Patterson et al v. National Collegiate Athletic Association

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
LANGSTON PATTERSON et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION,
Defendant.
Case No. 3:25-cv-00994
Chief Judge William L. Campbell, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Luke A. Evans
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Familiarity with the background of this case is presumed. Plaintiffs have filed a motion,
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) and Local Rules 15.01 and 7.01(a)(2), for leave to
file a second amended complaint. (Doc. No. 112.) Plaintiffs assert that the first amended complaint
needs updating in the wake of defendant’s decision, on June 23, 2026, to approve
a sweeping overhaul of eligibility rules for student-athletes, permitting Division I
student-athletes up to five years of eligibility if they enroll in college no later than
the academic year after their 19th birthday. The new rule streamlines a significant
portion of the Division I rule book by eliminating season-of-competition limits,
sport-specific eligibility and redshirt rules, and eligibility extension waivers.
(Doc. No. 126-3 at 2.) In the proposed second amended complaint, plaintiffs would amend factual
assertions and proposed class definitions to reflect the changes in eligibility rules. Plaintiffs also
would add certain athletic conferences as defendants based on their roles in implementing the rule
changes. Finally, plaintiffs would preserve the current Count I, alleging illegal restraint of trade
under the Sherman Act; but they would add a Count II alleging an unlawful group boycott under
the Sherman Act as well as Counts III through XVI alleging breach of contract under the laws of
various states with respect to defendant’s bylaws. Plaintiffs argue that the second amended
complaint would be filed in good faith, reflects recent events, would not be futile, and will promote
Case 3:25-cv-00994 Document 138 Filed 09/15/26 Page 1 of 5 PageID #: <pageID>

2
the efficient administration of this case without causing any undue prejudice. (Doc. No. 112 at 4–
7; Doc. No. 126 at 4–6.)
Defendant opposes amendment for several reasons. Defendant argues that plaintiffs could
have named athletic conferences from the beginning of this case, regardless of the June 23, 2026
rule change. (Doc. No. 122 at 4–5.) Adding other defendants and claims now, according to
defendant, would cause prejudice through the significant change in discovery and the resulting
need to alter case deadlines and to extend the litigation further. (Id. at 5.) Defendant further asserts
that a settlement in a prior case from California bars the amendments here and that plaintiffs cannot
assert additional antitrust claims because “they got everything they could have expected under the
previous rule—four seasons of eligibility in five years.” (Id. at 7.) Similarly, defendant argues that
the proposed new claims for breach of contract would be futile because plaintiffs received “the full
measure of eligibility to which they were entitled” under the existing eligibility rules that covered
them. (Id. at 9.)
Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs plaintiffs’ motion for leave
to amend. Under the rule, “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Rule 15 emphasizes that cases should be tried on the merits rather than on the
technicalities of pleadings, see Tefft v. Seward, 689 F.2d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 1982) (citations
omitted), but “leave to amend should be denied if the amendment is brought in bad faith, for
dilatory purposes, results in undue delay or prejudice to the opposing party, or would be futile.”
Carson v. U.S. Off. of Special Couns., 633 F.3d 487, 495 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). “In determining what constitutes prejudice, the court considers whether the
assertion of the new claim or defense would: require the opponent to expend significant additional
resources to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; significantly delay the resolution of the
Case 3:25-cv-00994 Document 138 Filed 09/15/26 Page 2 of 5 PageID #: <pageID>

3
dispute; or prevent the plaintiff from bringing a timely action in another jurisdiction.” Phelps v.
McClellan, 30 F.3d 658, 662–63 (6th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Futility means that a proposed
amendment would not survive a hypothetical motion to dismiss under Rule 12. See SFS Check,
LLC v. First Bank of Delaware, 774 F.3d 351, 355 (6th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
Several factors weigh in favor of allowing leave to amend. While the case is a little over a
year old, an initial case management order was not entered until April 7, 2026 (Doc. No. 103), and
the case remains in the early stages of considerations for injunctive relief. Amendment to add
parties in response to recent events makes more sense now than it would after further pretrial
preparations have occurred. Cf., e.g., Milbry v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, No. 1:24-CV-547, 2025
WL 2301588, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 11, 2025) (“Because the proposed amendment is closely tied
to the existing allegations and would not unfairly or fundamentally alter the nature of this case,
and because this case remains in its early stages, there is no identifiable prejudice.”). With respect
to pending motions for injunctive relief, there have been both jointly requested extensions of
various deadlines (Doc. Nos. 46, 57, 119) and a stay of about a month (Doc. No. 129). The passage
of a year, therefore, does not support any contention of delay as much as it might seem at first
glance. Cf. Martinez v. Hiland, No. 5:13-CV-P182-GNS, 2017 WL 939009, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar.
9, 2017) (denying motion to amend or to supplement where, inter alia, action was pending for over
three years, summary judgment motions were pending for over two years, and discovery was
completed).
With respect to futility, the proposed Count II essentially accuses defendants of violating
the Sherman Act through a perceived disparity announced in their own press release:
Case 3:25-cv-00994 Document 138 Filed 09/15/26 Page 3 of 5 PageID #: <pageID>

4
(Doc. No. 126-3 at 3.) Subject to further development of the record, the proposed new contract
claims flow from the changes in eligibility rules. Defendant has suggested that the settlement from
In re College Athlete NIL Litigation, No. 4:20-cv-03919-CW, Doc. No. 963-1 (N.D. Cal. July 26,
2024) (the House Case) makes the proposed second amended complaint futile, but this argument
falls short for two reasons. First, the House settlement appears to have focused on “certain NCAA
and conference rules and practices regarding (a) compensation and benefits which may be provided
to student-athletes during the relevant class periods and (b) NCAA roster and scholarship limits.”
(Doc. No. 77-2 at 4.) To the extent that the proposed second amended complaint implicates policy
changes that post-date the House settlement, those issues would not have been contemplated
earlier. The claims in the proposed second amended complaint thus appear to differ from concerns
about compensation and scholarships. See Wisne v. Nat’l Collegiate Atheletic Ass’n, No. 1:26-CV-
03063, 2026 WL 2214234, at *8 (D. Colo. July 31, 2026) (“These released [House settlement]
claims, on their face, concern NIL agreements, negotiation, and compensation. They do not
Case 3:25-cv-00994 Document 138 Filed 09/15/26 Page 4 of 5 PageID #: <pageID>

5
concern the Rule and its eligibility changes that Plaintiffs challenge here.”), opinion clarified, No.
1:26-CV-03063-CNS-KAS, 2026 WL 2214320 (D. Colo. Aug. 2, 2026), appeal docketed, No. 26-
1309 (10th Cir.), injunction stayed pending appeal, No. 26-1309, Doc. No. 28 (10th Cir. Aug. 21,
2026). Second, if the Court credits defendant’s argument that it has briefed claim preclusion as
part of its pending motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 122 at 5; see also Doc. Nos. 94, 98, 99), all sides
will benefit from having all interested parties address the issue in updated papers in this case rather
than in piecemeal litigation later. Futility thus is not a concern, and the proposed amendment
should proceed subject to future argument and development of the record.
Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a
second amended complaint. (Doc. No. 112.) The Clerk of the Court is directed to docket Doc. No.
112-1 as the Second Amended Complaint in this case. Rule 15(a)(3) will govern the time to
respond to the Second Amended Complaint unless an extension is sought by proper motion.
The Court also DENIES1 defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 94) but without
prejudice to filing an updated motion that addresses the Second Amended Complaint.
It is so ORDERED.
____________________________________
LUKE A. EVANS
United States Magistrate Judge
1 	The Court has concluded that a non-dispositive resolution to the motion is appropriate,
given the denial without prejudice. Under the circumstances here, because the “penalty to be
imposed, rather than the penalty sought by the movant” controls magistrate judge authority, Gomez
v. Martin Marietta Corp., 50 F.3d 1511, 1519 (10th Cir. 1995), the Court is proceeding by order
rather than by report and recommendation. Cf. Fowler v. Tenth Planet, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 3d 763,
768 (D. Md. 2023) (standard of review for Rule 37 dismissal sanction “is governed by the result
the Magistrate Judge determines”) (citations omitted); Edwards v. DeBord, No. 7:18-CV-00423,
2021 WL 5827324, at *3 (W.D. Va. Dec. 8, 2021) (same) (citations omitted).
Case 3:25-cv-00994 Document 138 Filed 09/15/26 Page 5 of 5 PageID #: <pageID>