Benfield v. Patterson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
CHAD ANTHONY BENFIELD,
Plaintiff,
v.
MATTHEW PATTERSON,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No.: 	2:25-CV-40-TAV-CRW
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, a prisoner housed at the Carter County Detention Center (“Jail”) during all
relevant times, was permitted to proceed in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
on a claim that his inability to attend congregational worship services at the Jail violated
his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) [See Doc. 6, pp. 8–11]. 	Before the
Court is Defendant Matthew Patterson’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or for
summary judgment [Doc. 30], which is accompanied by exhibits [Docs. 30-1, 30-2] and a
memorandum in support [Doc. 31]. 	Plaintiff has not responded to the motion, and the
deadline to do so has passed. See E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.1. Consistent with the Court’s Local
Rules, the Court finds Plaintiff has waived opposition to the sought relief. See E.D. Tenn.
L.R. 7.2. 	Further, upon consideration of the Parties’ pleadings, the evidence presented,
and the applicable law, the Court finds Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [Doc.
30] should be GRANTED and this action DISMISSED.
I. 	SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings and evidence, viewed in a
Case 2:25-cv-00040-TAV-CRW Document 35 Filed 10/16/26 Page 1 of 13 PageID
#: <pageID>

2
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, illustrate that no genuine issue of material
fact exists, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 	Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a),(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). 	A fact is deemed
“material” if resolving that fact in favor of one party “might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To
establish an entitlement to summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that the
nonmoving party cannot establish an essential element of his case for which he bears the
ultimate burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Moore v. Philip Morris Cos.,
Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 339 (6th Cir. 1993).
Once the motion is properly supported with competent evidence, the nonmovant
must show that summary judgment is inappropriate by setting forth specific facts showing
there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. If
the “evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,”
then there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If no proof
is presented, however, the Court does not presume that the nonmovant “could or would
prove the necessary facts.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)
(citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n., 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)). 	Thus, to successfully
oppose a motion for summary judgment, “the non-moving party . . . must present sufficient
evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for him.” Jones v. Muskegon Cnty., 625
F.3d 935, 940 (6th Cir. 2010).
But when a motion for summary judgment is based on a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust
his administrative remedies, the defendant bears the burden of proof. 	Surles v. Andison,
Case 2:25-cv-00040-TAV-CRW Document 35 Filed 10/16/26 Page 2 of 13 PageID
#: <pageID>

3
678 F.3d 452, 458 (6th Cir. 2012). And “[i]n cases where the party moving for summary
judgment also bears the burden of persuasion at trial, the party’s initial summary judgment
burden is higher in that it must show that the record contains evidence satisfying the burden
of persuasion and that the evidence is so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to
disbelieve it.” 	Id. at 455–56 (citing Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036,
1056 	(6th 	Cir. 	2001) 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted)). 	Accordingly, 	when
non-exhaustion is raised as a defense, “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate only if
defendants establish the absence of a ‘genuine dispute as to any material fact’ regarding
non-exhaustion.” Id. at 456 (citing Risher v. Lappin, 649 F.3d 236, 240 (6th Cir. 2011)).
II. 	UNDISPUTED FACTS
Plaintiff was housed at the Jail from August 2017 until July 2025, when he was
transferred to the Bledsoe County Correctional Complex (“BCCX”) [Doc. 30-2 ¶¶ 3, 17].
At various times during his incarceration in the Jail, Plaintiff was housed in the protective
custody (“PC”) unit because he is a sex offender and was labeled “a snitch” by inmates in
general population [Doc. 2, p. 4; Doc. 30-2 ¶ 10, p. 41]. 	Assignment to the PC unit is
voluntary, and any inmate on PC can obtain reassignment to general population if he
chooses [Doc. 30-2 ¶ 9]. Inmates in PC are always segregated from contact with inmates
in general population for their safety [Id.].
Inmates 	in 	general 	population 	are 	permitted 	to 	attend 	in-person 	religious
services—essentially in-person group Bible study—staffed by outside church volunteers,
but inmates in PC are not permitted to attend the congregational services [Doc. 2, p. 4;
Doc. 30-2 ¶ 11]. Aggrieved by this, Plaintiff filed a grievance and was told that he would
Case 2:25-cv-00040-TAV-CRW Document 35 Filed 10/16/26 Page 3 of 13 PageID
#: <pageID>

4
have to sign off PC and go to general population if he wanted to attend congregational
church services [Doc. 2, p. 4]. Otherwise, Plaintiff was told, he would be provided a Bible
[Id.].
Inmates in PC are not allowed to attend the general population in-person services
for a variety of reasons [Doc. 30-2 ¶ 12]. One, mixing PC inmates with general population
inmates puts PC inmates—who have usually expressed a concern about their safety in
general population—at greater risk of assault [Id.]. Two, mixing PC inmates and general
population inmates also puts correctional officers’ safety at greater risk, because it
increases the likelihood of inmate-on-inmate violence, which in turn subjects any officer
who might have to intercede into such incidents at risk of assault [Id.]. 	And three, the
process of permitting in-person Bible study or worship services with volunteers is
time-consuming and taxing on corrections staff, who must break the approximately 200
general population prisoners into several smaller groups for security purposes [Id.]. The
manpower of the Jail consists of approximately six corrections officers working at any
given time [Id.]. To then add more than 40 PC inmates, who would have to be segregated
from the general population inmates, would require multiple, additional smaller sessions
of in-person study and create a borderline unmanageable strain on the Jail’s staff and
resources [Id.].
On January 15, 2025, Plaintiff submitted a grievance regarding the lack of religious
service/in-person Bible study sessions in PC [Id. ¶ 13]. On the same day, the Jail denied
the grievance [Id. ¶ 14, p. 42]. Plaintiff states that he filed an appeal from his grievance
[Doc. 2, p. 2]. But neither the Sheriff nor the Jail ever received an appeal of the grievance
Case 2:25-cv-00040-TAV-CRW Document 35 Filed 10/16/26 Page 4 of 13 PageID
#: <pageID>

5
by Plaintiff [Doc. 30-2 ¶ 15]. 	And Plaintiff has not provided any records or other
documentary proof that he submitted an appeal [See Doc. 30-1 ¶¶ 11, 21, pp. 22, 26].
Plaintiff was always free to practice his religion, and the Jail never took any steps
to hinder his practice [Doc. 30-2 ¶ 16]. 	In fact, a minister, clergy, or other volunteer
affiliated with the previously referenced in-person Bible study sessions could visit Plaintiff
at any time during visiting hours for in-person Bible study or other religious activities upon
request by Plaintiff [Id.]. But Plaintiff never made any such request [Id.].
Plaintiff is no longer an inmate at the Jail. He was transferred to the Bledsoe County
Correctional Complex in July 2025 [Doc. 30-2 ¶ 17]. 	He was later transferred to the
Hardeman County Correctional Facility in Whiteville, Tennessee, where he remains
housed [Doc. 28].
III. 	LAW AND ANALYSIS
Defendant contends that he is entitled to (1) judgment on the pleadings under Rule
12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to
indicate that Patterson took any action that could arguably violate Plaintiff’s right to
religious freedom [Doc. 31 p. 6; citing, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (“The factual allegations [of the complaint],
assumed to be true, must do more than create speculation or suspicion of a legally
cognizable cause of action; they must show entitlement to relief.”); (2) a grant of summary
judgment because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), prior to filing suit [Id. at 7–11];
and (3) qualified immunity as to any claims against him individually [Id. at 11–13].
Case 2:25-cv-00040-TAV-CRW Document 35 Filed 10/16/26 Page 5 of 13 PageID
#: <pageID>

6
Defendant also contends that Plaintiff cannot show a custom or policy of Carter County
that was deliberately indifferent to his constitutional rights [Id. at 13–17], he cannot
demonstrate a violation of his First Amendment rights or of RLUIPA [Id. at 17–22], and
Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is moot given his transfer to another facility [Id. at
23].
Although Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant’s motion, he filed his complaint
under penalty of perjury [Doc. 2 p. 9]. Therefore, the Court treats Plaintiff’s complaint as
an opposing affidavit. See El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 414 (6th Cir. 2008) (recognizing
that a “verified complaint . . . carries the same weight as would an affidavit for the purposes
of summary judgment”).
The Court will first address the issue of exhaustion before turning to a consideration
of whether Plaintiff can demonstrate a violation of his rights under the First Amendment
or RLUIPA. 	Because Plaintiff’s case may be resolved upon consideration of these two
matters, the Court declines to address Defendant’s remaining arguments.
A. 	Exhaustion
The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined
in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are
available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The requirements of exhaustion are not
set out in the PLRA itself. Rather, to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, an inmate must
properly complete the grievance procedures put forward by his correctional institution,
including any procedural rules and deadlines. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006);
Case 2:25-cv-00040-TAV-CRW Document 35 Filed 10/16/26 Page 6 of 13 PageID
#: <pageID>

7
see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (“It is the prison’s requirements . . . that
define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”). 	Moreover, exhaustion is mandatory,
regardless of the type of relief sought, or whether such relief can be granted through the
administrative process. 	See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 641 (2016). 	Therefore,
“exhaustion is required even if the prisoner subjectively believes the remedy is not
available; even when the state cannot grant the particular relief requested; and ‘even where
[the prisoners] believe the procedure to be ineffectual or futile[.]’” Napier v. Laurel Cnty.,
636 F.3d 218, 222 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal citations and citations omitted).
The Jail’s procedures permit inmates to make requests and file grievances on the
kiosk system [Doc. 30-2 ¶ 4]. 	Requests and grievances each have their own procedures
and forms [Id.]. 	The separate policies for submitting a request and for submitting a
grievance were in place and made known to Plaintiff when he was first incarcerated in
August 2017 [Id.]. Plaintiff was provided a copy of the inmate grievance procedures upon
his admission to the Jail in August 2017 [Id. ¶ 4, pp. 8–40]. 1
The kiosks are made known and taught to the inmates when they are first
incarcerated [Doc. 30-2 ¶ 5]. In addition to submitting requests, grievances, and appeals
via the kiosks, inmates may use the kiosks for everyday matters, including permitting
inmates to access their accounts, make commissary requests, schedule visitations, etc. [Id.].
The kiosks permit inmates to access the policies, procedures, and forms in the Inmate
1 The Inmate Handbook filed by Defendant as an exhibit has the date of June 2024 on it,
but that is because the Inmate Handbook was updated at that time in areas unrelated to inmate
requests and grievances [Doc. 30-2 ¶ 4]. The procedures regarding requests and grievances have
remained unchanged since Plaintiff was first jailed in 2017 [Id.].
Case 2:25-cv-00040-TAV-CRW Document 35 Filed 10/16/26 Page 7 of 13 PageID
#: <pageID>

8
Handbook [Id.]. 	The Inmate Handbook provided to Plaintiff in 2017 has separate
categories for inmate request procedures and inmate grievance procedures [Id. ¶ 16].
To follow the required grievance procedure at the Jail, inmates “must completely
fill out the [grievance] form and submit it electronically through the kiosk machine” [Doc.
30-2 ¶ 7, p. 26]. The inmates are also notified, upon receipt of the grievance, the incident
will be assigned to an officer for investigation and the findings forwarded to the Jail
administrator [Id.]. Under the Jail’s procedure, the inmate should receive a response within
ten working days [Id.]. If the grievance cannot be satisfactorily answered within 10 days,
the inmate will receive a temporary response at that time that explains the delay [Id.]. In
such circumstances, “the inmate will receive a response within thirty days of submitting
the grievance form” [Id.].
The Jail also has an appeal process for a grievance that results in an unsatisfactory
answer to the inmate [Doc. 30-2 ¶ 8, p. 26]. That process requires as follows:
If an inmate is not satisfied with the response given, then the inmate may file
a grievance appeal to the Sheriff or his designee within three (3) days of
receipt of a response. The appeal can be filed electronically through the kiosk
machine. The Sheriff or his designee has fifteen (15) days from the receipt
of the appeal to reply to your appeal. The response from the Sheriff shall be
the final step in the appeals process. The Sheriff will review all appeals of
grievances and that response will be final.
[Id.].
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he “filed a grievance and also appealed the
grievance” but was never given a response [Doc. 2. pp. 2, 5]. On January 15, 2025, Plaintiff
submitted an inmate grievance regarding the lack of religious service/in-person Bible study
in PC, and the Jail denied Plaintiff’s grievance in a response issued the same day [Doc.
Case 2:25-cv-00040-TAV-CRW Document 35 Filed 10/16/26 Page 8 of 13 PageID
#: <pageID>

9
30-2 ¶ 14, p. 42]. Defendant avers that neither the Sheriff nor the Jail received an appeal
of that grievance [Id. ¶ 15]. And Plaintiff, in response to requests to provide any proof or
record of ever submitting any appeal, provided nothing [See Doc. 30-1 ¶¶ 11, 21, pp. 4, 10,
22, 26].
Plaintiff has not disputed that his grievance history does not contain any appeal of
his 	grievance 	regarding 	in-person 	Bible 	classes. 	And 	Plaintiff’s 	“conclusory
allegation[] . . . and unsubstantiated assertion[]” that he filed an appeal is “not sufficient to
defeat [Defendant’s] well-supported motion for summary judgment.” 	Jones v. City of
Franklin, 677 F. App’x 279, 282 (6th Cir. 2017); see also Williams v. Browman, 981 F.2d
901, 904 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding that for evidentiary purposes, plaintiff’s verified
complaint, which contained “nothing but mere conclusory allegations” could not survive a
motion for summary judgment” in favor of the defendants); Meeks v. Schofield, 10 F. Supp.
3d 774, 784 (M.D. Tenn. 2014) (“Accordingly, speculative and conclusory allegations,
even if made within a verified complaint, are insufficient to withstand a motion for
summary judgment.”). 	Therefore, there is no genuine dispute that Plaintiff failed to
exhaust his available administrative remedies in accordance with Jail procedures prior to
filing this action, and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
B. 	Merits
Further adjudication is not necessary considering the Court’s exhaustion ruling.
Nonetheless, out of an abundance of caution, the Court finds that the undisputed material
facts demonstrate that Plaintiff cannot establish a violation of either the RLUIPA or First
Amendment, and Plaintiff has not come forward with evidence demonstrating a jury could
Case 2:25-cv-00040-TAV-CRW Document 35 Filed 10/16/26 Page 9 of 13 PageID
#: <pageID>

10
reasonably find in his favor as to these claims. See Cox v. Ky. Dep’t of Transp., 53 F.3d
146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting a “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of
non-moving party’s position will not defeat a motion for summary judgment; there must
be evidence from which a jury could find for the non-movant (citing Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 252)).
This Court previously summarized the relevant law as follows:
RLUIPA “applies to prisons that receive federal funds and prohibits state and
local governments from placing ‘a substantial burden’ on the ‘religious
exercise’ of any inmate unless they establish that the burden furthers a
‘compelling governmental interest’ and does so in the ‘least restrictive’
way.” Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554, 559 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)).
“[T]he Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, applicable to the States
under the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that ‘Congress shall make no
law. . . prohibiting the free exercise’ of religion.” 	Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522, 532 (2021). 	To establish a free exercise
violation, Plaintiff must establish that (1) the belief or practice asserted is
religious within his own “scheme of things,” (2) his belief is sincerely held,
and (3) Defendant’s behavior infringes upon this practice or belief. Kent v.
Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1224–25 (6th Cir. 1987) (internal citations and
citation omitted).
Under both the First Amendment and RLUIPA, a prisoner must show that
the challenged government action substantially burdens his religious beliefs
in order to sustain a claim. Haight, 763 F.3d at 559; Barhite v. Caruso, 377
F. App’x 508, 510 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S.
680, 699 (1989). 	And “the Supreme Court has made clear that the
‘substantial burden’ hurdle is high.” Living Water Church of God v. Charter
Twp. of Meridian, 258 F. App’x 729, 734 (6th Cir. 2007). 	A burden is
substantial where it (1) forces an individual to choose between following the
tenets of his religion and foregoing governmental benefits or (2) places
“substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his
beliefs[.]” Id. at 734.
Under the First Amendment, “the circumstances of prison life may require
some restriction[s] on prisoners’ exercise of their religious beliefs” even if a
Case 2:25-cv-00040-TAV-CRW Document 35 Filed 10/16/26 Page 10 of 13
PageID #: <pageID>

11
religious practice is substantially burdened. 	Walker, 771 F.2d at 929.
Accordingly, 	a 	prisoner’s 	rights 	may 	be 	reasonably 	restricted 	to
accommodate “legitimate penological interests.” 	O’Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89
(1987)). If a regulation that interferes with an inmate’s constitutional rights
is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest, the courts then
balance 	“(1) 	whether 	the 	prisoner 	possesses 	alternative 	avenues 	for
exercising his religion; (2) whether accommodating the prisoner would affect
‘guards and other inmates’ or ‘the allocation of prison resources generally’;
and (3) whether ‘obvious, easy alternatives’ exist that suggest ‘the regulation
is not reasonable.’” 	Cavin v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 927 F.3d 455, 461 (6th
Cir. 2019) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–91).
A correctional institution must first “articulate their interest in the regulation”
to demonstrate a legitimate penological interest. 	Figel v. Overton, 121 F.
App’x 642, 646 n. 2 (6th Cir., Feb. 4, 2005) (internal citations omitted). The
correctional facility’s burden of demonstrating its interest is “slight, and in
certain instances, the connection may be a matter of common sense.” Sharp
v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 156 (3d Cir. 2012). Once it does so, “the burden
is on the prisoner to disprove the validity of the regulation at issue.” 	Id.
(citing Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (“The burden . . . is not
on the State to prove the validity of prison regulations but on the prisoner to
disprove it.”)).
[Doc. 6, pp. 9–10].
The uncontested facts in this case demonstrate that in-person Bible study/group
religious services were not available to Plaintiff because he was voluntarily housed in the
PC unit of the Jail [Doc. 30-2 ¶ 12]. The competent evidence shows that inmates in PC are
not permitted to attend in-person services for a variety of reasons, including the fact that
inmates on PC are usually located in that unit due to some fear about their safety in general
population [Id.]. This was the case with Plaintiff, who had expressed concerns about his
safety in general population due to being a sex offender and being labeled a “snitch” by
other inmates [Id.]. Further, mixing PC inmates, such as Plaintiff, with general population
inmates puts PC inmates at greater risk of assault and thus increases a risk to offer safety,
Case 2:25-cv-00040-TAV-CRW Document 35 Filed 10/16/26 Page 11 of 13
PageID #: <pageID>

12
as well, because officers would have to intervene in any ensuing assault [Id.]. 	The
competent evidence further shows that the process of permitting group in-person religious
services with volunteers is time consuming and taxing on limited corrections staff, and that
mixing in PC inmates, who would have to be segregated from general population inmates
in multiple, smaller sessions would make the strain “borderline unmanageable” on the
limited staff [Id.].
Additionally, there is also no dispute that Plaintiff was given access to a Bible, was
free to practice his religious beliefs at any time, that the Jail never took any steps to hinder
or prevent Plaintiff from practicing his religion, and that any volunteer (such as a minister,
clergy, or other religious volunteer) could visit Plaintiff at any time during visiting hours
for Bible study and/or other religious activities [Id. ¶ 16]. Plaintiff, however, never made
such a request [Id.].
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish a substantial burden on the exercise of
his religion. And even if he were able to establish such a burden, Defendant has identified
a compelling interest in maintaining order and safety in the Jail due to staffing limitations
and space constraints. 	See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005) (holding
order and safety are compelling interests and RULIPA does not “elevate accommodation
of religious observances over an institution’s need to maintain order and safety”); see also
Gayle v Harmon, 207 F. Supp. 3d 549, 554 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2016) (holding restriction
on inmate in administrative segregation did not violate RLUIPA or the First Amendment
where inmate could request a visit from a spiritual advisor, was provided a Bible, and did
not show his religious exercise was substantially burdened by the restriction). Therefore,
Case 2:25-cv-00040-TAV-CRW Document 35 Filed 10/16/26 Page 12 of 13
PageID #: <pageID>

13
Plaintiff has demonstrated that a reasonable jury could find that Defendant violated his
rights under RLUIPA or the First Amendment, and Defendant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc.
30] is GRANTED, and this action will be DISMISSED with prejudice. 	All pending
motions [See Doc. 33] are DENIED as moot.
The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this decision would not be taken in
good faith and would be totally frivolous, and therefore, Plaintiff is DENIED leave to
proceed in forma pauperis should he choose to appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed.
R. App. P. 24. An appropriate judgment order will enter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 2:25-cv-00040-TAV-CRW Document 35 Filed 10/16/26 Page 13 of 13
PageID #: <pageID>