706(2)(A) & (C)) because (1) Secretary Collins’ actions
were beyond the authority delegable by the President pursuant to § 7103(b) and (2)
the Rescission Order strayed beyond the strict parameters defined in § 7103(b) as
allowed for excluding agency employees from Chapter 71 coverage. ECF No. 10-1 at
25–30. 	Because the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of
success on the merits of their arbitrary-and-capricious APA-based claim, the Court
need not reach this claim at this time.
Case 1:25-cv-00674-MRD-PAS Document 16 Filed 03/27/26 Page 10 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

11
The 	Plaintiffs 	provide 	several 	examples 	of 	irreparable 	harm 	to 	their
organizations 	and to 	their members 	and 	contend that 	the 	loss 	of 	rights 	and
protections encompassed in the CBAs cannot be remedied later. ECF No. 10-1 at 32–
35. 	Some of these rights include union representation at investigatory interviews
and employee disciplinary proceedings,
see, e.g., Pilchard Decl. ¶ 23, ECF No. 10-7;
Keegan Decl. ¶¶ 25–26, ECF No. 10-4, working hours and leave time,
see, e.g., Keegan
Decl. ¶¶ 10, 11, 29, ECF No. 10-4, and safety measures,
see, e.g., Guzynski Decl. ¶ 12,
ECF No. 10-2. 	ECF No. 10-1 at 33–34. 	The Plaintiffs contend that all of these
previously enforceable rights are now stripped away, with the VA quickly changing
the working conditions and procedures for challenging them. ECF No. 15 at 24. The
Plaintiffs 	also 	argue 	that 	they 	are 	suffering 	irreparable 	harm 	because 	the
termination of the CBAs means that they are unable to perform their core functions
such as organizing additional employees thereby eliminating a reason why members
join and sustain their membership. ECF No. 10-1 at 34–35.
The Defendants retort that the Plaintiffs’ arguments on this factor are not
compelling. ECF No. 13 at 48. They argue that (1) the loss of collective bargaining
rights can be resolved later through remedial relief, (2) collection of dues is possible
without the automatic payroll deduction previously in place for VA employees, and
(3) loss of members is speculative at this point.
Id. at 49-50.
As the Court reasoned in
AFGE, there are myriad benefits from the CBAs that
cannot be remedied retroactively. 	2026 WL 709856, at *10. 	The Plaintiffs in this
case have well-supported their arguments that the VA has already been stripping the
Case 1:25-cv-00674-MRD-PAS Document 16 Filed 03/27/26 Page 11 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

12
benefits and protections encompassed in the CBAs. The changes to the disciplinary
processes and working conditions have immediate and irreparable harm to Plaintiffs
and their members, and the continued changes are likely to continue exacerbating
the harms in the absence of relief.
See Trump, 157 F.4th at 80. The Court concludes
that the Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden on this factor.
D. 	Balance of the Equities/Public Interest
The combined consideration of balancing the equities and the public interest
requires the Court to weigh “the competing claims of injury and must consider the
effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief,”
Winter,
555 U.S. at 24 (quoting
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987)),
“pay[ing] 	particular 	regard 	for 	the 	public 	consequences 	in 	employing 	the
extraordinary remedy of injunction,”
id. (quoting
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456
U.S. 305, 312 (1982)). The Plaintiffs argue that these two factors also weigh in their
favor because, without the CBAs in place, the Defendants enjoy the benefit of not
having additional protections and benefits with which to conform while the Plaintiffs
suffer immediate and demonstrable harm. 	ECF No. 10-1 at 35–36. 	There is no
indication, they continue, from the Defendants that allowing the Plaintiffs’ CBAs to
remain in place from April through November of 2025 caused any harm to the
country’s national security.
Id. at 35–36. The Defendants, relying on the EO and the
Rescission Order, assert that an injunction granted here would put the Plaintiffs back
within FSLMRS coverage despite Secretary Collins’ conclusion that this would not be
in the country’s national security interest. ECF No. 13 at 50. The Court notes that
Case 1:25-cv-00674-MRD-PAS Document 16 Filed 03/27/26 Page 12 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

13
although the EO did explain the basis for the change in policy, Secretary Collins—
either in the Rescission Order or a statement issued around the same time—did not.
“Having further considered the delegation of authority . . . and statutory authority”
cannot be interpreted to mean that leaving the Plaintiffs’ CBAs in place is to the
detriment of the country’s national security. Guzynski Decl. Ex. 7, ECF No. 10-2 at
159.
The Court agrees with the Defendants that “the public has an interest in
ensuring that agencies with a primary national security function . . . operate
effectively and without delay to protect the American people.” ECF No. 13 at 51. But
the Defendants have provided the Court with nothing to support their contention that
the Rescission Order is the result of any consideration and reasoned conclusions
regarding 	the 	effect 	of 	these 	Plaintiffs’ 	CBAs 	on 	national 	security 	interests.
Moreover, as this Court has quoted before, “the Court is mindful that the First Circuit
has been clear that ‘there is generally no public interest in the perpetuation of
unlawful agency action.’”
AFGE, 2026 WL 709856, at *11 (quoting
Somerville Pub.
Schs. v. McMahon, 139 F.4th 63, 76 (1st Cir. 2025)). The balance of the equities and
the public’s interest do not weigh against issuing the relief requested here.
* * *
Overall, the Court concludes the Plaintiffs have adequately established that
all the preliminary injunction factors weigh in their favor and will grant the
preliminary injunctive relief requested.
Case 1:25-cv-00674-MRD-PAS Document 16 Filed 03/27/26 Page 13 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

14
E. 	Bond
The Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs must be required to give some
security in case it is later determined that the injunction was not warranted. 	ECF
No. 13 at 54. The Plaintiffs respond that whether to order the payment of any bond
is within the Court’s broad discretion. 	ECF No. 15 at 27–28. 	As the parties know
well, Rule 65(c)’s instruction that a district court must require the moving party to
post some amount of security is accompanied by the actual substantial discretion
recognized by the court of appeals. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c);
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers v. E. Airlines, Inc., 925 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1991). And the district
courts within this Circuit have established a practice “[i]n the face of litigation
challenging the current presidential administration’s policies and implementation
thereof . . . to either require[] a nominal bond or waive[] bond in its entirety.”
AFGE,
2026 WL 709856, at *11 (citing cases). 	The Court therefore ORDERS the Plaintiffs
to post a nominal bond in the amount of $1,000.
III. 	ORDER
The Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED.
The November 11, 2025 Rescission Order is preliminarily set aside for the Plaintiffs.
The Defendants shall immediately reinstate the Plaintiffs’ CBAs and shall be
governed by the terms of each of these CBAs. The Defendants shall also immediately
notify the relevant bargaining units of this Order, shall continue or reinstate
processing of pending grievances and arbitrations submitted pursuant to the CBAs,
and shall accept new grievances filed pursuant to the CBAs.
Case 1:25-cv-00674-MRD-PAS Document 16 Filed 03/27/26 Page 14 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

15
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Melissa R. DuBose
United States District Judge
03/27/2026
Case 1:25-cv-00674-MRD-PAS Document 16 Filed 03/27/26 Page 15 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>