Leider v. Moeller et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
INDIAN LEIDER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DR. ARTHUR MOELLER, DO, Medical
Doctor, in his individual and official
capacity; OFFICER WILSON,
Correctional Officer, in his or her
individual and official capacity; CODY
HANSON, Unit Manager, in his
individual and official capacity; DAYNA
KLAWITTER, Registered
Nurse/Provider, in her individual and
official capacity,
Defendants.
4:22-CV-04006-KES
1915A SCREENING
Plaintiff, Indian Leider, an inmate at the South Dakota State
Penitentiary, filed a pro se petition pro se civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Docket 1. Leider paid his full filing fee on February 14, 2022. This
court will now screen Leider’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
I. 	1915A Screening
A. 	Factual Background
The facts alleged in Leider’s complaint are: that he was transported from
Mike Durfee State Prison to Avera Sacred Heart Hospital in Yankton, South
Dakota, on May 29, 2020. Id. at 5. Leider claims that a CT scan revealed that
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he had two mandibular fractures. Id. He claims that Dr. Arthur Moeller
performed surgery the next day, cutting open Leider’s neck and attaching
maxillary and mandibular arch bars and using 16 staples to close the incision.
Id. He also claims that this was the first incision of Dr. Moeller’s career. Id.
Leider alleges that he was given morphine shots to help with the pain. See id.
Leider states that he was examined the next day and complained of
severe, constant pain. Id. He also claims that there was a large gap between his
teeth on the left side. Id. Leider alleges that Dr. Moeller prescribed
hydrocodone, Tylenol, Motrin, and clindamycin. Id. He alleges that he was
discharged two days later and placed in the special housing unit under a
medical hold. Id. He also alleges that he was at a 10 out of 10 on the pain scale
when he was placed in the special housing unit. Id. at 6.
Leider claims that he was brought back to Dr. Moeller three days later for
an exam, where he was told that the wires in his jaw would be removed. Id. He
claims that he objected and felt that the wires should stay in place, but Dr.
Moeller removed them and replaced them with rubber bands. See id. Leider
also claims that he had questions about misalignment of his teeth, diet,
mouthwash, pain medication, antibiotics, pain and swelling which made sleep
unbearable, and oozing at the incision site. Id. Leider alleges that he tried to
ask these questions, but Correctional Officer Wilson, who brought him to the
exam, asked Dr. Moeller if Dr. Moeller was finished with the exam. Id. Leider
alleges that Dr. Moeller said yes, at which point Wilson grabbed Leider, pulled
him off the exam chair, and pushed him towards the door. Id. Leider also
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alleges that Dr. Moeller said he would talk to Health Services about pain
medication as Leider was being pushed out the door. Id.
Leider alleges that he was told by a nurse during med pass at the State
Prison later that day that his pain medication prescription was out. Id. He
claims that he asked about Dr. Moeller following up with Health Services, and
a nurse told him that “its [sic] up to our provider to allow you to have them in
here.” Id. He claims that he filed a grievance, and the official response was that
both providers encouraged him to continue on his current pain medication
plan, which he alleges was different from the medication list prescribed by Dr.
Moeller. See id. at 6-7. Leider alleges that he was left in an empty cell in the
special housing unit for weeks without his prescribed pain medication. Id. He
also alleges that the documented provider on shift was Dayna Klawitter, RN,
although he does not specify the exact times and dates during these weeks that
Klawitter was on shift. See id.
Leider claims that he was written up on June 9, 2020, for his behavior at
the follow-up exam with Dr. Moeller. Id. He claims that Wilson wrote a
transport report that described Leider’s verbal frustration regarding how
Wilson grabbed and pushed him at the end of the exam. Id. Leider also claims
that Wilson accused him of being insolent towards hospital staff. Id. Leider
alleges that this write-up did not accurately describe his interactions with
hospital staff because he only asked “concerning questions about his painful
condition.” Id. He also alleges that this write-up caused him to be transferred
to the Sioux Falls State Penitentiary on June 15, 2020. See id.
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Leider claims that he feared an attack from other inmates1 in the unit at
the State Penitentiary where he was to be housed. Id. He claims that he sought
to be transferred from his assigned housing unit to the west unit, which he
believed had “a more stable inmate population[.]” Id. at 7-8. Leider alleges that
Unit Manager Cody Hanson refused this transfer, forcing Leider to refuse
housing for his own safety. Id. at 8. Leider also alleges that he was written up
for refusing housing and was placed in the special housing unit from June 16,
2020, until June 22, 2020, at which point he was transferred to the west unit.
Id.
Leider states that he was transferred to the River Ridge Oral and
Maxillofacial Surgical Center in Sioux Falls on June 26, 2020, after repeated
complaints and requests to Health Services. Id. He claims that he was
examined by Dr. Andrew Hille at the Surgical Center, who recommended
immediate surgery to remove the existing hardware from Leider’s jaw. Id. He
also claims that Health Services noted several symptoms that day, including a
pocket of fluid in his lower left jaw from an infection following his surgery, his
difficulty swallowing, and bleeding in his gums. Id. at 8-9. Leider alleges that
he still was unable to sleep and had extreme pain while eating on June 29,
2020, 30 days after his surgery. Id. at 9. He alleges that he was taking Tylenol
1 In his complaint, Leider writes that he “feared attack by associates of him
whom had attacked Plaintiff causing the fractures of his jaw[.]” Docket 1 at 7. It
is unclear if Leider is claiming that he feared associates of his who had
attacked him or that he feared associates of those who had attacked him. See
id. In other words, it is unclear if he alleges that he was to be housed with his
attackers or that he was to be housed with associates of his attackers. See id.
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and ibuprofen at this time, which provided no relief. Id. He also alleges that the
hardware along his lower gums was being buried by surrounding tissue on
July 7, 2020, and that he had to push back the hardware to prevent this. Id.
He also claims that the rubber bands had all snapped off by this point. Id.
Leider claims that Dr. Hille performed a second surgery on July 15,
2020, to correct the harm caused by Dr. Moeller’s surgery. Id. He claims that
he interacted with Chief Warden Darin Young several times over the next nine
days and that he told Young he’d like to be transferred back to his home state
of Montana. Id. at 10. Leider also claims that he told Young he’d like to sue Dr.
Moeller, but Young warned him that if he sued Dr. Moeller in his official
capacity, Leider would be suing Young, too. Id. Leider alleges that Young
threatened not to allow his transfer to Montana and to oppose his parole if he
sued Dr. Moeller in his official capacity. Id.
Leider brings claims against all defendants in their individual and official
capacities for violating his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment. Id. at 2, 4. He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief,
although he does not specify the injunctive relief sought. Id. at 14. He also
seeks an unspecified amount of damages “to be determined by competent
appointed counsel.” Id.
B. 	Legal Background
The court must assume as true all facts well pleaded in the complaint.
Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 36 (8th Cir. 1995). Pro se and civil
rights complaints must be liberally construed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
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94 (2007); Bediako v. Stein Mart, Inc., 354 F.3d 835, 839 (8th Cir. 2004). Even
with this construction, “a pro se complaint must contain specific facts
supporting its conclusions.” Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir.
1985) (citation omitted); see also Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, 518 F. App’x 502,
504 (8th Cir. 2013).
A complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations . . . [but] requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (internal citations omitted). If it does not contain these bare essentials,
dismissal is appropriate. See Beavers v. Lockhart, 755 F.2d 657, 663 (8th Cir.
1985). Twombly requires that a complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption
that all of the allegations in the complaint are true[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(internal citation omitted); see also Abdullah v. Minnesota, 261 F. App’x 926,
927 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that a “complaint must contain either direct or
inferential allegations respecting all material elements necessary to sustain
recovery under some viable legal theory”). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court
must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss them if they “(1) [are] frivolous,
malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2)
seek[] monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The court will now assess each individual claim under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A.
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C. 	Legal Analysis
1. Official Capacity Claims for Money Damages
Leider brings claims against all defendants in their official capacities.
Docket 1 at 2. All defendants were employees of the state of South Dakota at
the times in question except for Dr. Moeller, who had a contract with the state
to provide dental services at the time.2 See id. “[A] suit against a state official in
his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit
against the official's office.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989) (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985)). Thus, it is a suit
against the state itself. While “[§] 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy
many deprivations of civil liberties, . . . it does not provide a federal forum for
litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil
liberties.” Id. at 66.
The Eleventh Amendment generally acts as a bar to suits against a state
for money damages unless the state has waived its sovereign immunity. Id.
Here, Leider requests both money damages and injunctive relief. The state of
South Dakota has not waived its sovereign immunity. Thus, Leider’s claims for
money damages against all defendants in their official capacities are dismissed
without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and 1915A(b)(2).
2 Because Dr. Moeller was a private actor that had contracted with the state to
provide medical services, he acted under color of state law and can be sued
under § 1983. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 n.14 (1988).
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2. 	Eighth Amendment Medical Care Claims
Leider brings claims for inadequate medical care in violation of his
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. See
Docket 1 at 4-10. Construing his complaint liberally, these are claims for
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against all defendants. See id.
“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). “This is true whether the indifference is
manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by
prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or
intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Id. at 104-05
(footnotes omitted). “This conclusion does not mean, however, that every claim
by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a
violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 105. “[A] prisoner must allege acts
or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs.” Id. at 106. Allegations of negligence will not suffice, nor will
mere disagreement with treatment decisions. Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094,
1096 (8th Cir. 2000).
The deliberate indifference standard includes both an objective and
subjective component. Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir.
1997) (citing Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997)). The
plaintiff “must demonstrate (1) that [he] suffered objectively serious medical
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needs and (2) that the prison officials actually knew of but deliberately
disregarded those needs.” Id. (citing Coleman, 114 F.3d at 784). “A serious
medical need is ‘one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring
treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’ ” Coleman, 114 F.3d at 784
(quoting Camberos v. Branstad, 73 F.3d 174, 176 (8th Cir. 1995)). To be liable
for deliberately disregarding medical needs, “the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Leider fails to state claims against Dr. Moeller, Klawitter, Wilson, and
Hanson for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Leider alleges
that Dr. Moeller performed surgery on him, that Dr. Moeller had not performed
this type of surgery before, and that the outcome of the surgery was poor. See
Docket 1 at 5-10. While Leider does demonstrate objectively serious medical
needs, he fails to show that Dr. Moeller deliberately disregarded those needs as
required under Dulany. At most, Leider alleges negligence on the part of Dr.
Moeller, and Jolly is clear that mere negligence is not sufficient to show a
constitutional violation. Further, although he alleges that he was denied
hydrocodone by Klawitter, he does not allege that Klawitter deliberately
disregarded his needs. See id. at 6-7. He was still treated with other pain
medication, and his claim is a mere disagreement with treatment decisions
under Jolly. To the extent that Leider brings claims against Wilson and
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Hanson, he alleges no facts regarding their connection to his medical care. See
id. at 5-11. Thus, Leider’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs claims against Dr. Moeller, Klawitter, Wilson, and Hanson are
dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1).
3. 	Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claims
Construing his complaint liberally, Leider brings claims against all
defendants for excessive force in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment against all defendants. See Docket 1
at 4, 6-7. The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment protects prisoners from the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). In considering an Eighth Amendment claim for excessive
force, the “core judicial inquiry . . . [is] whether force was applied in a good-
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to
cause harm.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (quoting Hudson, 503
U.S. at 7). To determine whether force was used in good faith, “courts may
consider the need for applying force, the relationship between that need and
the amount of force utilized, the threat the responsible officials reasonably
perceived, any efforts used to diminish the severity of a forceful response, and
the extent of the injury inflicted.” Walker v. Bowersox, 526 F.3d 1186, 1188
(8th Cir. 2008) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7).
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Leider successfully states a claim for excessive force against Wilson. He
alleges that Wilson “squeezed[,] jerked[,] and pushed” him from Dr. Moeller’s
office to the transport vehicle. Docket 1 at 7. He also alleges that he was in
intense pain at this time and that the only actions he took to prompt Wilson’s
actions were to ask about his medical condition. Id. at 6-7. Although Leider
does not allege that he was injured by Wilson other than suffering pain, he
alleges that no good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline was necessary
because he was not doing anything disruptive. See id. Thus, the court cannot
conclude that Leider’s claim against Wilson is wholly without merit. Leider’s
Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Wilson in his or her individual
capacity and in his or her official capacity for injunctive relief survive § 1915A
screening. Leider alleges no facts regarding excessive force used by Dr. Moeller,
Hanson, or Klawitter. His excessive force claims against Dr. Moeller, Hanson,
and Klawitter are dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
4. 	Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement Claims
Construing his complaint liberally, Leider brings claims for conditions of
confinement in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment against all defendants. See id. at 4, 7-8. To
sufficiently allege that the conditions of confinement violate the Eighth
Amendment, Leider must assert that the alleged deprivation resulted “in the
denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” and that prison
officials were deliberately indifferent to “an excessive risk to inmate health or
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safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837 (internal quotation omitted); see also
Dalrymple v. Dooley, 2014 WL 4987596, at *5 (D.S.D. Oct. 6, 2014). First,
under the objective component, an inmate must show that a condition of
confinement “pose[s] an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future
health” or safety. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993). The Supreme
Court has listed “food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety”
as minimal civilized measures. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989).
Second, under the subjective component, the inmate must show that the
defendant prison officials “act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind” in
relation to the prison condition. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (alteration in original)
(quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). A “ ‘should-have-known’
standard . . . is not sufficient to support a finding of deliberate indifference[.]”
Spruce v. Sargent, 149 F.3d 783, 786 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at
837). A prisoner need not show that the prison official acted with “the very
purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm [would] result.” Farmer,
511 U.S. at 835. A prisoner need only show that the prison official knew of and
disregarded “an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837. This
“subjective approach to deliberate indifference does not require a prisoner
seeking ‘a remedy for unsafe conditions [to] await a tragic event [such as an]
actua[l] assaul[t] before obtaining relief.’ ” Id. at 845 (alterations in original)
(quoting Helling, 509 U.S. at 33-34).
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Leider successfully states claims for conditions of confinement in
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights against Hanson. He alleges that he
was to be housed either with inmates who had previously assaulted him or
with inmates who were associates of those who had previously assaulted him.
See Docket 1 at 7. These inmates posed an unreasonable risk of serious
damage to his future health. He also alleges that he complained to Hanson and
asked Hanson to transfer him to the west unit because of the danger posed by
his housing assignment. Id. at 8. Thus, Hanson knew of the risk to Leider’s
safety. Although Leider was placed in the special housing unit and was not
subjected to the threat posed by his initial housing assignment, he alleges that
this placement was a punishment, rather than an effort to address the
dangerous condition, and that he was written up for it. See id. Because the
Eighth Amendment is concerned with cruel and unusual punishment, a
punishment for refusing a dangerous housing condition does not negate
deliberate indifference towards that condition. Leider’s Eighth Amendment
conditions of confinement claims against Hanson in his individual capacity and
in his official capacity for injunctive relief survive § 1915A screening.
To the extent that Leider brings these claims against Dr. Moeller, Wilson,
and Klawitter, he alleges no facts regarding their role in the conditions of his
confinement. His conditions of confinement claims against Dr. Moeller, Wilson,
and Klawitter are dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
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Thus, it is ORDERED:
1. 	That Leider’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against
Officer Wilson in his or her individual capacity and in his or her
official capacity for injunctive relief survive § 1915A screening.
2. 	That Leider’s Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims
against Cody Hanson in his individual capacity and in his official
capacity for injunctive relief survive § 1915A screening.
3. 	That all of Leider’s remaining claims against all defendants are
dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii)
and 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
4. 	That the Clerk shall send blank summons forms and Marshal Service
Form (Form USM-285) to Leider so that he may cause the complaint
to be served upon defendants Wilson and Hanson.
5. 	That Leider shall complete and send the Clerk of Court a separate
summons and USM-285 form for defendants Wilson and Hanson.
Upon receipt of the completed summons and USM-285 forms, the
Clerk of Court will issue the summons. If the completed summons
and USM-285 form are not submitted as directed, the complaint
may be dismissed.
6. 	The 	United 	States 	Marshal 	Service 	shall 	serve 	the 	completed
summonses, together with a copy of the complaint (Docket 1) and
this order, upon defendants Wilson and Hanson.
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7. 	Defendants Wilson and Hanson will serve and file an answer or
responsive pleading to the complaint on or before 21 days following
the date of service or 60 days if the defendants fall under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(a)(2) or (3).
8. 	Leider will keep the court informed of his current address at all
times. All parties are bound by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and by the court’s Local Rules while this case is pending.
Dated March 21, 2022.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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