McClain v. Strada et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
JOHNNY EUGENE MCCLAIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
EDMOND HILL, et al.,
Defendants.
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NO. 3:25-cv-00557
JUDGE RICHARDSON
ORDER
Pending before the Court1 is the report and recommendation (Doc. No. 69, “R&R”) of the
Magistrate Judge, which recommends that the Court deny the motions for preliminary injunctive
relief (Doc. Nos. 36, 42, collectively “Motions”) filed by pro se Plaintiff, Johnny Eugene McClain.
Plaintiff has filed Objections (Doc. No. 75, “Objections”)2 to the R&R.3 For the reasons stated
herein, the Court will adopt the R&R in full.
1 Herein, “the Court” refers to the undersigned District Judge, as opposed to the Magistrate Judge who
authored the R&R.
2 Herein, a given use of the term “Objections” may refer to the document (Doc. No. 75) itself, to the
purported objections contained therein (i.e., the “objections” to the R&R contained within the
“Objections”), or both.
3 Typically, a party has 14 days to file objections to a report and recommendation issued by a magistrate
judge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Here, Plaintiff filed his Objections on December 30, 2025, 27 days after the
R&R was issued on December 3, 2025. Nevertheless, owing to Plaintiff’s pro se status and because Plaintiff
is incarcerated, the Court in its discretion will not decline to consider the Objections because of their
untimeliness, and will consider the merits of the Objections herein. See, e.g., Moses v. Am. Apparel Retail,
Inc., No. 13-CV-2753-SHL-DKV, 2015 WL 4665968, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 6, 2015) (“Plaintiff’s
objections are untimely, but, in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court will take her objections into
consideration.”); Worth v. Wamsley, No. 2:17-CV-00043, 2018 WL 1315017, at *1-2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 14,
2018) (considering objections on the merits filed by pro se incarcerated plaintiff nearly two months after
the deadline to file objections expired).
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Below, the Court first will review the background of the instant action, of the Motions, and
of the R&R. The Court next will examine pertinent content of the R&R before then reviewing the
legal standard for a district court judge’s review of the report and recommendation of a magistrate
judge. The Court will then analyze Plaintiff’s Objections to the R&R and review (as necessary)
any portions of the Magistrate Judge’s R&R to which a proper objection was made by Plaintiff.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a prisoner currently incarcerated at Trousdale Turner Correctional Center
(“TTCC”). (Doc. No. 1 at 2). On May 15, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit by filing a complaint
(Doc. No. 1, “Complaint”). The Complaint asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
numerous defendants in their individual and official capacities based on alleged violations of
Plaintiff’s First Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Tenth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment
rights as well as Plaintiff’s rights under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Doc. No. 1 at 3-
4).
Plaintiff’s claims arise out of an alleged stabbing by another inmate, Jeremiah Key, during
an altercation on August 21, 2024. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff alleges that CoreCivic4 staff had “clear
knowledge of escalating tensions” between Plaintiff and Key, as well as “specific threats posed by
[Key],” to Plaintiff, yet failed to take any action to protect Plaintiff from Key’s attack. (Id.).
Plaintiff further alleges that correctional officers watched the alleged assault by Key on Plaintiff
without intervening. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that he was denied medical care after the attack,
and that that he was subject to retaliation planned by CoreCivic staff. (Id. at 2-3).
4 CoreCivic is the private corrections management firm that operates TTCC pursuant to contract with the
State of Tennessee. Trousdale Turner Correctional Center, TN Dep’t of Corr.,
https://www.tn.gov/correction/state-prisons/state-prison-list/trousdale-turner-correctional-center.html (last
visited January 14, 2025).
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On July 15, 2025, the Court conducted an initial screening of the Complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C § 1915A(a) (Doc. No. 34), and permitted Plaintiff’s First and Eighth Amendment claims to
proceed against seven defendants in their individual capacities. (Doc. No. 34 at 4-8). The Court
dismissed all other claims and defendants. (Id. at 7-10, 12).
Plaintiff then filed the two Motions, each of which seeks preliminary injunctive relief.
(Doc. Nos. 36, 42). In the first of the Motions (Doc. No. 36), Plaintiff requested an order requiring
“that prison staff be ordered to take [Plaintiff] to all [medical] appointments and for prison staff to
produce names of all Jane Does and John Does defendants.” (Id. at 2). With respect to his medical
appointment request, Plaintiff referred to certain vision problems he is experiencing, specifically
blindness in his right eye. (Id.). Plaintiff also requested that TTCC officials be ordered to “stop
putting gang members” in Plaintiff’s cell. (Id.). In the second motion for injunctive relief (Doc.
No. 42), Plaintiff requested both an order requiring “defendants [to] give him copies of all
grievances” he has filed at TTCC and the Court’s assistance in acquiring medical records from
non-prison medical providers. (Id. at 1). Plaintiff further requested the Court’s assistance in
sending these records via mail to Plaintiff’s family due to what Plaintiff asserted are “unlawful
acts of [TTCC] officials [in] holding and destroying Plaintiff[’s] incoming mail.” (Id. at 1). One
of the Defendants in this action, Edmond Hill, filed a response (Doc. No. 55) in opposition to the
Motions.5
5 Although Defendant Edmond Hill’s response (Doc. No. 55) is made in reference only to Doc. Nos. 35,
39, 41, and 42—and not Docket No. 36 (i.e., the first of the Motions), the Court understands Defendant
Edmond Hill therein to have substantively posed an objection to both of the Motions because he therein
requested the Court to deny Plaintiff’s requested “Preliminary Injunctions.” (Doc. No. 55 at 1) (emphasis
added).
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THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S R&R
The R&R addressed both of the Motions. As a threshold matter, the Magistrate Judge noted
in the R&R that:
In determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction, the Court must consider
whether the movant has established: (1) a “strong” likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) that he will suffer irreparable injury absent injunctive relief; (3) that the
balance of the equities favors the movant because the issuance of an injunction
would not cause substantial harm to others; and (4) that the public interest would
be served by the issuance of the injunction. Sisters for Life, Inc. v. Louisville-
Jefferson County, 56 F.4th 400, 403 (6th Cir. 2022); Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d
729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000).
(Doc. No. 69 at 3-4). The Magistrate Judge also explained that “[w]hether to grant a preliminary
injunction is within the discretion of the district court.” (Doc. No. 69 at 4) (citing Tenn. Scrap
Recyclers Ass’n v. Bredesen, 556 F.3d 442, 447 (6th Cir. 2009)).
With respect to Plaintiff’s Motions, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Motions
be denied on multiple grounds. First, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Motions be
denied because:
. . . they are not supported by an affidavit, declaration, or any other type of actual
evidence. Because the issuance of a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary
remedy, the proof required for a party to obtain a preliminary injunction is much
more stringent than the proof required to survive a summary judgment motion.
Leary, 228 F.3d at 739. Thus, a party seeking a preliminary injunction must present
“more than ‘scant evidence’ to substantiate [its] allegations.” Patel v. AR Grp.
Tennessee, LLC, 2020 WL 5849346, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 1, 2020) (quoting
Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted, 751 F.3d 403, 417 (6th Cir. 2014)). An
unsupported motion, such as Plaintiff’s two motions, must be denied.
(Doc. No. 69 at 4).
Second, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Motions be denied because even if
they “were properly supported” (id. at 4), “some aspects of the injunctive relief requested by
Plaintiff - providing him with documents and information - are actually issues that are more
appropriately raised as discovery issues.” (Id.) (citing Doe v. Off. of Inspector Gen. (OIG), 2025
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WL 2318623, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 11, 2025) (Campbell, J.) (“[T]he majority of the relief
requested – acknowledgement of claims and requests for discovery – is not an appropriate subject
for a preliminary injunction.”)). The Magistrate Judge also relied on his assessment that “Plaintiff
does not direct his requests for preliminary injunctive relief at any particular defendant who has
been shown to be able to provide the requested relief” (Doc. No. 69 at 4), which was problematic
for Plaintiff because “to obtain a preliminary injunction, there must be a defendant against whom
the preliminary injunction would be appropriately enforceable.” (Id. at 4-5) (quoting Doe v.
Rausch, 2025 WL 57711, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 9, 2025)).
Finally, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Motions be denied because:
Plaintiff does not actually seek to preserve the status quo in this case prior to trial
but requests that the Court actively intervene on his behalf by overseeing aspects
of his incarceration and by providing him with affirmative relief prior to any
resolution of his claims. The Court finds no basis supporting such extraordinary
relief. This action was only recently filed, and Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on
the merits is no greater than that of Defendants at this point. Plaintiff has also not
made a persuasive showing that he will suffer irreparable harm if the requested
injunctive relief is not granted. The balancing of harms . . . also does not weigh in
favor of the requested relief, and Plaintiff has not persuasively demonstrated that a
public interest would be advanced by the requested relief[.]
(Doc. No. 69 at 5).
LEGAL STANDARD FOR THE REVIEW OF REPORTS & RECOMMENDATIONS
When a magistrate judge issues a report and recommendation regarding a dispositive
pretrial matter, the district court judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the
report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which a proper objection is made.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1). 6 The district judge may accept, reject, or modify
6 Significantly, and perhaps surprisingly, the statute does not actually direct the district judge to expressly
rule on the objections themselves (i.e., expressly sustain or reject the objector’s specific criticism(s) of what
the magistrate judge did). Instead of requiring the district judge to determine the validity of the objections
to what the magistrate judge did, the statute requires the district judge to make a determination—de novo,
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the recommended disposition, review further evidence, or return the matter to the magistrate judge
with instructions. Id.
A district judge is not required to review, under a de novo or any other standard, those
aspects of a report and recommendation to which no proper objection is made. Ashraf v. Adventist
Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 3d 879, 881 (W.D. Tenn. 2018); Benson v. Walden Sec.,
No. 3:18-CV-0010, 2018 WL 6322332, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 4, 2018) (citing Thomas v. Arn,
474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985)).
Only “specific written objections” to the magistrate judge’s proposed factual findings and
legal conclusions are “proper” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b). Frias v. Frias, No.
which inherently means ultimately without reference to whether what the magistrate judge did was
objectionable—of the portion(s) of the report and recommendation to which objection was made. Moreover,
since the review of the objected-to portions of the report and recommendation is de novo, any critiquing of
what the magistrate judge did ultimately would be dicta (albeit relevant and probative dicta to the extent
that such critiquing explains the analysis underlying the district judge’s determination of the objected-to
portions of the R&R). Additionally, district judges in this Circuit not infrequently either decline to rule (or,
to the same effect, deny as moot) a particular objections on the specific ground that so doing is unnecessary
to rule on the objected-to portion of the report and recommendation. E.g., Collins v. Bright, No.
213CV02987JPMCGC, 2021 WL 5205622, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 9, 2021) (“[T]his objection does not
affect or alter the conclusions of the Magistrate Judge and is overruled as moot.”); Lashuay v. Fornwalt,
No. 1:15-CV-1109, 2017 WL 4160947, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 20, 2017) (“This Court need not resolve
all of the objections,” because only some of them needed to be addressed in order to resolve the motion that
was the subject of the report and recommendation); Weatherspoon v. Williams, No. 2:14-CV-108, 2016
WL 6070994, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2016) (“Plaintiff's objections are irrelevant and will be denied.”);
Bowers v. Burnett, No. 1:08-CV-469, 2011 WL 1047343, at *2 n.1 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 18, 2011) (noting
that the Court need not resolve an objection to the extent that the objector’s position on the R&R has other
fatal deficiencies); Powell v. Alcoa High Sch., No. 3:10-CV-212, 2010 WL 2598260, at *2 (E.D. Tenn.
June 24, 2010) (Because this objection is irrelevant to [the magistrate judge’s] recommendations, it is
hereby overruled.”) Cline v. Kelly, No. 09CV859, 2010 WL 1006529, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2010)
(“The Court acknowledges [the petitioner’s] objection, but need not resolve it because that specific fact is
not relevant to the resolution of any of the grounds for relief set forth in the petitioner that the magistrate
judge had recommended be denied”).
Thus, although it seems clear that the district judge can expressly rule on the objections, the Court
concludes that a district judge is not required to do so. And herein, the Court declines to do so, focusing
instead on the required de novo review and determination of the objected-to parts of the R&R—albeit in
part by taking account of any ways in which the objections shed light on what the Court’s ultimate
determination should be.
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2:18-cv-00076, 2019 WL 549506, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 12, 2019). Furthermore, Local Rule
72.02(a) provides that such objections must be written and must state with particularity the specific
portions of a magistrate judge’s report or proposed findings or recommendations to which an
objection is made. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); L.R. 72.02(a). Significantly, “[t]he filing of vague,
general, or conclusory objections does not meet the requirement of specific objections and is
tantamount to a complete failure to object. Moreover, an objection that does nothing more than
state a disagreement with a magistrate’s suggested resolution, or simply summarizes what has been
presented before, is not an objection as that term is used in this context.” Frias, 2019 WL 549506,
at *2. In other words, “the district court need not provide de novo review,” or any other type of
review, “where the objections are ‘[f]rivolous, conclusive or general,’” and therefore improperly
made. Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). See also Ashraf, 322 F.
Supp. 3d at 881 (“The district court is not required to review—under a de novo or any other
standard—those aspects of the report and recommendation to which no objection is made.”);
Benson, 2018 WL 6322332, at *3 (same).
ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS AND REVIEW OF THE R&R
Here, Plaintiff has filed Objections (Doc. No. 75) to the R&R. However, a review of the
Objections reveals that for the most part, the Objections comprise exactly those types of
“[f]rivolous, conclusive or general” objections which do not require the Court to provide de novo
(or indeed any) review of the R&R. Mira, 806 F.2d at 637. See also Frias, 2019 WL 549506, at
*2 (noting that the filing of “vague, general, or conclusory objections” is “tantamount to a complete
failure to object,” and that an objection “that does nothing more than state a disagreement with a
magistrate’s suggested resolution, or simply summarizes what has been presented before, is not an
‘objection’ as that term is used in [the context of objecting to the report and recommendation of a
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magistrate judge].”). Indeed, the Objections for the most part (though not entirely, as will be
explained in more detail below), simply restate what Plaintiff previously argued in his Motions
without stating with specificity what in the R&R is incorrect. For example, the Objections include
a restatement of Plaintiff’s vision problems (Doc. No. 75 at 2), simply restate in more detail
Plaintiff’s concerns with TTCC “placing gang members in [Plaintiff’s] cell,” (id. at 3) and include
unexplained citations to case law. (Id.). So, these portions of Plaintiff’s Objections are improper
and accordingly these parts of the Objections do not entitle Plaintiff to de novo (or indeed any)
review of any portion of the R&R. Frias, 2019 WL 549506, at *2 (“The failure to raise proper
objections is equivalent to filing no objections at all and releases the Court from its duty to
independently review the record.”).
On the other hand, Plaintiff does appear to lodge a specific and written (and thus
cognizable) objection with respect to the portion of the R&R where the Magistrate Judge
recommends that the Motions be denied because:
. . . they are not supported by an affidavit, declaration, or any other type of actual
evidence. Because the issuance of a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary
remedy, the proof required for a party to obtain a preliminary injunction is much
more stringent than the proof required to survive a summary judgment motion.
Leary, 228 F.3d at 739. Thus, a party seeking a preliminary injunction must present
“more than ‘scant evidence’ to substantiate [its] allegations.” Patel v. AR Grp.
Tennessee, LLC, 2020 WL 5849346, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 1, 2020) (quoting
Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted, 751 F.3d 403, 417 (6th Cir. 2014)). An
unsupported motion, such as Plaintiff’s two motions, must be denied.
(Doc. No. 69 at 4).
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that he “sent evidence in motion [sic] to support evidence in
complaint [sic]”7 to show that he was “missing appointments.” (Doc. No. 75 at 2). Plaintiff also
7 The Court understands Plaintiff to be referring here to Plaintiff’s filings titled: (i) “Declaration of Evidence
to Support Complaint” (Docket No. 58), which includes as an exhibit various documents that Plaintiff
contends support his Complaint; and (ii) “Evidence to Support My Claim” at Docket No. 59, which includes
some 150 pages of documents that Plaintiff contends support Plaintiff’s claims.
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appears to argue that evidence of correctional officials tampering with his mail is in the record at
Docket Nos. 58 and 59. (Doc. No. 75 at 3). Thus, the Court will conduct a de novo review of that
portion of the R&R (the portion quoted just above) as to which Plaintiff has lodged a specific,
written, and proper objection.
First, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s statement of law that because a
“preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the proof required for a party to obtain a
preliminary injunction is much more stringent than the proof required to survive a summary
judgment motion,” and that “a party seeking a preliminary injunction must present more than scant
evidence to substantiate [its] allegations.” (Doc. No. 69 at 4) (quotation marks omitted). Indeed,
both of these principles elucidated by the Magistrate Judge are well supported in case law. See
e.g., McNeilly v. Land, 684 F.3d 611, 615 (6th Cir. 2012) (“‘[T]he proof required for the plaintiff
to obtain a preliminary injunction is much more stringent than the proof required to survive a
summary judgment motion’ because a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy.”
(quoting Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 739 (6th Cir.2000))); Patel v. AR Grp. Tennessee,
LLC, 2020 WL 5849346, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 1, 2020) (explaining that “[p]laintiffs seeking a
preliminary injunction may not merely rely on unsupported allegations, but rather must come
forward with more than ‘scant evidence’ to substantiate their allegations.” (quoting Libertarian
Party of Ohio v. Husted, 751 F.3d 403, 417 (6th Cir. 2014))).
The Magistrate Judge also stated that “[a]n unsupported motion, such as [each of the
Motions], must be denied.” (Doc. No. 69 at 4). Plaintiff appears to dispute this characterization of
his Motions as unsupported, on the grounds that (according to him) his filings titled “Declaration
of Evidence to Support Complaint” (Doc. No. 58) and “Evidence to Support My Claim” (Doc. No.
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59) actually did include evidence supporting his Motions. The Court agrees with the Magistrate
Judge that the Motions are unsupported despite these filings and may be denied on that basis.
In the first place, there is no indication anywhere that Plaintiff intended these filings to be
made in support of either of Plaintiff’s Motions. Indeed, as noted above, the filing at Docket. No.
58 is titled as “Declaration of Evidence to Support Complaint” (emphasis added), and the filing at
Docket No. 59 is titled “Evidence to Support My Claim.” (emphasis added). In other words, the
Magistrate Judge could not have known, from the face of these filings, that Plaintiff intended these
filings to support the Motions. Moreover, Plaintiff nowhere in his Motions cites the filings at
Docket No. 58 and Docket No. 59, and Plaintiff made the filings at Docket Nos. 58 and 59 weeks
after he filed his Motions. Thus, by all indications, the filings at Docket No. 58 and Docket No.
59 were made in support Plaintiff’s Complaint (and the claims therein) and not Plaintiff’s Motions.
Moreover, at the time Plaintiff filed his Motions, Plaintiff filed in support thereof neither an
affidavit, a declaration, nor any other piece of evidence. This means—as the Magistrate Judge
correctly discerned—that the Motions were in fact unsupported at the time they were filed and that
this reality provides a sound basis for denying them.
In summary, after conducting a de novo review of that portion of the R&R to which
Plaintiff lodged a proper objection, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that because they
are unsupported, Plaintiff’s Motions should be denied.8 Moreover, as noted above, Plaintiff has
not lodged any other proper objections to the R&R entitling Plaintiff to de novo (or any other type
of) review of the R&R, and the Court will therefore adopt and approve the R&R in its entirety.
8 Even if the Court were to conclude that the Magistrate Judge erred on this point and thus found that the
Motions were supported by evidence (in the form of affidavits, declarations or otherwise), it would not
unsettle the ultimate conclusion of the R&R that the Motions should be denied, because, as noted above,
the Magistrate Judge explained that even if the Motions “were properly supported, the motions should
nonetheless be denied,” (Doc. No. 69 at 4) for reasons the Magistrate Judge then explained elsewhere in
the R&R (id. at 4-6)—reasons Plaintiff has not properly objected to as the Court explained above.
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons described herein, the R&R (Doc. No. 69) is adopted and
approved in its entirety, and Plaintiff’s Motions (Doc. Nos. 36 and 42) are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
ELI RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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