Huff v. City of Brookings Police Department et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
REGGIE D. HUFF, 4:22-CV-4020-LLP
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF BROOKINGS POLICE DEPT.,
DAWN M. ELSHERE,DAVID ERICKSON,
JOEL PERRY,SEAN DOREMUS, MARISSA
D. MARSHALL,RICHELLE GUERRIERI,
THE SDSU FOUNDATION,STEVE
ERPENBACH,and JANE «&/0R JOHN DOES,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY
FEES
Defendants,
and
DAWN M.ELSHERE,
Nominal Defendant.
Defendants City of Brookings Police Department, David Erickson, Joel Perry, Sean
Doremus, and Marissa Marshall moved for an award of attorney fees and sales tax incurred in
defending Huffs lawsuit. (Doc. 66.) A hearing on the motion was held before this Court on
January 18, 2023. Lawyers James Moore and Seth Lopour appeared on behalf of the defendants
who are requesting attorney fees. Lawyer Richard Williams appeared on behalf of the SDSU
Foundation and Steve Erpenbach, although those defendants are not requesting attorney fees.
Plaintiff Reggie Huff appeared pro se and he argued in opposition to the motion for attorney fees.
The background is set forth in a prior Opinion ofthis Court and it will not be repeated here.
(Doc. 116.)
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Defendants City of Brookings Police Department, David
Erickson, Joel Perry, Sean Doremus, and Marissa Marshall ask for an award of attorney fees and
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sales tax incurred in defending Huffs lawsuit, which fees and tax currently total $3,554.17 for
Marshall and $10,422.89 for the Brookings Defendants. (Doc. 66.) The motion is supported by
an Affidavit of James E. Moore(Doc. 67), an Affidavit of Marissa Marshall(Doc. 70), and a brief.
(Doc. 68.) These defendants argue that Huffs § 1983 claim against them was legally and factually
insufficient to survive dismissal, and that the nature of his case and the way he prosecuted it
without respect for the Court, the parties, or the process, make his conduct vexatious. (Doc. 68.)
Judge Elshere concurs with the arguments made by the defendants in support of an award of fees,
but she declined to file her own motion for attorney fees at this time because ofthe general practice
of the Unified Judicial System (UJS) of the State of South Dakota to avoid making claims for
attorney's fees against the state's citizens. (Doc. 71.)
Huff opposes an award of attorney fees. (Doc. 74 and Doc. 82.) He does not challenge the
rates charged or the hours expended by the lawyers. Rather, he argues that the Court has refused
to "hear" his case, and thus the case has not been litigated and the defendants are not prevailing
parties entitled to fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. However, it is clear that the defendants are
prevailing parties.
"The statute involved here, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, allows the award of'a reasonable attorney's
fee' to 'the prevailing party' in various kinds of civil rights cases, including suits brought under §
1983." Fox V. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 832-33 (2011). Under § 1988(b), a federal district court may
"award attorney's fees to a defendant'upon a finding that the plaintiffs action was frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation.'"Id. at 833(quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,
434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978); see also Flowers v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 49 F.3d 391, 392 (8th Cir.
1995)(same). This high standard for awarding attorney fees to prevailing defendants is applied
with particular strictness in cases where the plaintiff proceeds pro se, and "attorney's fees should
rarely be awarded against such plaintiffs." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 15 (1980).
Furthermore, "[t]he Supreme Court has cautioned that 'a district court [must] resist the
understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff
did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation.'"Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm 'n v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 944 F.3d 750,756(8th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 421-22). "So long as the plaintiff has 'some
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basis' for the discrimination claim, a prevailing defendant may not recover attorneys' fees." Id.
(citation omitted).
Defendants' motions to dismiss were granted based on the Complaint's failure to
sufficiently set forth a claim for relief under § 1983. While the Court concluded that the allegations
of Huffs Complaint did not rise to the level of stating a plausible § 1983 claim, this is not
equivalent to finding that Huffs claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation. Though the Court finds no merit to Huffs claims, the Court recognizes Huffs
apparent inability to be objective about the merits because he believes that Defendants, including
the state court judge. Defendant Elshere, as well as subsequently this Court and the lawyers for
the moving Defendants, were working together to violate his constitutional rights. The Supreme
Court requires the Court to consider Huffs pro se status, and to apply the test for awarding attorney
fees with particular strictness. Though it is a close call, the Court concludes that the circumstances
of this case do not meet the demanding standard for imposing attorney fees on a pro se civil rights
plaintiff. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' motion for attomey fees is denied. (Doc. 66.)
a ^
Dated this day of January, 2023.
BY THE COURT:
KouSdUiLL
^^awrence L. Piersol '
United States District Judge
ATTEST:
MATTHEW W. THELEN,CLERK
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