Johnson v. Leidholt et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
BRETT A. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MIKE LEIDHOLT, Secretary of
Corrections, in his individual and
official capacity, DARIN YOUNG, Chief
Warden, South Dakota Penitentiary
System, in his individual and official
capacity, BRENT FLUKE, Warden, Mike
Durfee State Prison, in his individual
and official capacity, and TAMMY
DOYLE, Unit Manager, Barracks, in her
individual and official capacity,
Defendants.
4:20-CV-04012-KES
1915A SCREENING ORDER
DIRECTING SERVICE AND DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Plaintiff, Brett A. Johnson, filed a pro se civil rights lawsuit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Docket 1. Johnson paid the full filing fee on January 21, 2020.
He also moves for appointment of counsel. Docket 2.
I. 	1915A Screening
A. 	Factual Background
The facts alleged in Johnson’s complaint (Docket 1) are: that he lives in
the Barracks at the Mike Durfee State Prison (“MDSP”). Docket 1 at 4. Johnson
believes that the “inadequate ventilation and lack of air conditioning combined
with the humidity from the showers has led to dangerous heat indexes and
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unsafe living conditions.” Id. Because of these living conditions, Johnson
suffers from migraines, extreme heat rash, “mental anguish, and misery.” Id.
Johnson seeks monetary damages of 1.1 million dollars and the installation of
air conditioning. Id. at 7.
B. 	Legal Standard
The court must assume as true all facts well pleaded in the complaint.
Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 36 (8th Cir. 1995). Civil rights and
pro se complaints must be liberally construed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007); Bediako v. Stein Mart, Inc., 354 F.3d 835, 839 (8th Cir. 2004). Even
with this construction, “a pro se complaint must contain specific facts
supporting its conclusions.” Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir.
1985); see also Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, 518 F. App’x 502, 504 (8th Cir.
2013). Civil rights complaints cannot be merely conclusory. Davis v. Hall, 992
F.2d 151, 152 (8th Cir. 1993); Parker v. Porter, 221 F. App’x 481, 482 (8th Cir.
2007).
A complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations . . . [but] requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). If it does not contain these bare essentials, dismissal is appropriate.
Beavers v. Lockhart, 755 F.2d 657, 663 (8th Cir. 1985). Twombly requires that
a complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all of the complaint’s
allegations are true.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Abdullah v.
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Minnesota, 261 F. App’x 926, 927 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that a complaint must
contain either direct or inferential allegations regarding all material elements
necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory). Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, the court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss them if they
“[are] (1) frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or (2) seek[] monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The court will now assess each individual
claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
C. 	Legal Analysis
1. 	Official Capacity Claims
Johnson sues defendants in their individual and official capacities.
Docket 1 at 2. Each defendant is employed by the South Dakota Department of
Corrections. Id. “[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is
not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office.”
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citing Brandon v. Holt,
469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985)). Thus, it is a suit against the state itself. While “[§]
1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties, . .
. it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a
State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties.” Id. at 66.
The Eleventh Amendment generally acts as a bar to suits against a state
for money damages unless the state has waived its sovereign immunity. Id. But
when an official capacity claim is asserted for injunctive relief against a state
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officer, the defense of qualified immunity does not apply. See Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242-43 (2009).
Here, Johnson requests that defendants in their official capacities install
air conditioning and seeks monetary damages of 1.1 million dollars. Docket 1
at 7. The state of South Dakota has not waived its sovereign immunity. Thus,
to the extent Johnson seeks to hold defendants liable in their official capacities
for money damages, the court finds that all of the defendants are protected by
sovereign immunity and are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Johnson’s
claim against defendants in their official capacities for money damages is
dismissed, but his claim against defendants in their official capacities for
injunctive relief survives § 1915A screening.
2. Individual Capacity Claims
Johnson claims that his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment is being violated because MDSP has inadequate
ventilation combined with the lack of air conditioning. Docket 1 at 4. “[T]he
Constitution ‘does not mandate comfortable prisons’; it prohibits ‘inhumane
ones.’ ” Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 445 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 83 (1994)). The Supreme Court has clarified that only
“extreme deprivations” that deny “the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis” of a Eighth Amendment
violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (internal quotation
omitted). The Supreme Court has listed as basic human needs “food, clothing,
shelter, medical care and reasonable safety.”
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32 (1993) (internal quotation omitted). In order to prevail on an Eighth
Amendment conditions of confinement claim, a prisoner must prove that: (1)
objectively, the deprivation was sufficiently serious to deprive him of the
minimal civilized measures of life's necessities, or to constitute a substantial
risk of serious harm to his health or safety; and (2) subjectively, the defendants
were deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm posed by the deprivation.
Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 875 (8th Cir.2004); Simmons v. Cook, 154
F.3d 805, 807 (8th Cir. 1998). An Eighth Amendment challenge to conditions of
confinement must examine the totality of the circumstances. Villanueva v.
George, 659 F.2d 851, 854 (8th Cir. 1981). Even if no single condition would be
unconstitutional in itself, the cumulative effect of prison conditions may
subject inmates to cruel and unusual punishment. Id.; see also Tyler v. Black,
865 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1989).
Here, Johnson claims that the ventilation is “inadequate” and the
barracks are subjected to “dangerous heat indexes[.]” Docket 1 at 4. Johnson
alleges that he suffers from migraines, extreme heat rash, and mental anguish.
Id. Johnson claims that defendants were “willfully negligen[t]” to the living
conditions. Id. at 2. He also claims that he has submitted grievances about the
heat and ventilation issues and has exhausted his administrative remedies. Id.
at 4. At the screening stage, filing a grievance may demonstrate that
defendants knew of and disregarded the allegedly unconstitutional conditions.
Johnson’s Eighth Amendment claims against defendants are sufficiently
pleaded to survive initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
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II. 	Motion for Appointment of Counsel
Johnson moves for appointment of counsel. Docket 2. “A pro se litigant
has no statutory or constitutional right to have counsel appointed in a civil
case.” Stevens v. Redwing, 146 F.3d 538, 546 (8th Cir. 1998). Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(1), “[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any person
unable to afford counsel.” When determining whether to appoint counsel to a
pro se litigant, the Eighth Circuit considers “the factual complexity of the case,
the ability of the indigent to investigate the facts, the existence of conflicting
testimony, the ability of the indigent to present his claim and the complexity of
the legal issues.” Abdullah v. Gunter, 949 F.2d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 1991)
(citing Johnson v. Williams, 788 F.2d 1319, 1322-23 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding
that the district court erred when it denied the plaintiff’s motion for counsel
solely because the plaintiff did not raise factually complex issues)). Here,
Johnson’s claims do not appear to be factually or legally complex. Because this
court believes Johnson can adequately present his claims at this time, his
motion for appointment of counsel (Docket 2) is denied.
Thus, it is ORDERED:
1. 	That Johnson’s motion for appointment of counsel (Docket 2) is
denied.
2. 	That Johnson’s Eighth Amendment claims (inadequate heat and
ventilation) against defendants in their official capacities (only for
injunctive relief) and in their individual capacities survives §1915A
screening. Johnson’s claim against defendants in their official
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capacities for money damages is dismissed under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
3. 	The Clerk shall send a blank summons form and Marshal Service
Form (Form USM-285) to Johnson so that he may cause the
complaint to be served upon the defendants.
4. 	Johnson shall complete and send the Clerk of Courts a separate
summons and USM-285 forms for the defendants. Upon receipt of
the completed summons and USM-285 forms, the Clerk of Court
will issue the summons. If the completed summons and USM-285
form are not submitted as directed, the complaint may be
dismissed.
5. 	The United States Marshal Service shall serve the completed
summonses, together with a copy of Docket 1 and this order, upon
defendants.
6. 	Defendants will serve and file an answer or responsive pleading
to the amended complaints and supplement on or before 21 days
following the date of service or 60 days if the defendants fall under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(2) or (3).
7. 	The clerk of the court is directed to send a copy of this order to the
appropriate official at Johnson’s institution.
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8. 	Johnson will keep the court informed of his current address at all
times. All parties are bound by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and by the court’s Local Rules while this case is pending.
Dated May 13, 2020.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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