Luong v. Vanderbilt University

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
MELISSA LUONG,
Plaintiff,
v.
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.
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NO. 3:25-cv-01351
JUDGE RICHARDSON
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is a “Motion for Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary
Injunction” (Doc. No. 18, “Motion”), filed by Plaintiff, Melissa Luong. Via the Motion, Plaintiff
moves “pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 for entry of an Order granting Plaintiff a
temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction requiring Defendant to reassign
a faculty member to serve as her major advisor (“advisor”) and reinstate her into the [Community
Research & Action] Program in good standing for the spring 2026 semester beginning January 5,
2026.” (Id. at 1).1 Accompanying the Motion is a proposed order (Doc. No. 18-1, “Proposed
1 As noted, Plaintiff moves the Court for a TRO (as well as for a preliminary injunction), “pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65.” (Doc. No. 18 at 1). Notably, however, where Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 refers
to TROs, it refers only to TROs issued “without written or oral notice to the adverse party,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
65(b)(1), which the Court in this footnote will call an “ex parte” TRO (since “ex parte” means “on one side
only; by or for one party; done for, in behalf of, or on the application of one party only.” Black’s Law Dict.
(6th ed. 1990) p. 76.). Rule 65 prescribes rules for the issuance and duration of an ex parte TRO. It does
not mention, let alone set any rules for, TROs that are not ex parte; to the extent that temporary injunctive
relief that is not issued ex parte is properly called a TRO, such a TRO is simply not within the scope of Rule
65.
Here, Plaintiff has provided Defendant a “[n]otice and a copy of [the Motion]” through the “Court’s
electronic filing system.” (Doc. No. 18 at 2). In theory, this would mean that Plaintiff’s Motion is not an ex
parte motion for a TRO and thus not a motion for a TRO that is within the scope of Rule 65. Nevertheless,
the Court will treat Plaintiff’s Motion as properly brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, for two reasons. First,
although the Court need not delve herein into why this is the case, parties and courts have been known to
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Order”), and a memorandum in support of the Motion (Doc. No. 19, “Memorandum”). Filed with
the Memorandum are twenty-three exhibits (Doc. Nos. 19-1 – 19-23).
For the reasons described below, the Motion will be DENIED in its entirety.
ASSERTED FACTS2
This case arises out of a dispute concerning Plaintiff’s academic standing in the
Community Research & Action (“CRA”) Program at Vanderbilt University, Plaintiff’s academic
advisor (or lack thereof), and certain accommodations that Plaintiff may be entitled to because of
her disability. Below, the Court will first address the identities of the parties to this action, before
then addressing the factual background underlying this action, the claims Plaintiff brings via her
complaint (Doc. No. 1, “Complaint”), and the relief sought via the Motion.
1. 	Parties3
Plaintiff is a student “enrolled in Vanderbilt’s Ph.D. CRA Program in the Department of
Human and Organizational Development.” (Doc. No. 19 at 1; Doc. No. 19-1 at ¶ 1). Plaintiff’s
speak as if a motion can be one for a TRO within the scope of Rule 65 (and not a preliminary injunction,
which is governed by other provisions of Rule 65) even if it is made with notice to the opposing
party. E.g., In re Reynolds, No. 23-22086, 2023 WL 11853230, at *3 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Sept. 1, 2023) (A
temporary restraining order is a temporary order entered in an action, often without notice . . . .”). And
second, although Defendant may have been put on notice of the motion through the Court’s electronic filing
system, the Court’s decision here comes before Defendant has responded to the Motion and before the
Defendant would necessarily have had a full opportunity to respond to the Motion.
Accordingly, the Court will continue its analysis as if Plaintiff’s Motion is properly brought under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 65.
2 The following asserted facts, unless somehow qualified herein (as for example by “Plaintiff alleges that”),
are taken as true for purposes of the Motion (though not necessarily for any future purposes in this
litigation), because they are either: (1) (a) evidentially supported at least to some degree by Plaintiff; and
(b) plausible; or (2) subject to judicial notice.
3 When citing to a page in a document filed by one of the parties, the Court endeavors to cite to the page
number (“Page __ of __”) added by the Clerk’s Office as part of the pagination process associated with
Electronic Case Filing if such page number differs from the page number originally provided by the
author/filer of the document. In addition, where the Complaint is cited herein without including a paragraph
symbol, the citation is not to a paragraph number but rather to a page that contains the cited content outside
the boundaries of any paragraph.
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academic advisor is (or, as will be discussed below, was) Dr. Ashmeet Oberoi (“Oberoi”). (Doc.
No. 19-1 at ¶ 13).
Defendant (hereinafter, “Defendant,” “Vanderbilt” or “Vanderbilt University”) “is a
private university that receives federal financial assistance within the meaning of Section 504,”
(Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 5), of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 	and “operates places of
public accommodation within the meaning of Title III of the ADA.” (Id. at ¶ 6).4
2. 	Factual Background
Before the 2024-2025 school year, Plaintiff achieved a 4.0 GPA in the CRA Program, a
Ph.D. program in the Department of Human and Organizational Development (“HOD”) at
Vanderbilt University, received “positive evaluation reports at the end of her first and second years
in the program, and receiv[ed] positive evaluations for her teaching assistant [ ] responsibilities.”
(Doc. No. 19 at 1; Doc. No. 19-1 at ¶¶ 1, 3-10; Doc. No. 19-2; Doc. No. 19-3). During the 2024-
2025 school year, Plaintiff was diagnosed with “mental health impairments [that] caused
substantial impairments in [her] ability to think concentrate, and sleep, and substantial impairments
to [her] gastrointestinal functions.” (Doc. No. 19-1 at ¶ 11; Doc. No. 19-5). The circumstances
surrounding Plaintiff’s mental health were “communicated” to Oberoi when Plaintiff had to
“cancel some meetings with [ ] Oberoi” because of ongoing problems with Plaintiff’s health. (Doc.
No. 19-1 at ¶ 13). At first, Oberoi “did not communicate [to Plaintiff] any concerns” regarding
Plaintiff’s decision to cancel certain meetings. (Doc. No. 19-1 at ¶ 14). However, in December
4 The upshot of these allegations is the legal conclusion that, as Plaintiff puts it in her Memorandum,
“Defendant is an entity “subject to Section 504 and Title III of the ADA.” (Doc. No. 19 at 1) (citing
Vanderbilt University, Grievances, https://www.vanderbilt.edu/student-access/grievances/). The Court
accepts that legal conclusion, and indeed takes judicial notice that in the just-cited web page, Vanderbilt
impliedly recognizes that it is subject to Section 504 of the ADA.
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2024,5 Oberoi communicated to Plaintiff via email “her frustrations and perceived disrespect with
meeting cancellations without acknowledging . . . previous communications” with Plaintiff. (Doc.
No. 19-1 at ¶ 15). This response helped lead to “mental health diagnoses of major depression,
anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder in January of 2025” for Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 19
at 2; Doc. No. 19-1 at ¶ 18; Doc. No. 19-5).
Subsequently, and recognizing her “need [ ] [for] support,” Plaintiff “sought out [what
Plaintiff describes as] reasonable accommodations through the Student Access Office (SAO),”
(Doc. No. 19-1 at ¶¶ 19, 20), “related to the expectations and deadlines set by [Plaintiff’s] major
advisor . . . in an attempt to mitigate [Plaintiff’s] disabilities and allow [Plaintiff] to continue to
make progress towards her research requirements in the CRA Program.” (Doc. No. 19 at 2; Doc.
No. 19-5).6 Plaintiff and representatives of the SAO met on February 6, 2025. (Doc. No. 19-6).7
The SAO “recognized [Plaintiff’s] disabilities,” but determined that “[the SAO] could not provide
specific accommodations related to advising relationship expectations and such requests should be
discussed with an advisor with the help of the HOD department and/or with the Graduate and
5 Docket No. 19-1 actually refers by its text to Oberoi expressing concerns in “December 2025.” (Doc. No.
19-1 at ¶ 15). However, the Court understands that this is a scrivener’s error and that this is meant to be a
reference to December 2024, as the Motion and Memorandum were both filed in November 2025.
6 It is not exactly clear what the accommodations were that Plaintiff requested from the SAO. The
Complaint characterizes these requested accommodations as “flexibility in scheduling meetings and
making up missed time, including research tasks and research meetings,” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 33), as requested
in a letter from Plaintiff’s psychotherapist. A letter from Plaintiff’s psychotherapist, Sellers Terrell (Docket
No. 19-5) is cited in the Memorandum. In that letter, dated January 21, 2025, Terrell, “clinically approv[ed]”
Plaintiff’s request for what Terrell characterizes as reasonable accommodations, including: “flexibility in
scheduling meetings and making up missed time including work and appointments, more emphasis on
positive 	feedback 	during 	progress 	reviews, 	and 	increased 	communication 	amongst 	supervisory
relationships.” (Id.). The Court will thus proceed with the understanding that the accommodations requested
by Plaintiff from the SAO are those detailed in Terrell’s letter.
7 Although the reference in the Memorandum to meeting with “the SAO” (an office) is imprecise, the Court
infers that the reference is, more precisely, to meeting with one or more SAO representatives (individuals).
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Postdoc Academic success program (“GPAS”).” (Doc. No. 19-1 at ¶ 21). Ultimately, the SAO
approved an accommodation consisting of “Notetaking Support.” (Doc. No. 19-7).
“Plaintiff continued with efforts to obtain [what Plaintiff describes as] a reasonable
accommodation for her advisor’s expectations related to research deadlines by consulting with the
HOD department chair, the Director of Graduate Studies, and GPAS personnel.” (Doc. No. 19 at
3; Doc. No. 19-1 at ¶¶ 23-28, 31-33; Doc. No. 19-8, Doc. No. 19-9). Via email, Plaintiff
communicated to Dr. Nichole Allen (“Allen”), who was the HOD Department Chair, and Dr. Brian
Christens (“Christens”), who was a professor in the HOD department, that she was concerned
about her thesis progress under Oberoi’s mentorship, (Doc. No. 19-8 at 2), and requested
accommodations including that she be permitted to “switch advisors,” “be excused from having a
POS committee meeting,”8 and for Allen and Christens to “help resolve [Plaintiff’s] advising
situation.” (Id. at 1).
Ultimately, Plaintiff did not receive “assistance in identifying a new advisor or approval
of other . . . accommodations to navigate the issues with [her] current advisor [(Oberoi)] from the
CRA faculty or Vanderbilt’s SAO.” (Doc. No. 19-1 at ¶ 33). Subsequently, Plaintiff “developed
additional medical conditions during the spring of 2025 . . . and provided notification of the new
8 The POS committee is the “Program of Studies committee” that consists of “of a minimum of three people:
the major advisor (who is a core faculty member) and two additional Graduate Faculty members, at least
one of whom must be core CRA faculty.” (Doc. No. 1-1 at 3). As provided for in the CRA Handbook:
“Students should establish their Program of Studies committee by mid-March of their first year in the
program. Students are encouraged to meet with their full committee at least annually, but perhaps more
often. In addition to approving students’ program of studies, the members of the committee can be a key
source of mentoring and support throughout the program and may form the core of degree committees.
Students should consult with their advisors for selecting committee members and determining how best to
utilize the committee’s time and expertise. Students may change POS committee membership as the need
arises, in consultation with their advisor.” (Id.).
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medical conditions to her department faculty via the University’s ‘Dean’s Notification.’”9 (Doc.
No. 19 at 3; Doc. No. 19-1 at ¶¶ 29-30; Doc. No. 19-10; Doc. No. 19-11).
Plaintiff was ultimately dismissed from the CRA Program on July 24, 2025, (Doc. No. 19-
12; Doc. No. 19-1 at ¶ 34), for failure (according to Vanderbilt) to find a “new advisor” and
inadequate “progress towards the PhD degree,” including with respect to progress on Plaintiff’s
thesis. (Doc. No. 19-12; Doc. No. 19 at 3-4). As a consequence of this dismissal, Plaintiff would
not be permitted to attain a Ph.D degree through the CRA Program, although she would be
permitted to attain a master’s degree, (Doc. No. 19-12), without any mention “of dismissal” on
Plaintiff’s transcript. (Doc. No. 1-4 at 3). “This dismissal occurred despite the fact that Plaintiff
never received a poor evaluation, called a Professional Performance Review (“PPR”); was never
put on probation; and was never provided written notice of the specific actions she needed to take
(and deadline to take such actions) to remedy any concerns as required [according to Plaintiff] by
Vanderbilt’s policies and student handbook.” (Doc. No. 19 at 3; Doc. No. 19-1 at ¶ 36). Likewise,
Plaintiff “did not receive assistance with identifying a new advisor” and believed, at the time of
her dismissal, that she still had Oberoi as her advisor. (Doc. No. 19-1 at ¶¶ 35, 37).10
“Plaintiff appealed the unwarranted dismissal pursuant to Vanderbilt’s internal appeals
process.” (Doc. No. 19 at 5; Doc. No. 19-14; Doc. No. 19-15; Doc. No. 19-16; Doc. No. 1-4; Doc.
No. 19-17). Plaintiff’s first two appeals (made on July 29, 2025 (Doc. No. 19-14) and on August
28, 2025 (Doc. No. 19-15), respectively) were denied, but a third appeal was granted on October
9 The Dean’s Notification appears to be a mechanism to provide notice of student “health issues and pending
medical procedure[s]” to Vanderbilt faculty and staff. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 40).
10 It is unclear to the Court at this juncture whether this belief was reasonable. The record indicates that
Plaintiff’s last meeting with Oberoi was “nine months” before Plaintiff’s dismissal and that Vanderbilt
understood that Plaintiff’s “advising relationship with Oberoi was no longer functional.” (Doc. No. 1-4 at
1). Ultimately, the record indicates that Oberoi was removed as Plaintiff’s advisor in late May 2025 (though
it is unclear whether Plaintiff knew this at the time). (Doc. No. 19-21).
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15, 2025 via a letter from Andrea Page-McCaw, Associate Dean of Academic Affairs (Doc. No.
1-4 at 2, “Third Appeal Response”). The Third Appeal Response stated that the CRA Program
“failed to notify [Plaintiff] of a deadline for finding a new advisor . . . [and] did not follow its
published policies nor the Graduate School’s policies in notifying [Plaintiff] of [her] failure to
meet expectations about progress to the PhD.” (Doc. No. 1-4 at 2). Ultimately, the Third Appeal
Response conditioned Plaintiff’s reinstatement into the CRA Program on Plaintiff’s ability to
establish a new advisory relationship by December 5, 2025, but noted that it was “not possible”
for the “school [to] assign a new advisor” to Plaintiff “because of the nature of the advising
relationship, which takes conversation and reflection by both parties involved to determine fit.”
(Doc. No. 1-4 at 2). The Third Appeal Response further noted that Plaintiff’s “experience in twice
choosing to discontinue working with [her] advisor [i.e., previously discontinuing an advisory
relationship with two advisors] is evidence of the importance of [the advisory] relationship and the
agency that is provided to both parties in assessing whether [such relationship] continues to be
productive.” (Id.).
Ultimately, Plaintiff filed a “fourth appeal to Vanderbilt (currently pending), [that]
challenges Vanderbilt’s false assertion that [Plaintiff’s] dismissal was ‘justified’ due to failure to
meet program expectations, even though it was overturned due to Vanderbilt’s failure to follow its
procedures.” (Doc. No. 19 at 5-6; Doc. No. 19-17). Additionally, on “September 3, 2025” Plaintiff
requested, through her attorney, “copies of [Plaintiff’s] educational records from Vanderbilt,”
which “[a]s of October 22, 2025,” she had still not received. (Doc. No. 19-1 at ¶¶ 38-39).
3. 	Plaintiff’s Claims
Plaintiff initiated this action on November 20, 2025 by filing the Complaint (Doc. No. 1).
Via the Complaint, Plaintiff brings three claims.
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First, through Count I, Plaintiff brings a claim for “Disability Discrimination In Violation
of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title III of the ADA.” (Doc. No. 1 at 15). Via Count
I, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed “to provide reasonable accommodations after Plaintiff
requested them,” and thereby “excluded [Plaintiff] from, denied her the benefits of, and subjected
her to discrimination in its educational programs and activities on the basis of her disability.” (Id.
at ¶ 99). Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant “acted with deliberate indifference by disregarding
Plaintiff[’s] disability related needs, refusing to provide her with reasonable accommodations,
discouraging faculty from serving as her advisor, dismissing her without following Vanderbilt’s
clearly delineated process for dismissal, falsifying the reasons for her dismissal, removing her
existing major advisor, dismissing her from the CRA [P]rogram because of her disability, and
engaging in other discriminatory acts and omissions,” and that “[b]y refusing to assign Plaintiff an
advisor after her dismissal was overturned, [Defendant] further discriminated against [Plaintiff] on
the basis of disability and denied her equal access to and participation in the CRA Program.” (Id.
at ¶¶ 100-01).
Second, through Count II, Plaintiff brings a claim for “Retaliation Under the Americans
With Disabilities Act.” (Id. at 16). Via Count II Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n or about January 2025
and ongoing thereafter, Plaintiff engaged in protected activity under the ADA by requesting
reasonable accommodations for her disability” and that “Plaintiff further engaged in protected
activity when she appealed her dismissal on the basis of discriminatory treatment related to her
disability and involved an attorney to advocate for her rights.” (Id. at ¶ 106). Further, Plaintiff
alleges that in retaliation for this protected activity, Defendant took numerous adverse actions
against 	Plaintiff 	including: 	“Removing 	Plaintiff’s 	current 	advisor, 	[ 	] 	Oberoi, 	and 	then
discouraging faculty members from agreeing to serve as Plaintiff’s advisor; dismissing [Plaintiff]
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from the CRA 	[P]rogram without following 	Vanderbilt’s 	clearly delineated policies 	and
procedures; conditioning [Plaintiff’s] reinstatement to the CRA Program upon her securing a new
advisor; delaying and obstructing [Plaintiff’s] access to her educational records; and withdrawing
[Defendant’s] offer to provide Plaintiff with a master’s degree if she is reinstated to the CRA
Program.” (Id. at ¶ 107).
Finally, through Count III, Plaintiff brings a “Breach of Contract” claim. (Id. at 18). Via
Count III, Plaintiff alleges that she and Defendant “entered into a valid and enforceable contract
at the time of Plaintiff’s admittance into Defendant’s CRA Program at Vanderbilt University,” and
that “[t]he terms of the contract are specifically delineated in the student handbook, CRA and
Graduate Studies written guidelines and procedures, and any other related written promises and
agreements, which govern the expectations of academic performance, procedures for probation
and dismissal, and the rights of students, including the right to reasonable accommodations and
feedback on academic progress.” (Id. at ¶ 113). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “breached the
contract by failing to perform its obligations under the terms set forth in the student handbook and
related academic agreements, including but not limited to: failing to provide Plaintiff with timely
and specific feedback regarding any concerns with her academic performance and providing an
action plan to correct such concerns, as required by the student handbook and other written
documents; and failing to adhere to the probation and dismissal procedures outlined in the student
handbook, instead proceeding to dismiss Plaintiff from the CRA Program without following the
prescribed procedures for probation and an opportunity to show improvement.” (Id. at ¶ 114).
4. 	Relief Sought Via the Motion
Via the Motion, Plaintiff seeks (as shown by the Proposed Order) an order restraining
Defendant from “(a) dismissing [Plaintiff] from Vanderbilt University’s Ph.D. [CRA Program]
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based on the current disputes and (b) from retaliating against [Plaintiff] in any manner for
requesting accommodations, appealing her dismissal, or pursuing this litigation.” (Doc. No. 18-1
at ¶ 2). Plaintiff also seeks to have the Court, via the Proposed Order, (a) “[reinstate her] into the
CRA Program in good standing, with all rights, privileges, and benefits associated with her
enrollment; (b) reinstate [Plaintiff’s] full support, including a stipend and eighteen hours of tuition
through the first five years of the CRA Program, as provided to all CRA Program students and as
outlined in the CRA Program Student Handbook, as well as [Plaintiff’s] Provost’s Graduate
Fellowship; (c) permit [Plaintiff] to register for and fully participate in courses and other
graduation requirements for the CRA Program beginning on January 5, 2026; (d) assign [Plaintiff]
a qualified major advisor to advise her towards her thesis and research requirements; and (e) issue
written notice to all the CRA Program faculty and staff indicating that [Plaintiff’s] dismissal was
unwarranted based on Vanderbilt’s own dismissal policies and procedures and that [Plaintiff] is
being reinstated in good standing.” (Id. at ¶ 3).
Plaintiff further requests that the Court, via the requested order, order “Defendant to
provide Plaintiff with a copy of her educational records, which were requested by Plaintiff in
September of 2025.” (Id. at ¶ 4).
Finally, Plaintiff requests that the Court, via the requested order, set a briefing schedule for
the Motion and set a hearing date as necessary on the Motion. (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 7). Presumably in this
last request, Plaintiff is referring to a briefing schedule on Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary
injunction, into which Plaintiff’s requested TRO would be converted so that Plaintiff’s requested
injunctive relief would “remain in effect during the pendency of this action.” (Doc. No. 19 at 15).
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LEGAL STANDARD
“An ex parte TRO is an extraordinary and drastic remedy . . . .” Ahrouch v. Boulakhrif, No.
2:25-CV-02535-SHL-CGC, 2025 WL 1490494, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. May 23, 2025) (quoting
Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 226 (6th Cir. 1996)). Those seeking a
TRO (or, for that matter, a preliminary injunction)11 must meet four requirements.12 They must
11 As noted above, via the Motion Plaintiff requests both a TRO and a preliminary injunction. The standards
for both a TRO and a preliminary injunction are the same. G.S. ex rel. Schwaigert v. Lee, 558 F. Supp. 3d
601, 607 (W.D. Tenn. 2021). Thus herein, the Court considers concurrently Plaintiff’s request for a TRO
and Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction. For the sake of brevity however, throughout the Court’s
analysis, the Court will, at times, refer to the standard as it relates to a TRO only. The Court notes that for
administrative and logistical reasons, it is treating both requests in the Motion (the one for a TRO and the
one for a preliminary injunction) as denied at this time. But Plaintiff may move in the future for a
preliminary injunction based on additional evidence beyond that presented in connection with the instant
Motion. If such a motion eventually is filed, then absent a court order to the contrary, Defendant’s response
shall be due two weeks after such filing and Plaintiff’s reply shall be due one week after the filing of
Defendant’s response, and the Court will notify the parties if an evidentiary hearing is to be held.
12 Published Sixth Circuit case law stands unmistakably for the proposition that these four items are factors
rather than requirements, except that irreparable harm is a requirement (and, if it exists and thus keeps the
possibility of a TRO alive, thereafter becomes a factor to be balanced along with the other three factors).
See, e.g., D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Sch., 942 F.3d 324, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2019). Alas, this case law is inconsistent
with other (including more recent) Sixth Circuit case law and with Supreme Court cases (including Winter)
that describe these as all being requirements (i.e., things that must be established. See, e.g., id. at 328, 329
(Nabaldian, J., concurring) (noting that “[Winter]'s language seems clear—a plaintiff must establish the
factors” and questioning “whether the balancing analysis itself aligns with Winter.”).
Notably, other courts have likewise treated the four items as requirements (prerequisites), rather than as
factors. E.g., Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d
357, 363 (5th Cir. 2003); Southern Poverty Law Ctr. v. United States Dep't Homeland Sec., Civil Action
No. 18-760 (CKK), 2020 WL 3265533, *10 (D.D.C. June 17, 2020); 	Transatlantic, LLC v. Humana, Inc.,
8:13–CV– 1925–T–17TBM, 2013 WL 3958361, *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2013).
The Court believes that it needs to choose between the two approaches—even if the substance or the
outcome of the Motion does not turn on such choice—because the approach does dictate how a court goes
about explaining its analysis and decision on a motion for preliminary injunction. And the Court believes
that it should follow the latter line of cases, i.e., those that treat the standard as involving requirements
rather than factors.
First, explaining and applying the standard in terms of requirements is substantially more straightforward
than the alternative—which is to explain that the four items are factors to be balanced, except that, well,
that's only partially true because actually irreparable harm is a requirement (but also, if it exists, then a
factor to be balanced along with the other factors) and likelihood of success (at least to some minimal
extent) is also required. D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Sch., 942 F.3d 324, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Thus, although
the extent of an injury may be balanced against other factors, the existence of an irreparable injury is
mandatory.”); S. Glazer's Distribs. of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir.
2017) (noting that it is reversible error for a district court to issue a preliminary injunction “where there is
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show a likelihood of success on the merits; irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction; the
balance of equities favors them; and that the public interest favors an injunction. Winter v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Sisters for Life, Inc. v. Louisville-Jefferson County, 56
F.4th 400, 403 (6th Cir. 2022).
Plaintiffs seeking a TRO may not merely rely on unsupported allegations but rather must
come forward with more than “scant evidence” to substantiate their allegations.13 See, e.g.,
Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted, 751 F.3d 403, 417 (6th Cir. 2014); Cameron v. Bouchard,
815 F. App’x 978, 986 (6th Cir. 2020) (vacating preliminary injunction when plaintiffs made no
evidentiary showing on some elements of their claim, but instead made mere allegations regarding
the treatment of COVID-19 in prisons); McNeilly v. Land, 684 F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir. 2012)
(upholding denial of preliminary injunction when plaintiff made only a “small showing” of
evidence); United States v. Certain Land Situated in City of Detroit, No. 95-1118, 1996 WL 26915,
simply no likelihood of success on the merits (quoting Winnett v. Caterpillar, Inc., 609 F.3d 404, 408 (6th
Cir. 2010))). Second, it is easier to articulate a conclusion as to whether requirements are satisfied (which
is done in simple yes/no, or satisfied/unsatisfied, terms) than to articulate the outcome of some so-called
“balancing” of (mismatched) factors. This is especially true given that case-specific balancing apparently
is based in part on some inscrutable sliding scale of required likelihood of success on the merits that depends
on the strength of the other three factors. See, e.g., In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th
Cir.1985) (“[T]he degree of likelihood of success required may depend on the strength of the other
factors.”).
The Court notes that herein it quotes some case law that refers to these items as “factors” and describes
them in language that befits factors more than requirements—as for example by referring to the issue of
whether issuing the injunction would harm others (factor-style language) rather than the requirement that
the balance of equities favors the movant, or the issue of where the public interest lies (factor-style
language) rather than the requirement that the public interest favors an injunction. In so doing, the Court is
confident that the astute reader readily will be able to translate the factor-style language into the
corresponding language of requirements for purposes of following the Court’s analysis herein. The Court
also notes that even in some opinions where the court clearly treats the four items as requirements, the court
therein at times refers to them as “factors.” Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 677 (N.D.
Tex. 2016).
13 When courts refer to this principle, usually it is in connection with a motion for a preliminary injunction
rather than a motion for a TRO. But it has been stated in connection with a motion for a TRO, e.g., Dates
v. HSBC, 721 F. Supp. 3d 616, 624 (S.D. Ohio 2024), and the Court believes that it applies to a motion for
a TRO just as it applies to a motion for a preliminary injunction.
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*1 n.1 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 1996) (noting a lack of evidence to support speculative allegations);
Boulding v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. 1:06-CV-811, 2008 WL 2095390, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 11,
2008), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:06-CV-811, 2008 WL 2095387 (W.D. Mich.
May 15, 2008) (“Plaintiff did not marshal any evidence in support of his motion [for a preliminary
injunction]. Plaintiff’s unsupported allegations do not suffice.” (citations omitted)). In deciding a
motion for a TRO, a court may consider the entire record, including affidavits and other hearsay
evidence. Sterling v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 368 F. Supp. 3d 723, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 2019);
J.S.R. by & through J.S.G. v. Sessions, 330 F. Supp. 3d 731, 738 (D. Conn. 2018). In conducting
the TRO analysis, the Court is not limited to the four corners of the complaint but rather may rely
on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be admissible evidence for a permanent
injunction, if the evidence is appropriate given the character and objectives of the injunctive
proceeding. Express Franchise Servs., L.P. v. Impact Outsourcing Sols., Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d
1368, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2017); Action NC v. Strach, 216 F. Supp. 3d 597, 629 (M.D.N.C. 2016)
(explaining that district courts in appropriate circumstances rely on hearsay or other inadmissible
evidence when deciding whether a preliminary injunction is warranted).
ANALYSIS
As noted, a party seeking grant of a TRO (or a preliminary injunction) must show: (1)
whether the movant has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant
will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of relief; (3) whether the balance of equities favors the
movant; and (4) whether the injunction would serve the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.
1. 	Likelihood of Success on the Merits
To obtain her requested TRO, Plaintiff must demonstrate that she is likely to succeed on
the merits of her claims. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. As discussed below, the Court finds that at
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this juncture, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of any of her
claims.
a. 	Count I
Via Count I, Plaintiff is really challenging two types of conduct. The first is Defendant’s
purported failure to accommodate Plaintiff’s disability, and the second is Defendant’s dismissal of
Plaintiff from the CRA Program. (Doc. No. 17 at 7). These challenges require different analyses,
which the Court conducts below in turn.
i. 	Failure to Accommodate
To establish a failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show that “(1) she was disabled
within the meaning of the ADA, (2) she was otherwise qualified for her position, with or without
reasonable accommodation; (3) the defendant knew or had reason to know about her disability; (4)
she requested an accommodation; and (5) the defendant failed to provide the necessary
accommodation.” Kirilenko-Ison v. Bd. of Educ. of Danville Ind. Schs., 974 F.3d 652, 669 (6th
Cir. 2020).14 A plaintiff “bears the burden of requesting a reasonable accommodation and showing
the accommodation is objectively reasonable.” Bolden v. Lowes Home Centers, LLC, No. 3:17-
CV-00741, 2018 WL 4181614, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 2018) (citing Aldini v. Kroger Co. of
14 The standard laid out in Kirilenko is referred to as the “prima facie case for failure to accommodate.”
Kirilenko, 974 F.3d at 669. Thus, the Court notes here for context that because “ADA discrimination ‘claims
premised upon a[ ] failure to offer a reasonable accommodation necessarily involve direct evidence (the
failure to accommodate) of discrimination’; the familiar McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework
(applicable to claims premised on indirect evidence) therefore does not apply.” Brumley v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 90 F.3d 834, 839 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862,
868-69). Rather, a slightly different framework applies. That is, if a plaintiff can make out the prima facie
case for a failure to accommodate, then the burden shifts to the defendant “to prove that the proposed
accommodation would impose an undue hardship.” Brownlow v. Alfa Vision Ins. Co., 527 F. Supp. 3d 951,
956 (M.D. Tenn. 2021). Here, as discussed below, Plaintiff has not yet made a showing of a prima facie
case to establish a failure to accommodate (by failing to demonstrate that the requested accommodations
were reasonable), such that the Court need not engage in the burden shifting framework applicable here.
It is worth highlighting that, consistent with the above discussion, although the concepts of “prima facie
case” and burden-shifting are applicable to claims of failure to accommodate, they are not the more familiar
McDonnell Douglas kind(s) of prima facie case and burden-shifting.
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Mich., 628 Fed. App’x 347, 350 (6th Cir. 2015); Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862,
870 (6th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 783 F. App'x 589 (6th Cir. 2019)). “Courts should afford deference to
professional 	academic 	judgments 	concerning 	reasonable 	accommodations.” 	Johnson 	v.
Washington Cnty. Career Ctr., 470 Fed. App’x 433, 437 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Kaltenberger v.
Ohio College of Podiatric Med., 162 F.3d 432, 436 (6th Cir. 1998)). Moreover, the ADA does not
require “an educational institution to lower or to effect substantial modifications of standards”
when making accommodations. Kaltenberger, 162 F.3d at 436 (quoting Se. Cmty. Coll. v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413 (1979)). Additionally, “the ‘determination of what constitutes [a]
reasonable [accommodation] is highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case inquiry.’” Bennett v.
Hurley Med. Ctr., 86 F.4th 314, 326 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Roell v. Hamilton Cnty.,
Ohio/Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 870 F.3d 471, 489 (6th Cir. 2017)).
At least at this stage, Plaintiff has not met her burden of showing that either of her requested
accommodations—i.e., changes to the “expectations and deadlines set by [Plaintiff’s] major
advisor . . . in an attempt to mitigate [Plaintiff’s] disabilities and allow [Plaintiff] to continue to
make progress towards her research requirements in the CRA Program,” (Doc. No. 19 at 2; Doc.
No. 19-5), and assigning Plaintiff a new advisor—are objectively reasonable.
First, in the Memorandum, Plaintiff appears to argue that her requested accommodations
related to the “expectations and deadlines set by [Plaintiff’s] major advisor . . . in an attempt to
mitigate [Plaintiff’s] disabilities and allow [Plaintiff] to continue to make progress towards her
research requirements in the CRA Program,” (Doc. No. 19 at 2; Doc. No. 19-5),15 were reasonable
15 That is to say, the accommodations described in the letter from Terrell (Doc. No. 19-5), wherein Terrell,
a psychotherapist for Plaintiff “clinically approv[ed]” Plaintiff’s request for what Terrell characterizes as
“reasonable accommodations,” including: “flexibility in scheduling meetings and making up missed time
including work and appointments, more emphasis on positive feedback during progress reviews, and
increased communication amongst supervisory relationships.” (Id.).
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because Defendant has “provided other non-disabled students extensions to complete their thesis
while remaining in good standing.” (Doc. No. 19 at 8-9; Doc. No. 19-13 at 1). The record indicates
that such extensions were granted for “medical or family reasons.” (Doc. No. 19-13 at 1). But
Defendant’s history of providing extensions to other students based on medical or family reasons
(the specifics of which the Court cannot ascertain from the current record) is not sufficient to show
that the requested accommodation here is reasonable. As noted above, “the ‘determination of what
constitutes 	[a] 	reasonable [accommodation] 	is 	highly 	fact-specific, 	requiring 	case-by-case
inquiry,’” Bennett, 86 F.4th at 326, such that even if certain deadline extensions previously had
been afforded to certain students, that does not mean such deadline extensions are automatically
or necessarily reasonable for all students, or for Plaintiff in particular.
The issue is whether extensions would have been reasonable in Plaintiff’s particular case,
which involved particular circumstances (regarding, for example, the nature, extent of, and
cause(s) of delays in Plaintiff’s progress) that may well have been absent in the other past cases
The Court does not believe at this juncture it can credit the conclusion of Terrell that the accommodations
were reasonable (as opposed, of course, to medically necessary), because there is no indication that Terrell
has any sort of knowledge of the requirements of the CRA Program, or the specifics of Plaintiff’s academic
record in particular. This does not mean, of course, that the Court denies that a medical practitioner’s
opinion is important to determining whether an accommodation is necessary. See Horn v. Knight Facilities
Mgmt.-GM, Inc., 556 F. App’x 452, 455 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting that “[i]n evaluating a reasonable
accommodation claim ‘this Court’s analysis must focus on the limitations indicated by the doctors to
determine whether [the plaintiff] was denied a necessary, reasonable accommodation.’” (quoting Johnson
v. Cleveland City Sch. Dist., 443 Fed. App’x. 974, 984 (6th Cir. 2011))). Indeed, the Court recognizes that
“[i]n order for an accommodation to be reasonable, it should be necessary in light of the plaintiff’s known
physical limitations.” Belasco v. Warrensville Heights City Sch. Dist., 86 F. Supp. 3d 748, 764 (N.D. Ohio
2015). With that said, the Court also notes that even if an accommodation is medically necessary (which
for the purposes of the present Motion, the Court accepts is true with respect to Plaintiff’s requested
accommodations), the accommodation may not necessarily be reasonable. See Phillips v. Acacia on the
Green Condo. Ass'n, Inc., No. 20-4182, 2022 WL 1692948, at *4 (6th Cir. May 26, 2022) (noting that even
if an accommodation were necessary, it was not reasonable). This makes perfect sense because
reasonableness naturally has to take account of the burden of the requested accommodation on the
defendant—a matter about which doctors are unlikely to be at all concerned or knowledgeable.
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that Plaintiff invokes. As evidenced by the Third Appeal Response, Plaintiff’s delays with respect
to her academic progress appear to be substantial and beyond mere delays in thesis progress. For
example, in relevant part, the Third Appeal Response provides that:
[Plaintiff] had not filed [her] empirical paper (in lieu of a master’s thesis) by the
end of [her] second year, a stated expectation for PhD students. Further, [ ] Oberoi
did not recall seeing even a paragraph of written submission from [Plaintiff] over
the entire course of [the] advising relationship, when it was expected [Plaintiff]
would be working on [Plaintiff’s] empirical paper and planned publications. Other
expectations, listed in [Plaintiff’s] Program of Studies document from April 2024,
were not met. Specifically, [Plaintiff] failed to take Intro Qualitative Methods,
Applied Qualitative Data Analysis, and Factor Analysis; and [Plaintiff] received a
Permanent Incomplete for HOD-7960: Readings and Research in HOD.
(Doc. No. 1-4 at 2).
The current record does not indicate that Plaintiff’s requested accommodations with respect
to research and deadlines were reasonable. This is particularly true given that some of Plaintiff’s
requested accommodations are so vague (in that they comprise in part vague references to changed
deadlines) that the Court is unable to determine whether those accommodations would “lower or
[ ] effect substantial modifications of standards” at Vanderbilt. Kaltenberger, 162 F.3d at 436.
Plaintiff also argues that the requested accommodation related to her request for Vanderbilt
to assign her a new advisor was reasonable because Defendant “routinely assigns advisors for new
students, yet in Plaintiff’s case, it has refused to do so, despite Plaintiff specifically requesting
assignment of an advisor as a reasonable accommodation.” (Doc. No. 19 at 9 n.9). Yet, at this
juncture, the Court again cannot determine that this accommodation would have been reasonable
for Plaintiff. Again, the Court refers to the Third Appeal Response, which, as noted above,
indicates that the breakdown of Plaintiff’s relationship with Oberoi was not Plaintiff’s first issue
with an advisor and that the student-advisor relationship is not conducive to a centralized
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assignment process from Vanderbilt’s administration. In relevant part, the Third Appeal Response
provides (with “you” referring to Plaintiff):
You have requested that the school assign a new advisor to you. It is not possible
to assign you a new PhD advisor because of the nature of the advising relationship,
which takes conversation and reflection by both parties involved to determine fit.
Indeed, your own experience in twice choosing to discontinue working with your
advisor is evidence of the importance of this relationship and the agency that is
provided to both parties in assessing whether it continues to be productive. I am
aware of the possibility that you may not find a willing advisor, given that you were
unable to identify a new advisor in the months before you went on leave. If you
cannot identify an advisor by December 5, 2025, then your PhD ambitions would
be best fulfilled elsewhere with a fresh start, and you would be awarded a terminal
master's degree on December 15, 2025. Note that there is no mention of dismissal
in your transcript, as you will simply be moved to the master’s track and graduated.
(Doc. No. 1-4 at 2-3).
For all of these reasons, the Court at this juncture cannot conclude that Plaintiff has met
her burden of showing that the requested accommodations were reasonable such as to show a
likelihood of success on the merits with respect to those portions of Count I predicated on
Defendant’s purported failure to accommodate.
ii. 	Plaintiff’s Dismissal from the CRA Program
“To establish 	[that] 	dismissal 	from 	an 	academic program 	constitutes 	a disability
discrimination action under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that ‘(1) she is handicapped or disabled
as defined in each statute, (2) she is ‘otherwise qualified’ to continue in the program, and (3) she
was dismissed from the program on the basis of her handicap or disability.’” Johnson, 470 Fed.
App’x at 436 (quoting Kaltenberg, 162 F.3d at 435). Here again, Plaintiff has failed to establish a
likelihood of success on the merits.
The current record does not indicate that Plaintiff was dismissed from the CRA Program
on the basis of her disability. Rather, the record indicates that Plaintiff failed to maintain
compliance with several requirements of the CRA Program. For example, the Third Appeal
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Response makes clear, as noted above, that Plaintiff was lagging behind on her academic progress.
(Doc. No. 1-4 at 2). Seeming to anticipate this weakness in her claim, Plaintiff argues that any
deficiency in Plaintiff’s academic progress (referring specifically to Plaintiff’s thesis progress) is
due to Defendant’s “failure to reasonably accommodate [Plaintiff’s] disability.” (Doc. No. 19 at
8). This argument collapses, however, in light of the Court’s finding above that Plaintiff has not
met her burden at this juncture to show that her requested accommodations were reasonable.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed, at least at this stage of the litigation, to show a likelihood
of success on the merits with respect to those portions of Count I predicated on Plaintiff’s dismissal
from the CRA Program.
b. 	Count II
With respect to Count II, Plaintiff has also failed to establish a likelihood of success on the
merits. Via Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff for engaging in
protected activity under the ADA.
To begin with, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success
on the merits of Count II because Plaintiff has failed to explain the actual legal framework for
evaluating its failure-to-accommodate claim in Count II. In the Memorandum, Plaintiff merely
references the prima facie standard (explained in further detail below) for establishing a retaliation
claim under the ADA. Nowhere in the Memorandum does Plaintiff explain the burden shifting
framework under McDonnell-Douglas that occurs if a plaintiff meets this prima facie standard or
even explain explicitly that (or why) the burden-shifting framework under McDonnell-Douglas is
applicable to Count II. This sort of cursory legal analysis does not cut the mustard, particularly
where Plaintiff is seeking the extraordinary remedy of a TRO (and a preliminary injunction).
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Alternatively, even if the Court were to overlook Plaintiff’s shortcomings here and itself
examine Count II within the McDonnell-Douglas framework, this still would not avail Plaintiff in
showing a likelihood of success on the merits.
Where, as here,16 a plaintiff does not seem to claim to have direct evidence of retaliation,
the Court “analyzes [their] claim for ADA retaliation using the McDonnell–Douglas burden-
shifting approach.” Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1046 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing A.C. v.
Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 711 F.3d 687, 697 (6th Cir. 2013)). Under that framework, the plaintiff
bears the initial burden of showing, as an indirect-evidence prima facie case, that “(1) the plaintiff
engaged in activity protected under the ADA; (2) the employer knew of that activity; (3) the
employer took an adverse action against the plaintiff; and (4) there was a causal connection
between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Rorrer, 743 F.3d at 1046 (citing Shelby
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 711 F.3d at 697. If a plaintiff can satisfy this burden, the burden then shifts to
the defendant to show “some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse action. Texas
Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Finally, should the defendant carry this
burden, plaintiff then has the “opportunity to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the
legitimate reasons offered by defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination.” Id.
With respect to the fourth element of the indirect-evidence prima facie case for a retaliation
claim, the causality element, the Sixth Circuit has held that where an adverse action “occurs very
16 The Court understands that Plaintiff is not claiming to have direct evidence of discrimination for two
reasons, first because Plaintiff has relied on the indirect-evidence prima facie standard for establishing
ADA retaliation claims in her Memorandum (Doc. No. 17 at 9) (citing A.C. v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
711 F.3d 687, 697 (6th Cir. 2013)), and second because Plaintiff does not reference any direct evidence of
discrimination in that portion of her Memorandum focused on the likelihood of success on the merits of
Count II. The Court here forgoes any discussion of what does and does not constitute “direct evidence” of
retaliatory motive because it is entirely clear that Plaintiff has not identified anything that could possibly
be considered direct evidence.
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close in time” after a defendant “learns of a protected activity, such temporal proximity between
the events is significant enough to constitute evidence of a causal connection for the purposes of
satisfying a prima facie case of retaliation.” Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 525
(6th Cir. 2008). However, the Sixth Circuit has noted that “where some time elapses” between the
protected activity and the adverse action, temporal proximity must be coupled with “other evidence
of retaliatory conduct to establish causality.” Id. The Sixth Circuit has explained this doctrine by
observing that when a defendant immediately takes an adverse action against an individual upon
learning of a protected activity, that individual may be “unable to couple temporal proximity with
any such other evidence of retaliation because the two actions happened consecutively, and little
other than the protected activity could motivate the [adverse action].” Id. It is on this fourth element
of establishing an indirect-evidence prima facie retaliation claim, the causality element, that
Plaintiff’s attempt to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits fails (alternatively to failing
at the very outset for reasons discussed at the beginning of this section).
In attempting to demonstrate the requisite causality, Plaintiff focuses entirely on “temporal
proximity” and asserts that Defendant’s “course of conduct, following Plaintiff’s request for
accommodations and her appeal of the dismissal, supports a strong inference of retaliatory motive
under Section 504 and the ADA.” (Doc. No. 17 at 9-10). But, as explained below, this will not
do, and this argument fails to establish the causality element of an indirect-evidence prima facie
case of retaliation First, Plaintiff points to Defendant’s removal of Oberoi as her advisor (as
reflected in an internal Vanderbilt email dated May 28, 2025), (Doc. No. 17 at 9) (citing Doc. No.
19-21), and to Defendant dismissing Plaintiff from the CRA Program on July 24, 2025 as evidence
of causality. Yet, neither this email, nor indeed Plaintiff’s eventual dismissal from the CRA
Program in July 2025, demonstrate the taking of an adverse action immediately following protected
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activity so as to permit Plaintiff to rely on temporal proximity alone to establish causality. Rather,
nearly four months had elapsed between Plaintiff’s request for accommodations from the SAO,
(Doc. No. 19-6), and the removal of Oberoi as Plaintiff’s advisor, and half a year had elapsed
between Plaintiff’s first request for accommodations from the SAO and Plaintiff’s dismissal from
the CRA Program.17
Plaintiff also argues that Defendant’s “refus[al]” to assign her a new advisor, which
occurred on October 15, 2025, (Doc. No. 1-4 at 3), may be used to show causality, (Doc. No. 19
at 9-10), and that Defendant’s failure to provide Plaintiff with her educational records, (Doc. No.
19 at 10), which Plaintiff requested on September 3, 2025, (Doc. No. 19-1 at ¶ 38), may be used
to show causality. The Court disagrees. Both of these purported instances of adverse action
occurred over half a year after Plaintiff’s meeting with the SAO in February 2025, and at least a
month after Plaintiff’s first appeal of her dismissal, which occurred on July 29, 2025. (Doc. No.
19-14). Accordingly, the timeline of events detailed above does not evince an immediate adverse
action that would “constitute evidence of a causal connection for the purposes of satisfying [an
indirect-evidence] prima facie case of retaliation.” 	Mickey, 516 F.3d at 525. Instead, because
“some time [had] elapse[d]” between the protected activity (either in the form of the request for
an accommodation or Plaintiff’s first appeal of her dismissal) and the adverse actions cited by
Plaintiff, Plaintiff must couple temporal proximity with “other evidence of retaliatory conduct to
establish causality.” Id. Plaintiff has not done so and accordingly has failed to satisfy the fourth
17 The Court notes here that the removal of Oberoi as an advisor (in late May 2025 (Doc. No. 19-21)), and
Plaintiff’s dismissal (on July 24, 2025 (Doc. No. 19-12)), both occurred before Plaintiff’s first appeal of
her dismissal, which occurred on July 29, 2025, when Plaintiff emailed Allen requesting to appeal her
dismissal for the first time. (Doc. No. 19-14).
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element of an indirect-evidence prima facie case of retaliation, meaning that the Court cannot find
that Plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of Count II.18
c. 	Count III
Plaintiff also has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of Count III,
her breach of contract claim. In the Memorandum, Plaintiff argues that Defendant “has already
acknowledged [in the Third Appeal Response] that it failed to follow its own probation and
dismissal procedures. This admission strongly supports Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the
breach of contract claim as the student handbook and related policies form part of the contractual
relationship between Vanderbilt and its students.” (Doc. No. 17 at 10; Doc. No. 1-4 at 2). Plaintiff
further argues that “[i]nstead of providing Plaintiff notice of her ‘lack of progress’ and then placing
her on probation with an improvement plan as Vanderbilt’s Student Handbook and related
documents require, Vanderbilt proceeded directly to dismissal and then conditioned continued
enrollment on her unilateral ability to obtain an advisor, contrary to its own established practices.”
(Doc. No. 19 at 10-11). Even assuming arguendo that the “student handbook and related policies
form” a contract between Plaintiff and Defendant,19 and that Defendant somehow breached this
contract, this is not the end of a breach of contract analysis.
It is well-settled law that “[o]nce a party has materially breached a contract, the other
party’s obligations are excused.” See e.g., Gizzi v. Marinov, 79 F.3d 1148 (6th Cir. 1996). “A
18 Plaintiff also references a single comment, located in a screenshot that Plaintiff took during a Microsoft
Teams meeting with Vanderbilt staff, where Vanderbilt staff refer to the “musings of [Plaintiff’s] therapist.”
(Doc. No. 19-20). The Court, without more, cannot see how this comment could support an argument that
any of the alleged adverse actions were taken in retaliation for Plaintiff’s protected activity.
19 What the Court here assumes arguendo might well actually be valid. See, e.g., Evans v. Vanderbilt Univ.
Sch. of Med., 589 F. Supp. 3d 870, 892–93 (M.D. Tenn. 2022) (Richardson, J.) (noting, inter alia, that
catalogs, manuals, student handbooks, bulletins, circulars and regulations of a university help define an
implied contractual relationship between a student and the university).
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breach is ‘material’ if a party fails to perform a substantial part of the contract or one or more of
its essential terms or conditions, the breach substantially defeats the contract’s purpose, or the
breach is such that upon a reasonable interpretation of the contract, the parties considered the
breach as vital to the existence of the contract.”20 Spec’s Fam. Partners, Ltd. v. First Data Merch.
Servs. LLC, 777 F. App'x 785, 791 (6th Cir. 2019). As detailed above, the Third Appeal Response
asserted that Plaintiff’s dismissal was warranted due to Plaintiff’s lack of a thesis advisor and
Plaintiff’s failure to make “satisfactory academic progress toward [Plaintiff’s] degree,” including
her failure to meet expectations listed in Plaintiff’s “Program of Studies document.” (Doc. No. 1-
4 at 1-2). At least at this juncture then, it seems not unlikely that these (purported) failures by
Plaintiff to meet academic expectations constitute a material breach of whatever contractual
relationship existed between Plaintiff and Defendant. It seems particularly probable to the Court
that failing to meet certain academic benchmarks could likely be understood as a failure to perform
by Plaintiff of the “essential terms” of Defendant and Plaintiff’s contractual relationship. Spec’s,
777 F. App'x at 791. Cf. Merrow v. Goldberg, 672 F. Supp. 766, 774 (D. Vt. 1987) (finding that
because “plaintiff [(a student)] breached the contract [between the student and a state college] by
failing to perform academically according to the college’s, or any reasonable, standards . . .
defendants [officers at a state university] are relieved of any obligation under the contract.”) If
such failure by Plaintiff to meet certain academic expectations does constitute a material breach,
then Defendant’s obligations to continue performing (to the extent there are contractual obligations
at all), are, of course, excused. Gizzi, 79 F.3d 1148.
Thus, because of the uncertainty extant in the record as to whether Plaintiff breached he
contractual relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant on which Plaintiff relies, and whether
20 The Court is aware that this test is framed in very subjective terms—like “substantial,” “essential,” and
“reasonable,” the application of which in a particular case may be viewed differently by different persons.
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such breach was material such as to excuse any further obligation of performance by Defendant,
the Court cannot at this juncture conclude that Plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success
as to Count III.
Because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success as to any of her claims
as required, Plaintiff’s requested injunctive relief (whether in the form of a TRO or a preliminary
injunction) will be denied.
2. 	Plaintiff’s Requested Hearing and Briefing Schedule
As noted above, via the Motion Plaintiff also requests that the Court set a briefing schedule
for the Motion and set a hearing date as necessary to consider the Motion. (Doc. No. 18-1 at ¶¶ 6,
7). As also noted above, Plaintiff here apparently is referring to a briefing schedule on Plaintiff’s
request for a preliminary injunction, into which Plaintiff’s requested TRO would be converted so
that Plaintiff’s requested injunctive relief would “remain in effect during the pendency of this
action.” (Doc. No. 19 at 15). 	As noted in a footnote above, the Court for administrative and
logistical reasons is treating both requests in the Motion (the one for a TRO and the one for a
preliminary injunction) as denied at this time (without prejudice to Plaintiff’s prerogative to move
in the future for a preliminary injunction based on additional evidence beyond that presented in
connection with the instant Motion). So, the Court will also deny as moot Plaintiff’s request for a
briefing schedule and hearing on the Motion.
CONCLUSION
For the reason’s described herein, Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. No. 18) will be DENIED in
its entirety. An appropriate accompanying order will be entered.
__________________________________
ELI RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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