Monday v. UT-Battelle, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
SUSIE MONDAY, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No.: 	3:24-cv-284-TAV-DCP
)
UT-BATTELLE, LLC, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on defendant’s motion for summary judgment
[Doc. 15]. Plaintiff has responded [Doc. 18], and defendant replied [Doc. 19]. This matter
is now ripe for the Court’s review. See E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.1(a). For the reasons explained
below, defendant’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. 15] will be GRANTED, and this
case will be DISMISSED.
I. 	Background
This action arises from the circumstances surrounding plaintiff’s termination from
her position as a Senior Administrative Assistant at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory
(“ORNL”) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee [see Doc. 1]. 	Defendant is a private not-for-profit
limited liability company that manages ORNL for the U.S. Department of Energy [Doc.
16-1, p. 9]. 	Plaintiff worked in the Information Systems Group (“ISG”) within the
Integrated Operations Support Division (“IOSD”) [Doc. 18-23, pp. 6, 20]. Plaintiff reported
to Cheryl Shanklin, ISG Group Leader, and Shaklin reported to Kim Jeskie, IOSD Director
[Doc. 18-20, p. 3]. 	Plaintiff worked part-time on a 32-hour a week schedule as the only
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administrative assistant in a building supporting approximately 20 people [Doc. 16-1, pp.
184, 590–91]. Plaintiff lives in Jacksboro, Tennessee, which is approximately 1 hour and
30 minutes from ORNL [Id. at 144–45].
A. 	Plaintiff’s Job Duties
When plaintiff was present at ORNL, she managed the conference room schedule,
put away supplies, helped with copier issues, worked with vendors who replaced equipment,
formatted documents, and helped others [Doc. 18-20, pp. 6, 9, 16]. Further, plaintiff assisted
with annual events, including the F&O End of Year Safety Celebration, Supervisor Summit,
and the Perfect Attendance Breakfast [Doc. 18-23, pp. 8, 11, 12, 16]. 	However, plaintiff
asserts that her responsibilities related to those events were minimal and could be performed
remotely [Id.].
Further, a job description1 for the “administrative assistant” position at ORNL
includes various “major duties,” such as maintaining the office atmosphere in a professional
manner, establishing and maintaining effective working relationships, and assisting and
participating in team activities [Doc. 16-1, p. 504]. This description states that the “position
is located on-site at our facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee” [Id.]. 	Shanklin testified that
although this job description was not necessarily created for plaintiff’s position, it reflects
some of the duties plaintiff would have done [Doc. 18-20, p. 7; Doc. 18-23, pp. 28–29].
1 	Defendant sent plaintiff this job description on August 1, 2022, so that plaintiff’s
optometrist could complete plaintiff’s accommodation request related to a disability [Doc. 16-1, p.
506]. It is unclear when the description was created or whether plaintiff reviewed the description
before accepting her position.
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Additionally, plaintiff received performance evaluations during her employment.2 In fiscal
years 2019 and 2020, plaintiff received a score of “full contributor” [Doc. 18-15, p. 8; Doc.
18-16, p. 4]. In fiscal years 2021 and 2022, plaintiff received a rating of “successful” [Doc.
18-17, p. 5; Doc. 18-18, p. 5].
B. 	Plaintiff’s Disability and Requests for Remote Work Accommodations
It is undisputed that plaintiff suffers from binocular vision dysfunction, preventing
her from driving to and from work [Doc. 18-23, p. 3; Doc. 16, p. 10]. 	Plaintiff’s vision
impairment does not interfere with her job once she arrives at work [Doc. 18-23, p. 3].
On November 9, 2021, plaintiff requested a temporary accommodation, requesting
to work remotely until she got her MRI results [Doc. 18-3]. Plaintiff’s request was approved
through December 1, 2021 [Doc. 18-4]. 	On November 30, 2021, plaintiff requested a
six-week extension of her request, which was also granted [Doc. 18-5; Doc. 18-20, pp.
14–15]. 	Upon expiration of this extension, Jeskie approved remote work through March
2022, but she noted that a long-term remote position was not ideal for defendant or for
plaintiff to work “optimally” [Doc. 18-2].
Subsequently, plaintiff saw an eye specialist who again restricted her from driving,
and defendant agreed to a three-week accommodation allowing plaintiff to work remotely
[Doc. 18-6]. On August 18, 2022, plaintiff informed Shanklin that she would be working
remotely for at least an additional two weeks [Doc. 16-1, p. 35].
2 	From March 2020 until April 2021, plaintiff worked remotely due to the COVID-19
pandemic [Doc. 16-1, p. 360; Doc. 18-20, p. 13].
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Plaintiff worked on-site most workdays in September of 2022 until defendant
determined that plaintiff’s request could be handled through “situational flexibility” [Doc.
18-7, p. 2]. Situational flexibility is a “non-routine” and “short term” solution to be used
when plaintiff could not find a ride to work with a co-worker [Id.]. 	In January 2023, the
co-worker with whom plaintiff rode to work retired [Doc. 18-23, p. 4; Doc, 18-8, p. 1].
Defendant informed Shanklin and Jeskie that she would continue visual physical therapy
through April 2023 and hoped it would help her drive [Doc. 16-1, pp. 494, 546–47]. As a
result, defendant granted plaintiff’s remote-work request through April 2023 [Doc. 18-23,
pp. 43–44].
C. 	Plaintiff’s Termination
Plaintiff continued to work remotely through July 10, 2023, when she informed
defendant that “[n]othing has changed with [her] driving situation” [Doc. 18-11, p. 2].
Defendant responded that plaintiff was expected to return to work on site by July 24, 2023
[Id. at 1]. Plaintiff replied by requesting a “permanent remote position” [Doc. 18-12, p. 2].
In her deposition, plaintiff explained that “permanent” meant she could retire with full
benefits in 2026 [Doc. 18-23, p. 24].
In a follow-up meeting, defendant proposed other methods for plaintiff to commute
to work, such as a taxi, carpooling app, or a ridesharing platform like Uber or Lyft [Id. at
25]. Defendant also suggested, among other options, a “guest pass” so that someone else
could drive plaintiff through the security portal at work [Id.]. 	Plaintiff declined these
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options3 [Id.]. 	On August 28, 2023, defendant informed plaintiff that her request for a
permanent remote work accommodation would be denied and that plaintiff needed to report
to work in person by September 5, 2023 [Id. at 27; Doc. 18-22, p. 20; Doc. 16-1, p. 84].
After plaintiff did not return to work at ORNL on September 5th, defendant gave
plaintiff a final chance to change her mind [Doc. 18-13]. Since plaintiff responded that she
was unable to return to the office [Doc. 16-1, p. 582], defendant sent plaintiff a letter
terminating her employment [Id. at 25–26].
Plaintiff now brings this action under the American Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
alleging that defendant discriminated against her because of her disability [See Doc. 1].
Defendant moved for summary judgment on plaintiff’s ADA claim [Doc. 15].
II. 	Standard of Review
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he court shall
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 	In ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. McLean v. 988011 Ontario Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). As
such, the moving party has the burden of conclusively showing the lack of any genuine issue
of material fact. Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 63 (6th Cir. 1979). To successfully oppose
a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he non-moving party . . . must present sufficient
evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for him.” Jones v. Muskegon Cnty., 625
3 In an email on January 30, 2023, plaintiff also mentioned that she considered moving to
Oak Ridge, Tennessee, but she wants to live and retire in Campbell County [Doc. 16-1, p. 494].
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F.3d 935, 940 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 447 U.S. 242, 252
(1986)).
III. 	Analysis
A. 	Discrimination under the ADA
Defendant contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because: (1) plaintiff’s
essential functions required her to work in-person at ORNL; and (2) plaintiff’s requested
accommodation is unreasonable since the ADA does not require defendant to accommodate
plaintiff’s work commute [Doc. 16, pp. 18–20]. Moreover, defendant alleges that plaintiff
refused other reasonable accommodations, forcing defendant to terminate plaintiff’s
employment when she failed to return to work in-person [Id. at 25].
Plaintiff responds that summary judgment is inappropriate because: (1) plaintiff was
otherwise qualified for her position despite her disability; and (2) plaintiff’s requested
remote work accommodation was reasonable since on-site attendance was not an essential
function of her position [Doc. 18, pp. 11–26]. In reply, defendant contends that plaintiff’s
statements prove that the essential functions of her position required her to work in-person
at ORNL [Doc. 19, pp. 3–4].
The ADA prohibits discrimination “against a qualified individual on the basis of
disability[.]” 	42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 	One form of discrimination includes “not making
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability who is an . . . employee, unless such covered entity
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation
of the business of such covered entity[.]” Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added).
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“To establish a prima facie claim for failure to accommodate under the ADA,
[plaintiff] must show that: (1) [s]he is disabled within the meaning of the Act; (2) [s]he is
otherwise 	qualified 	for 	h[er] 	position, 	with 	or 	without 	reasonable 	accommodation;
(3) [defendant] knew or had reason to know about [her] disability; (4) [s]he requested a
reasonable 	accommodation; 	and 	(5) 	[defendant] 	failed 	to 	provide 	the 	necessary
accommodation.” Brownlow v. Alfa Vision Ins. Co., 527 F.Supp.3d 951, 956 (M.D. Tenn.
2021) (citing Brumley v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 909 F.3d 834, 839 (6th Cir. 2018)). If
plaintiff meets her burden, then the burden shifts to defendant to show “that the proposed
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of [defendant’s]
business.” Id.
Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff is disabled, defendant knew about plaintiff’s
disability, and defendant refused to provide plaintiff’s requested accommodation of
continuing remote work [See Doc. 16, pp. 18, 25–26]. Therefore, the contested issues are:
(1) whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified for her position with or without a reasonable
accommodation; and (2) whether plaintiff’s requested accommodation was reasonable.
1. 	Otherwise Qualified
Defendant claims that working in-person is an essential function of plaintiff’s
position, meaning that she is not a “qualified individual” under the ADA [Doc. 16, pp.
20–25]. Defendant relies, in part, on a job description purportedly requiring on-site work
and on plaintiff’s testimony and emails that allegedly acknowledge this expectation [Id.].
Plaintiff counters that on-site work is not essential because she previously performed
her job remotely, many of her duties are procedural, and she had access to the same
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technology when she worked remotely [Doc. 18, pp. 13–25]. In support, plaintiff relies on
her testimony that her functions could be performed remotely, Shanklin’s testimony, and
performance evaluations that she received during periods of remote work [Id.].
In reply, defendant contends that plaintiff could not perform all essential functions
remotely [Doc. 19, pp. 3–8]. 	Defendant rebuts plaintiff’s performance evaluations with
Jeskie’s testimony that she received several concerns about plaintiff’s availability while
plaintiff worked remotely [Id. at 17]. Defendant also argues that plaintiff mischaracterized
Shanklin’s testimony, which allegedly shows that plaintiff’s absence shifted work onto
other employees on at least one occasion [Id. at 17–19].
Under the ADA, a “qualified individual” is an “individual who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphasis added). “Essential
functions are ‘the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a
disability holds or desires.’” Brownlow, 527 F.Supp.3d at 956–57 (quoting Rorrer v. City
of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1038 (6th Cir. 2014)). The ADA mandates that “consideration shall
be given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an
employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants
for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the
job.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
Generally, “regularly attending work on-site is essential to most jobs, especially the
interactive ones[.]” E.E.O.C. v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 761 (6th Cir. 2015). In fact,
the Sixth Circuit has recognized that, in most jobs, “the employer will require regular and
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predictable on-site attendance from all employees (as evidenced by its words, policies, and
practices).” Id. at 762.
Nevertheless, the Court considers several factors to determine whether a job function
is essential: “(1) the employer’s judgment [as to which functions are essential]; (2) the
written job description; (3) the amount of time spent performing the function; (4) the
consequences of not requiring performance of the function; (5) the work experience of past
incumbents of the position; and (6) the current work experience of incumbents in similar
jobs.” Brownlow, 527 F.Supp.3d at 957 (quoting Keith v. Cnty. of Oakland, 703 F.3d 918,
925–26 (6th Cir. 2013)).
a. 	Employer’s Judgment
According to defendant’s judgment, working on-site at ORNL was an essential
function of plaintiff’s position [Doc. 16, pp. 20–25]. Paul Estes, HR Business Partner Lead
at ORNL, testified that “the main purpose of an administrative assistant is to be on-site
supporting the manager and the organization that they’re assigned to for just the day-to-day
needs, [and] emergency situations that may come up” [Doc. 18-22, p. 13]. Moreover, in a
team meeting, defendant’s Interim Lab Director, Jeff Smith, confirmed that the “position
of administrative assistant is still viewed as a full-time on-campus role” [Doc. 16-1, p. 13].
The record also shows that, on multiple occasions, defendant informed plaintiff that
her 	temporary 	remote 	work 	accommodations 	could 	not 	be 	a 	permanent 	solution.
Specifically, in 2022, Jeskie explained that defendant could “afford to continue [the
accommodation] for a short period of time . . . to see if her health condition resolves, but it
cannot be a permanent solution” [Id. at 125]. 	In 2023, Jeskie cautioned that plaintiff’s
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“position has been determined to be most effective onsite, and it will be the goal to return
[plaintiff’s] position to onsite status” [Id. at 75].
Plaintiff’s deposition and emails further indicate that she understood defendant’s
expectation for her to perform her role on-site. 	Specifically, on March 7, 2022, plaintiff
acknowledged in an email to Jeskie and Shanklin, “I know and understand that we are
needed and required to be onsite” [Id. at 536–37]. On July 20, 2023, plaintiff emailed Estes
and again stated, “I understand that according to the emails that my position is an onsite
position” [Id. at 496]. 	During her deposition, defendant confirmed that she understood
defendant expected her position “to be one that was performed at ORNL” [Doc. 18-23, p.
31]. 	Thus, defendant’s “words, policies, and practices” clearly indicate that it required
“regular and predictable on-site attendance.” Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d at 762.
Plaintiff’s assertion that she could perform her essential job functions remotely is
insufficient to create a genuine fact dispute. 	As the Sixth Circuit has stated, “we do not
‘allow employees to define the essential functions of their positions based solely on their
personal viewpoint and experience.’” Id. at 764 (quoting Mason v. Avaya Commc’ns, Inc.,
357 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2004)). 	Although the evidence suggests that some of
plaintiff’s duties could have been performed at home, Jeskie testified that plaintiff’s remote
work created a “void” that concerned her [Doc. 18-21, p. 17].
Jeskie stated that defendant’s goal was to create an atmosphere where employees
could “walk in and get answers to the things that they need” [Id.]. Further, Jeskie testified
that she received “availability” concerns about plaintiff from other employees, and she was
“asked repeatedly to allow other people to become qualified on what [plaintiff] was doing”
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[Id. at 11, 17]. The evidence shows that these concerns increased in 2023 when plaintiff
worked remotely for an extended period [Id. at 17]. 	While plaintiff claims that she was
available and that her availability was communicated to the individuals with concerns, “the
essential-job-function inquiry does not require employers to lower their standards by
altering a job’s essential functions.” 	Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d at 764. 	Therefore,
defendant’s judgment weighs in favor of a finding that on-site attendance was an essential
function of plaintiff’s position.
b. 	Job Description
Additionally, the job description provided to plaintiff stated that the administrative
assistant position is located “on-site at our facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee” [Doc. 16-1,
p. 504]. 	When confronted with the job description at her deposition, plaintiff did not
dispute the accuracy of the following listed “major duties”: (1) the duty to “[m]aintain
office atmosphere in a professional and congenial manner and receive and assist visitors”;
(2) the duty to “[e]stablish and maintain effective working relationships with internal and
external contacts”; and (3) the duty to “[a]ssist with coordination and participate in team
activities 	of 	administrative 	support 	staff 	across 	the 	division” 	which 	“may 	include
participation in” meetings and special assignments [See Doc. 18-23, pp. 28–29]. Thus, the
record reflects that plaintiff’s job involves “face-to-face interaction and coordination of
work with other employees” and “immediate access” to co-workers, which the Sixth
Circuit has held requires being in the workplace. See Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d at 762–63
(determining 	that 	the 	plaintiff’s 	position 	required 	teamwork, 	meetings, 	and 	onsite
availability to participate in face-to-face interactions, making on-site attendance essential
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to her position). Accordingly, the job description factor also weighs in favor of a finding
that on-site attendance was essential to plaintiff’s position.
c. 	Consequences
Furthermore, 	although 	defendant 	permitted 	plaintiff 	to 	work 	remotely 	on 	a
temporary basis, defendant has shown that the consequences of a long-term remote position
would 	be 	significant. 	Specifically, 	Shanklin 	testified 	that 	plaintiff 	was 	the 	only
administrative assistant in a building supporting approximately 20 people [Doc. 16-1, pp.
184, 590–91]. 	Shanklin also testified that when plaintiff was present, plaintiff managed
the conference room schedule, put away supplies, helped with copier issues, worked with
vendors to replace equipment, and helped others [Doc. 18-20, pp. 6, 9, 16]. 	During her
deposition, plaintiff acknowledged that her position required ordering supplies and
organizing the supply room [Doc. 18-23, p. 6].
If defendant allowed plaintiff to continue working at home, plaintiff’s co-workers
or supervisors would inevitably be forced to complete office tasks assigned to plaintiff. In
fact, Shanklin’s testimony indicates that on at least one occasion, plaintiff’s absence shifted
work onto other employees [Doc. 18-20, p. 29]. 	Jeskie further described plaintiff as
defendant’s “procedures point of contact for the directorate[,]” demonstrating the value of
plaintiff’s role at ORNL, and stated that while other employees had access to technology
to perform procedures, they are “expected to be in the field 80 percent of the time” [Doc.
18-21, pp. 11–12]. 	Even if other employees could perform plaintiff’s office tasks, “the
ADA does not force employers to shift work onto other employees[.]” Smith v. Newport
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Util., 129 F.4th 944, 952 (6th Cir. 2025). Thus, the consequences of a long-term remote
position demonstrate that on-site work was an essential function of plaintiff’s position.
d. 	Plaintiff’s Technology Argument
Moreover, plaintiff’s argument that she had access to the same technology remotely
and on-site does not create a genuine fact issue. As the Sixth Circuit noted in Ford Motor
Company, “[i]t is ‘self-evident,’ . . . that ‘technology has advanced’ enough for employees
to perform ‘at least some essential job functions’ at home.” 782 F.3d at 765. There, the
evidence in the record did not show that technology had changed “so as to make regular
in-person attendance marginal for [that] job.” 	Id. 	Likewise, here the record shows that
plaintiff used email, phone, and computer, which “were equally available when courts
around the country uniformly held that on-site attendance is essential for interactive jobs.”
Id. 	Thus, the mere fact that plaintiff possessed the same technology at home and in the
office does not negate defendant’s judgment that in-person collaboration is required for
plaintiff’s position. 	See Kiesel v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 1:23-CV-24, 2023 WL
5717940, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 23, 2024) (“The fact that it would be possible for plaintiff
to participate in meetings through technology does not obviate [the employer’s] judgment
that permitting full-time remote work would not be as effective or efficient as in-person
work.”) (emphasis in original)).
e. 	Plaintiff’s Performance Evaluations
Lastly, plaintiff’s performance evaluations do not create a genuine dispute of
material fact. At least two of plaintiff’s evaluations were based, in part, on work performed
remotely due to the COVID-19 pandemic [See Doc. 16-1, p. 360; Doc. 18-16; Doc. 18-17;
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Doc. 18-20, p. 13]. As other courts have noted, the fact that defendant permitted remote
work during the pandemic does not mean that in-person work is not essential to plaintiff’s
position or that defendant abandoned its goal to return of returning to an in-person work
environment. 	See Kinney v. St. Mary’s Health, Inc., 76 F.4th 635, 644 (7th Cir. 2023)
(“The fact that many employees were able to work remotely temporarily when forced to
do so by a global health crisis does not mean that those jobs do not have essential functions
that require in-person work over the medium to long term.”); see also Kiesel, No.
1:23-CV-24, at *5 (“The fact that Plaintiff and his team did their jobs remotely during the
pandemic . . . does not mean that in-person work is not essential to Plaintiff’s position.”).
In addition, while the Court acknowledges plaintiff’s satisfactory performance
evaluations during periods of remote work, defendant has provided sufficient evidence
showing that in-person work was an essential function of plaintiff’s position. 	And the
ADA requires the Court to give deference to the employer’s judgment “as to what functions
of a job are essential.” 	42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 	Therefore, plaintiff’s performance
evaluations are insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact.
In sum, defendant’s judgment, the job description, and the consequences of
plaintiff’s remote work demonstrate that on-site work was an essential function of
plaintiff’s position. 	Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no genuine dispute of
material fact regarding plaintiff’s failure to qualify as a “qualified individual” under the
ADA. On this basis alone, defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
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2. 	Request for a Reasonable Accommodation
Even assuming arguendo that plaintiff could perform all of her essential job
functions remotely, plaintiff’s request for a “permanent” remote work accommodation is
unreasonable. 	In 	its 	memorandum, 	defendant 	contends 	that 	plaintiff’s 	requested
accommodation is unreasonable because it is indefinite4 in duration, and the ADA does not
require an employer to accommodate plaintiff’s commute to work [Doc. 16, pp. 18–20].
Moreover, defendant alleges that plaintiff refused other reasonable accommodations and
insisted on an accommodation that was unreasonable as a matter of law [Id. at 25].
In response, plaintiff asserts that she requested a change to a “workplace condition
that is entirely within [d]efendant’s control and is reasonable” [Doc. 18, p. 12]. 	Plaintiff
argues that she did not request assistance related to her commute but rather, she requested
that defendant “eliminate the non-essential function of being physically on-site” to allow
her to perform her position remotely [Id.].
A “reasonable accommodation” includes, in part, “job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training
materials or policies.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). An accommodation is unreasonable “if
it requires eliminating an ‘essential’ function of the job.” Rorrer, 743 F.3d at 1039 (citing
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)). 	Moreover, “[a]n employee cannot make his employer provide a
4 	Plaintiff clarified in her deposition that her request for a “permanent” accommodation
was meant to last until she could retire with full benefits in 2026 [Doc. 18-23, p. 24].
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specific accommodation if another reasonable accommodation is instead provided.”
Hankins v. The Gap, Inc., 84 F.3d 797, 800–01 (6th Cir. 1996).
An employee “bears the burden of proposing an accommodation that will permit her
to effectively perform the essential functions of her job.” 	Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d at
763; Klieber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 870 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations
omitted) 	(“Generally, 	an 	ADA 	plaintiff 	‘bears 	the 	initial 	burden 	of 	proposing 	an
accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable.’”).
Here, the Court finds that plaintiff has not met this burden. This case is like Regan
v. Faurecia Automotive Seating, Inc., 679 F.3d 475, 480 (6th Cir. 2012), in which the Sixth
Circuit held that an employee’s request for a “modified work schedule for purposes of
commuting during hours with allegedly lighter traffic is not a reasonable accommodation.”
There, the plaintiff was diagnosed with narcolepsy. 	Id. at 478. 	Her shift ran from 6:00
a.m. to 3:00 p.m. until her supervisor changed it to span from 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Id.
The plaintiff notified her supervisor that the change would increase her fatigue and
lengthen her commute because of heavier traffic. Id. However, her request to work from
either 6:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. or from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. was refused. Id. The plaintiff
resigned and sued under the ADA. 	Id. 	On appeal from summary judgment, the Sixth
Circuit agreed that “[w]hile an employer is required to provide reasonable accommodations
that eliminate barriers in the work environment, an employer is not required to eliminate
those barriers which exist outside the work environment.” Id. at 480.
Just like the plaintiff in Regan, plaintiff here seeks an accommodation because she
has difficulty commuting to work. It is undisputed that plaintiff’s vision impairment does
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not interfere with her job as long as she does not have to commute to work [Doc. 18-23, p.
30]. 	Thus, plaintiff’s concerns about her work commute go beyond defendant’s duty to
accommodate under the ADA. 	Although plaintiff attempted to distinguish Regan on the
grounds that in-person work was an essential function of the plaintiff’s position, that case
does not expressly address the essential function issue [See Doc. 18, p. 12].
Additionally, in Zaffino v. Metro Government of Nashville and Davison County, 688
F. App’x 356, 359 (6th Cir. 2017), the Sixth Circuit held that “the ADA does not require
an employer to make accommodations just because they might be in an individual’s
interest.” There, the Sixth Circuit determined that an employer does not have the duty to
accommodate an employee’s commute and noted that “the ADA’s requirement to
accommodate extends only as far as reasonably necessary to allow qualified, disabled
individuals to perform the essential functions of a job.” Id.
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit has distinguished a request to work remotely “for a
limited time rather than an indefinite period.” 	Mosby-Meachem v. Mem. Light, Gas, &
Water Div., 883 F.3d 595, 605 (6th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added). 	Unlike the plaintiff in
Ford Motor Company who sought to work remotely up to 4 days a week indefinitely, the
plaintiff in Mosby-Meachem requested a 10-week remote work accommodation. Compare
Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d at 759 (finding that the plaintiff’s request was unreasonable),
with Mosby-Meachem, 883 F.3d at 604–05 (finding that the plaintiff’s request was
reasonable). 	In Mosby-Meachem, the Sixth Circuit explained that testimony from other
employees demonstrated that the plaintiff could perform “all” essential functions and work
“effectively” from home during the 10-week remote period. 888 F.3d at 604–05.
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Here, plaintiff requested a “permanent” remote work accommodation, lasting at
least three years, making this case more like Ford Motor Company. than Mosby-Meachem.
Further, plaintiff has not produced evidence showing that she could “effectively” perform
“all” the essential job functions of her job remotely on an indefinite basis, or at least until
her retirement. 	In fact, plaintiff conceded that her job was “95%” procedures, meaning
that at least some of her functions could not be performed remotely [Doc. 16-1, p. 496].
The record also shows that defendant provided plaintiff with multiple alternatives,
including, but not limited to, taxi, carpooling, ridesharing platforms, and a guest pass, all
of which plaintiff refused [Doc. 18-23, p. 25]. 	The Sixth Circuit has noted that “[a]n
employee cannot make his employer provide a specific accommodation if another
reasonable accommodation is instead provided.” Hankins, 84 F.3d at 800–01.
Defendant has no duty to accommodate plaintiff’s permanent remote work request
simply because it is in her interest. 	See Zaffino, 688 F. App’x at 359. 	Accordingly, the
Court finds that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to plaintiff’s ADA claim
because: (1) plaintiff is not a “qualified individual” under the ADA; and (2) even if she
was, plaintiff’s request for a “permanent” remote position is unreasonable.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, defendant’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. 15]
is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED. An appropriate judgment order will follow.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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