Villeda Alvarado v. Wesling et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
OSMAN VILLEDA ALVARADO,
Petitioner,
v.
DAVID WESLING, Acting Field Office
Director, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Boston Field
Office, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; DAVID J.
VENTURELLA, Senior Official
Performing the Duties of the Director,
U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; MARKWAYNE
MULLIN, Secretary, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security; TODD
BLANCHE, Acting U.S. Attorney
General; and MICHAEL NESSINGER,
Warden of Wyatt Detention Facility,
Respondents.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
C.A. No. 26-cv-306-JJM-PAS
ORDER
Before the Court is Mr. Villeda Alvarado’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees under
the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). 	For the following reasons, the Court
GRANTS the motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Mr. Villeda Alvarado filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on May14,
2026. 	ECF No. 1. 	On May 16, 2026, the Court granted his petition ordering his
release and a subsequent bond hearing before an immigration judge under 8 U.S.C.
Case 1:26-cv-00306-JJM-PAS Document 11 Filed 09/22/26 Page 1 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
§ 1226(a). 	ECF No. 5. 	On August 17, 2026, Mr. Villeda Alvarado filed a motion for
attorney’s fees under EAJA. ECF No. 7.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. Habeas Petitions Fall Within the Scope of EAJA as “Civil Actions”
Immigration habeas cases are ‘civil action[s]’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(A).
	See 	Saysana 	v. 	Gillen, 	614 	F.3d 	1 	(1st 	Cir. 	2010) 	(rejecting
government’s argument that habeas may be characterized as ‘civil’ in a general sense
but is not necessarily a “civil action” as used in the EAJA). 	EAJA “entitles a
prevailing party in certain civil actions against the United States to receive attorney's
fees, 	unless 	the 	government’s 	position 	was 	substantially 	justified 	or 	special
circumstances make an award unjust.”
Michel v. Mayorkas, 68 F.4th 74, 76 (1st Cir.
2023) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)). 	Here, Respondents do not contest that Mr.
Villeda Alvarado is a prevailing party within the meaning of EAJA or that the fees
requested were reasonable, but instead argue that habeas actions are not ‘civil
actions’ for the purposes of EAJA and that Respondents’ position in the underlying
action was substantially justified.
	See ECF No. 12. 	Moreover, other courts within
this circuit have determined that habeas actions are civil actions within the meaning
of EAJA. 1
	See Tuzolana v. Hyde, 2026 WL 1831597, at *2 (D. Mass. June 25, 2026);
Ndongala v. Wesling, 2026 WL 1534981, at *1 (D. Mass. June 1, 2026);
Orrego Orrego
1 The Court acknowledges the circuit split raised by the Respondents—where
the Fourth and Fifth Circuit courts have held habeas petitions fall outside the ambit
of the EAJA—but nevertheless sides with the thread of rulings in the Second, Third,
Ninth and Tenth Circuits not to mention the bulk of courts in this District.
Case 1:26-cv-00306-JJM-PAS Document 11 Filed 09/22/26 Page 2 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
v. Hyde, 2026 WL 1480362, at *1–2 (D. Mass. May 27, 2026) (“[h]abeas actions are
civil actions for the purposes of EAJA.”);
Arreaga Barrios v. Hyde, No. 26-cv-10336,
Dkt. 26 at 3 (D. Mass. July 6, 2026);
see also Cazeau v. Nessinger, No. 26-cv-166-
JJM-PAS, 	slip 	op. 	at 1 	(D.R.I. 	July 31, 	2026) 	(granting 	immigration 	habeas
petitioner’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs upon the petitioner’s filing of a
separate EAJA motion).2
B. Respondents Were Not Substantially Justified in Their Position
The Court is not convinced that Respondents were ‘substantially justified’ in
their position to erroneously detain Mr. Villeda Alvarado under § 1225(b)(2)(a). The
burden belongs to the Respondents to show that it “[i]s ‘substantially justified’ if ‘it
has a reasonable basis in law and fact’ for its position . . . or put another way, if ‘a
reasonable person could think [the Government’s position] correct.’”
	Michel v.
Maorkas, 68 F.4th at 78 (first quoting
Aronov v. Napolitano, 562 F.3d at 94; then
quoting
	Dantran, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 246 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2001)).
Respondent’s 	notion 	that 	mandatory 	detentions 	in 	the 	present 	context 	are
‘reasonable’ does not pass muster because it largely ignores the hundreds of decisions
in
this circuit that have rejected their position.3
	See also Tuzolana, 2026 WL
2 A pending appeal to the First Circuit seeks to precisely address this matter.
See Bernardo-Rodrigues v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-00553, 2026 WL 370863, at *2 (D. Me.
Feb. 10, 2026),
appeal docketed, No. 26-1375 (1st Cir. Apr. 9, 2026).
3
See,
e.g.,
Morales v. Hyde, No. 26-cv-093-JJM-PAS, 2026 WL 508811, at *1
(D.R.I. Feb. 24, 2025) (collecting cases from the District of Rhode Island);
Jimenez v.
FCI Berlin, Warden, 799 F. Supp. 3d 59, 66-67 (D.N.H. 2025);
Rocha v. Hyde, No. 25-
cv-12584-ADB, 2025 WL 2807692, at *1 n.2 (D. Mass. Oct. 2, 2025) (collecting cases
from the District of Massachusetts);
Chanaguano Caiza v. Scott, No. 1:25-cv-00500-
JAW, 2025 WL 2806416, at *3 (D. Me. Oct. 2, 2025) (collecting cases from the District
Case 1:26-cv-00306-JJM-PAS Document 11 Filed 09/22/26 Page 3 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
1831597, at *3 (“By the time the respondents detained Tuzolana, they understood
that District Judges throughout the First Circuit had repeatedly and (as far as the
Court is aware) uniformly rejected the view that the relevant immigration detention
statutes supported treating a noncitizen in Tuzolana’s position as a person subject to
automatic, mandatory detention without bond.”);
Ndongala, 2026 WL 1534981, at *3
(“In light of the flood of decisions in this District and beyond that had repeatedly
rejected it by the time the government took the position in this action, a reasonable
person could not think that the government's contrary position, which it first adopted
in early 2025, was correct.” (citations omitted)). The Court is unpersuaded by either
of the Respondent’s contentions and agrees with most courts that this is a civil action
and Respondents were not justified in their position.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court GRANTS Mr. Villeda Alvarado’s Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees and Costs under the EAJA. ECF No. 7. The Court awards Petitioner
attorney’s fees and expenses in the total amount of One Thousand Nine Hundred
Eighty-Four Dollars and Ninety-Six Cents ($1,984.96).
of Maine);
Aguilar-Linares v. Lyons, No. 26-1122 (GLS), 2026 WL 1031860, at *4
(D.P.R. Apr. 16, 2026) (collecting cases from the District of Puerto Rico)
Case 1:26-cv-00306-JJM-PAS Document 11 Filed 09/22/26 Page 4 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/John J. McConnell, Jr.
_________________________________
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR.
Chief Judge
United States District Court
September 22, 2026
Case 1:26-cv-00306-JJM-PAS Document 11 Filed 09/22/26 Page 5 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>