Larry Darnell Murphy v. State of Iowa

CourtListener 10013017Iowactapp24 lug 2024

Testo completo

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1683
Filed July 24, 2024

LARRY DARNELL MURPHY,
Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County,

Jeffrey L. Larson, Judge.

Larry Murphy appeals the summary dismissal of his application for

postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.

Audra F. Saunders, West Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ.
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SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Larry Murphy appeals the summary dismissal of his second application for

postconviction relief (PCR). Because Murphy’s PCR application was filed more

than three years after his conviction was final and he asserted no ground of fact

material to his substantive claims that could not have been presented within the

three-year time frame, see Iowa Code § 822.3 (2023), we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

In 2019, Murphy entered a written plea of guilty to child endangerment

causing death. The district court accepted Murphy’s plea, entered judgment, and

sentenced him to an indeterminate fifty-year term of incarceration. The court

denied Murphy’s motion for new trial and motion in arrest of judgment. Murphy

filed a pro se notice of appeal, which was dismissed as untimely. Procedendo

issued in December 2019.

Meanwhile, Murphy filed a pro se PCR application, claiming trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to file a timely appeal. PCR counsel was appointed, but

Murphy subsequently moved to dismiss his application in mid-2020.

The following year, in his underlying criminal case, Murphy filed a motion to

withdraw his written plea of guilty. The district court denied the motion, stating in

part, “Defendant’s motion is not timely and must be denied. It is possible the

defendant could seek relief in a postconviction action.”

Murphy filed this PCR application in May 2023. He claimed trial counsel

was ineffective by: failing to file a notice of appeal, failing to “properly argue” the

motion in arrest of judgment, and failing to ensure there was a factual basis for his

guilty plea. Murphy also claimed first PCR counsel was ineffective.
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The State moved for summary judgment, asserting Murphy’s application

was time-barred by the statute of limitations. Murphy resisted. Following a

hearing, the court granted the State’s motion, finding Murphy failed to show a

ground-of-fact exception to the statute of limitations.1 Murphy appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review the summary dismissal of a PCR application for correction of

errors at law. Moon, 911 N.W.2d at 142. Applying our summary judgment

standards to summary disposition of PCR applications, summary disposition is

appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show . . . there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as

a matter of law.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3)). The

State, as the moving party, bears the burden of proving there are no genuine

issues of material fact, and we review the record in the light most favorable to

Murphy. See id. Murphy has the “onus” to establish the “obvious requirement”

that he “could not have raised the ground of fact within the limitations period.” Id.

at 143.

III. Analysis

Murphy claims the district court erred by granting the State’s motion for

summary judgment without a full evidentiary hearing on the merits of his

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims relating to trial counsel’s “failure to timely

file a notice of appeal” and “failure to ensure adequate factual basis” for his guilty

1 See, e.g., Moon v. State, 911 N.W.2d 137, 143–44 (Iowa 2018) (applying the

ground-of-fact test to determine whether the applicant’s claims were time barred).
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plea and first PCR counsel’s “fail[ure] to properly research all issues in [his]

underlying criminal case.”

Applying the summary judgment standards, we concur with the court’s

determination that the State proved no issue of material fact is in dispute. Murphy’s

conviction was final in 2019. Under Iowa Code section 822.3, Murphy had until

2022 to apply for PCR from the conviction. Murphy filed this PCR application in

2023. Because the application was untimely on its face, summary dismissal was

appropriate unless Murphy established a new ground of fact or law excepting his

application from the statute of limitations.

Murphy maintains his PCR application falls under the exception in section

822.3 for “a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the

applicable time period” because he “was not alerted to the ineffectiveness of his

trial counsel and [first] PCR counsel until he filed his second application.”

However, “[a] fact could have been raised within the limitations period if it was

either known to the applicant or it could have been discovered with the exercise of

due diligence during the statute-of-limitations window.” Prentiss v. State,

No. 23-0550, 2024 WL 2842274, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 5, 2024).

Murphy was charged with first-degree murder and child endangerment

causing death following an incident in which he “disciplined” a two-year-old child

in his care by sitting on the child’s head until the child suffocated. Murphy entered

into a written plea agreement, in which he agreed to plead guilty to the child

endangerment charge in exchange for the State’s dismissal of the murder charge.

At the plea hearing, Murphy stated he understood the agreement, and the court
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determined a factual basis existed to accept the plea of guilty to the child

endangerment causing death charge.

The following month, Murphy filed a motion for new trial and a motion in

arrest of judgment, alleging in part: “The defendant has advised his attorneys that

he wishes to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to a jury trial”; “The defendant

states he did not have a full understanding of his rights, options and possible

results from a trial as well as other positions best explained by the defendant.” The

court addressed the motion at the sentencing hearing, during which the following

colloquy took place:

COURT: Mr. Murphy, what is your specific problem with the
plea taking?
MURPHY: My plea was to—just—well, I had, but then I—I just
disconnected my plea before it was—it was sentenced.
COURT: Are you telling me you have buyer’s remorse—
MURPHY: Yeah.
COURT: —is that what you’re saying? And is that your only
problem with the plea?
MURPHY: Yes.

The court denied the motion, stating in part: “[Y]ou just deciding you don’t like the

plea after you go back to your cell does not give you reason to withdraw your plea.”

The court further observed, “I have reviewed Judge Dreismeier’s plea taking and,

like I said, it not only substantially complies, I believe it fully complies.”

The court then imposed Murphy’s sentence and concluded the hearing by

stating:

COURT: You have a right to appeal the sentence this Court
just handed down. That right to appeal is jurisdictional, meaning you
would have to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of today’s date
with the Pottawattamie County Clerk of Court. Do you understand
that?
MURPHY: Yes, I do.
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COURT: You do not do so you’re forever barred from
appealing this sentence. Do you understand that?
MURPHY: Yes, sir.

Forty-four days later, Murphy filed a pro se notice of appeal. The supreme

court dismissed his appeal as untimely, noting in part: “Upon consideration,

because it appears neither State action nor circumstances beyond the appellant’s

control have frustrated his intention to appeal, we deny the application for delayed

appeal.”

A few days before procedendo issued, Murphy filed his first PCR

application, claiming in part, “Defendant had requested this matter be appealed on

direct appeal. Counsel failed to file a timely appeal which consequently led to the

dismissal of the matter entirely.” He alleged his counsel was ineffective. Attorney

Katherine Murphy was appointed to represent Murphy. Attorney Murphy reviewed

the “transcripts and criminal file” and opined she was “not able to find a case on

appeal that would have been a winner” had Murphy’s trial counsel filed a timely

appeal. Attorney Murphy also told Murphy he “receive[ed] a very favorable plea

deal, and your attorney was correct to recommend that you accept the offer.”

Attorney Murphy asked Murphy to explain “what successful grounds for appeal

would have been.” Subsequent correspondence indicates Attorney Murphy

investigated a potential claim relating to the calculation of Murphy’s sentencing

time, but determined “everything is working as if should,” and recommended

Murphy dismiss his application “since it is without legal basis.” Attorney Murphy

further advised Murphy: “On August 15, 2019 the court made its determination of

guilt. You have three years from that date to file a Petition for Postconviction

Relief.” Ultimately, Murphy signed a verification he understood he was
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withdrawing his application. In May 2020, Murphy, through counsel, formally

moved to dismiss the application, stating in part, “[Murphy] was appointed counsel

and consulted with such counsel with regard to the bases for his [PCR] Application”

and “[Murphy], together with his counsel, was unable to generate compelling bases

for his Application.” The application was dismissed.

Murphy then filed a motion to withdraw his written plea of guilty “due to new

found evidence and me signing this plea under duress and or stress of this case.”

The district court denied the motion in October 2021, finding it “is not timely and

must be denied,” but noting, “It is possible [Murphy] could seek relief in a

postconviction action.”

Despite the court’s statement—coupled with Murphy’s apparent

dissatisfaction with his guilty plea and untimely appeal—it was not until May 2023

that Murphy filed this PCR application. By then, the limitation period had expired.2

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Murphy, we conclude he was

or could have been alerted to his potential claims before the limitations period

expired. In the first PCR action, Attorney Murphy advised Murphy “[y]ou have three

years from [August 15, 2019] to file a Petition for Postconviction Relief.” In October

2021, the district court noted Murphy could file a PCR action to raise his claims.

Murphy now maintains he “has been diligently attempting to get this matter before

a court since the entry of the sentencing order.” Even that argument concedes

2 In 2019, our legislature amended section 822.3 to include the following: “An

allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel in a prior case under this chapter
shall not toll or extend the limitation periods in this section nor shall such claim
relate back to a prior filing to avoid the application of the limitation periods.”
2019 Iowa Acts ch. 140, § 34 (codified at Iowa Code § 822.3 (Supp. 2019))
(emphasis added).
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Murphy’s belief a potential claim existed as early as 2019. “[T]o avoid the three-

year statute of limitations contained in section 822.3, an applicant must show he

or she could not have raised the ground of fact within the applicable time period.”

Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 798 (Iowa 2018). Murphy has failed to do that.3

Because Murphy’s PCR application was filed more than three years after

his conviction was final and he asserted no ground of fact material to his

substantive claim that could not have been presented within the three-year time

frame, we affirm the court’s dismissal of the application.

AFFIRMED.

3 Murphy also summarily raises a claim relating to the “[t]he cumulative errors of

trial counsel and PCR counsel.” Because Murphy’s underlying application was
untimely, we decline to consider this claim. Cf Smith v. State, ___ N.W.2d ___,
___, 2024 WL 2868782 (Iowa 2024) (“We disagree that the cumulative prejudice
analysis is applicable here. . . . It is an argument that 0+0+0=1.”).

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