Delgadillo v. Cumberland University

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
SERVANDO JORDAN DELGADILLO,
Plaintiff,
v.
CUMBERLAND UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.
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No. 3:25-cv-00524
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc.
No. 24) recommending that the Court grant in part Cumberland University’s motion to dismiss
(Doc. No. 19). Servando Jordan Delgadillo, proceeding pro se, has filed timely objections to the
R&R. 	(Doc. No. 25).1 	Cumberland University was permitted, but not required, to respond to
Delgadillo’s objections within 14 days. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); M.D. Tenn. L.R. 72.02(b). The
14-day deadline has passed, and Cumberland University has not responded. 	Therefore, the
objections are ripe for review. 	For the following reasons, Delgadillo’s objections will be
overruled, the R&R will be adopted, and Cumberland University’s motion to dismiss will be
granted in part.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Delgadillo alleges that while at Cumberland University, he was discriminated against
because of his age, race, and gender after he was accused of harassing a white female student.
1 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(d), Delgadillo had 17 days to file timely objections to
the R&R because he was served by mail. The seventeenth day landed on a holiday, President’s
Day (Monday, February 16, 2026). Therefore, Delgadillo had until Tuesday, February 17, 2026,
to timely file objections, which he did. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C) (providing that where a
deadline falls on a legal holiday, “the period continues to run until the end of the next day that is
not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.”).
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(Doc. No. 24 at 3). He also claims that employees of Cumberland University unlawfully obtained
a message off his phone, violated his privacy by surveilling him in his home, and stole his property.
(Id. at 4). 	He alleges that when he reported these violations, he was retaliated against by
Cumberland University’s Title IX Coordinator. (Id.). Delgadillo filed claims against Cumberland
University under Title IX of the Educational Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.
(he titled these claims “False Title IX Allegation,” “Wrongful Disciplinary Action,” and
“Retaliation”). 	(Id. at 8–10). 	He also alleges the following state law claims: “fraudulently
obtaining access devices; malpractice; negligent breach of fiduciary duty; reckless breach of
fiduciary duty; intentional breach of fiduciary duty; breach of contract and covenant of good faith
and fair dealing; intrusion to seclusion; emotional distress; defamation; retaliation; [and] wrongful
disciplinary actions.” (Id. at 2). In response, Cumberland University filed the instant motion to
dismiss. (Doc. No. 19). Delgadillo filed a response in opposition (Doc. No. 21), and Cumberland
University filed a reply (Doc. No. 23).
The Magistrate Judge recommends granting Cumberland University’s motion in part as to
Delgadillo’s federal claims, and that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Delgadillo’s remaining state law claims. (Doc. No 24 at 1). There are several reasons that
the Magistrate Judge recommends dismissing Delgadillo’s federal claims. First, Delgadillo does
not allege that Cumberland University receives federal funding and is thus subject to Title IX. (Id.
at 9). Second, Delgadillo’s factual allegations are unclear and insufficient, leaving the Court to
attempt to piece together what occurred, as he alleges it. (Id.). Third, Delgadillo does not offer
any legal support from which the Court can plausibly conclude that the facts alleged, even if true,
rise to the level of Title IX violations. (Id. at 10). For example, general complaints about how a
university handles claims of harassment like the one Delgadillo alleges was lodged against him
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are not protected activity under Title IX. 	(Id. at 11). 	Similarly, any actions Delgadillo took in
defense of the harassment allegation against him also would not qualify as protected activity under
Title IX. (Id.). Thus, he cannot make out a claim that he was retaliated against for engaging in
protected activity. (Id.).
In short, the Magistrate Judge concludes that Delgadillo’s federal claims are too vague and
conclusory to survive a motion to dismiss. 	Having so concluded, the Magistrate Judge
recommends that the Court dismiss the federal claims and decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over the state law claims. (Doc. No 24 at 13). Finally, the
Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court should decline Cumberland University’s request for
attorney’s fees, discretionary costs, and expenses under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 20-
17-107(a), because Cumberland University does not offer any legal argument that such an award
is warranted in this case. (Doc. No 24 at 14).
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that only “specific written objections” to the
Magistrate Judge’s proposed factual findings and legal conclusions are considered “proper” for
consideration. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Proper objections also
must state with particularity the specific portions of the Magistrate Judge’s report
or proposed findings or recommendations to which an objection is made, and must
be accompanied by sufficient documentation including, but not limited to,
affidavits, pertinent exhibits, and if necessary, transcripts of the record to apprise
the District Judge of the bases for the objections. A separately filed supporting
memorandum of law, not exceeding twenty-five (25) pages, must accompany the
objections.
M.D. Tenn. L.R. 72.02(a). “The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate
judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). 	In so doing,
“[t]he district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further
evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id.
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“The filing of vague, general, or conclusory objections does not meet the requirement of
specific objections and is tantamount to a complete failure to object.” Cole v. Yukins, 7 F. App’x
354, 356 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995)). Indeed, “an
‘objection’ that does nothing more than state a disagreement with a magistrate’s suggested
resolution, or simply summarizes what has been presented before, is not an ‘objection’ as that term
is used in this context.” 	VanDriver v. Martin, 304 F. Supp. 2d 934, 938 (E.D. Mich. 2004)
(citations and quotations omitted). Additionally, arguments raised for the first time to the district
court on objection are not properly before the district court for consideration, because arguments
are generally forfeited when not first presented to the magistrate judge. 	See AES-Apex Emp.
Servs., Inc. v. Rotondo, 924 F.3d 857, 867 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[A] district court never abuses its
discretion when it holds that an issue not actually presented to a magistrate judge is forfeited.”);
Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (explaining that
petitioner waived claims raised for the first time in his objections to the R&R).
“The failure to properly [or] specifically . . . object to a report and recommendation releases
the Court from its duty to independently review the matter.” Lawhorn v. Buy Buy Baby, Inc., No.
3:20-CV-00201, 2021 WL 1063075, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 19, 2021) (citing Frias v. Frias, No.
2:18-cv-00076, 2019 WL 549506, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 12, 2019)). When objections are not
properly raised, “[t]he district court’s attention is not focused on any specific issues for review,
thereby making the initial reference to the magistrate [judge] useless.” Howard v. Sec’y of Health
and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, “[t]he functions of the district
court are effectively duplicated as both the magistrate and the district court perform identical
tasks.” Id. “This duplication of time and effort wastes judicial resources rather than sav[es] them,
and runs contrary to the purposes of the Magistrates Act.” Id.
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III. 	DISCUSSION
Delgadillo’s objections are not proper for several reasons. First, Delgadillo’s objections
mischaracterize the R&R as providing only two reasons for recommending that his Title IX claims
be dismissed: (1) that he did not allege that Cumberland University receives federal funding, and
(2) that he “was not discriminated/harassed based on his sex.” (Doc. No. 25 at 2). As explained
above, the Magistrate Judge provided more than two reasons for recommending dismissal,
including that Delgadillo’s allegations were, overall, too conclusory, unclear, and vague to meet
the pleading standards required to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. No 24
at 9–12). 	Delgadillo does not explain with any specificity or particularity why the Magistrate
Judge’s analysis is incorrect. Next, Delgadillo attempts to cure his admitted failure to allege that
Cumberland University receives federal funding by alleging that fact for the first time in his
objections to the R&R. 	(Doc. No. 25 at 3). 	However, he forfeited that issue by failing to first
present it to the Magistrate Judge. See Rotondo, 924 F.3d at 867 (6th Cir. 2019); Murr, 200 F.3d
at 902 n.1. 	Third, Delgadillo’s objections merely repeat conclusory allegations that he was
discriminated against due to his gender and race. (Doc. No. 25 at 3–4). 	As such, his objections
“do[] nothing more than state a disagreement with a magistrate’s suggested resolution [and] simply
summariz[e] what has been presented before.” VanDriver, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 938. To the extent
that Delgadillo attempts to elucidate the facts underlying the Amended Complaint in his
objections, again, he is procedurally barred from raising issues for the first time in his objections
to the R&R. See Rotondo, 924 F.3d at 867 (6th Cir. 2019); Murr, 200 F.3d at 902 n.1.
Finally, Delgadillo’s objections are not “accompanied by sufficient documentation” or “[a]
separately filed supporting memorandum of law.” M.D. Tenn. L.R. 72.02(a). It is true that “[p]ro
se complaints are to be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers, and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th
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Cir. 2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “[p]ro se litigants must comply
with the procedural rules that govern civil cases.” Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 342–43
(6th Cir. 1988). Therefore, this Court does not have jurisdiction to review the R&R de novo
because Delgadillo’s objections were not properly raised. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
Even if Delgadillo’s objections were properly raised, however, this Court would overrule
them. The Court has reviewed the Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 6) as well as the objections to
the R&R. Even assuming, arguendo, that Delgadillo properly pled that Cumberland University
receives federal funding and is therefore subject to Title IX, his allegations are nevertheless too
conclusory and vague to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
The most the Court can infer regarding possible Title IX claims, after construing the
Amended Complaint in Delgadillo’s favor, is that he was accused of harassing a female student;
in response, Cumberland University threatened or took disciplinary action against him; and when
he reported the Head of Security for discrimination, Cumberland University issued some sort of
restraining order against him. (Doc. No. 6 at 6–7, 10, 11). Even if true, those allegations fall short
of establishing a plausible Title IX claim that he was discriminated against due to his gender. See
Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 589–94 (6th Cir. 2018) (describing various causes of action
that can be brought under Title IX, all of which involve gender discrimination); Doe v. Baum, 903
F.3d 575, 581 (6th Cir. 2018) (explaining that alleged facts and inferences drawn therefrom must
“plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”). 	Delgadillo’s allegations also fall short of
establishing that he was retaliated against in violation of Title IX. To make out such a retaliation
claim, Delgadillo must show he engaged in protected activity under Title IX: “protected activity
that forms the basis of a Title IX retaliation claim is actively complaining of or opposing alleged
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discrimination on the basis of sex under Title IX.” Doe v. Belmont Univ., 367 F. Supp. 3d 732,
756–57 (M.D. Tenn. 2019). 	Delgadillo’s claim that the Head of Security at Cumberland
University discriminated against him is not directly tied to his gender, so he has not stated a
plausible allegation that he engaged in protected activity. See id.; (Doc. No. 6 ¶¶ 11, 49 ).
In his objections, Delgadillo elaborates somewhat on the allegations in the Amended
Complaint, repeatedly stating that because, as he claims, he was accused of harassing female
students without justification or proper grievance procedures being followed, that amounts to
gender discrimination under Title IX. (See Doc. No. 25 at 3–4). 	Still, however, these objections,
as with the allegations in the Amended Complaint, do not go beyond mere “‘labels and
conclusions.’” 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 	Therefore, even if Delgadillo’s objections were
properly before this Court, they would be overruled, and the Court would dismiss his federal claims
on de novo review.
Lastly, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Cumberland University’s request
for attorney’s fees, discretionary costs, and expenses under Tennessee Code Annotated Section
20-17-107(a) is completely devoid of any supporting legal argument. (See Doc. No. 19 at 2; Doc.
No. 19-1 at 30). Therefore, that request will be denied.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:
1. 	The R&R (Doc. No. 24) is APPROVED AND ADOPTED;
2. 	Cumberland University’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 19) is GRANTED IN
PART and Delgadillo’s claims under Title IX are DISMISSED;
3. 	The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Delgadillo’s state law
claims, which are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Delgadillo’s ability to pursue them
in state court;
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4. 	Delgadillo’s Motion to Allow Late Filing (Doc. No. 26) is DENIED AS MOOT;
and
5. 	Cumberland University’s request for attorney’s fees, discretionary costs, and
expenses under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 20-17-107(a) is DENIED.
This is a final order. The Clerk shall enter judgment in accordance with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 58 and close the file. Delgadillo is on notice that this Court is no longer the proper
forum in which to raise arguments; if he disagrees with the Court’s rulings, he may file an appeal
with the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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