Sedwick v. McDonald

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JACQUELINE CAMILLE
SEDWICK,
Plaintiff,
v.
DENIS RICHARD McDONOUGH,
Secretary, Department of Veterans
Affairs,
Defendant.
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Case No. 3:22-cv-02321-S-BT
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendant’s Bill of Costs (ECF No. 119) and Plaintiff
Jacqueline Sedwick’s Opposition to Defendant’s Bill of Costs (ECF No. 127).1 For
the reasons explained below, the District Judge should SUSTAIN in part Sedwick’s
objections and ORDER Sedwick to pay $4,293.28 of Defendant’s costs.
Background
Sedwick sued Defendant on October 17, 2022, alleging that she experienced
racial discrimination, a hostile work environment, retaliation, and constructive
discharge. See generally Am. Compl. (ECF No. 36). The Court granted Defendant’s
1 Sedwick inadvertently filed responses and objections to Defendant’s Bill of Costs,
see ECF Nos. 120 & 122, but then requested leave to file her intended opposition.
See Mot. for Leave (ECF No. 124). The Court granted Sedwick’s request and
ordered the Clerk to file on the docket Sedwick’s intended opposition. See Order at
1–2 (ECF No. 126).
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Motion for Summary Judgment and entered judgment in favor of Defendant. See
Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate
Judge (ECF No. 115); Order (ECF No. 117); J. (ECF No. 118). Thereafter, Defendant
filed its Bill of Costs seeking to tax $5,042.28 against Sedwick pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1920 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). See Def.’s Bill of Costs (ECF No. 119).
Specifically, 	Defendant 	seeks 	fees 	for 	printed 	and 	electronically 	recorded
transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case. Id. at 2. Sedwick timely filed
her opposition to Defendant’s Bill of Costs.2
Legal Standard
A prevailing party in a civil action is entitled to recover its costs unless the
Court otherwise directs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). But “taxable costs are limited by
statute and are modest in scope.” Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S.
560, 573 (2012). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1920, taxable costs include:
(1) 	Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) 	Fees 	for 	printed 	or 	electronically 	recorded 	transcripts
necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) 	Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
2 The Court advised the parties that “[a]fter Defendant files a reply, briefing will be
closed, and the Court will strike additional briefings regarding the Defendant’s bill
of costs.” Order at 2 (ECF No. 126). Despite the Court’s instructions, Sedwick filed
a Reply to Defendant’s Response to Opposition to Bill of Costs (ECF No. 131) and
a Notice of Clarification Regarding Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Response to
Opposition of Bill of Costs (ECF No. 132). Accordingly, the Court STRIKES these
filings for failure to comply with the Court’s Order.
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(4) 	Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any
materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in
the case;
(5) 	Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; [and]
(6) 	Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of
interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special
interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 1920. The Court “may decline to award the costs listed in [§ 1920] but
may not award costs omitted from the list.” Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 5 F.3d
877, 891 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S.
437, 442 (1987)).
The party seeking recovery of its costs bears the burden of proving the
amount and necessity of its costs. See Holmes v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 11 F.3d 63,
64 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam); Fogleman v. ARAMCO, 920 F.2d 278, 285–86
(5th Cir. 1991). “If the party against whom costs are sought does not object, a
presumption arises that the costs were necessarily incurred and will be taxed.”
Harris v. Dall. Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 2016 WL 8674685, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2016)
(Horan, J.) (quoting Tempest Publ’g, Inc. v. Hacienda Records & Recording
Studio, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 3d 712, 717 (S.D. Tex. 2015)). However, “[a]n objection
shifts that burden to require the party seeking costs to show that the costs were
necessary.” Id.
Analysis
Sedwick objects to the entirety of Defendant’s Bill of Costs, contending that
(1) Defendant’s choice to obtain copies of the depositions transcripts of Sedwick,
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Gregory Guillermo, and Kimberly Coleman-Prier are “discretionary expenses, not
taxable 	costs,” 	(2) 	Defendant’s 	fees 	for 	obtaining 	a 	transcript 	and 	audio
synchronized CD of Sedwick’s deposition “exceed[s] local norms and include[s]
non-taxable enhancements,” and (3) Defendant’s Bill of Costs is a “punitive
maneuver that undermines the principles of equity, access to justice, and civil
rights enforcement.” Pl.’s Opp. at 2–3 (ECF No. 127). The Court disagrees with
Sedwick’s opposition and finds that Defendant has satisfied its burden to show that
the deposition transcripts were necessarily obtained for use in the case. However,
the Court agrees with Sedwick’s objections regarding the audio synchronized CD,
rough draft costs, and administrative fees, and accordingly, Defendant’s Bill of
Costs should be reduced by $749.00.
A. Original Deposition Transcripts
A court may tax costs for “[f]ees for printed or electronically recorded
transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2). This
District holds that “[t]he cost of a deposition is taxable if the court finds that ‘all or
any 	part 	of 	the 	deposition 	was 	necessarily 	obtained 	for 	use 	in 	the 	case.’”
Woodberry v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 2017 WL 1408826, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr.
20, 2017) (Lindsay, J.) (quoting Nissho-Iwai Co., Ltd. v. Occidental Crude Sales,
Inc., 729 F.2d 1530, 1553 (5th Cir. 1984)). “Section 1920(2) authorizes recovery of
the cost for [written deposition transcripts] so long as, at the time that a transcript
was obtained . . . [it] could reasonably be expected to be used during trial or for
trial preparation, rather than for the mere convenience of counsel or merely for
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discovery.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Plambeck, 66 F. Supp. 3d 782, 790 (N.D. Tex. 2014)
(citing Marmillion v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 381 F. App’x 421, 429 (5th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam) and Fogleman, 920 F.2d at 285).
Here, the District Judge should find that Defendant has met its burden to
show that the costs of obtaining the original deposition transcripts of Gregory
Guillermo, 	Kimberly 	Coleman-Prier, 	and 	Sedwick 	were 	necessary 	for 	trial
preparation. 	Indeed, 	Defendants 	cite 	to 	the 	deposition 	transcripts 	in 	their
successful motion for summary judgment. And it is generally recognized that the
basic costs of an original deposition transcript and one copy are taxable against the
non-prevailing party. Leal v. Magic Touch Up, Inc., 2019 WL 162885, at *2 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 9, 2019) (Ramirez, J.).
As the original deposition transcripts of Sedwick, Guillermo, and Coleman-
Prier were reasonably expected to be used during trial preparation and were in fact
used in Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the District Judge should
OVERRULE Sedwick’s objections as to the original deposition transcript costs.
B. Audio Synchronized CD, Administrative Fees, and Rough Drafts Costs
Sedwick next contends that the deposition rates “exceed local norms and
include non-taxable enhancements.” Pl.’s Opp. at 2 (ECF No. 127). Sedwick
specifically objects to the fees associated with obtaining an audio synchronized CD
of her deposition. Id. The Fifth Circuit has noted that “federal courts may only
award 	those 	costs 	articulated 	in 	section 	1920 	absent 	explicit 	statutory 	or
contractual authorization to the contrary.” Mota v. Uni. Of Tex. Hous. Heath Sci.
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Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 529 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons,
Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 444–45 (1987)). Incidental costs associated with taking the
depositions are generally not recoverable. Leal, 2019 WL 162885, at *2 (collecting
cases).
Defendant should not be awarded incidental costs associated with the
depositions, such as the audio synchronized CD, administrative fees, and rough
draft costs. See Leal, 2019 WL 162885, at *2 (“Incidental costs associated with
taking 	the 	depositions . . . such 	as 	the 	costs 	for 	disks . . . are 	generally 	not
recoverable.”); Bevill v. City of Quitman, 2025 WL 2470073, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Aug.
27, 2025) (“This Court has refused to award the types of incidental costs [p]laintiff
seeks, including costs for expedited delivery, as well as costs attributable to ASCII
disks, rough drafts, condensed transcripts, and real time reporting.”); Mercer v.
Patterson-UTI Drilling Co., LLC, 2016 WL 10951286, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 20,
2016) (sustaining objection as it related to administrative and rough draft fees).
This District has held that fees for videotaped depositions are necessarily
incurred when the case is complex, and the credibility of the witnesses are sharply
disputed. Antero v. Resources Corp. v. C&R Downhole Drilling, 2022 WL
21697287, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2022) (Means, J.) (collecting cases). However,
this case was not particularly complex, and the credibility of the witnesses was no
more disputed in this case than in similar cases. The circumstances of this matter
do not justify awarding costs for an audio synchronized CD as well as a transcript
of Sedwick’s deposition.
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The Court should SUSTAIN Sedwick’s objections as to the incidental costs
associated with the depositions, including the audio synchronized CD of her
deposition, administrative fees, and rough draft costs.
C. Equitable Considerations
Finally, Sedwick argues that “equitable grounds” justify denying Defendant’s
Bill of Costs, mainly that she “is a pro se litigant who challenged systemic
retaliation and racism within a federal agency.” Pl.’s Opp. at 2 (ECF No. 127). In
sum, Sedwick alleges that Defendant’s Bill of Costs is a “punitive maneuver”
designed to “penalize her for asserting her rights.” Id. at 2–3.
In support of her contentions, Sedwick cites to Ass’n of Mex.-Am. Educators
v. State of Cal., 231 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 2000) (analyzing the bill of costs for an
action challenging the constitutionality of a state-imposed testing system for
teachers that allegedly had a disproportionate, adverse impact on minority
teaching candidates).3 Sedwick’s reliance is misplaced. As an initial matter, a
ruling from the Ninth Circuit does not bind this Court. Further, the case presented
to the Ninth Circuit is not analogous to Sedwick’s case. The instant action did not
involve “close and complex issues” and “extraordinarily high” costs. Id. at 593.
Rather, many of Sedwick’s civil rights claims were barred by the Civil Service
Reform Act, and the Court found that Sedwick failed to allege prima facie cases for
3 In support of this argument, Sedwick also cites to Whitfield v. Board of County
Comm’rs, 837 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 1242 (D. Kan. 2011). See Pl.’s Opp. at 3 (ECF No.
127). However, the Court was unable to locate this case.
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her remaining civil rights claims. See generally Findings, Conclusions, and
Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 115).
The Court finds no basis to deny Defendant’s Bill of Costs on equitable
grounds, and the District Judge should OVERRULE Sedwick’s objection. See
Williams v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 2019 WL 3240751, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. May 31,
2019) (Horan, J.) (rejecting pro se plaintiff’s argument that bill of costs should be
denied due to plaintiff’s inability to pay costs because the Fifth Circuit has “never
held that the ‘limited resources’ of the losing party provide a basis for denying the
prevailing party its costs”), adopted by 2019 WL 3239249 (N.D. Tex. July 19, 2019)
(Lindsay, J.); Cruz v. Mattis, 2018 WL 2299044, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 21, 2018)
(Ramirez, J.) (awarding in part the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Defense’s
bill of costs against a represented individual); Thomas v. DeJoy, 2025 WL
1448729, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May 1, 2025) (awarding Postmaster General of the United
States Postal Service’s bill of costs against pro se plaintiff who alleged disability
discrimination and retaliation claims), adopted by 2025 WL 1446029 (S.D. Tex.
May 20, 2025).
Recommendation
For the reasons stated, the District Judge should SUSTAIN in part Sedwick’s
objections to Defendant’s Bill of Costs and ORDER Sedwick to pay $4,293.28 to
Defendant.
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SO RECOMMENDED.
December 10, 2025.
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in
the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). In order to be
specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to
which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in
the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	report 	and 	recommendation 	where 	the 	disputed
determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or
refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file
specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual
findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted
by the district judge, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
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