Moloaa Farms LLC v. AOAO of Moloaa Hui I

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
15-AUG-2024
07:56 AM
Dkt. 111 SO

NOS. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX AND CAAP-20–0000444

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

In Re MOLOAA FARMS LLC, Claimant-Appellant, v.
ASSOCIATION OF APARTMENT OWNERS OF MOLOAA HUI I;
PAUL C. HUBER, individually and as President of
the Association of Unit Owners of Moloaa Hui I;
ASSOCIATION OF APARTMENT OWNERS OF MOLOAA HUI II;
NED Y. WHITLOCK, as President of the Association of
Unit Owners of Moloaa Hui II; MOLOAA HUI LANDS, INC.;
CANDACE L. STRONG, individually; and ERIC M. STRONG,
President and Chief Executive Officer of Moloaa Hui
Lands, Inc., Respondents-Appellees

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 5CSP-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Hiraoka, Presiding Judge,
and Wadsworth and Nakasone, JJ.)

These consolidated appeals arise from a special
proceeding in the Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit (Circuit
Court)1/ that terminated an arbitration before the American
Arbitration Association (AAA). Claimant-Appellant Moloaa Farms,
LLC (Moloaa Farms) appeals from the following Circuit Court
orders granting the identified motions and substantive joinder
filed by Respondents-Appellees Association of Apartment Owners of
Moloaa Hui I (AOAO MH I); Paul C. Huber (Huber), individually and
as President of the Association of Unit Owners of Moloaa Hui I;
Association of Apartment Owners of Moloaa Hui II (AOAO MH II);
Ned Y. Whitlock (Whitlock), as President of the Association of

1/
The Honorable Kathleen N.A. Watanabe presided.
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Unit Owners of Moloaa Hui II; and Candace L. Strong (C. Strong),
individually (collectively, Respondents-Appellees):
(1) the March 18, 2020 "Order Granting: (1) [AOAO MH
I] and . . . Huber's Motion to Stay Arbitration
and/or Terminate Arbitration Regarding [Moloaa
Farms'] Demand for Arbitration in AAA Case:
01-19-0002-2645, Filed on January 27, 2020; and
(2) [AOAO MH II] and . . . Whitlock's Substantive
Joinder to [AOAO MH I] and . . . Huber's Motion to
Stay Arbitration and/or Terminate Arbitration
Regarding [Moloaa Farms'] Demand for Arbitration
in AAA Case: 01-19-0002-2645 (Filed 1/27/2020),
Filed on February 28, 2020";
(2) the March 18, 2020 "Order Granting '. . . Huber,
Individually's, Motion to Determine Existence and
Validity of Agreement to Arbitrate Re: "Demand for
Arbitration," Dated October 7, 2019, in [AAA] Case
No. 01-19-0002-2645,' Filed February 18, 2020";
(3) the March 19, 2020 "Order Granting . . . [C.]
Strong's Motion to Terminate Arbitration Against
Her Filed, February 11, 2020";2/
(4) the June 12, 2020 "Order Granting '. . . Huber,
Individually's, Motion for an Award of Attorneys'
Fees and Costs,' Filed April 1, 2020";
(5) the June 15, 2020 "Order Granting in Part [AOAO MH
I] and . . . Huber's Motion for Attorney's Fees
and Costs Filed on April 3, 2020";
(6) the June 16, 2020 "Order Granting . . . [C.]
Strong's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs";
and
(7) the June 22, 2020 "Order Granting [AOAO MH II's]
and . . . Whitlock's Motion for Award of
Attorneys' Fees Incurred in Successful Defense of
Demand for Arbitration Filed by [Moloaa Farms] in

2/
We refer to orders (1) through (3) as the Termination Orders.

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AAA Case No. 01-19-0002-2645 (Filed 4/6/2020)."3/
In October 2019, Moloaa Farms initiated an arbitration
proceeding against Respondents-Appellees and others
(collectively, Respondents), seeking declaratory relief and
damages for, among other things, the alleged breach of two
agreements, both of which contain arbitration provisions – a
Bargain Sale Option Agreement (Option Agreement or Agreement),
dated February 10, 1997, for the purchase and development of
certain subdivided agricultural land in Moloa#a, Kaua#i (the
Moloaa Hui Lands), and a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions (Declaration), recorded on March 13, 1997, in the
State of Hawai#i Bureau of Conveyances. Moloaa Farms contends
that Respondents are signatories (or successors in interest) to
one or both agreements, are contractually required to provide
Moloaa Farms with, among other things, access to a common water
system as required for the development of certain land subject to
those agreements, and have failed to do so.
After Moloaa Farms submitted the dispute to
arbitration, AOAO MH I, Huber, AOAO MH II, Whitlock, and C.
Strong moved or joined in a motion to stay or terminate the
arbitration pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter
658A (the Termination Motions). The Circuit Court granted the
Termination Motions and terminated the arbitration. In doing so,
the Circuit Court found and concluded that:
1. "There is no arbitration agreement to which Huber
[or C. Strong] is a party, that would compel Huber
[or C. Strong] to arbitrate disputes with [Moloaa
Farms]";
2. "The subject matter of the dispute [upon] which
[Moloaa Farms] bases its arbitration demand is not
an arbitrable dispute, as to Huber [or C.
Strong]";
3. "The Demand for Arbitration ('Demand') in AAA
Case: 01-19-0002-2645 seeks to adjudicate a
dispute between private individuals over water

3/
We refer to orders (4) through (7) as the Fee Orders.

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rights in the agricultural district of Moloaa on
the island of Kaua#i, and pursuant to HRS
§ 664-33, this Court 'shall hear and determine all
controversies respecting rights of private way and
water rights, between private individuals";
4. "There is no valid and enforceable arbitration
provision or agreement between [Moloaa Farms] and
AOAO MH I or AOAO MH II, and/or their officers in
their official capacities, that would compel the
arbitration of the claims and issues set forth in
the Demand"; and
5. "The subject matter of the dispute upon which
[Moloaa Farms] bases its Demand is not arbitrable
against AOAO MH I and AOAO MH II, and/or their
officers in their official capacities."
After the Circuit Court granted the Termination
Motions, it issued several orders granting Respondents' motions
for attorneys' fees and costs (Fee Motions).
On appeal, Moloaa Farms contends that the Circuit Court
erred in granting the Termination Motions because: (1)
Respondents "waived their right to seek a judicial determination
as to the existence and scope of the arbitration agreements under
HRS § 658A-6"; (2) Respondents "failed to serve their motions and
joinder as required by HRS § 658A-5, thereby depriving the
[C]ircuit [C]ourt of jurisdiction"; (3) Respondents "are parties
to and bound by the Option Agreement and/or Declaration as
signatories or successors in interest"; (4) "[t]he subject matter
of dispute is arbitrable under both the Option [Agreement] and
Declaration"; and (5) the dispute "is not about water rights but
rather the terms and conditions upon which [a portion of the
Moloaa Hui Lands, designated as] Lot 2, is entitled to access the
common facilities, as provided for in the Option [Agreement] and
Declaration[.]" (Emphasis added.) Moloaa Farms also contends
that the Circuit Court abused its discretion in granting the Fee
Motions.
After reviewing the record on appeal and the relevant
legal authorities, and giving due consideration to the issues

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raised and the arguments advanced by the parties, we resolve
Moloaa Farms' contentions as follows, and vacate.

I. The Circuit Court's Jurisdiction (Point of Error 2)

Moloaa Farms contends that the Circuit Court "lacked
jurisdiction" over the Termination Motions because Respondents
"failed to properly serve" Moloaa Farms as required by HRS
§ 658A-5. Moloaa Farms makes a conclusory three-sentence
argument that does not explain how service was defective, does
not specify whether it is challenging the subject matter or
personal jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, and does not cite any
authority other than HRS § 658A-5. See Hawai#i Rules of
Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 28(b)(7). Instead, Moloaa Farms
merely cites to its opposition memoranda filed in the Circuit
Court.
We conclude that the Circuit Court had subject matter
jurisdiction over the special proceeding, and Moloaa Farms has
waived any challenge to the Circuit's Court's personal
jurisdiction based on any alleged defect in service. See HRAP
Rule 28(b)(7); Lambert v. Waha, 137 Hawai#i 423, 436 n.14, 375
P.3d 202, 215 n.14 (2016) (concluding issue waived where "no
discernible argument supporting this specific challenge is
raised").

II. Existence of Arbitration Agreement and Parties Thereto
(Points of Error 1 and 3)

In granting the Termination Motions, the Circuit Court
made two primary determinations: (1) there is no valid agreement
between Moloaa Farms and each of the Respondents to arbitrate;
and (2) the subject matter of the parties' dispute is not
arbitrable.
In challenging these determinations, Moloaa Farms
contends that Respondents waived their rights under HRS § 658A-6
to seek the court's determination as to the existence and scope
of the arbitration provisions in the Option Agreement and
Declaration, by agreeing to vest the arbitrator with this
authority. Moloaa Farms further contends that even if the

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Circuit Court had this authority, it erred in determining that
(1) there is no valid arbitration agreement between the parties
and (2) the subject matter of the dispute is not arbitrable. As
to the validity issue, Moloaa Farms argues that each of the
Respondents are bound by the arbitration provision in the Option
Agreement and/or Declaration as signatories of, or successors in
interest to, those agreements.
The Hawai#i Supreme Court, in Haw. State Tchrs. Ass'n
v. Univ. Lab'y Sch. (HSTA), 132 Hawai#i 426, 322 P.3d 966 (2014),
set out the framework for addressing these issues, as follows:

Our statutes have delineated the roles of courts and
arbitrators in enforcing arbitration agreements; "[t]he
court shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists
or a controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate"
and "[a]n arbitrator shall decide whether a condition
precedent to arbitrability has been fulfilled and whether a
contract containing a valid agreement to arbitrate is
enforceable." HRS §§ 658A–6(b)–(c). "When presented with a
motion to compel arbitration, the court is limited to
answering two questions: 1) whether an arbitration
agreement exists between the parties; and 2) if so whether
the subject matter of the dispute is arbitrable under such
agreement." Koolau[ Radiology, Inc. v. Queen's Med. Ctr.],
73 Haw. [433,] 445, 834 P.2d [1294] 1300[ (1992)]. The
second prong of this rule—"whether the subject matter of the
dispute lies within the arbitrator's jurisdiction"—is termed
the "arbitrability" of the dispute. Hokama v. Univ. of
Haw., 92 Hawai#i 268, 274 n. 6, 990 P.2d 1150, 1156 n. 6
(1999).

We have modified this general rule for cases in which
the parties have agreed to leave questions of arbitrability
to the arbitrator. See Bateman Constr., Inc. v. Haitsuka
Bros., Ltd., 77 Hawai#i 481, 485, 889 P.2d 58, 62 (1995)
("[T]he question of arbitrability is usually an issue to be
decided by the courts, 'unless the parties clearly and
unmistakably provide otherwise.'") (alterations omitted)
(quoting FSC Sec. Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310, 1312 (8th
Cir. 1994)). Where the parties have "clearly and
unmistakably" reserved the issue of arbitrability for the
arbitrator, courts lack the authority to rule upon this
issue because "[a]fter all, 'it was the arbitrator's
judgment [the parties] had bargained for, not a court's.'"
Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Morrison–Knudsen Co. v.
Makahuena Corp., 66 Haw. 663, 670, 675 P.2d 760, 766
(1983)); see also Bronster v. United Public Workers, Local
646, 90 Hawai#i 9, 14–16, 975 P.2d 766, 771–73 (1999)
("[P]arties are free to agree among themselves to vest sole
authority in an arbitrator to determine the issue of the
arbitrability of a particular subject matter so long as they
do so 'clearly and unmistakably.'" (quoting Bateman Constr.,
Inc., 77 Hawai#i at 485, 889 P.2d at 62)). "Parties may
contractually excise the court from the determination" of
whether the dispute is arbitrable and, in these cases, the
court may only consider whether there is a valid agreement
to arbitrate. Bronster, 90 Hawai#i at 15, 975 P.2d at 772;
see also In re United Public Workers, Local 646, 124 Hawai #i
372, 378, 244 P.3d 609, 615 (2010) ("When agreements reserve

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questions of arbitrability for the arbitrator, as they do
here, the court may only consider the first prong[—whether
there is a valid agreement to arbitrate].")[.]

Id. at 430–31, 322 P.3d at 970–71.
Here, under HRS § 658A–6(b) and HSTA, the Circuit Court
had the authority to determine whether there was a valid
agreement between Moloaa Farms and the Respondents to arbitrate.
We thus address whether the Circuit Court erred in determining
there was no valid agreement to arbitrate as to each of the
Respondents.

A. Huber and C. Strong

The Option Agreement states that it was "entered into
by and between MOLOAA HUI LANDS, INC. [(MHLI)], a Hawaii
corporation ('Seller'),4/ and JEFFREY S. LINDNER [(Lindner)],
unmarried, ('Buyer')." (Footnote added.) Recital A of the
Agreement also identifies MHLI as "SELLER" and Lindner as
"BUYER." Recital B states that MHLI's officers, directors and
stockholders are Michael R. Strong (M. Strong), C. Strong, and
Huber, and are jointly referred to as "Principals." Under the
Agreement, Lindner agreed, among other things, to loan the
"Strongs and Huber" $500,000 to fund the purchase of the Moloaa
Hui Lands, with Lindner's option to acquire a portion of the
property. "Seller" agreed, among other things, to use its best
efforts to subdivide or condominiumize the Moloaa Hui Lands as
provided in the Agreement. The Agreement further provided: "The
Strongs and Huber shall be personally and severally liable for
the repayment of the Loan and all amounts due under the Note.
The Seller shall guarantee the Note."
Under the Agreement, "THE PARTIES AGREE[D]," in Section
12.20, that "[a]ny dispute arising hereunder shall be resolved by
arbitration and not by litigation." The parties also agreed, in
Section 12.17, that "[t]he rights and obligations set forth
herein shall be binding upon, and shall inure to the benefit of,
the Seller and Buyer and their respective heirs, estates,

4/
MHLI was a developer of the Moloaa Hui Lands. It appears that
MHLI administratively dissolved in 2008.

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personal representatives, successors, successors in trust and
assigns." Immediately before the signature lines, the Agreement
states: "IN WITNESS of the foregoing provisions, the parties
have signed the Agreement below[.]" (Emphasis added.) The
signatories below include "SELLER[,]" identified as MHLI, with
signatures by M. Strong, "[i]ts President," Huber, "[i]ts Vice-
President," and C. Strong, "[i]ts Secretary." Below that, the
signatories include "PRINCIPALS[,]" with signatures by M. Strong,
"individually," C. Strong, "individually," and Huber,
"individually." Lindner signed as "BUYER[.]"
C. Strong and Huber thus signed the Option Agreement as
"parties" both in their official capacities as officers of MHLI
and in their individual capacities. They agreed to and are bound
by the arbitration provision of the Agreement, which is a valid
agreement to arbitrate "any dispute arising [under the
Agreement]." Moloaa Farms sought to enforce the Agreement as
successor in interest to Lindner under Section 12.17 of the
Agreement.5/ See Siopes v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 130
Hawai#i 437, 453, 312 P.3d 869, 885 (2013) ("[C]ourts have
recognized that 'well-established common law principles dictate
that in an appropriate case a nonsignatory can enforce, or be
bound by, an arbitration provision within a contract executed by
other parties." (quoting Int'l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen
Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411, 416–17 (4th Cir. 2000)
(original brackets omitted)). Accordingly, the Circuit Court
erred in concluding there was no arbitration agreement to which
Huber or C. Strong is a party, that would compel Huber or C.
Strong to arbitrate disputes with Moloaa Farms.

B. AOAO MH I and AOAO MH II

In March 1997, MHLI recorded the Declaration against
the Moloaa Hui Lands. The Declaration imposes certain covenants,
conditions and restrictions on the land, and states that these
"covenants . . . shall run with the land[,] and shall be binding
upon all persons acquiring any right, title or interest in and to

5/
Moloaa Farms owns a 25% interest in Lot 2.

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said Project, and shall inure to the benefit of the Declarant,
any Association of Condominium Owners established pursuant to the
provisions of [HRS] Chapter 514-A . . . and each future owner
thereof." Section IX of the Declaration includes an arbitration
provision, which states in relevant part: "[A]ny disputes over
the meaning, intent, enforcement or interpretation of these
covenants shall be resolved by binding arbitration" and that
"[u]nless the parties otherwise agree in writing, the Commercial
Rules of the [AAA] then in effect shall govern the course of the
arbitration."
It is undisputed that AOAO MH I and AOAO MH II are
Hawai#i Condominium Projects formed pursuant to HRS Chapter 514A,
and their respective members own interests in a portion of the
Moloaa Hui Lands. By acquiring rights, title, and/or interests
in land subject to the Declaration, AOAO MH I and AOAO MH II and
their respective members agreed to resolve "any dispute over the
meaning, intent, enforcement or interpretation of th[o]se
covenants . . . by binding arbitration." AOAO MH I and AOAO MH
II are therefore bound by the arbitration provision of the
Declaration, which is a valid agreement to arbitrate any disputes
arising out of the interpretation or enforcement of the
Declaration covenants. Moloaa Farms sought to enforce the
Declaration as an owner of Lot 2. The Circuit Court therefore
erred to the extent it concluded there was no valid and
enforceable arbitration provision or agreement that would compel
AOAO MHI and AOAO MHII, and their current officers in their
official capacities, acting on behalf of their respective AOAOs,
to arbitrate such disputes with Moloaa Farms.

III. Arbitrability of the Dispute (Point of Error 4)

We next address whether the Circuit Court erred in
determining that the subject matter of the dispute on which
Moloaa Farms based its arbitration demand was not arbitrable.
As explained above, the supreme court has stated that where
parties have "clearly and unmistakably" reserved the issue of
arbitrability for the arbitrator, courts lack the authority to
rule on the issue. HSTA, 132 Hawai#i at 430–31, 322 P.3d at

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970–71.
Moloaa Farms argues in part that the signatories (and
successors in interest) to the Option Agreement and the
Declaration reserved the issue of arbitrability for the
arbitrator by agreeing to arbitrate covered disputes under the
AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules. In turn, Rule 7(a) of the AAA
Commercial Arbitration Rules provides that "[t]he arbitrator
shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction,
including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or
validity of the arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of
any claim or counterclaim." American Arbitration Association,
Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures 13 (2013),
http://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/CommercialRules_Web-Final.
pdf.6/
In the absence of controlling Hawai#i authority, we
look to federal case law for guidance on whether the parties have
"clearly and unmistakably" reserved the issue of arbitrability
for the arbitrator in these circumstances. See Bateman Constr.,
Inc. v. Haitsuka Bros., Ltd., 77 Hawai#i 481, 485, 889 P.2d 58,
62 (1995) (finding that because the pertinent language of certain
Hawai#i arbitration statutes was "virtually identical to the
language of the federal arbitration statute . . . we review
federal authority for guidance."). Addressing this issue, the
United States District Court for the District of Hawai#i has
followed the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that "[v]irtually every
circuit to have considered the issue has determined that
incorporation of the [AAA's] arbitration rules constitutes clear
and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate
arbitrability." Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc. v. Flynn, No.
CIV. 14-00372 JMS-RLP, 2014 WL 7076827, at *8 (D. Haw. Dec. 11,

6/
"Rule 1 of the 1996 AAA Rules provides 'these rules, and any
amendment of them, shall apply in the form obtained at the time the demand for
arbitration . . . is received by the AAA.'" Sleepy's LLC v. Escalate, Inc.,
No. 10 Civ. 1626(SAS), 2010 WL 2505678, at *2, n.28 (brackets omitted and
emphasis added). Here, that means the October 1, 2013 AAA Commercial
Arbitration Rules apply, which include Rule R-7. See JSC Surgutneftegaz v.
President and Fellows of Harvard Coll., 167 Fed. App'x. 266, 268 (2d Cir.
2006) (concluding that Rule 1 of the 1996 AAA Rules incorporates later AAA
Rules that reflect the intent of the parties to commit the question of
arbitrability to the arbitrator).

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2014) (quoting Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Group A.G., 724 F.3d
1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013), and citing additional cases from the
Second, Fifth, Eighth, Eleventh, and Federal circuits).
Here, the arbitration provisions in the Option
Agreement and the Declaration unambiguously incorporate the
AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules. We thus conclude that the
signatories (and successors in interest) to these agreements
clearly and unmistakably reserved the issue of arbitrability for
the arbitrator, and the Circuit Court erred in determining that
issue, i.e., that the subject matter of the dispute upon which
Moloaa Farms bases its arbitration demand is not an arbitrable
dispute as to Huber, C. Strong, AOAO MH I and AOAO MH II, and the
AOAOs' current officers in their official capacities, acting on
behalf of their respective AOAOs. That issue is for the
arbitrator to decide.

IV. Jurisdiction Over Water Rights (Point of Error 5)

Moloaa Farms challenges the Circuit Court's conclusion
that the arbitration demand seeks to adjudicate a private dispute
over water rights, and pursuant to HRS § 664-33,7/ the Circuit
Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute. Moloaa Farms
contends that the dispute "is not about water rights[,] but
rather the terms and conditions upon which Lot 2 is entitled to
access the common facilities, as provided for in the Option
[Agreement] and Declaration[.]" Moloaa Farms further argues
that, in any event, "jurisdiction under HRS § 664-328/ is not

7/
HRS § 664-33 (2016) provides:

The circuit courts shall hear and determine all
controversies respecting rights of private way and water
rights, between private individuals, or between private
individuals and the State. Any person interested, or the
State, may apply for the settlement of any rights involved
hereunder by filing a complaint in the circuit court of the
circuit in which the property affected is situated.
Thereupon the court shall issue a summons to each land owner
or occupant having an interest in the controversy. A notice
of the pending action may be published in any case in the
discretion of the court.
8/
HRS § 664-32 (2016) provides: "The circuit courts shall have
jurisdiction to hear and determine, without the intervention of a jury, all
controversies respecting rights of private way and water rights, as in this
part provided."

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exclusive[,] and there is nothing in the language of HRS § 664-32
that suggests the parties are precluded from waiving rights to a
judicial forum . . . ."
We conclude that nothing in HRS § 664-32 or § 664-33
prohibits an AAA arbitrator from hearing the underlying dispute,
if the arbitrator otherwise determines the dispute is arbitrable.
In particular, this is not a controversy respecting "water
rights" within the meaning of these statutes; it is a dispute
concerning rights under the Option Agreement and the
Declaration.9/ Accordingly, the Circuit Court erred in concluding
that the Circuit Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the
dispute pursuant to HRS § 664-33.

VI. Attorneys' Fees (Points of Error 6, 7, and 8)

In light of our disposition, we vacate the Fee Orders,
as Respondents are no longer prevailing parties.

VII. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, we vacate the
Termination Orders and the Fee Orders, and remand the case to the
Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit for further proceedings
consistent with this Summary Disposition Order. It is further
ordered that the July 26, 2024 motion for retention of oral
argument is denied.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, August 15, 2024.

On the briefs:
Paul Alston and /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
Timothy H. Irons Presiding Judge
(Dentons US LLP)
for Claimant-Appellant.
/s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Matt A. Tsukazaki and Associate Judge
Tyler A. Tsukazaki
(Li & Tsukazaki, Attorneys at
Law, LLLC) /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
for Respondents-Appellees, Associate Judge

9/
We thus need not determine whether the circuit court has exclusive
jurisdiction over controversies respecting water rights under HRS § 664-32 or
§ 664-33.

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Association of Apartment
Owners of Moloaa Hui I and
Paul C. Huber, Individually
and as President of the
Association of Unit Owners of
Moloaa Hui I

John D. Zalewskei and
Michelle J. Chapman
(Case Lombardi & Pettit, A Law
Corporation)
for Respondents-Appellees,
Association of Apartment
Owners of Moloaa Hui II and
Ned Y. Whitlock, as President
of the Association of
Unit Owners of Moloaa Hui II

Jason G.F. Wong and
Michel A. Okazaki
for Respondent-Appellee,
Candace L. Strong

Carl H. Osaki
for Respondent-Appellee,
Paul C. Huber, individually

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