Sitani v. Rivera et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
SITANI,
Petitioner,
v.
RIVERA, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER REGARDING [1] PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Case No. 2:26-cv-00410-HCN-CMR
District Judge Howard C. Nielson, Jr.
Chief Magistrate Judge Cecilia M. Romoero
Before the court is pro se Petitioner Loni Sam Sitani’s (Mr. Sitani) Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Petition) (ECF 1 at 3). Although Mr. Sitani filed his
Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF 1 at 3 (“This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241”)), his claims more appropriately fall under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For
this reason, the court1 gives notice to Mr. Sitani that it intends to construe his Petition as a § 2255
petition—unless Mr. Sitani files an objection to this characterization by November 13, 2026. Mr.
Sitani may also supplement or withdraw his Petition by that date, if he chooses.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The Petition appears to concern two of Mr. Sitani’s cases. The first case is described as a
“parentage action” in the Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 244903252 (the Parentage Case)
(ECF 1 at 11). The second case is a criminal matter in which Mr. Sitani was charged with Custodial
Interference in the Midvale Justice Court, Case No. 261000097 (the Custodial Interference Case)
(ECF 1 at 15).
Regarding the Parentage Case, the Petition indicates that “[o]n June 20, 2024, Sicilia
1 District Judge Howard C. Nielson, Jr. referred this case to the undersigned magistrate judge under
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (ECF 5).
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Laisyut Burrell [Ms. Burrell] filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal in Case No. 244903252 under
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)” (ECF 1 at 10). Mr. Sitani asserts that “[t]he dismissal was
self-executing and terminated the parentage action in its entirety by operation of law upon filing”
(id.). The Petition further asserts that “[o]n August 2, 2024, after the dismissal and without leave
of court, Ms. Burrell filed an Amended Verified Parentage Petition,” which the court accepted (id.
at 11). Mr. Sitani filed a motion asserting that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in light
of the Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, but Commissioner Kim M. Luhn denied the motion on
October 7, 2025 (see id. at 12). The Petition further asserts that the court also never obtained
personal jurisdiction over Mr. Sitani (id. at 10–11).
Regarding the Custodial Interference Case, liberally construing the Petition, it appears that
Mr. Sitani asserts that because the court lacked jurisdiction in the Parentage Case, his custodial
interference charges rest on an invalid custody order, which is an essential element of custodial
interference under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-303 (see id. at 15–16).
Accordingly, Mr. Sitani filed this Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF 1 at 3). The
Petition seeks various forms of relief, but most relevant is Mr. Sitani’s request that the court enter
the following orders: (1) an order declaring that the Third Judicial District Court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction in the Parentage Case; and (2) an order that the pending custodial interference
charges are constitutionally defective (see ECF 1 at 21).
II. 	ANALYSIS
Habeas corpus petitions brought under § 2241 differ from those brought under § 2255. A
prisoner’s challenge to the execution of a sentence is properly brought under § 2241. Bradshaw v.
Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996). However, a prisoner must challenge the legality of his
commitment under § 2255. Id. In other words, petitions under § 2241 “do[] not oppose the sentence
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or conviction itself,” Watson v. McCollum, 772 F. App’x 675, 678 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal
quotation marks omitted), whereas petitions under § 2255 “attack the validity of a conviction and
sentence,” McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1997). The only
circumstance in which a prisoner may challenge his conviction under § 2241 is when a § 2255
motion would be “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” Prost v. Anderson,
636 F.3d 578, 580 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)). But failure to obtain relief under
§ 2255 does not mean it is an inadequate or ineffective remedy. Lester v. United States, 668 F.
App’x 334, 335 (10th Cir. 2016).
A. Construing Mr. Sitani’s Petition as a Section 2255 Motion
Mr. Sitani styles his Petition as a § 2241 petition. But his Petition collaterally attacks the
validity of the rulings in the Parentage and Custodial Interference Cases. Mr. Sitani does not argue,
for example, that the holdings in these cases are legitimate but that he should be held elsewhere or
treated differently. Instead, Mr. Sitani argues that the court in his Parentage Case lacked
jurisdiction, and that his pending criminal charges are invalid because an essential element of his
custodial-interference charge is not met. These arguments challenge the validity of court orders.
Because of this, the court intends to characterize his Petition as a § 2255 petition.
The ability to file a § 2255 claim is strictly limited. For instance, petitions must generally
be filed within one year of the date of the judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Second or successive
petitions are also strictly limited. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b); see also Davis v.
Roberts, 425 F.3d 830, 835 (10th Cir. 2005). Given the severe consequences a decision on a §
2255 petition can have on future petitions, courts must give pro se petitioners notice before
characterizing a pleading as a § 2255 petition. Davis, 425 F.3d at 834–35. Specifically, the court
must (1) “notify the pro se litigant that it intends to recharacterize the pleading”; (2) “warn the
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litigant that this recharacterization means that any subsequent § 2255 motion will be subject to the
restrictions on ‘second or successive’ motions”; and (3) give “the litigant an opportunity to
withdraw the motion or to amend it so that it contains all the § 2255 claims he believes he has.”
Id. at 835 (quoting Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 383 (2003)).
Based on these requirements, the court gives Mr. Sitani notice of its intent to recharacterize
the Petition and an opportunity to supplement or withdraw it.
III. 	CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the court ORDERS:
1. 	If Mr. Sitani does not want the court to recharacterize his Petition under § 2255,
and if he wants to withdraw his Petition, he must file a document with the court
stating this by November 13, 2026.
2. 	If Mr. Sitani wants the court to recharacterize his Petition under § 2255 and
wants to supplement his Petition to include all his possible claims under § 2255,
he must file any such supplemental information with the court by November
13, 2026.
3. 	If Mr. Sitani does not want the court to recharacterize his Petition under § 2255
and wants to supplement his Petition to argue why a § 2255 petition is
ineffective or inadequate to address the legality of his conviction, he must file
any such supplemental information with the court by November 13, 2026.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 16 October 2026.
Chief Magistrate Judge Cecilia M. Romero
United States District Court for the District of Utah
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