Tablada v. Rocket Mortgage, LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
AMERRISQUE TABLADA,
Plaintiff,
v.
ROCKET MORTGAGE, LLC;
SEVEN DEUCE, LLC,
Defendants.
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C.A. No. 1:26-cv-00118-MSM-AEM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Mary S. McElroy, United States District Judge.
Before this Court is the plaintiff, Amerrisque Tablada’s, Motion to Remand.
ECF No. 8. Mr. Tablada alleges that Rocket Mortgage, LLC (“Rocket”) breached its
mortgage contract when it foreclosed on his home. 	The plaintiff previously brought
this matter before this Court in
Tablada v. Seven Deuce, LLC et al., 1:25-cv-00284-
MSM-AEM, but named a federal defendant and stated a federal cause of action. The
Court denied Mr. Tablada’s motion for preliminary injunction, and subsequently,
with a motion to dismiss pending, he voluntarily dismissed the matter. Mr. Tablada
then filed another complaint in Rhode Island Superior Court without the named
federal defendant and federal claim. ECF No. 1-2. Rocket removed that case to this
Court and Mr. Tablada now moves to remand.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
On January 29, 2026, Mr. Tablada filed a complaint in Washington County
Superior Court alleging breach of contract. Mr. Tablada claims that Rocket failed to
comply with the terms of the mortgage, which he argues mandated that Rocket
comply with all laws and regulations, including federal HUD regulations. He claims
they did not comply with the HUD regulation requiring live contact for delinquency
and for a servicer to evaluate the borrower for a partial claim and other loss
mitigation requirements. 	ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 48–56. 	Mr. Tablada also alleges that
Rocket’s Notice of Foreclosure Sale “did not strictly comply with the terms of the
mortgage and R.I.G.L. [§] 34-27-4.”
	Id. ¶ 58. 	Rocket now seeks to convey the
foreclosure deed to Seven Deuce, LLC.
Count I seeks a declaratory judgment voiding the foreclosure “for failure to
strictly comply with the terms of the mortgage, the Rhode Island statutory scheme
for nonjudicial foreclosures and the HUD regulations.”
	Id. ¶ 170. 	Count II seeks
injunctive relief prohibiting the recording of a foreclosure deed and Count III asserts
a claim of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breach of an
“implied contract,” both premised on the same alleged facts pertinent to Count I.
	Id.
¶¶ 171, 175. 	Mr. Tablada’s core theory under Count I is that that Rocket failed to
comply with the contract’s requirement that Rocket adhere to “Applicable Law” which
incorporated HUD regulations and state law.
Id. ¶¶ 176–77. The key question before
the Court is whether this argument raises a federal question sufficient to grant this
Court jurisdiction. For the following reasons, the Court finds that it does not.
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II. 	DISCUSSION
The parties agree that there is no federal diversity jurisdiction, and that Mr.
Tablada does not explicitly allege any federal claims. 	In this case, the claimed
jurisdiction rests on a narrow exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule.
Gunn v.
Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257 (2013) (describing such instances as “extremely rare”). The
factors a court considers in evaluating this exception are known as the
Grable
Factors. A state-law claim may give rise to federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331
when it “[1] necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, [2] actually disputed and [3]
substantial, 	which 	[4] 	a 	federal 	forum 	may 	entertain 	without 	disturbing 	any
congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.”
Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005);
Rhode Island Truck Ctr., LLC v. Daimler Trucks N. Am., LLC, 92 F.4th 330, 342 (1st
Cir. 2024). 	“Federal courts must be cautious in exercising this form of jurisdiction
because it lies at the outer reaches of § 1331.”
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v.
BP P.L.C., 31 F.4th 178, 208 (4th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). The Court finds that
even if Defendants are able to meet the first two
Gable factors, the federal question
presented is not substantial and would upset the balance of federal and state
responsibilities such that the remaining
Grable factors do not permit this Court to
exercise jurisdiction.
Federal courts have repeatedly, whether at the first
Grable step or the last,
found they lack jurisdiction over claims such as Mr. Tablada’s.
	See, e.g.,
Henry v.
Bank of Am., N.A., No. 4:12-CV-786-A, 2012 WL 6730718, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 28,
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2012) (describing findings by federal courts that the balance of federal and state
judicial responsibilities would be disturbed if courts were to find an embedded federal
question in similar cases);
Myers v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 2d
587, 588–89 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (determining that a “contractual incorporation of a
federal standard” was not essential as it only involved the state right of the
performance of the contract, not a federal right under HUD regulations);
W. Michigan
Woods Ltd. Dividend Hous. Ass'n Ltd. P'ship v. City of Kalamazoo, No. 1:09-CV-79,
2009 WL 2392899, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 3, 2009) (finding federal issue insubstantial
where it was not the sole contested issue, state law controlled the issue, and where a
federal agency was not involved);
Beverlin v. I.R.S., 574 F. Supp. 553, 554 (W.D. Mo.
1983) (“The fact that parties include the language of a federal law in their contract
does 	not 	raise 	a breach 	of 	such 	contract 	to 	a 	‘civil action arising under the
Constitution laws or treaties of the United States,’ even though an interpretation of
the contract will involve interpretation of language that is also a federal statute.”);
N. Jefferson Square Assocs., L.P. v. Va. Hous. Dev. Auth., 94 F. Supp. 2d 709, 719
(E.D.Va.2000),
aff’d, 32 Fed. App’x 684 (4th Cir. 2002) (state breach of contract claim
interpreting HUD regulations did not raise federal question);
Yorkshire Commons
Ltd. Dividend Hous. Ass’n Ltd. P’ship v. City of Mount Pleasant, No. 12-13468, 2012
WL 13002174, at *7–8 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2012) (same);
Atrisco Heritage Found. v.
New Mexico Comm’n for Cmty. Volunteerism, No. 18-CV-937 MV/JFR, 2020 WL
1514625, at *8 (D.N.M. Mar. 30, 2020) (same). 	Rocket does not point to any cases
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where federal courts have exercised jurisdiction in similar circumstances. The Court
proceeds to examine and apply each factor to this to the facts here.
A. 	Necessarily Raised Federal Question
The 	necessarily 	raised 	prong 	is 	satisfied 	when 	a 	state-law 	claim 	is
“inescapabl[y]” bound up in resolving an issue of federal law.
	See Rhode Island v.
Shell Oil Prods. Co., 35 F.4th 44, 56 (1st Cir. 2022) (citing
Hartland Lakeside Joint
No. 3 Sch. Dist. v. WEA Ins. Corp., 756 F.3d 1032, 1035 (7th Cir. 2014)). To prevail
on his state contract claim, the plaintiff must show that Rocket breached the
mortgage contract. 	This, in turn, requires Mr. Tablada to show that the contract
incorporated 	the 	relevant 	HUD 	regulations 	and 	that 	Rocket 	breached 	those
provisions.1	
See Rhode Island Fishermen’s All., Inc. v. Rhode Island Dep’t Of Env’t
Mgmt., 585 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2009) (describing embedded federal question).
Although Mr. Tablada’s breach of contract claim is one of state law, his
underlying argument can be characterized as bound up in federal law because it
includes the question of whether Rocket complied with HUD notice provisions.
	See
Rhode Island Fishermen’s All., 585 F.3d at 49 (finding federal question raised where
state-law prohibition required interpreting whether activity was “expressly required
1 Rocket argues that Mr. Tablada has no “basis to assert federal regulations.” (ECF
No. 10 at 9.) But “the Court is not aware of any principles of preemption that would
operate to suggest that the absence of a federal cause of action under the NHA [or
HUD] was intended to prevent parties from entering into an agreement to make
otherwise unenforceable conditions enforceable under state principles of contract
law.”
Kersey v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 682 F. Supp. 2d 588, 597 (E.D. Va. 2010),
vacated,
No. 3:09CV726, 2010 WL 3222262, at *3 n.2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 13, 2010);
see also Dan-
Harry v. PNC Bank, N.A., No. CV 17-136 WES, 2018 WL 1083581, at *5 (D.R.I. Feb.
27, 2018).
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by federal law”);
see also Mathews v. PHH Corp., No. 3:09-CV-00083, 2010 WL
3766538, at *3 (W.D. Va. Sept. 24, 2010) (finding necessarily raised prong met when
declaratory judgment action required analysis of HUD regulation). 	Assuming
without deciding that the element is “essential,” the Court proceeds to the next prong,
where Rocket’s argument runs into greater headwinds.
B. 	Actually Disputed
A federal question must not only be necessarily raised, but also actually
disputed.
	Grable, 545 U.S. at 314–15. 	The parties dispute whether “good faith”
contact, defined by HUD regulations, was attempted, and Mr. Tablada’s entitlement
to partial claim loss mitigation. ECF No. 10 at 9. But their dispute rests not on the
definition of “good faith” contact or any other interpretation of federal law but on
whether this requirement was incorporated into their contract and whether contact
in fact occurred. 	There does not appear to be a dispute about the meaning of the
federal statute or even what constitutes “contact”. Mr. Tablada’s claimed entitlement
to a partial claim is reliant on whether HUD regulations were incorporated, not on
an interpretation of substantive federal law. Thus, “it is somewhat difficult to discern
exactly what the ‘disputed’ question of federal law is.”
	In re Pharm. Indus. Average
Wholesale Price Litig., 457 F. Supp. 2d 65, 75 (D. Mass. 2006).
To meet the requirements of this factor interpretation of HUD regulations
would have to be necessary to decide the outcome of the breach of contract claim.
See
id. Rocket’s theory stretches the “actually disputed” prong too far in the Court’s view,
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but even if the Court were to find in their favor, their argument does not meet the
test of the subsequent factors.
C. 	Substantial Federal Question
“Substantiality demands that an embedded federal question be ‘important to
the federal system,’ not just to the parties.”
	AMTAX Holdings 227, LLC v. Tenants’
Dev. II Corp., 15 F.4th 551, 558 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting
Mun. of Mayagüez v.
Corporación Para el Desarrollo del Oeste, Inc., 726 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2013)). 	An
issue is important to the federal system as a whole: (1) “where the outcome of the
claim could turn on a new interpretation of a federal statute or regulation” or (2)
“where the resolution of the issue has broader significance . . . for the Federal
Government.”
Mun. of Mayagüez, 726 F.3d at 14 (citation modified). A case involving
a straightforward legal question that can be resolved permanently rather than a
highly fact dependent issue where the ruling only applies to a single case is more
likely to be considered important to the federal system as a whole. 	And “a federal
issue is more likely to be substantial where a claim between two private parties,
though based in state law, directly challenges the propriety of an action taken by ‘a
federal 	department, 	agency, 	or 	service.’”
	Id. 	(quoting
	Empire 	Healthchoice
Assurance, 547 U.S. at 700.)
Mr. Tablada “challenges the action of [Rocket], not the federal government.”
Wendella Sightseeing Co. v. Blount Boats, Inc., No. CV 17-368 WES, 2018 WL
1620925, at *3 (D.R.I. Mar. 30, 2018);
see also W. Michigan Woods, No. 1:09-CV-79,
2009 WL 2392899, at *5 (finding no federal issue in a dispute between a municipality
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and a developer). 	That a government agency might be affected downstream by the
outcome of a state court case does not amount to presenting a federal question.
	See
Shamrock Grp. v. Base, Inc., No. 19-CV-12407-DJC, 2020 WL 4583846, at *4 (D.
Mass. Aug. 10, 2020) (“The fact that the contracts were created to comply with federal
law and enacted by a federal agency is too tenuous a connection to rise to the level of
substantial question of federal law.”).
Rocket argues that “resolution of this issue would apply by analogy to all cases
where Ginnie Mae owns a mortgage that only references ‘Applicable Law’ with no
express contractual references to the HUD Regulations.” 	ECF No. 10 at 10. 	First,
resolution of this issue would affect contractual matters Rocket had entered into that
used the same contractual language. 	Second, resolution of this issue would be a
matter 	of 	Rhode 	Island 	contract 	law 	by 	determining 	whether 	this 	contract
incorporated HUD regulations and therefore would not apply by analogy to all cases.
Deciding whether the contract incorporated HUD regulations could, at most, only
impact other mortgagors in Rhode Island and is unlikely to have broader significance
for the Federal Government.
	See Mennonite Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Molina Healthcare
of Puerto Rico, 319 F. Supp. 3d 587, 594 (D.P.R. 2018) (finding interpretation of the
law that would only impact Puerto Rico would not have broader significance for the
Federal Government). 	Thus, Rocket has not shown “that a judgment would pose a
risk to some federal actor or program.”
Tyngsboro Sports II Solar, LLC v. Nat'l Grid
USA Serv. Co., Inc., 88 F.4th 58, 68 (1st Cir. 2023). 	And Rocket concedes that the
issue does not often arise. (ECF No. 10 at 10);
see also Wendella Sightseeing, No. CV
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17-368 WES, 2018 WL 1620925, at *3 (D.R.I. Mar. 30, 2018) (finding interpretation
of a federal statute or regulation insubstantial where it did not “govern a large
number of cases”).
Furthermore, the issue before the Court is not a nearly pure issue of law that
could be settled once and for all. The issue of law presented is one of state contract
law. The remainder of the dispute is a fact specific inquiry of whether contact was in
fact attempted and/or made with Mr. Tablada. 	“Rather than disputes over the
meaning of HUD regulations incorporated in the contract between the parties, the
complaint reveals that the disputes between the parties [are] overwhelmingly
factual.”
See Mun. of Mayagüez, 726 F.3d at 14.
Although Mr. Tablada’s claims may touch on a federal regulation, “the suit
actually relates to rights and obligations under the parties’ contract, the rights and
obligations of which are governed by state law,” with the remaining dispute being
factual in nature.
Mathews v. PHH Corp., No. 3:09-CV-00083, 2010 WL 3766538, at
*3 (W.D. Va. Sept. 24, 2010). 	The federal question therefore is not substantial, and
the Court does not have jurisdiction.
D. 	Balance of Federal and State Responsibilities
Assuming 	that 	the 	federal 	issue 	is 	necessary, 	actually 	disputed, 	and
substantial, federal jurisdiction will not attach if its exercise will “[disturb] any
congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.”
Grable, 545 U.S. at 314.
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It is “highly doubtful that Congress intended to permit a seismic shift” in
mortgage litigation, from state to federal courts, if any contract refers to HUD
regulations.
	See Rhode Island Fishermen’s All., 585 F.3d at 52. 	Congress has
“neither preempted state remedies in the field nor created a private federal right of
action to enforce the regulation.”
	See id. 	The absence of a federal private right of
action suggests that Congress did not intend for federal courts to exercise jurisdiction.
See Grable, 545 U.S. at 318. 	This doubt is underscored in the context of the
foreclosure litigation before the Court, where real property interests and contract
rights, which “are paradigms of state law concern” lie.
	Nash v. GMAC Mortg., LLC,
No. CA 10-493 S, 2011 WL 2470645, at *6 n.7 (D.R.I. May 18, 2011) (citing
Marks v.
Bank of Am., N.A., No. 03:10-CV08039PHXJAT, 2010 WL 2572988, at *7 (D. Ariz.
June 22, 2010)). Such controversies are generally relegated to state law.
See id. So
should this controversy.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Tablada’s Motion to Remand (ECF No. 8) is
GRANTED. This matter is REMANDED to the Rhode Island Superior Court sitting
in Wakefield, for the county of Washington. Rocket’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6)
is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Mary S. McElroy
United States District Judge
October 15, 2026
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