Woodraska v. Young et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RICHARD JAMES WOODRASKA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DARIN YOUNG, CHIEF WARDEN, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY; MIKE LEIDHOLT,
CABINET SECRETARY, IN HIS
INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
JEREMY BAKER, SERGEANT, IN HIS
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; Z. LENTSCH,
SERGEANT, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL
CAPACITY; AND TAYLOR YOST, SCO, IN
HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY,
Defendants.
4:21-CV-04120-RAL
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, Richard James Woodraska, filed a pro se civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that the Defendants used excessive force against him during an altercation at the
South Dakota State Penitentiary. Doc. 1. This Court granted Woodraska leave to proceed in
forma pauperis and screened his complaint, dismissing his claims against defendants Darin
Young and Mike Leidholt and directing service of his complaint upon defendants Jeremy Baker,
Z. Lentsch, and Taylor Yost. Doc. 7. The Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment.
Doc. 15. Woodraska has also filed a motion for appointment of counsel and a motion to amend
his complaint. Docs. 14, 30. For the reasons explained below, this Court grants the Defendants'
motion for summary judgment.
I. Facts
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Woodraska alleges that on February 10, 2021, he was assaulted by Baker, Lentsch, and
Yost. Doc. 1 at 8-9. He alleges that Baker broke his leg and that Lentsch and Yost kneed him,
punched him, and twisted his leg after it was injured. Id. at 9, He also alleges that Yost told the
other two to kill him and that one of the officers placed his knee on Woodraska's neck, causing
him to pass out. Id, Woodraska claims that Lentsch slammed his head against a wall. Id. at 7. He
claims that the assault caused bruising to his face, and he required surgery for his broken leg. Id.
at 9. He also claims that he struggles with mental health issues as a result of the assault. Id. In
documentation attached to his complaint, Woodraska alleges that he was sprayed with five cans
of pepper spray and that he was not taken to the hospital following his injuries. Doc. 1-1 at 2.
The Defendants filed a statement of undisputed material facts, six affidavits, and a
memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment. Docs. 16, 17, 18,19,20,21,22,
23. The Defendants also filed a motion for a protective order staying discovery, a memorandum
in support of that motion, and a motion to seal exhibits. Docs. 24, 25, 26. This Court granted the
Defendants' motion for a protective order and motion to seal exhibits on November 17, 2021.
Doc. 27. Over three months later, Woodraska filed an objection to the motion for a protective
order and an objection to the affidavit of Matthew Van Otterloo, a South Dakota State
Penitentiary Correctional Officer who witnessed the altercation in question. See Docs. 28, 29. In
his objection to Van Otterloo's affidavit, Woodraska alleges that the "lies in [Van Otterloo's]
affidavid [sic]. . . will become apparent upon viewing of camera footage." Doc. 29 at 1.
Specifically, Woodraska claims that he never "shoved or pushed" Van Otterloo. Id. Other than
this objection, Woodraska did not respond to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Under Local Rule 56.1.B., a party opposing summary judgment "must respond to each
numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement of material facts with a separately
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numbered response and appropriate citations to the record." D.S.D. Civ. LR 56.1.B. Woodraska
has failed to respond to the Defendants' statement of undisputed material facts. Thus, under
Local Rule 56.1.D, all material facts set forth in the Defendants' statement of undisputed
material facts will be deemed admitted. D.S.D. Civ. LR 56.1,D. This Court will draw facts
primarily from that statement of undisputed material facts.
Baker and Lentsch went to collect a urine sample from Woodraska in the West Holding
Cell on the evening of February 10, 2021. See Doc. 23 ^ 12 (citations omitted). Woodraska
informed West Hall Officers that he was ready to produce a sample after "yelling at the top of his
lungs at staff." IdL ^ 14 (quoting Doc. 16-8 at 1). Baker, Lentsch, and Van Otterloo entered and
began uncuffmg Woodraska for the urine sample, at which point Woodraska ran out of his cell.
]A ^ 16 (citations omitted). Woodraska then attempted to lock Baker and Lentsch inside the cell.
Id ^ 17 (citations omitted). Woodraska next grabbed a nearby broomstick, swung it at the
officers, and "broke the end of the broom stick off by swinging it against the wall." Id. ^ 18-19
(quoting Doc. 16-1 at 2). Officer Stanley Knode, who was present at the time, called in a "triple
code red for an inmate with a weapon." Id ^ 22 (quoting Doc. 16-8 at 1). Woodraska was
ordered to drop the weapon, but he did not do so. Id ^ 23 (citations omitted). Officers then
sprayed Woodraska in the face with OC spray. IcL ^ 24 (citations omitted).
At this point, Baker grabbed Woodraska by his upper torso and "brought him to the
ground[.]" Id. ^ 26-27 (quoting Doc. 18^18). During this struggle, Woodraska and Baker
"bumped into a nearby ice machine" and fell to the ground. IcL 129 (quoting Doc. 18^21).
Woodraska continued to resist despite several orders to stop doing so, and Yost "deliver[ed] an
elbow strike to [Woodraska's] torso." l± ^ 36 (quoting 16-7 at 1). Yost was then able to control
Woodraska's arms and handcuff him. IdL ^ 37 (citations omitted). The officers involved all deny
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that anyone placed a knee on Woodraska's neck and caused him to pass out. IcL ^ 38 (citations
omitted). The Defendants also deny that they applied knee strikes to Woodraska's head or face or
punched him in his head or face. Id. ^ 40-41 (citations omitted).
On February 16, 2021, Woodraska spoke with AMG Orthopedics and Sports Medicine
staff about the incident and admitted that "he was instigated." Id ^ 47 (quoting Doc. 16-30 at 1).
He "admitted] that he took several swings at staff with a weapon" at a Restrictive Housing
Hearing on February 24, 2021. IdL ^ 48 (alteration in original) (quoting Doc. 16-13 at 3). During
his Disciplinary Hearing Officer hearing, Woodraska admitted that he threatened a non-inmate
with bodily harm and possessed a weapon. IcL ^ 49 (citations omitted).
Woodraska was seen after the melee by Health Services on February 11, 2021, and he
told nursing staff that Baker "landed on his right knee" during the fight. Id. ^31-32 (quoting
Doc. 16-17 at 1). Woodraska was seen by Health Services twice following the incident, and he
did not mention losing consciousness at either visit. Id ^ 39 (citations omitted). The photograph
ofWoodraska taken after the incident shows no injuries to his head or face and no bruising
around the bridge of his nose. Id ^ 42 (citing Doc. 16-3). Woodraska also did not mention
injuries to his head or face when seen by Health Services on February 10, 2021. Id. ^ 43
(citations omitted). Although Woodraska complained of pain in his right knee on February 10,
2021, his knee showed no swelling or deformity and only slight bruising on that day, and the
photograph taken of his knee that day shows no obvious injury. Id. ^ 44-46 (citations omitted).
Health Services ordered x-rays for Woodraska's right knee on February 11, 2021, the day
after the incident, because Woodraska continued to complain about pain in his knee, which had
become "very swollen and painful to touch[.]" IcL ^ 54 (quoting Doc. 16-17 at 1). The x-rays
revealed a tibial plateau fracture. Id ^ 55 (citations omitted). Tibial plateau fractures such as the
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one suffered by Woodraska are commonly caused by falls. Id. ^ 33-34. Woodraska was told not
to put weight on the leg and to avoid stairs, and nursing staff at the State Penitentiary called Dr.
Sultana and were told to "call ortho triage in the morning." Id. ^ 56-57 (quoting Doc. 16-20 at
1). On February 12, 2021, Dr. Krajca ofAMG Orthopedics and Sports Medicine reviewed the
imaging and determined that the injury did not require surgery. See id, ^ 58 (citations omitted).
Although Woodraska was not allowed crutches until he was no longer on safety watch because
of his use of a broom as a weapon, he was provided a wheelchair for transport. Id. ^ 61-62
(citations omitted).
At an appointment with AMG Orthopedics and Sports Medicine on February 16, 2021,
Woodraska said that he had been "weightbearing on his right lower extremity." Id Tj 60 (quoting
Doc. 16-30 at 1). Avera physicians determined at this time that Woodraska did need surgery for
his biee. Id ^ 63 (citations omitted). Woodraska underwent surgery on February 17, 2021, and
returned to the State Penitentiary that day. Id. ^ 64-65 (citations omitted). Five days later,
Woodraska was transported to the Emergency Department at Avera McKennan Hospital because
of worsening pain and continued swelling in his right leg. Id. ^ 66-67 (citations omitted). X-rays
performed at that time "show[edj good postoperative appearance [,]" and the attending physician
concluded that Woodraska's condition could be related to his anxiety regarding his leg. Id. ^ 69-
70 (first alteration in original) (quoting Doc. 16-35 at 3).
Future visits by Woodraska to AMG Orthopedics and Sports Medicine on March 9, 2021,
and April 20, 2021, showed that his knee was healing well. See id, ^ 72-77. Woodraska
performed strengthening exercises during physical therapy at the State Penitentiary in March and
April 2021 and had no complaints other than fatigue. Id. ^ 78-82. At a follow-up visit on June
22, 2021, AMG Orthopedics and Sports Medicine recommended Woodraska continue range of
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motion and strengthening exercises. I(L ^ 85 (citations omitted). Woodraska refused physical
therapy three times during August 2021, at which point his physical therapy was discontinued.
Id, <ffH 87-89 (citations omitted).
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper
when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56(a) places the burden on
the moving party to establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to
judgment as a matter of law. Id; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The
nonmoving party must establish that a material fact is genuinely disputed by either "citing to
particular parts of materials in the record" or "showing that the materials cited do not establish
the absence ... of a genuine dispute[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(l)(A), (B); see also Gacek v.
Owens & Minor Distrib., Inc., 666 F.3d 1142, 1145-46 C8th Cir. 2012) ('citine Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986)). A party opposing a properly supported motion
for summary judgment "may not rest upon mere allegations or denials" in his pleading but "must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Gacek, 666 F.3d at 1145-
46 (citing Anderson. 477 U.S. at 256); see also Moslev v. City ofNorthwoods, 415 F.3d 908,
910 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that a nonmovant may not merely rely on allegations or denials). In
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the facts and inferences fairly drawn from those facts
are "viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 d986) Cquoting United States v.
Diebold. Inc, 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam)).
III. Discussion
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A. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claim
The Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Woodraska's Eighth
Amendment excessive force claim. Doc. 16 at 5-6. "On summary judgment, a defendant official
is entitled to qualified immunity unless '(1) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right was
clearly established at the time of the deprivation.' " Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1116 (8th
Cir. 2014) (quoting Howard v. Kan City Police Dep't, 570 F.3d 984, 988 (8th Cir. 2009)).
Plaintiffs must establish both prongs to defeat qualified immunity. Greenman v. Jessen, 787 F.3d
882, 887 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing Nord v. Walsh County, 757 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2014)),
Courts may examine the prongs of a qualified immunity analysis in any order based on the
circumstances of each case. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Here, the Defendants
argue that Woodraska cannot demonstrate that a constitutional right has been violated. Doc. 16 at
5-6.
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners
from the "unnecessary and wanton infliction ofpain[.]" Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5
(1992) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). In considering an Eighth
Amendment claim for excessive force, the "core judicial inquiry .. . [is] whether force was
applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to
cause harm." Wilkins v. Gaddv, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (20W (-quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7).
In evaluating whether the force was reasonable and in good faith, courts may
consider the need for applying force, the relationship between that need and the
amount of force utilized, the threat the responsible officials reasonably perceived,
any efforts used to diminish the severity of a forceful response, and the extent of
the injury inflicted.
Walker v. Bowersox, 526 F.3d 1186, 1188 (8th Cir. 2008).
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The Defendants argue that the force used in this incident was not excessive because
"Woodraska was creating a disturbance that presented an obvious threat to the safety of staff."
Doc. 16 at 7 (citations omitted). The Defendants further argue that the force used was reasonable
because of the threat presented and that the seriousness of the injury suffered by Woodraska was
not foreseeable. Id. (citations omitted). Woodraska presents no evidence that the Defendants
acted "intentionally, maliciously, and sadistically" other than the allegations made in his
complaint. See Doc. 1 at 7. Rather, the evidence shows that Defendants acted reasonably and
applied force "in a good-faith effort to restore discipline" as required by Wilkins. See 559 U.S. at
37. After Woodraska had tried to enclose officers in the cell and grabbed a broomstick to swing
at officers, the Defendants used OC spray, grabbed Woodraska by the torso and brought him to
the ground, and struck him in the chest with an elbow. Doc. 23 ^ 17-19, 24, 26-27, 36. Although
Woodraska was injured during the altercation, the "extent of the injury inflicted" is only one
factor to be considered under Walker. See 526 F.3d at 1188. The Defendants were justified in
applying force because of the threat posed by Woodraska, and the force used was reasonable
given that Woodraska was using a broken broomstick as a weapon. See Doc. 23 ^ 18-20. Thus,
the force used by the Defendants was not excessive, and the Defendants did not violate
Woodraska's Eighth Amendment rights.
Woodraska also alleges that the Defendants failed to take him to the hospital after the
incident. Doc. 1-1 at 2. To the extent that this allegation falls under Woodraska's excessive force
claims, the Defendants argue that they had no medical training, were not medical staff, and were
The Defendants also note that there is a question regarding when and how Woodraska sustained
this injury. Doc. 16 at 17 n.3. Because the facts on summary judgment are viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, this Court will assume that Woodraska's leg was broken
during the altercation in question. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587-88.
8
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thus not responsible for decisions regarding Woodraska's medical treatment. Doc. 16 at 21. This
allegation is better construed as an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs claim.
To succeed on a deliberate indifference claim, Woodraska must show that (1) he suffered
"an objectively serious medical need" and (2) that the "defendants] actually knew of, but
deliberately disregarded, such need." McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974, 980 (8th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Vauehn v. Gray, 557 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir. 2008)). "An objectively serious medical
need is one that either has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or is so obvious
that even a 'layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.' " Jones v.
Minn. Dep't ofCorr.. 512 F.3d 478. 481 ('8th Cir. 2008) (-quoting Coleman v. Rahija, 1 14 F.3d
778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997)). "[A]ctual knowledge of a serious medical need may be inferred from
circumstantial evidence or from the very fact that the risk was obvious." Id. at 481-82 (citing
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994)). "It is sufficient to show that the 'defendant-
official being sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus "must have
known" about it.' " Letterman v. Does, 789 F.3d 856, 862 C8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Farmer, 511
U.S. at 842). If such knowledge is shown, the plaintiff must also show the defendants " 'knew
that their conduct was inappropriate in light of the risk to the prisoner." Id (quoting Krout v.
Goemmer, 583 F.3d 557, 567 (8th Cir. 2009)).
The plaintiffs burden to show deliberate indifference is greater than the burden to show
negligence. McCaster v. Clausen. 684 F.3d 740, 746 (8th Cir. 2012) Cciting Alberson v. Non-is,
458 F.3d 762, 765 (8th Cir. 2006)). The plaintiff must show that the defendant's mental state was
"akin to criminal recklessness." Id. (quotation omitted). When evaluating whether a defendant
displayed deliberate indifference to a plaintiffs serious medical needs, a court considers the
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defendant's "actions in light of the information [the defendant] possessed at the time, the
practical limitations of [the defendant's] position[,] and alternative courses of action that would
have been apparent to an official in that position." Letterman, 789 F.3d at 862 (quoting Gregoire
v. Class, 236 F.3d 413, 419 (8th Cir. 2000)). Examples of"[d]eliberate indifference may include
intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care, or intentionally interfering with
treatment or medication that has been prescribed." Pietrafeso v. Lawrence County, 452 F.3d 978,
983 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Vaughan v. Lacev, 49 F.3d 1344, 1346 (8th Cir. 1995)). "[M]ere
disagreement with treatment decisions does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation."
Laneford v. Norris. 614 F.3d 445, 460 C8th Cir. 2010) ('quotine Alberson, 458 F.3d at 765).
Here, Woodraska alleges that he suffered an objectively serious medical need, but he
makes no showing that the Defendants were aware of and deliberately indifferent to that need.
See Doc. 1-1 at 2. Woodraska again fails to name defendants who were responsible for his
medical care while in the State Penitentiary following the altercation. See Doc. 16 at 29. Further,
although Woodraska was not taken to the hospital immediately after the incident, he had x-rays
done the very next day, and AMG Orthopedics and Sports Medicine reviewed the imaging the
day after that. Doc. 23 ^ 54-55, 58. Ultimately, surgery was performed to repair Woodraska's
broken leg a week after he was injured. Id. ^ 64-65. Woodraska fails to allege that any named
defendant was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.
IV. Motion to Amend Complaint
Woodraska has filed a motion to amend his complaint, which the Defendants oppose.
Docs. 30, 31. Specifically, he seeks to add retaliation claims and to add Van Otterioo as a
defendant. Doc. 30. Because Woodraska filed his motion to amend more than 21 days after the
Defendants served him their answer, he cannot amend his pleading as a matter of course under
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(l). See Docs. 13, 30. Instead, his amended pleading
requires either the opposing party's consent or leave of the Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Thus,
because the Defendants oppose his motion to amend, Woodraska needs to have leave of the
Court to amend his complaint.
The Court "may not ignore the [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 15(a)(2)
considerations that favor affording parties an opportunity to test their claims on the merits."
United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, 752 F.3d 737. 743 C8th Cir. 2014) (quotine United
States ex rel. Roop v. Hypoeuard USA, Inc., 559 F.3d 818, 823-24 (8th Cir. 2009)). A court may
deny a party leave to amend "when there are compelling reasons 'such as undue delay, bad faith,
or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,
undue prejudice to the non-moving party, or futility of the amendment.' " Hammer v. City of
Osaee Beach, 318 F.3d 832, 844 f8th Cir. 2003) fquoting Becker v. Univ. of Neb., 191 F.3d 904,
907-08 (8th Cir. 1999)). Under Local Rule 15.1, "any party moving to amend a pleading must
attach a copy of the proposed amended pleading to its motion to amend with the proposed
changes highlighted or underlined so that they may be easily identified." D.S.D. Civ. LR 15.1.
Woodraska did not attach a copy of the proposed amended pleading to his motion to amend and
only briefly described the new claims and new party he seeks to add. See Doc. 30.
The Defendants argue that Woodraska's motion to amend his complaint should be denied
because he failed to comply with the local rules. Doc. 31 at 4. Defendants further argue that
granting Woodraska's motion would cause undue delay and prejudice. Id. at 5-6. Woodraska
failed to respond to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment and instead filed his motion
to amend over three months later. Docs. 15, 30. The Defendants argue that "Woodraska should
not now be allowed to circumvent their properly supported Motion for Summary Judgment by
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seeking leave to file an Amended Complaint." Doc. 31 at 5-6. The Defendants also argue that
Woodraska could not have exhausted his administrative remedies for claims of retaliatory
conduct that occurred after the start of this lawsuit. Id. at 6.
This Court denies Woodraska's motion to amend his complaint because it is not in
compliance with the Local Rules and because allowing Woodraska to amend at this late stage in
the proceedings would cause undue delay and prejudice the Defendants by requiring them to
further litigate these claims after summary judgment has been granted.
V. Conclusion and Order
Because Woodraska does not have a viable Eighth Amendment claim, the Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment. It is hereby
ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 15, is granted. It
is further
ORDERED that Woodraska's Motion to Amend Complaint, Doc. 30, is denied. It is
finally
ORDERED that Woodraska's Motion for Appointment of Counsel, Doc. 14, is denied as
moot.
DATED August 17, 2022.
BY THE COURT:
ROBERTO A. LANGE
CHIEF JUDGE
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