Bordages v. T-Mobile Corporation et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
JAMES HARRY HEBERT BORDAGES, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No: 2:25-cv-02617-BCL-atc
T-MOBILE CORPORATION,
AT&T CORPORATION,
VERIZON CORPORATION, and
MEMPHIS LIGHT GAS AND WATER,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT UNDER § 1915
______________________________________________________________________________
On June 16, 2025, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against Defendants. Doc.
1. Magistrate Judge Annie T. Christoff1 issued a Report and Recommendation advising dismissal
of this case. Doc. 21. Plaintiff timely objected to the Report. Doc. 22. For the following reasons,
the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections (Doc. 22) and ADOPTS the Report and
Recommendation (Doc. 21). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED.
LEGAL STANDARD
A United States District Court Judge may designate a United States Magistrate Judge to
submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for disposition by the District Judge of
certain matters. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The District Judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge,” and “shall make a de
1 Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 2013-05, this case was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge
for management and for all pretrial matters for determination and/or report and recommendation as appropriate.
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novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.” Id. Written objections to a magistrate judge’s
findings or conclusions must be specific. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). “[A] general objection to a
magistrate [judge]’s report, which fails to specify the issues of contention, does not satisfy the
requirement that an objection be filed.” Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995).
Under Local Rule 4.1(b)(2), the Clerk of the Court will only issue summonses in cases with
non-prisoner pro se plaintiffs who are proceeding in forma pauperis at the Court’s direction after
the Court conducts a screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under that provision, the Court
shall dismiss the case at any time if it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii)
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Section 1915 gives “judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s
factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327
(1989)). “[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level
of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts
available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992); see also Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 328 (explaining that Section 1915 is designed to screen “clearly baseless” claims,
which describe “fantastic or delusional scenarios”). Importantly, “[u]nlike a dismissal for failure
to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual allegations as true,” when screening a
complaint under Section 1915, “a judge does not have to accept ‘fantastic or delusional’ factual
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allegations as true.” Hill, 630 F.3d at 471 (first citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009),
then citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327–28).
BACKGROUND
As stated in the Complaint, Plaintiff files this action “in connection with the facts and
circumstances underlying (Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-02562-TLP-atc) and asserts distinct but
interrelated constitutional claims arising from unlawful use of telecommunications infrastructure.”
Doc. 1 at 2. Plaintiff alleges that he “has used telecommunications services provided by
Defendants within Tennessee, primarily in the city of Memphis,” but “his devices have repeatedly
displayed false location data indicating presence in or near Dallas, Texas.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff alleges
that “Defendants have knowingly allowed Plaintiffs traffic to be rerouted through Dallas-based
networks” as part of “consistent efforts to facilitate illegal genetic and DNA data extraction . . . to
harm Plaintiff in order to extort and exploit” him. Id. Plaintiff asserts that “this surveillance and
data redirection are tied to medical and data collection enterprises operating from Dallas, Texas,
including Tenet Healthcare Corporation,” who are wrongfully taking Plaintiff’s private data. Id. at
4. Plaintiff brings various claims for relief and seeks one hundred billion United States dollars in
compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 7.
ANALYSIS
The Report “recommended that this case be dismissed sua sponte, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Doc. 21 at 2. The entirety of Plaintiff’s
objections center on the Report’s discussion of Plaintiff’s many other civil actions filed in this
District. Doc. 22 at 1–6. In brief, Plaintiff objects that the Report’s analysis of the instant complaint
is “procedurally unsound,” because it “depends on a factual composite that does not exist in the
operative pleading.” Id. at 7.
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These objections are OVERRULED. To begin, Plaintiff himself indicated that this action
was filed in connection with at least one other of his cases. Doc. 1 at 2. Further, the Report correctly
noted that Plaintiff’s claims here involve a conspiracy by various actors to “harvest [Plaintiff’s]
‘unique biological and biometric signals . . . for purposes of medical profiling, digital entrapment,
psychological manipulation, and possibly biological experimentation.’” Doc. 21 at 4.
The Court agrees with the Report that Plaintiff’s Complaint is not sufficient to avoid
dismissal under Section 1915(e)(2)(B). From the nature of the claims here, Plaintiff’s Complaint
is frivolous on its face—a point underscored by Plaintiff’s history of other frivolous and
unmeritorious filings.2 Even at this procedural juncture and under the relaxed standard for pro se
pleadings, Plaintiff’s claims are “wholly incredible”: Plaintiff demands one hundred billion United
States dollars in damages stemming from an alleged conspiracy between various
telecommunications companies and Memphis Light Gas and Water to violate his civil rights by
stealing and exploiting his genetic information to benefit a Dallas, Texas based healthcare
organization. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 32–33; Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328. Plaintiff’s Complaint is
DISMISSED.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Objections (Doc. 22) are all OVERRULED. The Court ADOPTS the Report
and Recommendation (Doc. 21). Defendant’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED. The Clerk
SHALL close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 13th day of October, 2026.
s/ Brian C. Lea
BRIAN C. LEA
2 When deciding whether to dismiss a complaint, courts may take judicial notice of “facts in a public record
that ‘are not subject to reasonable dispute’—such as the court’s ultimate resolution of a prior case.” Blackwell v.
Nocerini, 123 F.4th 479, 487–88 (6th Cir. 2024).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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