Sedwick v. McDonald

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JACQUELINE CAMILLE
SEDWICK,
Plaintiff,
v.
DENIS RICHARD McDONOUGH,
Secretary, Department of Veterans
Affairs,
Defendant.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Case No. 3:22-cv-02321-S-BT
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	pro 	se 	Plaintiff 	Jacqueline 	Sedwick’s 	Motion 	for
Reconsideration and Recalculation of Post-Judgment Deadlines (ECF No. 125).
For the reasons stated, the Court should DENY Sedwick’s Motion.
Background
Sedwick asserted claims against Defendant for racial discrimination, hostile
work environment, retaliation, and constructive discharge. See generally Am.
Compl. (ECF No. 36). The Court granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment and entered judgment in favor of Defendant on September 19, 2025. See
Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate
Judge (“FCR”) (ECF No. 115); Order Accepting FCR (ECF No. 117); J. (ECF No.
118). 	Thereafter, 	on 	October 	20, 	2025, 	Sedwick 	filed 	her 	Motion 	for
Case 3:22-cv-02321-S-BT Document 142 Filed 05/05/26 Page 1 of 14 PageID <pageID>

2
Reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b)(4) (ECF No. 125).
Defendant filed a response to Sedwick’s Motion (ECF No. 129). Rather than filing
a reply, Sedwick moved to strike Defendant’s response (ECF No. 130), which was
denied. Order (ECF No. 141); see also Pl.’s Reply to Def.’s Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. to
Strike (ECF No. 134). The Motion for Reconsideration is ripe for adjudication.
Legal Standards1
Rule 59(e)
Relief under Rule 59(e) “is appropriate (1) where there has been an
intervening change in the controlling law; (2) where the movant presents newly
discovered evidence that was previously unavailable; or (3) to correct a manifest
error of law or fact.” Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 702 F.3d 177, 182 (5th Cir.
2012) (per curiam) (citing Schiller v. Physicians Res. Grp. Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567
(5th Cir. 2003)). District courts enjoy discretion in deciding whether to reopen a
1 Generally, “motions for reconsideration” are analyzed under Rule 59(e) or Rule
60(b), depending on the timing of filing. See Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc.,
702 F.3d 177, 182 n.2 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“A motion asking the court to
reconsider a prior ruling is evaluated either as a motion to ‘alter or amend a
judgment’ under Rule 59(e) or as a motion for ‘relief from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding’ under Rule 60(b)” and “[i]f the motion was filed within twenty-eight
days after the entry of the judgment, the motion is treated as though it was filed
under Rule 59, and if it was filed outside of that time, it is analyzed under Rule
60.”) 	(internal 	citations 	omitted). 	Here, 	Sedwick 	filed 	her 	Motion 	for
Reconsideration thirty-one days after the Final Judgment. See J. (ECF No. 118)
(entered on September 19, 2025); Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. (ECF No. 125) (filed on
October 20, 2025). But she also sought an extension of time to file her Motion on
October 17, 2025. See Mot. to Extend Time to File Mot. for Reconsideration (ECF
No. 123). Therefore, the Court considers Sedwick’s arguments under both Rule
59(e) and Rule 60(b).
Case 3:22-cv-02321-S-BT Document 142 Filed 05/05/26 Page 2 of 14 PageID <pageID>

3
case under Rule 59(e). Weber v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 276 (5th Cir.
2000) (citing Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir.
1993)). But a Rule 59(e) motion is “not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence,
legal theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry
of judgment.” Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004).
“Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy that
should be used sparingly.” Id. (citations omitted). In striving to strike a balance
between the need for finality and the need to render just decisions on the basis of
all the facts, “the Fifth Circuit has observed that Rule 59(e) ‘favor[s] the denial of
[these motions].’” Greenidge v. Carter, 2024 WL 4183523, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May
21, 2024) (Lindsay, J.) (citing S. Constructors Grp., Inc. v. Dynalectric Co., 2 F.3d
606, 611 (5th Cir. 1993)).
Rule 60(b)
“‘[R]elief under Rule 60(b) is considered an extraordinary remedy,’ and the
‘desire for a judicial process that is predictable mandates caution in reopening
judgments.’” Haygood v. Dies, 2023 WL 2326424, at *4 (5th Cir. Mar. 2, 2023)
(per curiam) (internal footnotes omitted) (quoting Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d
1000, 1007 (5th Cir. 1998)). The moving party carries the burden of showing
entitlement to relief under any provision of Rule 60(b), and the district court has
considerable discretion in determining whether that burden has been satisfied. See
Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173–74 (5th Cir.
Case 3:22-cv-02321-S-BT Document 142 Filed 05/05/26 Page 3 of 14 PageID <pageID>

4
1990), abrogated on other grounds by Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
1075–76 n.14 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam).
Analysis
Sedwick moves for reconsideration on seven different grounds: (1) the
District Judge failed to conduct a de novo review of the FCR, (2) the Court allegedly
denied Sedwick an opportunity to rebut new arguments in a sur-reply, (3) the
Court failed to preserve and consider relevant documentary evidence, (4) the Court
wrongfully compelled the production of Sedwick’s medical records, (5) the FCR
misapplied the election of remedies doctrine, (6) Sedwick did not receive CM/ECF
notifications of certain docket entries, and (7) the FCR relied on incomplete and
unauthenticated agency records. See Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. at 2–11 (ECF No. 125).
Sedwick specifically moves for relief under Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b)(4). Id. at 1.
Rule 59(e)
Sedwick rests her request for relief under Rule 59(e) on her contentions that
the Court committed manifest errors of law and fact. See Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. at
2 (ECF No. 125) (“Rule 59(e) relief is available where the court’s decision rests on
manifest factual or legal error or where material evidence was overlooked.”), 9
(“Reconsideration is warranted under Rule 59(e) to correct these manifest legal
and factual errors.”). For the reasons set forth below, Sedwick’s various arguments
that the Court committed manifest factual and legal errors are unavailing and
represent attempts to relitigate matters previously rejected by the Court. See Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, n.5 (2008) (Rule 59(e) “may not be used to
Case 3:22-cv-02321-S-BT Document 142 Filed 05/05/26 Page 4 of 14 PageID <pageID>

5
relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have
been raised prior to the entry of judgment.”). Sedwick does not point to any
intervening change in controlling law or present newly discovered evidence that
was previously unavailable that would otherwise entitle her to relief under Rule
59(e). 	As 	Sedwick 	has 	not 	satisfied 	any 	of 	the 	requirements 	justifying 	the
“extraordinary remedy” of reconsideration of the judgment, the Court should deny
her motion for relief under Rule 59(e).
Rule 60(b)
Under Rule 60(b)(4), a court may grant relief from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding if “the judgment is void.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). A judgment may
be set aside under Rule 60(b)(4) in two circumstances: “1) if the initial court lacked
subject matter or personal jurisdiction; and 2) if the district court acted in a
manner inconsistent with due process of law.” Callon Petrol. Co. v. Frontier Ins.
Co., 351 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 2003). “If a court has both subject matter and
personal jurisdiction, however, the ‘only inquiry is whether the district court acted
in a manner so inconsistent with due process as to render the judgment void.’” Id.
at 210 (quoting New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 143 (5th Cir. 1996)).
“Such circumstances are rare because due process in civil cases usually requires
only proper notice and service of process and a court of competent jurisdiction.”
Id. Additionally, “procedural irregularities during the course of a civil case, even
serious ones, will not subject the judgment to collateral attack.” Id. (quoting
Fehlhaber v. Fehlhaber, 681 F.2d 1015, 1027 (5th Cir.1982)) (cleaned up).
Case 3:22-cv-02321-S-BT Document 142 Filed 05/05/26 Page 5 of 14 PageID <pageID>

6
1. 	Failure to Conduct De Novo Review
First, Sedwick argues that relief is warranted because the District Judge’s
Order Accepting the FCR constitutes a “silent adoption” which “deprived [her] of
the statutory de novo review required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(3)[.]” Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. at 2–4 (ECF No. 125). In support of her first
argument, Sedwick cites Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th
Cir. 1996) and Acosta v. City of Austin, 2022 WL 1694862 (5th Cir. May 26, 2022).
Sedwick, however, misconstrues Fifth Circuit precedent. Douglass stands
for the proposition that a party may file specific written objections to the FCR and
“thereby secure de novo review by the district court.” Douglass, 79 F.3d at 1420.
Despite Sedwick’s assertions, this decision does not hold that “silent adoption
without meaningful engagement—especially where specific objections identify
contested 	facts 	and 	newly 	raised 	reply 	assertions—warrants 	vacatur 	and
reconsideration.” Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. at 4 (ECF No. 125). And Defendant
correctly notes that “Douglass does not require a court to issue a written opinion
analyzing a party’s objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation.” Def.’s
Resp. at 7 (ECF No. 129). Although Sedwick also cites Acosta v. City of Austin,
2022 WL 1694862 (5th Cir. May 26, 2022) in support of this argument, the Court
could not locate this case.2
2 The inaccuracies in Sedwick’s brief are typical of unverified, AI-generated filings,
which have become an increasing concern for courts in recent years. While no
federal or local rule explicitly prohibits the use of artificial intelligence in litigation,
all parties—including those proceeding pro se—must fulfill their obligations under
Case 3:22-cv-02321-S-BT Document 142 Filed 05/05/26 Page 6 of 14 PageID <pageID>

7
Contrary to Sedwick’s assertions, the District Judge’s Order Accepting the
FCR complies with Fifth Circuit precedent. In Scott v. Alford, the Fifth Circuit
reviewed a district judge’s order accepting the magistrate judge’s FCR that read:
“The Court has conducted a careful de novo review of the pleadings and testimony
in this cause, the Report of the Magistrate Judge, and the Defendants’ objections
thereto. Upon such a review, . . . the Court has determined that the Magistrate
Judge was correct.” Scott v. Alford, 1995 WL 450216, at *3 (5th Cir. July 6, 1995)
(per curiam) (alternations in original). The Fifth Circuit held that “[s]uch language
constitutes sufficient proof that the district court conducted a de novo review in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).” Id.
Here, the District Judge’s Order Accepting the FCR states:
The United States Magistriate Judge made findings, conclusions, and
a recommendation in this case. Objections were filed. The Court
reviewed 	de 	novo 	those 	portions 	of 	the 	proposed 	findings,
conclusions, and recommendation to which objection was made, and
reviewed 	the 	remaining 	proposed 	findings, 	conclusions, 	and
recommendation 	for 	plain 	error. 	Finding 	no 	error, 	the 	Court
ACCEPTS the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation the
United States Magistrate Judge.
Order Accepting FCR at 1 (ECF No. 117) (emphasis in original). This language is
sufficient evidence that the District Judge conducted a de novo review of the FCR.
Therefore, Sedwick’s first argument for relief is unavailing.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b), which requires lawyers and unrepresented
parties alike to certify that, after a reasonable inquiry, their legal contentions are
warranted by existing law. Consequently, this duty necessitates a careful review of
AI-generated statements and citations to ensure accuracy.
Case 3:22-cv-02321-S-BT Document 142 Filed 05/05/26 Page 7 of 14 PageID <pageID>

8
2. Denial of Opportunity to Rebut New Arguments and Termination of
Supplemental Evidence
Next, Sedwick contends that the Court’s order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave to File Sur-Reply in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment 	“foreclosed 	[her] 	ability 	to 	rebut 	reputational 	assertions 	and
authenticate evidence.” Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. at 4 (ECF No. 125). As the Court
previously stated, “[s]urreplies are ‘heavily disfavored, and the decision to allow a
sur-reply lies within the district court’s discretion.’” Order (ECF No. 111) (quoting
Ga. Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 99 F.4th 770, 774
(5th Cir. 2024)). Additionally, when a party provides new evidence for the first
time in a reply, the district court has the discretion to decline to rely on that new
evidence, which the Court did in this case. Id. (“If the Court finds that Defendant
identifies new arguments in his Reply brief, it will not consider them.”) (citing Ga.
Firefighters’ Pension Fund, 99 F.4th at 774). Thus, Sedwick’s second argument is
not an adequate basis for relief.
3. Authentication of Agency Assertions
Sedwick alleges that the Court improperly granted Defendant’s Motion for
Summary 	Judgment 	because 	the 	FCR 	“credited 	agency 	assertions 	without
requiring 	authentication,” 	and 	the 	District 	Judge 	“adopted 	these 	findings
wholesale, without correcting the evidentiary gaps or requiring supplementation.”
Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. at 6 (ECF No. 125). In support of this argument, Sedwick
Case 3:22-cv-02321-S-BT Document 142 Filed 05/05/26 Page 8 of 14 PageID <pageID>

9
contends that “courts routinely require supplementation or custodial declarations
before crediting agency assertions.” Id.
In 	this 	case, 	Defendant 	provided 	four 	declarations 	from 	employees
authenticating documents used in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment.
See Decl. of Jennifer E. Foster at 1, ¶ 3 (ECF No. 100-1); Decl. of Kimberly Coleman
Prier at 593, ¶ 5 (ECF No. 100-3); Decl. of Gregory Guillermo at 685, ¶ 8 (ECF No.
100-4) 	(all 	declaring 	that 	the 	documents 	attached 	to 	the 	declarations 	are
maintained by the VA; made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, someone with knowledge; kept in the course of the VA’s regularly
conducted activity; were a part of a regular practice of the VA’s activities; and are
true and correct copies of documents created, received, and/or reviewed in the
course of employment); see also Decl. of Deatra Childress at 768–69, ¶ 4 (ECF No.
100-5) (declaring to the veracity of files related to Sedwick’s EEO complaints).
Therefore, 	Sedwick’s 	assertion 	that 	the 	Court 	inappropriately 	relied 	on
“unauthenticated documentary assertions” in adjudicating Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment is unsupported by the record.
4. Compelled Medical Records
Sedwick next alleges that the Court improperly relied on “records obtained
through informal or coercive means without proper authentication.” Pl.’s Mot. for
Recons. at 7 (ECF No. 125). Specifically, Sedwick implies that the Court coerced
her to sign medical releases. See id. at 6 (“Plaintiff complied under threat of
dismissal.”). However, the Court was well within its discretion to compel Sedwick
Case 3:22-cv-02321-S-BT Document 142 Filed 05/05/26 Page 9 of 14 PageID <pageID>

10
to sign the authorization for release of her medical records because she placed her
mental and physical health at issue by seeking damages for “mental anguish,”
“psychiatric and medical expenses,” and “future medical and psychiatric expenses
to cope with the mental, emotional, psychological, and physical effects of the
persistent and pervasive race discrimination, retaliation, harassment, hostile work
environment, [and] mental anguish Plaintiff was subjected to.” See Am. Compl. at
24 (ECF No. 36); Discovery Order at 26–28 (ECF No. 69) (citing Merrill v. Waffle
House, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 467, 471 (N.D. Tex. 2005)); see also Coleman v. Cedar Hill
Ind. Sch. Dist., 2022 WL 1470957, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 10, 2022) (Fitzwater, J.)
(explaining 	that 	courts 	“may 	compel 	parties 	to 	sign 	written 	releases 	or
authorization forms consenting to the production of various documents”). And
despite Sedwick’s contention that these medical disclosures “circumvented Rule
45 enforcement procedures,” Sedwick used Rule 45 to challenge the subpoenas to
her medical providers in two motions to quash, which the court denied. Pl.’s Mot.
for Recons. at 7 (ECF No. 125); see also Pl.’s First Mot. to Quash (ECF No. 72); Pl.’s
Second Mot. to Quash (ECF No. 82); Order at 8–9 (ECF No. 90) (denying
Sedwick’s motion to quash under Rule 45 because her medical and insurance
records were relevant to the dispute and rejecting Sedwick’s right to privacy
argument). Sedwick’s claim that her medical records were improperly compelled
lacks merit, and therefore, is not a proper basis for relief.
Case 3:22-cv-02321-S-BT Document 142 Filed 05/05/26 Page 10 of 14 PageID <pageID>

11
5. 	Election of Remedies Doctrine
Sedwick also argues that the Court misapplied the election of remedies
doctrine by failing to consider that the Union filed the grievances and not herself.
Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. at 7–9 (ECF No. 125). As explained in the FCR, other courts
have “found that an election of remedies is made when the employee or a union
representative on the employee’s behalf initiates the grievance process.” FCR at 13
(ECF No. 115) (citing René v. Granholm, 2022 WL 17820342, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec.
20, 2022) and Redmon v. Mineta, 243 F. App’x 920, 922 (6th Cir. 2007))
(emphasis in original). Sedwick’s Motion for Reconsideration merely rehashes
arguments that have already been rejected by the Court, and therefore, she is not
entitled to relief under Rule 60(b). See Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at
33–34 (ECF No. 105) (arguing that the election of remedies did not preclude her
claims because she “never personally initiated the grievance process”).
6. Service Defect and Jurisdictional Challenge
Finally, Sedwick claims that her due process rights were violated because
she failed to receive notifications of electronic filing of the District Judge’s Order
Accepting the FCR (ECF No. 117) and Judgment (ECF No. 118). Pl.’s Mot. for
Recons. at 9 (ECF No. 125). In a separate filing, Sedwick alleges that electronic
service “does not satisfy the Court’s own directives, which falsely stated that
Plaintiff was not registered for electronic service and ordered manual transmission
by 	mail.” 	Pl.’s 	Not. 	at 	2 	(ECF 	No. 	121). 	Sedwick 	requests 	that 	the 	Court
“[d]etermine whether verified service of [the Order Accepting the FCR and
Case 3:22-cv-02321-S-BT Document 142 Filed 05/05/26 Page 11 of 14 PageID <pageID>

12
Judgment] occurred in accordance with CM/ECF procedures and constitutional
notice standards,” or alternatively, “vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) or
recalculate all post judgment and appellate deadlines from the date of verified
service.” Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. at 10 (ECF No. 125).
Although not entirely clear, the Court believes Sedwick’s argument stems
from the Judgment. In the Judgment, the District Judge stated: “IT IS FURTHER
ORDERED that the Clerk shall transmit a true copy of this Judgment and the Order
Accepting the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of the United States
Magistrate Judge to the parties and their counsel.” J. (ECF No. 118) (emphasis
omitted). As Sedwick is registered as a CM/ECF user, the Order Accepting the FCR
and Judgment were electronically transmitted to her via email, which is reflected
on 	the 	docket. 	Indeed, 	Sedwick 	admits 	that 	she 	eventually 	received 	email
notifications via CM/ECF of the documents she states violated her due process
rights. See Pl.’s Not. at 2 (ECF No. 121) (“Although Plaintiff ultimately received
copies of Dkt. #117 and Dkt. #118 via CM/ECF email notification . . . .”); Supp. Obj.
to Bill of Costs at 1 (ECF No. 122) (same). Nowhere in the Judgment did the District
Judge require the Clerk of Court to physically mail a copy of the Order Accepting
the FCR and Judgment to Sedwick. And nowhere in the Judgement did the District
Judge “falsely” state that Sedwick was not registered for CM/ECF. Therefore,
Sedwick’s due process rights were not violated, and this argument does not void
the judgment under Rule 60(b)(4).
Case 3:22-cv-02321-S-BT Document 142 Filed 05/05/26 Page 12 of 14 PageID <pageID>

13
7. 	Remaining Arguments
None of Sedwick’s arguments demonstrate a basis for relief under Rule
60(b)(4). 	However, 	even 	liberally 	construing 	Sedwick’s 	Motion 	for
Reconsideration under Rule 60(b)(6), Sedwick cannot prevail. Rule 60(b)(6)
allows the court to “relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for . . . any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). In other
words, Rule 60(b)(6) is “a residual clause used to cover unforeseen contingencies;
that is, it is a means for accomplishing justice in exceptional circumstances.”
Steverson v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., 508 F.3d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 2007); see also
BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 605 U.S. 204, 210 (2025) (describing Rule
60(b)(6) 	as 	a 	“catch 	all” 	provision 	and 	relief 	requires 	“extraordinary
circumstances” not already covered by the preceding five rules).
Sedwick 	has 	not 	demonstrated 	any 	extraordinary 	or 	exceptional
circumstances 	that 	would 	entitle 	her 	to 	relief. 	Rather, 	her 	Motion 	for
Reconsideration is merely an attempt to rehash previously rejected arguments. See
Lyles v. Seacor Marine, Inc., 555 F. App’x 411, 412 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“A
Rule 60(b) motion is not an opportunity to rehash prior arguments.”) (citing Triple
Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 269 (5th Cir. 2007)); Alfred v. Allen
Correctional Ctr., 317 F. App’x 420, 421 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“A district
court does not abuse its discretion by denying a Rule 60(b) motion wherein the
movant merely rehashes his prior arguments without making a showing that his
request for reconsideration is based on one of the statutory grounds.”) (citing
Case 3:22-cv-02321-S-BT Document 142 Filed 05/05/26 Page 13 of 14 PageID <pageID>

14
Matter of Colley, 814 F.2d 1008, 1010–11 (5th Cir.1987)); Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr.
Co. as Tr. of Aames Mortg. Inv. Tr. 2005-1 v. Mortberg, 2021 WL 2793928, at *2
(E.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2021) (“A Rule 60(b) motion cannot be used to rehash
arguments or reassert allegations that have already been considered.”).
Recommendation
For the reasons stated, the District Judge should DENY Sedwick’s Motion
for Reconsideration and Recalculation of Post-Judgment Deadlines (ECF No. 125).
SO RECOMMENDED.
May 5, 2026.
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). In order to be
specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to
which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in
the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	report 	and 	recommendation 	where 	the 	disputed
determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or
refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file
specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual
findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted
by the district judge, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
Case 3:22-cv-02321-S-BT Document 142 Filed 05/05/26 Page 14 of 14 PageID <pageID>