Cartwright et al v. Hoodoo Land Holdings et al

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH
JENNIFER CARTWRIGHT, individually
and as the personal representative of the
heirs and Estate of Cameron Rutherford;
and SCOTT RUTHERFORD, individually,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HOODOO LAND HOLDINGS, L.L.C.,
dba PRESTON NUTTER RANCH;
PRESTON NUTTER RANGE CREEK
HOLDINGS, LLC; HUNT
CONSOLIDATED, INC.; HUNT OIL
COMPANY; WHIRLPOOL
CORPORATION; and WHIRLPOOL
CORPORATION SOUTH AMERICA,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
Case No. 2:24-cv-00376-TS-JCB
District Judge Ted Stewart
Magistrate Judge Jared C. Bennett
B ACKGROUND1
The genesis of this case is the death of Cameron Rutherford.2 Plaintiffs Jennifer
Cartwright and Scott Rutherford (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege that Cameron Rutherford died
from carbon monoxide poisoning while staying in a cabin at Preston Nutter Ranch (“Ranch”),
1 This case is referred to Magistrate Judge Jared C. Bennett under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). ECF
No. 11.
2 See generally ECF No. 113.
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which is where he was working at the time of his death.3 Plaintiffs assert various claims against
Defendants based upon that incident.4
During discovery, Plaintiffs moved to compel Defendants Hoodoo Land Holdings, L.L.C.
dba Preston Nutter Ranch (“HLH”); Preston Nutter Range Creek Holdings, LLC (“PNRCH”);
and Hunt Consolidated, Inc. (“HCI”) to provide complete responses to Interrogatory No. 1 and
Request for Production No. 1 in Plaintiffs’ second set of discovery requests.5 In those discovery
requests, Plaintiffs sought certain financial information from HLH, PNRCH, and HCI that
Plaintiffs asserted was relevant to punitive damages. The court held a hearing on Plaintiffs’
motion and took it under advisement.6 In a January 7, 2026 Memorandum Decision and Order
(“January 7 MDO”), the court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs’ motion.7 The court
ordered HLH and HCI to respond to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory No. 1 and Request for Production
No. 1 but required HLH and HCI to produce only the financial information each entity currently
possessed for the one-year period prior to the date of production.8
HLH, PNRCH, and HCI then moved for a stay of HCI’s compliance with the January 7
MDO.9 HLH, PNRCH, and HCI also moved for: (1) reconsideration of the January 7 MDO’s
requirement that HCI respond to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory No. 1 and Request for Production No.
3 See generally id.
4 See generally id.
5 ECF No. 79.
6 ECF No. 85.
7 ECF No. 90.
8 Id. at 5-11.
9 ECF No. 93.
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1; and (2) for leave to submit additional briefing on the issue of whether HCI could be subject to
punitive damages.10 HLH, PNRCH, and HCI argued that HCI was neither a possessor of the
Ranch at the time of Cameron Rutherford’s death nor Cameron Rutherford’s employer, and,
therefore, HCI cannot be held liable for punitive damages.11
Thereafter, the court held two status conferences to discuss the issues raised in the
aforementioned motions.12 At the final status conference, the court denied without prejudice
HLH, PNRCH, and HCI’s motion to reconsider and for additional briefing.13 The court also set a
briefing schedule on HLH, PNRCH, and HCI’s motion for a stay of HCI’s compliance with the
January 7 MDO.14
District Judge Ted Stewart subsequently granted Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend
their first amended complaint.15 Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint, which added
Defendant Hunt Oil Company (“HOC”).16 In response, HCI, PNRCH, and HOC moved to
dismiss,17 and HLH answered.18 In HCI and PNRCH’s motion to dismiss, they reiterated the
argument that HCI was not a possessor of the Ranch at the time of Cameron Rutherford’s death
10 ECF No. 94.
11 Id.
12 ECF No. 104; ECF No. 106.
13 ECF No. 106; ECF No. 107.
14 ECF No. 106; ECF No. 107.
15 ECF No. 108.
16 ECF No. 113.
17 ECF No. 124; ECF No. 126.
18 ECF No. 125.
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and was not Cameron Rutherford’s employer.19 Plaintiffs opposed HCI and PNRCH’s motion to
dismiss20 and opposed HOC’s motion to dismiss.21 Concurrently, Plaintiffs filed a motion
requesting that, in the event the two pending motions to dismiss are not denied based on the
sufficiency of the pleadings, those motions be converted into motions for summary judgment
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).22 Plaintiffs further requested that they be permitted to conduct
additional discovery on the motions for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).23 HCI
and PNRCH’s motion to dismiss, HOC’s motion to dismiss, and Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) motion are
all pending before Judge Stewart.
While those motions were being briefed, Plaintiffs served a notice seeking a collective
Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) deposition of HLH, PNRCH, HCI, and HOC.24 Several days later, HLH,
PNRCH, HCI, and HOC filed a short form discovery motion for a protective order to stay the
deposition.25 Plaintiffs opposed that motion.26
ANALYSIS
For the reasons explained below, the court grants: (I) HLH, PNRCH, and HCI’s motion
for a stay of HCI’s compliance with the January 7 MDO pending resolution of HCI’s motion to
19 ECF No. 124.
20 ECF No. 135.
21 ECF No. 134.
22 ECF No. 136.
23 Id.
24 ECF No. 128-1.
25 ECF No. 128.
26 ECF No. 133.
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dismiss; and (II) HLH, PNRCH, HCI, and HOC’s short form discovery motion for a protective
order to stay their Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. Each motion is addressed in turn.
I. 	The Court Grants HLH, PNRCH, and HCI’s Motion to Stay HCI’s Compliance
With the January 7 MDO Pending Resolution of HCI’s Motion to Dismiss.
The court grants HLH, PNRCH, and HCI’s motion to stay HCI’s compliance with the
January 7 MDO pending resolution of HCI’s motion to dismiss. “District courts ‘have broad
discretion in deciding whether to issue a stay of discovery.’”27 When considering a motion to
stay, the court is mindful that “the right to proceed in court should not be denied except under the
most extreme circumstances.”28 Accordingly, a party seeking a stay “must make a strong
showing of necessity because the relief would severely affect the rights of others.”29 “That is, ‘if
even a fair possibility exists that the stay would damage another party,’ the movant ‘must
27 Classic Aviation Holdings LLC v. Harrower, No. 2:20-CV-00824-RJS-JCB, 2021 WL 633587,
at *2 (D. Utah Feb. 18, 2021) (quoting White Knuckle, IP, LLC v. Elec. Arts Inc., No. 1:15-CV-
00036-DN-BCW, 2015 WL 5022579, at *1 (D. Utah Aug. 24, 2015)) (other quotations and
citation omitted); see also Garner v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 2:24-CV-00378-TC-DAO, 2025
WL 2061923, at *2 (D. Utah July 23, 2025) (“The court’s power to stay proceedings ‘is
incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its
docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.’” (quoting Landis
v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936))).
28 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Chilcott Portfolio Mgmt., Inc., 713 F.2d 1477, 1484
(10th Cir. 1983) (citation modified); see also Classic Aviation Holdings LLC, 2021 WL 633587,
at *2 (same); White Knuckle, IP, LLC, 2015 WL 5022579, at *1 (same).
29 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 713 F.2d at 1484; see also White Knuckle, IP, LLC,
2015 WL 5022579, at *1 (same).
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demonstrate a clear case of hardship or inequity.’”30 Thus, “[t]he party seeking a stay generally
faces a difficult burden.”31
“When determining whether to grant a stay, the court must weigh competing interests and
consider the effects of the stay on the [c]ourt’s docket, on counsel, and on the litigants.”32 “The
mere pendency of a dispositive motion, in and of itself, is generally not sufficient to support the
issuance of a stay.”33
In deciding whether to grant a motion to stay pending resolution of
a dispositive motion, courts consider factors such as: (1) plaintiff’s
interests in proceeding expeditiously with the civil action and the
potential prejudice to plaintiff of a delay; (2) the burden on the
defendants; (3) the convenience to the court; (4) the interests of
persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the public interest.34
Based upon the following consideration of those factors, the court grants HLH, PNRCH,
and HCI’s motion to stay HCI’s compliance with the January 7 MDO pending resolution of
HCI’s motion to dismiss. First, although the court acknowledges that Plaintiffs have an interest in
proceeding with this case, the court is unpersuaded that Plaintiffs will be prejudiced by the delay
resulting from a stay. Although Plaintiffs argue that they will be prejudiced if they cannot obtain
HCI’s financial information now, they also contend that the information is relevant to a potential
award of punitive damages against HCI. If Judge Stewart denies HCI’s motion to dismiss, the
30 Classic Aviation Holdings LLC, 2021 WL 633587, at *2 (quoting Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co.
v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 987 (10th Cir. 2000)).
31 White Knuckle, IP, LLC, 2015 WL 5022579, at *1 (citation modified); see also Classic
Aviation Holdings LLC, 2021 WL 633587, at *2 (same).
32 Lewis v. eAssist, Inc., No. 2:22-CV-00121, 2022 WL 1224978, at *1 (D. Utah Apr. 26, 2022)
(citation modified).
33 Id. (citation modified).
34 Id. at *1-2 (citation modified); see also Garner, 2025 WL 2061923, at *2 (same).
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issue of whether HCI is subject to an award of punitive damages will be decided much later in
this case. Further, there is no indication that HCI’s financial information is at risk of becoming
unavailable if the court were to impose a stay. Plaintiffs also maintain that they will be
prejudiced by a stay because they will be unable to adequately oppose HCI’s motion to
dismiss—which they contend should be converted to a motion for summary judgment—without
production of HCI’s financial information. However, by filing their Rule 56(d) motion, Plaintiffs
have now placed that issue before Judge Stewart, not this court. Because Judge Stewart will
ultimately determine that issue, the court is not persuaded that Plaintiffs will be prejudiced by a
stay pending Judge Stewart’s ruling. For those reasons, the first factor weighs in favor of a stay.
Second, there would be minimal burden imposed on HCI in the absence of a stay. HCI
does not contend that producing its financial information would be burdensome from the
perspective of either cost or effort. Therefore, this factor weighs against a stay.
Third, a stay will be more convenient to the court and consistent with principles of
judicial economy. If this court were to order HCI’s compliance with the January 7 MDO, that
could conflict with Judge Stewart’s decision on Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) motion. Additionally, by
requiring HCI to comply with the January 7 MDO, this court would be implicitly determining
that HCI could be subject to an award of punitive damages, which could complicate Judge
Stewart’s ruling on HCI’s motion to dismiss. Permitting Judge Stewart to make those
determinations in the first instance promotes convenience for the court and judicial economy.
Consequently, this factor weighs in favor of a stay.
Fourth, requiring HCI to comply with the January 7 MDO prior to resolution of its
motion to dismiss will affect the interests of entities that are not parties to this case. HLH,
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PNRCH, and HCI assert that HCI has many private subsidiaries—which are not parties to this
case—and that disclosure of HCI’s financial information would result in disclosure of financial
information about those entities. Before requiring such disclosure, it is prudent to permit Judge
Stewart to determine whether HCI should remain in this case. Thus, this factor favors a stay.
Finally, the public interest is not substantially implicated by the imposition of a stay.
Accordingly, that factor is neutral. On balance, consideration of the relevant factors weighs in
favor of granting a stay of HCI’s compliance with the January 7 MDO pending resolution of
HCI’s motion to dismiss. Therefore, the court grants HLH, PNRCH, and HCI’s motion to stay.
II. 	The Court Grants HLH, PNRCH, HCI, and HOC’s Short Form Discovery Motion
for a Protective Order to Stay Their Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition.
The court grants HLH, PNRCH, HCI, and HOC’s short form discovery motion for a
protective order to stay their Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. As for PNRCH, HCI, and HOC, the court
grants their motion to stay their Rule 30(b)(6) deposition pending resolution of their motions to
dismiss because the following consideration of the relevant factors weighs in favor of a stay.
First, the court again acknowledges that although Plaintiffs have an interest in proceeding with
this case, the court is not convinced that a delay will prejudice Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argue that a
stay will prejudice their need to conduct Rule 30(b)(6) depositions to adequately oppose PNRCH
and HCI’s motion to dismiss and HOC’s motion to dismiss. However, similar to the discussion
above, Judge Stewart will ultimately determine that issue in his ruling on Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d)
motion. Thus, the court is unpersuaded that Plaintiffs will suffer prejudice from a stay pending
Judge Stewart’s ruling. Therefore, the first factor weighs in favor of a stay.
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Second, there would be some burden imposed on PNRCH, HCI, and HOC in the absence
of a stay. However, because the effort and expense associated with a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition are
not an undue burden, this factor weighs against a stay.
Third, a stay will promote convenience for the court and judicial economy. Consistent
with the discussion above, if this court were to order PNRCH, HCI, and HOC’s Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition to go forward, that could conflict with Judge Stewart’s ruling on Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d)
motion. Allowing Judge Stewart to make that ruling will be more convenient for the court and
promote judicial economy. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of a stay.
Finally, because the interests of nonparties and the public interest will not be affected by
a stay, those factors are neutral. Because consideration of the relevant factors weighs in favor of
a stay of PNRCH, HCI, and HOC’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, the court grants their short form
discovery motion for a protective order to stay that deposition.
Turning to HLH, the court notes that HLH answered Plaintiffs’ second amended
complaint rather than moving to dismiss. Consequently, Plaintiffs may take HLH’s Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition. Nevertheless, the court grants HLH’s short form motion for a protective order to stay
the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition Plaintiffs noticed because Plaintiffs’ deposition notice is not
directed only to HLH. Instead, Plaintiffs deposition notice seeks a collective deposition of HLH,
PNRCH, HCI, and HOC. Thus, it is unclear whether all the topics in Plaintiffs’ deposition notice
are applicable to HLH. Therefore, the court stays the deposition of HLH as noticed. However,
Plaintiffs are free to serve on HLH a new notice of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition if they choose to
do so.
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O RDER
For the reasons stated above, the court HEREBY ORDERS:
1. 	HLH, PNRCH, and HCI’s motion for a stay of HCI’s compliance with the January
7 MDO pending resolution of HCI’s motion to dismiss35 is GRANTED.
2. 	HLH, PNRCH, HCI, and HOC’s short form discovery motion for a protective
order to stay their Rule 30(b)(6) deposition36 is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 5th day of May 2026.
BY THE COURT:
JARED C. BENNETT
United States Magistrate Judge
35 ECF No. 93.
36 ECF No. 128.
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