Word v. Sumner County Sheriff's Department et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
LATHAN WORD,
Plaintiff,
v.
SUMNER COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT , et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 3:26-cv-00002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Lathan Word filed a pro se complaint alleging violations of his civil rights. (Doc. No. 1).
Now before the Court are Word’s Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP
Application”) (Doc. No. 2) and Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 4).
I. 	FILING FEE
Based on the Court’s review of the IFP Application, it appears that Word lacks sufficient
financial resources from which to pay the full filing fee in advance. Therefore, his IFP Application
is GRANTED. (Doc. No. 2).
II. 	MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
A. Background
In the complaint, Word alleges that on January 4, 2025, Officer Stanfill initiated a traffic
stop while Word was driving in Sumner County, Tennessee. (Doc. No. 1 at 2). Word alleges that
he had not committed a traffic violation and that Officer Stanfill had no reasonable suspicion to
initiate the stop. (Id.) During the stop, Word “asserted his constitutional rights.” (Id.) Officer
Stanfill and Officer Brawler then “violently seized [Word], slammed him onto a patrol vehicle,
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and handcuffed him.” (Id.) The officers conducted a warrantless search of Word’s vehicle but
found no contraband. (Id. at 3). They then searched Word’s person, forcing him to “lower his pants
in freezing temperatures in public view.” (Id.) Ultimately, Officer Stanfill issued unspecified
citations, which Word describes as “void citations based on a non-existent statute.” (Id.)
(emphasis in original). In total, Word was detained for nearly two hours. (Id.)
Word further alleges that on January 9, 2025, Officer Stanfill and several deputies entered
the management office of his apartment building and falsely asserted that Word was in possession
of a stolen vehicle. (Id.) According to Word, the officers then “illegally obtained [Word]’s
apartment number, entered the residential grounds, and banged aggressively on [Word]’s door,
alarming neighbors.” (Id.) Also on January 9, Officer Stanfill also had Word’s vehicle towed.
(Id. at 3−4). Word reports that he was forced to vacate his apartment due to “repeated police
harassment, false accusations, and fear of further retaliation.” (Id. at 4).
Word further alleges that on January 13, 2025, Officer Stanfill “obtained an arrest warrant
based on a knowingly false affidavit alleging vehicle theft.” (Id. at 3). To obtain the warrant,
Officer 	Stanfill 	“retroactively 	manipulated 	NCIC 	[National 	Crime 	Information 	Center]
records.” (Id.) (emphasis in original). The charge was ultimately dismissed, and the criminal
record expunged. (Id. at 6, 8).
Word complained about the officers’ January 2025 conduct, and the Sumner County
Sheriff’s Department Office of Professional of Accountability conducted an internal investigation.
(Id. at 5). On April 4, 2025, an internal affairs investigator issued a report finding the complaint
unfounded. (Id. at 5−6).
Word reiterates these allegations in a declaration signed under penalty of perjury.
(Doc. No. 6).
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B. Discussion
Ordinarily, Courts look to four factors in assessing whether to grant a preliminary
injunction: “(1) whether the party moving for the injunction is facing immediate, irreparable harm,
(2) the likelihood that the movant will succeed on the merits, (3) the balance of the equities, and
(4) the public interest.” D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Schs., 942 F.3d 324, 326 (6th Cir. 2019). However,
“a plaintiff must present the existence of an irreparable injury to get a preliminary injunction. Thus,
a district court is well within its province when it denies a preliminary injunction based solely on
the lack of an irreparable injury.” (Id.) (citation and quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original).
“To merit a preliminary injunction, an injury must be both certain and immediate, not speculative
or theoretical.” (Id.)
Here, Word asserts in his Motion for Preliminary Injunction that he faces “ongoing
retaliation, intimidation, fabrication of evidence, abuse of law enforcement authority, and
irreparable harm.” (Doc. No. 4 at 1). However, Word does not allege—let alone point to any
evidence—of ongoing misconduct by any Defendant. At most, he presents speculative concerns
about future unlawful activity, which are insufficient to warrant a preliminary injunction.
D.T., 942 F.3d 	at 	326. Accordingly, 	the 	Motion 	for 	Preliminary 	Injunction 	is 	DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.1 (Doc. No. 4).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
1 Word’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction includes a request for an order directing the preservation of
evidence. (See Doc. No. 4 at 4). However, this request is more properly presented in Word’s separate
Motion to Preserve Evidence (Doc. No. 3), which the Court will resolve in due course.
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