Mayorga v. Facility Administrator of the Western Tennessee Detention Facility et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
JORGE LUIS RIVAS MAYORGA,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 2:26-cv-3252-BCL-atc
WEST TENNESSEE DETENTION FACILITY, et al.,
Respondents.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
______________________________________________________________________________
Petitioner Jorge Luis Rivas Mayorga has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by
which he seeks release from immigration detention or, in the alternative, bond. Doc. 2 at 5.
Petitioner also filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. Doc. 4. This Court ordered a
response and further provided a window for Petitioner to file a reply to that response. Doc. 6.
Petitioner did not reply. For the reasons that follow, the Petition is DENIED.
Petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Respondent notes that
Petitioner has not sought a bond hearing before the immigration authorities, and Petitioner has not
argued otherwise. Doc. 8 at 4. Petitioner is effectively asking this Court to step in in the first
instance, bypassing the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals entirely. Doc.
2. That is inappropriate—particularly where, as here, the petition was filed after the Sixth Circuit
held in Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026), that some applicants are entitled
to individualized bond hearings.
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The Supreme Court “long has acknowledged the general rule that parties exhaust
prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from the federal courts.” McCarthy v.
Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992). Exhaustion gives an agency “the opportunity to correct its
own mistakes with respect to the programs it administers”; “discourages disregard of the agency's
procedures”; promotes efficiency because “[c]laims generally can be resolved much more quickly
and economically before an agency”; and “may produce a useful record for subsequent judicial
consideration.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
And the doctrine arguably helps to protect and promote the separation of powers, insofar as it
leaves it to the Executive Branch to make the call in the first instance, without the Judicial Branch
jumping in to dictate the results before the Executive has had an opportunity to reach a final
decision on the Petitioner’s claim through its own processes.1 See Smith v. U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, 178 F.4th 312, 325 (6th Cir. 2026) (“This rule is designed to afford the agency the
opportunity to reconsider its position in the first instance, and to promote efficient litigation.”
(citing Jones Bros., Inc. v. Sec’y of Lab., 898 F.3d 669, 673 (6th Cir. 2018))). Petitioner must
exhaust his remedies before seeking judicial relief in this Court.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 2) is
DENIED. Petitioner's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 4) is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 8th day of October, 2026.
s/ Brian C. Lea
BRIAN C. LEA
1 Petitioner argues that exhaustion should not be required because he has invoked the Fifth Amendment’s
due process clause. Doc. 2 at 4. But Petitioner offers neither argument nor authority for this contention, and therefore
has forfeited it. Moreover, Petitioner’s constitutional claim is apparently only an as-applied challenge asserting that
he has been detained too long—a situation that could be remedied through a bond hearing. Petitioner may not decline
to seek a bond hearing and then sidestep that failure to exhaust simply by declaring his detention without a bond
hearing is now unconstitutional.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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