USA v. Hardison

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
v. 	) 	No. 3:25-CR-48-TAV-DCP
)
BRYAN HARDISON, 	)
)
Defendant, 	)
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
All pretrial motions in this case have been referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b) for disposition or recommendation as appropriate. Defendant Bryan Hardison is charged
by Indictment with possession with intent to distribute 280 grams or more of a mixture or substance
containing cocaine base (Count One) and possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more
of a mixture or substance containing cocaine (Count Two), both allegedly occurring on May 5,
2025 [Doc. 8 p. 1].
This case is now before the Court on Defendant’s ten non-dispositive pretrial motions1:
1. 	Omnibus Motion for All Exculpatory Evidence [and] Impeachment
Evidence [Doc. 56];
2. 	Motion for Notice and Disclosure of Any Rule 404(B) Evidence the
U.S. Seeks to Introduce at Trial [Doc. 57];
3. 	Motion to Compel Discovery Under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure for the Government to Produce and Turnover
Drug Toxicology Report to the Defendant [Doc. 63];
4. 	Motion to Reveal Informant’s Identity [Doc. 64];
1 	Defendant also has six other pending non-dispositive motions/filings [Docs. 52, 76, 88, 97,
120, & 144]. The undersigned will address these motions in separate orders.
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5. 	Motion to Compel the Government to Disclose Six Photo Line-Up
Shown to Confidential Source and All Favorable Evidence [Doc.
70];
6. 	Motion 	to 	Exclude 	All 	Testimony 	from 	Giglio 	Impaired
Officers/Agents at Trial [Doc. 82];
7. 	Motion to Preserve and Authenticate Digital Evidence [Doc. 93];
8. 	Motion to Compel Disclosure or in Camera Review of Confidential
Source Technically Confidential Informant [Doc. 94];
9. 	Rule 16 Motion to Compel Discovery (Lab, Chain of Custody
Recordings) (Marked Money) [Doc. 95]; and
10. Motion [for] Leave and [to] File Late Filed Pretrial Motion to
Compel K-9 Discovery and All Favorable Evidence [Doc. 105]
along with the associated Motion to Compel K-9 Stop Discovery
[106].
The Government responded to each motion [Docs. 58, 66, 67, 78, 85, 98, 104, & 126], and
Defendant filed replies [Docs. 65, 74, 75, 86, 107, 121, & 133]. These matters are now ripe for the
Court’s consideration. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES each of Defendant’s
motions [Docs. 56, 57, 63, 64, 70, 82, 93, 94, 95, & 105/106].2
I. 	DEFENDANT’S TIMELY MOTIONS
Defendant 	timely 	filed 	motions 	seeking 	to 	compel 	disclosure of 	exculpatory 	and
impeachment evidence [Docs. 56, 63, & 70], evidence of other crimes or acts the Government will
introduce in its case-in-chief [Doc. 57], and the identity of the confidential source [Doc. 64]. The
Court examines each of these categories of motions in turn.
2 	Defendant also filed a Notice and Request [Doc. 53] relating to items sought in discovery,
and the Government responded to the extent the Court construed the filing to be a motion [Doc.
58]. Defendant did not file this Notice and Request as a motion; therefore, the Court takes no action
on this filing.
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A. EXCULPATORY & IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE [Docs. 56, 63, & 70]
Defendant filed three motions seeking exculpatory and impeachment evidence from the
Government. In his Omnibus Motion for All Exculpatory Evidence Impeachment Evidence,
Defendant asks the Court to compel the Government to disclose all exculpatory evidence pursuant
to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) [Doc. 56 p. 1]. Specifically, he seeks “perjured
testimony” in the possession of law enforcement, and Brady evidence that “proves a known drug
supplier” [Id. at 2]. Defendant also asks the Court to compel the prosecution to disclose
impeachment evidence pursuant to Brady and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) [Id. at
1–2]. In this regard, he requests the identity of the Government’s trial witnesses and physical
evidence; the criminal history of the confidential source; information on lineups, show-ups, and
photographs; character and impeachment evidence for any prosecution witness; and any promises
or inducements made to prosecution witnesses [Id. at 3]. Defendant further requests the Court
require the Government to review the personnel files of all law enforcement officers and agents
and employees involved in the investigation of this case and to disclose all exculpatory
information, impeachment evidence, and evidence of dishonesty within those files [Id. at 4–5].
The Government responds by stating it has met and exceeded its discovery requirements
by providing more than 300 pages of written materials and documents, 15 audio and video
recordings, digital extractions from four cell phones, and pole camera recordings to Defendant
[Doc. 58 pp. 2–3]. The Government also states those materials “document” the evidence it intends
to use at trial and sentencing [Id.] The Government represents it has also offered to arrange for
Defendant to inspect the materials if requested [Id.]. With respect to the specific items Defendant
requests, the Government maintains it fulfilled its discovery obligations by disclosing all “arguably
material exculpatory and impeachment information” [Id. at 4]. The Government states Defendant
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is not entitled to personnel files as he has made no showing that the files include information
material to his defense [Id. at 4–5]. Moreover, it asserts that Defendant’s request is overly broad
and not limited to impeachment information regarding testifying officers [Id. at 5]. Furthermore,
the Government contends it is not required to identify its witnesses and exhibits before trial [Id.].
Nor does Rule 16 require it to disclose the list of investigative materials Defendant requests with
respect to his challenge of the search warrant [Id. at 6].3
In reply, Defendant denies that the Government has provided the information he seeks
regarding the investigation underlying the search warrant affidavit or relating to the confidential
source [Doc. 65 pp. 1–3].
Defendant also moves the Court to require the Government to turn over drug toxicology
reports pursuant to Rule 16(a)(1)(F) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure [Doc. 63 p. 1;
Doc. 75 p. 3]. Defendant states he has been incarcerated for five months, and the Government has
yet to disclose the toxicology report in violation of his rights to due process and a fair and speedy
trial [Doc. 63 p. 2; see also Doc. 75 p. 2]. He requests that the Court compel the Government to
produce the drug toxicology reports, dismiss the case, or release him pretrial [Doc. 63 p. 3; Doc.
75 p. 4].
The Government filed two responses [Docs. 66 & 85] to Defendant’s motion. While it first
explained the toxicology report had not yet been completed [Doc. 66 p. 1], the Government later
filed a supplemental response stating it had received the reports and disclosed the same to
Defendant thus making the request moot [Doc. 85 p. 1].
3 	The 	Government’s 	response 	also 	addresses 	Defendant’s 	requests 	with 	respect 	to
information regarding the confidential source mentioned in the search warrant [Doc. 58 p. 7–8].
The Court addresses below Defendant’s request for identification of the confidential source.
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Finally, Defendant moves for disclosure under Brady, of a six-photo lineup shown to the
confidential source, as stated in the search warrant affidavit [Doc. 70 pp. 1–2]. Defendant states
this photographic lineup is material, exculpatory evidence because it was used in support of
probable cause to obtain the search warrant executed at his residence [Id. at 3]. Defendant further
asserts that the Government’s failure to disclose the lineup diminishes his ability to attack the
search warrant, which if successful, would be dispositive of the case [Id.].
In response, the Government first states Defendant’s reliance upon Rule 16 is misplaced
as the rule does not require disclosure where a defendant believes materials may assist in
challenging a search warrant affidavit [Doc. 78 p. 1; see also Doc. 58 pp. 6–7]. The Government
states Brady also does not require disclosure of the photo lineup, as the evidence is not favorable
to Defendant [Id. at 1]. The Government further describes Defendant’s request for disclosure based
upon his belief that the evidence would support grounds for a Franks hearing as speculative and
improper to warrant further discovery [Id. at 1–2]. In his reply, Defendant states that his prior
elbow counsel told his investigator “there is no six-photo line-up” [Doc. 86 p. 3]. He disputes the
Government’s characterization of the lineup as not favorable to him [id.] and maintains that the
Government has an affirmative duty to provide the lineup as exculpatory evidence so that he can
prepare a motion for a Franks hearing [id. at 2, 6].
The discovery available in criminal cases is generally limited to that provided in: (1)
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16; (2) the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500; and (3) the doctrine
set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny. The government violates due
process when it withholds from the defendant favorable evidence that is “material either to guilt
or punishment.” Id. at 87. This rule also extends to evidence that could be used to impeach the
credibility of a government witness. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972) (holding
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that impeachment evidence falls within Brady “[w]hen the reliability of a given witness may well
be determinative of guilt or innocence”).
Rule 16 requires the government to disclose, upon a defendant’s request, any oral or written
statements of the defendant; the defendant’s prior record; certain documents or tangible evidence
within the government’s possession, custody or control; reports of examinations or tests; and a
summary of any expert witness testimony. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a). “The Jencks Act generally
requires the government, on motion of a defendant, to produce statements in its possession of
witnesses who testify at a trial.” United States v. Short, 671 F.2d 178, 185 (6th Cir. 1982). The
government is required to produce the statement only after the witness has testified on direct
examination. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a).
In United States v. Presser, the Sixth Circuit found that “so long as the defendant is given
impeachment material, even exculpatory impeachment material, in time for use at trial,” the
defendant’s constitutional rights are not violated. 844 F.2d 1275, 1283 (6th Cir. 1988). Further,
the Sixth Circuit observed that “while the Brady rule imposes a general obligation upon the
government to disclose evidence that is favorable to the accused and material to guilt or
punishment, the government typically is the sole judge of what evidence in its possession is subject
to disclosure.” Id. at 1281 (internal citations omitted). In this case, the Court’s Order on Discovery
and Scheduling provides:
The government shall reveal to the defendant and permit inspection
and 	copying 	of 	all 	information 	and 	material 	known 	to 	the
government which may be favorable to the defendant on the issues
of guilt or punishment within the scope of Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963), United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)
(exculpatory evidence), and United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667
(1985) (impeachment evidence). Timing of such disclosure is
governed by United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275 (6th Cir. 1988).
[Doc. 14 ¶ E].
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Here, Defendant requests a litany of information and documents far and beyond the limited
discovery permitted in criminal cases. And it appears, based on its representations, the Government
has complied with its discovery obligations up to this point. Considering Sixth Circuit law and this
Court’s Order on Discovery and Scheduling, the Court will not compel pretrial discovery where
the Government has already conceded that it is aware of its obligations under Brady and Giglio,
and Defendant has failed to establish that any of these rules require disclosure of the requested
material at this time, or earlier than proposed by the Government. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (“[N]o
statement or report in the possession of the United States which made by a Government witness
or prospective Government witness . . . shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection
until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.”); Presser, 844 F.2d
at 1281 (“‘[T]he prosecutor is not required to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to
disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a
fair trial.’” (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675)). The Court’s Order on Discovery and Scheduling
[Doc. 14] also addressed the items requested by Defendant, including when the Government’s
obligation to disclose arises. The Court, therefore, will not compel discovery where it appears the
Government has met its discovery obligations under both Rule 16 and Brady, as well as the Court’s
scheduling Order [Doc. 14].
Regarding Defendant’s specific requests, the Government is generally not required to
disclose its witnesses or an exhibit list before trial. United States v. Prince, 618 F.3d 551, 562 (6th
Cir. 2010) (providing that “Rule 16 does not entitle a defendant to pretrial disclosure of the
government’s exhibit list”); United States v. Turner, 91 F. App’x 489, 491 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding
a “defendant in a non-capital case . . . is not entitled to know in advance of trial who will testify
for the government”). Yet, here the Government states that it “often provides witness and exhibit
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lists soon before trial and will likely do so here” [Doc. 58 p. 5]. The Government also states it has
already provided and will continue to provide impeachment evidence for its witnesses, such as
criminal history and prior inaccurate statements, “evidence of reputation for untruthfulness,” and
incentives or promises [Id. at 4].
Defendant’s request for all personnel files of law enforcement officers, agents, and
employees is overly broad and unavailing because Defendant fails to show the materiality of such
evidence. United States v. Valentine, No. 94-6195, 1995 WL 390322, at *4 (6th Cir. June 30, 1995)
(observing defendant is not entitled “to officers’ personnel files by simply asserting the hope that
he could find evidence to ‘cast doubt on their credibility’” (quoting United States v. Driscoll, 970
F.2d 1472, 1482 (6th Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Hampton v. United States, 191
F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 1999)). Nevertheless, the Government “anticipates surveying relevant
investigative agencies for impeachment information of law enforcement trial witnesses and
providing any such information to [Defendant] as required in time for his effective use at trial”
[Doc. 58 p. 5].
Regarding Defendant’s request for the photo lineup referenced in the search warrant
affidavit, the Government asserts that this information is not exculpatory and that Defendant’s
assertions that the affidavit’s reference to the lineup is somehow false is speculative.4 While the
Court agrees that Defendant has not established that the photographic lineup is either exculpatory
or material to a Franks motion, the Court’s Order on Discovery and Scheduling requires that
“[u]pon request, the government shall state whether the defendant was identified in any lineup,
4 	Moreover, the Court questions whether the identification of Defendant based upon a
photographic lineup is material to probable cause for the search warrant because the confidential
informant 	engaged 	in 	controlled 	buys 	with 	Defendant, 	which 	unquestionably 	established
Defendant’s identity as the informant’s cocaine supplier regardless of the sufficiency of the lineup
[See Doc. 58-1 ¶ 6].
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show up, photo spread or similar identification proceeding, and produce any pictures utilized or
resulting therefrom” [Doc. 14 ¶ G]. Accordingly, to the extent that the photo lineup shown to the
confidential informant was retained by law enforcement, the Government shall disclose it to
Defendant.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Omnibus Motion for All Exculpatory
Evidence and Impeachment Evidence [Doc. 56]. Defendant’s Motion to Compel the Government
to Disclose Six Photo Line-up Shown to Confidential Source and All Favorable Evidence [Doc.
70] is GRANTED in part, in that the Government shall disclose the photo lineup referenced in
the search warrant affidavit. With respect to Defendant’s motion seeking drug toxicology reports,
because the Government explained those reports were disclosed after testing was completed, this
motion [Doc. 63] is DENIED as moot.
B. RULE 404(b) EVIDENCE [Doc. 57]
Defendant requests an order directing the Government to disclose all evidence it intends to
offer pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) [Doc. 57 p. 1]. Defendant anticipates the
Government will attempt to introduce evidence falling within the purview of Rule 404(b), and he
requests disclosure of such evidence to allow him the opportunity to address the admissibility of
the evidence pretrial to avoid unfair prejudice [Id. at 2].
The Government responds that Defendant’s request is unnecessary as the Court’s Order on
Discovery and Scheduling [Doc. 14] requires it to notify and disclose 404(b) evidence to
Defendant fourteen days before trial [Doc. 58 p. 5]. The Government acknowledges its duty to
disclose and states it will comply with Rule 404(b) and the Court’s Order should it seek to
introduce any such evidence at trial [Id.].
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Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(3) requires the government to do the following in a
criminal case:
(A) provide reasonable notice of any [other crime, wrong, or act]
evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer at trial, so that the
defendant has a fair opportunity to meet it;
(B) articulate in the notice the permitted purpose for which the
prosecutor intends to offer the evidence and the reasoning that
supports the purpose; and
(C) to so in writing before trial—or in any form during trial if the
court, for good cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(3).
The Court’s Order on Discovery and Scheduling states that “reasonable notice” under Rule
404(b) is deemed to be fourteen days before trial unless the Court orders otherwise [Doc. 14 ¶ I].
Consistent with the Government’s representations, the Court expects it will comply with the
Court’s Order on Discovery and Scheduling and make the necessary disclosures under Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b) and the scheduling Order when appropriate. Given the Government’s
deadline to disclose the evidence Defendant seeks has not expired, Defendant’s motion [Doc. 57]
is DENIED.
C. REVEAL CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE [Doc. 64]
Pursuant to Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), Defendant next asks the Court
to “compel the Government to reveal the identity of the confidential informant” discussed by the
affiant in the application for the search warrant that resulted in Defendant’s arrest, [Doc. 64 pp. 1–
2]. Defendant contends the holding in Roviaro supports the identification of the confidential
informant under the facts of his case, which include controlled buys by the informant, because “the
confidential informant was a material witness to the drug transaction[s]” [Id. at 2–3 (citing
Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 61)]. Defendant points out the absence of any video or audio recordings of
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the controlled buys, audio recordings of the telephone calls to arrange the controlled buys, or
seizure of “marked money” used in the controlled buys [Id. at 4]. In the absence of this evidence,
he states a “high possibility” exists that the information on the controlled buys was “false and
misleading” and from an ex-girlfriend, which he says supports disclosure of the informant’s
identity [Id.].
The Government asks the Court to deny the request to reveal the identity of the confidential
informant because the identity of the confidential informant is privileged and Defendant does not
show how the informant’s identity would substantively assist his defense [Doc. 67 p. 1]. The
Government agrees that the informant conducted controlled buys from Defendant but points out
Defendant is not charged with distribution based on those buys, but, instead, he is charged with
crimes arising from evidence seized during a search of his residence [Id. at 1–2]. The Government
maintains that because the informant only provided information that led to the search warrant, the
informant was not a witness to the crimes Defendant is charged with committing and, thus, the
informant’s identity should not be revealed [Id. at 2].
In his reply, Defendant expands his request for the identity of the confidential informant,
who participated in the controlled buys discussed in the affidavit, to also ask for the identity of the
“human source” who allegedly provided information to law enforcement in late 2024 that
Defendant sold cocaine and resided at the Skyline Drive residence [Doc. 74 p. 2; see Doc. 58-1 ¶
2 (Affidavit of Detective Brandon Stryker)]. Defendant says he wants to know if the confidential
informant and the human source are the same person [Doc. 74 p. 2]. Defendant reiterates his
arguments for disclosure raised in his initial motion [Id. at 1–3]. Citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213 (1982), Defendant asserts the affidavit fails to substantiate the reliability or credibility of either
the confidential informant or the human source and, without this information, the affidavit does
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not show a nexus between his residence and drug trafficking [Id. at 4]. He requests the Court
compel the Government to reveal the identity of both the confidential informant and the human
source “to protect [his] due process rights and [his] speedy trial rights” [Id. at 5].
As a general rule, the government is not required to disclose the names of its witnesses
before trial. United States v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398, 420 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation modified). With
regard to the identities of confidential informants, the Supreme Court has recognized what has
become known as the informer’s privilege:
What is usually referred to as the informer’s privilege is in reality
the Government’s privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity
of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers
charged with enforcement of that law. The purpose of the privilege
is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective
law enforcement. The privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens
to communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to
law-enforcement officials and, by preserving their anonymity,
encourages them to perform that obligation.
Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 59 (citation modified).
This privilege is limited by the requirement that criminal trials be fundamentally fair. Id.
at 60. In other words, the informer’s privilege must yield when the informant’s identity is “relevant
and helpful to the defense of an accused” or “essential to a fair determination of a cause.” Id. at
60-61. “A court must balance public interest against the defendant’s right to prepare his defense,
the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible
defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors.” United
States v. Flowers, 712 F. App’x 492, 507 (6th Cir. 2017) (citation modified). Also relevant to the
Court’s balancing inquiry is the informant’s degree of involvement in the alleged offenses. United
States v. Sharp, 778 F.2d 1182, 1186 n.5 (6th Cir. 1985 (observing disclosure may be required
when an informant is an “active participant in the events underlying the defendant’s potential
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criminal liability” and is usually not required when the informant is a “mere tipster or introducer”).
Finally, danger to the life of the informant is entitled to significant weight in the balance. Flowers,
712 F. App’x at 507; United States v. Jackson, 990 F.2d 251, 255 (6th Cir. 1993). “The defendant
has the burden to show how disclosure of the informant would substantively assist his defense.”
Flowers, 712 F. App’x at 507 (citation omitted & modified).
Here, the Government has the informer’s privilege. Therefore, Defendant must show the
confidential informant’s identity is relevant and helpful to his defense. Defendant says he needs
the identity of the informant because the informant was a “material witness” to the drug
transactions [Doc. 64 p. 3]. But Defendant does not face a charge of engaging in a drug transaction
or distributing drugs in this case, nor is he charged with drug distribution related to the controlled
buys conducted by the confidential informant [See Doc. 8]. See Jackson, 990 F.2d at 255 (denying
disclosure of informant’s identity when the informant was not a participant in the charged offenses
and was not in the apartment when the defendant was arrested and when defendant “was not
charged in relation to the controlled sale to the informant”). Defendant is charged with two counts
of drug possession [Doc. 8]. Therefore, the confidential informant’s testimony would not be
relevant to the drugs found in Defendant’s house. As the Government highlighted in its response
[Doc. 67 pp. 1–2], providing information used to secure a search warrant that led to charges does
not require the disclosure of a confidential informant. See United States v. Ray, 803 F.3d 244, 274
(6th Cir. 2015) (explaining disclosure not required where an informant only “supplied the
information to law enforcement that ultimately led to a fruitful search”) (citation omitted)). With
regard to the human source, Defendant does not even argue that he or she witnessed any drug
transactions.
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The law requires Defendant to show how the disclosure of the informant’s identity will
substantively assist his defense of the charged offenses, and he has failed to make such a showing.
The Court therefore determines disclosure of the informant’s identity is not appropriate.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to reveal confidential informant’s identity [Doc. 64] is
DENIED.
II. 	DEFENDANT’S UNTIMELY MOTIONS
“A party may raise by pretrial motion any defense, objection, or request that the court can
determine without a trial on the merits.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1). Motions requesting the
provision of discovery under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 must be raised pretrial. Fed.
R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(E). Rule 12 recognizes the court’s authority to set and extend or reset a
deadline for filing pretrial motions. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(1)-(2). If a party fails to file a pretrial
motion timely, the Court has discretion to decline to consider the motion or to permit the untimely
motion, if the party shows “good cause” for the untimely filing. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3).
“Good cause is a ‘flexible standard’ requiring an explanation for both the delay and the
potential prejudice.” United States v. Trujillo-Molina, 678 F. App’x 335, 337 (6th Cir. 2017)
(citing United States v. Walden, 625 F.3d 961, 965 (6th Cir. 2010)). “At a minimum, a party must
‘articulate some legitimate explanation for the failure to timely file.’” Id. (quoting Walden, 625
F.3d at 965). “The Sixth Circuit rejects improvident strategy as a reason to excuse a tardy defensive
motion.” United States v. Campos, No. 5:17-CR-55-DCR-REW, 2018 WL 1406614, at *3 (E.D.
Ky Feb. 23, 2018) (finding defense counsel pursued plea negotiations, allowing the motion
deadline to expire, as a matter of strategy), adopting report & recommendation 2018 WL 1406614
(E.D. Ky. Mar. 13, 2018). When determining the potential prejudice from a late-filed motion, the
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Court considers “all interests in the particular case,” including those of the Court and the public.
Trujillo-Molina, 678 F. App’x at 339 (citation modified).
Here, the final deadline for filing pretrial motions was October 23, 2025, after the
undersigned granted several extensions [Doc. 62 p. 2].5 In denying Defendant’s sixth request to
extend the deadline beyond October 23, the undersigned explained that if Defendant discovered a
pretrial motion he could not have previously filed by the deadline, he may move for leave and
show good cause for the belated filing [Doc. 96 p. 4].
On November 4, 2025, Defendant filed a motion to exclude the testimony of “all officers
[who were] involved in the investigation” [Doc. 82] because they are “Giglo-impaired.” On
November 13, 2025, he filed a motion to produce and authenticate the pole camera video footage
and “all other favorable digital evidence” [Doc. 93], a second motion to disclose the identity of the
confidential informant [Doc. 94], and a motion for disclosure of all laboratory reports along with
all testing data and chain of custody records, the audio and video recordings of the controlled buys,
surveillance logs, payment records for the confidential informant, “marked money logs,” and “full”
extraction reports for electronic devices [Doc. 95]. These four motions were filed without leave
and after the expiration of the October 23, 2025 pretrial motion deadline [Docs. 82, 93, 94, & 95].6
Defendant provides no explanation for the belated filing of these motions, much less a statement
of good cause. He offers neither a reason for his delay in filing these motions nor a statement
5 	A full discussion of the chronology of the deadline for filing pretrial motions is contained
in the Court’s Memorandum and Order of November 14, 2025 [Doc. 94 p. 3].
6 	Although Defendant filed these motions before the Court’s Memorandum and Order [Doc.
96] denying extension of the pretrial motion deadline and requiring leave for further pretrial
motions, Defendant did not provide good cause for these late motions in his reply briefs [See Docs.
107 & 121]. Defendant sought leave to file his last discovery motion [Doc. 105]. The Court
discusses that Motion separately from the untimely motions without requests for leave.
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regarding potential prejudice. Defendant’s motions include no statements suggesting the subject
matter of the motion was recently discovered. Accordingly, Defendant fails to provide a legitimate
explanation for the untimely filing of these motions.
Defendant will also not be unduly prejudiced by the Court denying review of his untimely
motions. Defendant’s Motion to Compel Disclosure or In Camera Review of Confidential Source
[Doc. 94] repeats requests already included in a timely pretrial motion [see Doc. 64]. Defendant’s
Motion to Exclude All Testimony from Giglio Impaired Officers/Agents at Trial [Doc. 82] is more
appropriately addressed as a motion in limine and is premature at this phase of the case. And with
regard to the specific items of discovery requested, the Government confirms it has complied with
its discovery obligations [Doc. 104 p. 1]. To the extent Defendant believes an issue has not been
addressed, he can file a motion for leave to raise that issue providing a statement of good cause.7
On December 1, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion [for] Leave and [to] File Late File Pre-
Trial Motion to Compel K-9 Discovery and All Favorable Evidence [Doc. 105] and the associated
Motion to Compel K-9 Stop Discovery [Doc. 106]. Defendant seeks leave to file the motion to
compel, which requests information regarding the traffic stop and subsequent K-9 search of the
confidential informant’s vehicle [Doc. 105 p. 4; Doc. 106 p. 2]. Defendant concedes his motion is
filed after the expiration of the pretrial motion deadline [Doc. 105 p. 2]. He argues, however, that
he has good cause for filing this motion late [Id. at 1]. Defendant explains the background of his
requests for extensions of the pretrial motion deadline, and he also highlights the fact that he has
been representing himself since September 2025 [Id. at 2]. Defendant also argues he would be
7 	On December 11, 2025, Defendant filed a reply to the Government’s consolidated response
to his late motions pointing out perceived technical errors with the response but not addressing its
substance [Doc. 121].
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prejudiced by the Court’s refusal to grant leave for this late-filed motion because it would impact
his ability to challenge the traffic stop and search of the informant’s vehicle [Id. at 3–4].
As stated above, the Court granted several extensions of Defendant’s pretrial motion
deadline before declining to extend for the sixth time in November 2025 [Doc. 96]. The
undersigned also cautioned Defendant about the difficulty of representing oneself [Doc. 51 p. 3].
Neither the Court’s denial of Defendant’s request to extend the deadline, nor his pro se status
qualifies as good cause for the Court to hear Defendant’s late-filed motion. The Court also finds
no danger of prejudice to Defendant with respect to this motion, which seeks to challenge the
traffic stop of a confidential informant, not a stop of Defendant. Defendant lacks standing to
challenge the search of the confidential informant’s car in which he has no proprietary or
possessory interest. See United States v. Russell, 26 F.4th 371, 375 (6th Cir. 2022) (“[S]tanding is
‘an element’ of a Fourth Amendment suppression claim” and a “defendant bears the ‘burden’ of
showing he [or she] has standing.”); United States v. Talley, 275 F.3d 560, 563 (6th Cir. 2001)
(holding a defendant challenging a search has the burden of demonstrating his or her legitimate
expectation of privacy in the location). Moreover, Defendant is not charged with drugs found in
the confidential informant’s car. Given that Defendant fails to show good cause or prejudice,
Defendant’s Motion [for] Leave and [to] File Pre-Trial Motion to Compel K-9 Discovery and All
Favorable Evidence [Doc. 105] is DENIED, and the undersigned declines to entertain Defendant’s
Motion to Compel K-9 Stop Discovery [Doc. 106], which is DENIED as untimely and filed
without leave.
For the reasons discussed above, Defendant’s untimely pretrial motions [Docs. 82, 93, 94,
95 & 105/106] are DENIED.
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VI. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. 	Defendant’s 	Omnibus 	Motion 	for 	All 	Exculpatory 	Evidence 	[and]
Impeachment Evidence [Doc. 56] is DENIED;
2. 	Motion for Notice and Disclosure of Any Rule 404(B) Evidence the U.S. Seeks
to Introduce at Trial [Doc. 57] is DENIED;
3. 	Motion to Compel Discovery Under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure for the Government to Produce and Turnover Drug Toxicology
Report to the Defendant [Doc. 63] is DENIED;
4. 	Motion to Reveal Informant’s Identity [Doc. 64] is DENIED;
5. 	Defendant’s Motion to Compel the Government to Disclose Six Photo Line-Up
Shown to Confidential Source and All Favorable Evidence [Doc. 70] is
GRANTED in part, in that the Government shall disclose the photo lineup
referenced in the search warrant affidavit;
6. 	Motion to Exclude All Testimony from Giglio Impaired Officers/Agents at
Trial [Doc. 82] is DENIED;
7. 	Motion to Preserve and Authenticate Digital Evidence [Doc. 93] is DENIED;
8. 	Motion to Compel Disclosure or in Camera Review of Confidential Source
Technically Confidential Informant [Doc. 94] is DENIED;
9. 	Rule 16 Motion to Compel Discovery (Lab, Chain of Custody Records)
(Marked Money) [Doc. 95] is DENIED as moot; and
10. Motion to Leave and File Late Filed Pretrial Motion to Compel K-9 Discovery
and All Favorable Evidence [Doc. 105] is DENIED, and the Court declines to
entertain Defendant’s Motion to Compel K-9 Stop Discovery [Doc. 106], which
is DENIED as untimely and filed without leave.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER:
_________________________
Debra C. Poplin
United States Magistrate Judge
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