Robert Teig v. Patrick Loeffler, Ashley Vanorney, Dale Todd, Brad Hart, Ann Poe, Tyler Olson and Scott Olson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0029
Filed January 9, 2025

ROBERT TEIG,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

PATRICK LOEFFLER, ASHLEY VANORNEY, DALE TODD, BRAD HART, ANN
POE, TYLER OLSON and SCOTT OLSON,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Andrew Chappell,

Judge.

A Cedar Rapids resident appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his

lawsuit claiming members of the Cedar Rapids city council violated Iowa’s open

meetings statute when they closed the job interview of an applicant for the position

of city clerk and argues the district court erred in its orders closing part of the trial

and sealing the recording of the job interview meeting. AFFIRMED IN PART,

REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

Robert L. Teig, Cedar Rapids, self-represented appellant.

Patricia G. Kropf, Assistant City Attorney, Cedar Rapids, for appellees.

Heard by Ahlers, P.J., Sandy, J., and Potterfield, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2025).
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SANDY, Judge.

We filed our opinion in this case on December 4, 2024, but subsequently

granted both the plaintiff's and defendants’ petitions for rehearing. Our December

4, 2024 decision is therefore vacated, and this decision replaces it. See Iowa R.

App. P. 6.1204(5).

Robert Teig, a resident of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, sued the members of the

city council of Cedar Rapids (the Council), claiming they violated Iowa’s open

meetings statute when they closed the job interview of an applicant for the position

of city clerk. See Iowa Code § 21.5(1)(i) (2021). Teig appeals the district court’s

dismissal of his lawsuit, as well as the court’s orders closing part of the trial and

sealing the recording of the job interview meeting. He argues the district court

made an error at law by dismissing the case and abused its discretion in closing

part of the trial and sealing the interview recording because it cited no law and

made no factual findings supporting its decision to do so.

We reverse the district court’s judgment with respect to its interpretation of

the closed meetings law and hold that the closed session should have been

reopened to the public upon the Council’s assessment that no needless and

irreparable injury would occur to the job applicant during the interview.

Accordingly, we remand for the district court to assess any applicable defenses,

and, if no defenses negate Teig’s claim for damages, to determine such statutory

damages. We affirm the district court’s denial of Teig’s motion to reconsider

insofar as it relates to the district court’s decision to close part of trial and seal the

closed meeting recording.
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I. Background Facts and Proceedings

On April 29, 2021, the Council members—Brad Hart, Tyler Olson, Ann Poe,

Patrick Loeffler, Dale Todd, Scott Olson, and Ashley Vanorny—held an interview

with Alissa Van Sloten for the position of city clerk. Van Sloten was a longtime city

employee and was then serving as interim city clerk. She requested that her

interview be conducted in a closed session pursuant to Iowa Code

section 21.5(1)(i).

The proposed agenda was submitted to the city attorney for review—a

common practice for any meeting with a closed session. He made one edit to an

item in the proposed agenda, which initially read: “Selection process for the City

Clerk position. This meeting may be closed pursuant to Iowa Code

Section 21.5(1)(i) (2021).” After the city attorney’s edit, the agenda item read:

“Interview of City Clerk candidate. Note: May be closed pursuant to Iowa Code

Section 21.5(1)(i) (2021).”

The meeting was conducted via Zoom video conference consistent with all

city council meetings at that time. Following a motion and unanimous vote, the

closed session commenced. Preliminary matters related to the closed session

were discussed, and Van Sloten was connected to the meeting. Then, they were

off and running without looking back. The Council made no inquiry into why Van

Sloten requested the closed session. Her interview was conducted, and she

disconnected from the meeting. The Council deliberated about her candidacy and

the closed session ended. The open session was reconvened, and the meeting

concluded. Van Sloten’s hiring was formally approved at a later meeting as part

of the consent agenda.
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Van Sloten only later testified that she requested the closed session

because she was concerned about the possibility of something negative about her

being brought up. Yet she did not articulate that at the time of the interview. She

claimed the concern was precautionary as she could not determine ahead of time

what information would come up during the interview. Yet she cited no specific

information that she believed would have caused needless and irreparable injury.

Van Sloten testified she did not know how all of the council members felt about her

job performance until then and wanted to prepare in case they had any negative

assessments in that respect. She testified that she would not have applied for the

position if she knew the interview would be public because she characterizes

herself as an introverted person. She testified she was uncomfortable with the

idea that the interview would be livestreamed on Facebook and available on the

internet.

Each member of the Council testified to their decision to close the meeting.

Each member agreed on several points. The Council members agreed that

(1) there was a general consensus that an interview would and should routinely be

closed upon the interviewee’s request, (2) none of them knew of any specific,

negative information that would come up during the interview, (3) the city attorney

was preemptively informed of the closed session request and affirmatively

approved it in writing, and (4) no negative information was ultimately revealed

during the interview.

The members of the Council knew the standard questions that would be

asked during Van Sloten’s interview, but they did not know what Van Sloten’s

answers would be or what follow-up questions would be raised. Council member
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Vanorney testified that in her experience interviewing job applicants, “sometimes

there are very surprising, shocking things that just end the interview process with

[a] candidate,” even in that candidate’s “third or fourth vetting.” This, combined

with the city attorney’s assurances that closing the session did not raise any legal

conflicts, convinced the Council it was appropriate to close the session.

II. Standard of Review

“Actions to enforce the open meetings law are ordinary, not equitable,

actions.” Hutchison v. Shull, 878 N.W.2d 221, 229 (Iowa 2016). We afford the

district court’s findings of fact the same deference we afford a jury’s special verdict.

Id. Such findings of fact are binding if supported by substantial evidence. Id.

“Substantial evidence supports a factual finding when the finding ‘may be

reasonably inferred from the evidence presented.’” Id. at 229–30 (citation omitted).

“This appeal requires us to construe the Iowa open meetings law” and will be

reviewed for corrections of errors at law. Id. at 230.

To the extent that Teig challenges the district court’s evidentiary rulings or

discretionary actions, we review those actions for abuse of discretion. Andersen

v. Khanna, 913 N.W.2d 526, 535 (Iowa 2018).

III. Discussion

Teig argues the district court made an error at law by dismissing his suit

against the Council because the Council did not know of particular adverse

information about Van Sloten and nothing said at the meeting would have caused

needless and irreparable harm to her reputation. He also argues the district court

abused its discretion in closing part of the trial and sealing the interview recording
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because it cited no law and made no factual findings supporting its decision to do

so. We address both arguments in turn.

A. Closure of the Interview Session

We first address Teig’s argument that the district court erred in dismissing

his lawsuit against the Council.

Iowa’s open meetings law is contained in Iowa Code chapter 21. The

statute generally requires any “governmental body” to conduct its meetings in open

session, unless a closed session is expressly permitted by law. Iowa Code § 21.3

(2021). The term “open session,” as it is used in the statute, means “a meeting to

which all members of the public have access.” Id. § 21.2(3).

Section 21.5 sets forth the procedure that must be followed before a closed

session may be held. This procedure requires that either two-thirds of the

members of the governmental body or all the members present must vote, in open

session, to hold a closed session. Id. § 21.5(1). The vote of each member along

with the statutory provision authorizing the closed session must be announced at

the open session and entered into the meeting’s minutes. Id. § 21.5(2). And, once

in closed session, the members present may not discuss any business “which does

not directly relate to the specific reason announced as justification for the closed

session.” Id.

Section 21.5 also provides the various reasons for which a closed session

may be held. A governmental body may conduct a closed session “[t]o evaluate

the professional competency of an individual whose appointment, hiring,

performance, or discharge is being considered when [(1)] necessary to prevent

needless and irreparable injury to that individual’s reputation and [(2)] that
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individual requests a closed session.” Id. § 21.5(1)(i). As the district court

acknowledged, “[t]his language, in some form, has been part of the law since it

was first adopted in 1967.” When first adopted, section 28A.3 provided that a

closed session could be held “when necessary to prevent irreparable and needless

injury to the reputation of an individual whose employment or discharge is under

consideration.” Iowa Code § 28A.3 (1971).

Section 21.5(1)(i) contains no requirement that a factual record be made in

open session as to why closure is necessary. And we have held that section 21.5’s

language stating that a closed session “may” be held upon a proper showing

“confers a power and places discretion within the one who holds the power.” Feller

v. Scott Cnty. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 435 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). We

will thus only find that the government body has abused its discretion when “it is

exercised on clearly untenable grounds or to a clearly unreasonable extent.” Id.

The open meetings law may be enforced by any aggrieved person,

taxpayer, or citizen of the state, along with the attorney general and county

attorneys, by suit brought in the county in which the governmental body has its

principal place of business. Iowa Code § 21.6(1) (2021). Once a complainant

establishes that a governmental body is subject to the requirements of chapter 21

and held a closed session, the governmental body and its members then have the

burden to demonstrate they complied with the law. Id. § 21.6(2).

If the district court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

governmental body has violated the law, there are several remedies set forth in

the statute. See id. § 21.6(3). The district court shall “assess each member of the

governmental body who participated in its violation damages in the amount of not
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more than five hundred dollars and not less than one hundred dollars.” Id.

§ 21.6(3)(a). But damages shall not be assessed against any member who

(1) “[v]oted against the closed session,” (2) “[h]ad good reason to believe and in

good faith believed facts which, if true, would have indicated compliance” with

chapter 21, or (3) “[r]easonably relied upon . . . a formal opinion of . . . the attorney

for the governmental body, given in writing.” Id. § 21.6(3)(a)(3).

The district court must “void any action taken in violation of [the statute]” if

(1) the suit is brought within six months of the alleged violation, and (2) the district

court finds “that the public interest in the enforcement of the policy of [chapter 21]

outweighs the public interest in sustaining the validity of the action taken in the

closed session.” Id. § 21.6(3)(c). And the district court must enter an order

removing from office any member that “has engaged in a prior violation of [the

statute] for which damages were assessed against” them during such member’s

term. Id. § 21.6(3)(d). Finally, the district court may issue an injunction punishable

by contempt ordering all members of the governmental body to refrain from any

future violations for a year. Id. § 21.6(3)(e).

No party disputes that the city council of Cedar Rapids is a governmental

body subject to the duties of chapter 21. Nor is there any dispute that a closed

session was held. So the Council bears the burden to establish, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that it complied with the statute. It is also not

disputed that the closed session was called to “[t]o evaluate the professional

competency of an individual whose . . . hiring . . . [was] being considered,” id.

§ 21.5(1)(i), or that Van Sloten—the individual being considered—requested the

closed session. Thus, the sole issue the parties dispute is whether the closed
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session was “necessary to prevent needless and irreparable injury to [Van

Sloten’s] reputation.” Id.

It is true that the purpose of chapter 21 is to “assure, through a requirement

of open meetings of governmental bodies, that the basis and rationale of

governmental decisions, as well as those decisions themselves, are easily

accessible to the people.” Id. § 21.1; see also Hutchison, 878 N.W.2d at 237 (“The

legislature clearly intended public bodies subject to the open meetings law to

deliberate the basis and rationale for important decisions . . . during open

meetings.”). Yet that purpose is not unfettered. The governmental entity must

exercise discretion when considering whether to close a meeting.

Although section 21.5(1)(i)—the section at issue here—specifically seeks to

protect government employees and applicants, see Feller, 435 N.W.2d at 390,

transparency remains the overarching aim of chapter 21. The protection afforded

by section 21.5(1)(i) is not meant to lessen the gravity of the purpose stated in

section 21.1. But section 21.5(1)(i) recognizes the importance of protecting the

privacy of government employees, and it helps ensure the governmental body

balances those sometimes-conflicting interests. Our supreme court has explained

that the open meetings law was enacted to favor openness but that the legislature

has “set [the law’s] parameters” and that sometimes the “demands of efficient

administration require a measure of confidentiality.” Donahue v. State, 474

N.W.2d 537, 539 (Iowa 1991).

Teig argues that section 21.5(1)(i) requires the governmental body to

identify specific information that will injure the applicant’s reputation in a way that

is needless and irreparable and that the meeting may be closed only “when
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necessary” to prevent the disclosure of that injuring information. While that view

may sound restrictive, we agree that it is the only avenue by which the statutory

word “necessary” takes on any qualitative meaning. Why is a closed session

necessary? The language of the statute presumes the governmental body will

know the answer before exercising its discretion to cloak an otherwise public

proceeding. Teig’s interpretation makes open meetings the default position while

still leaving a means to close meetings consistent with section 21.5(1)(i).

There are several issues with the Council’s position that they are free to

close any job interview upon the applicant’s request. For one, it invites the

governmental body to approve closed meetings more liberally than contemplated

by statute. For example, an applicant would simply need to invoke the magic

words, “fear of needless and irreparable injury” and could then have the

governmental body close the entire interview without further inquiry as to why. In

that circumstance, there would be no analysis of whether any needless and

irreparable injury would occur without the closed session. Necessity becomes

unnecessary.

The Council’s position that the statute “does not require specific negative

information about the applicant be known in order to close the meeting” similarly

ignores the plain language of section 21.5(1)(i). The statute’s direction that an

interview may be closed only when “when necessary to prevent needless and

irreparable injury to that individual’s reputation” implies that there are times when

it is not necessary to close the interview. Id. § 21.5(1)(i) (emphasis added). Under

the statute, the applicant’s request to close the meeting is a separate prong from

the necessity requirement. The necessity prong would not act as a barrier to
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closing meetings if a candidate simply needed to utter the magic words in their

closed meeting request. In this case, not even those magic words were uttered.

Van Sloten simply requested that the interview be closed “pursuant to Iowa Code

section 21.5(1)(i).”

So absent evidence that it is necessary to prevent needless and irreparable

injury, the applicant’s request to close the meeting does not meet the statutory

requirements for maintaining the closed session. The governmental body must

conduct further inquiry into the necessity of the closed session to ensure that the

closed session complies with the statute. And a reasonable interpretation of the

statute would allow for such inquiry to occur in a limited closed session, thus

avoiding any “unrung bell” concern.

Here, the Council failed to ask any questions as to why Van Sloten’s request

was necessary. Not one. And that is troublesome given the Council’s admission

that they would have closed the interview regardless of her reason. There was a

consensus in the Council’s testimony that the interview would be closed upon a

request, none of them knew of any specific, negative information that would come

up during the interview, and no negative information was ultimately revealed during

the interview. And while it is difficult to ascertain what exactly would come up

during an interview, such is the case in every interview. Something more than

mere possibility is required—otherwise every interview could be kept closed upon

request.
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The district court raised the concern of other “strained, impractical or absurd

results” that would come out of Teig’s statutory interpretation:

It could result in a meeting being closed and reopened multiple times
based on what questions were asked. It also would seem to require
much of the deliberation regarding a hiring decision to be done in
open session, with a separate vote to close the meeting in the event
a member thought they were going to make an observation or share
an impression that would be damaging to the candidate’s reputation.
Because, as the [Council] pretty well unanimously pointed out, there
simply is no way to know during an interview, for instance, when
something negative will come up. The Court also finds that, if this
was the procedure the legislature had meant to require, it very easily
could have written the statute differently to make that clear.

But our case law already recognizes that such fluidity in coming in and out of open

and closed session is not impractical or absurd. See Feller v. Scott Cnty. Civ.

Serv. Comm’n, 482 N.W.2d 154, 155–56 (Iowa 1992) (describing a fact pattern in

which a county commission entered and exited multiple closed sessions and

reversing district court on other grounds). Efficiency should not take priority over

transparency.

We find that Van Sloten’s expression of concern for her reputation served

as sufficient reason to initially close the interview session. To find otherwise would

require a candidate to make public the specific concern for their closed session

request during open session. Indeed, “requiring an individual to expressly state in

an open session the exact nature of the reputational harm they would suffer would

render [section 21.5(1)(i)] useless.” Closed Session Requirements, Advisory

Opinion 21AO:0007 (Iowa Pub. Info. Bd. Oct. 21, 2021). But the Council violated

the statute’s requirements when, upon closing the session, it failed to even attempt

to ascertain any specific, damaging information that would justify continuing the

interview outside the public’s view.
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B. Damages.

Iowa Code section 21.6(3)(a) requires a court to assess damages if a

governmental body has been found to have violated any provision of chapter 21.

Damages assessed shall be between $100 and $500 to each member that

participated in such violation, and between $1000 and $2500 if that member’s

participation in the violation was knowing. Id. That section also provides for

several defenses the violating member may assert to avoid assessment of

damages for their participation in the violation. Id. § 216.(3)(a)(1)–(3).

Having found the Council engaged in a violation of chapter 21, we remand

to the district court to determine whether any defenses under section

21.6(3)(a)(1)–(3) are available and the extent to which the Council is subject to the

mandatory damages if no statutory defense is available. The district court is

permitted to make this remand decision without further evidence or argument if it

so chooses. However, if the district court decides it may benefit from additional

evidence, hearings, or argument, the court is permitted, at its sole discretion, to

conduct hearings, receive evidence, or receive additional argument on the terms

and conditions it sets.

C. Closure of the Trial and Sealing of Closed Meeting Recording

Teig contends that the district court improperly closed part of the trial and

sealed the recording of the closed session.

Although Van Sloten’s interview session was improperly closed by the

Council, the district court could not have yet made that determination at the time

the closed meeting recording was played at trial. At that stage of the case,

competing statutory requirements remained at play. Compare Iowa Code
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§ 602.1601 (2023) (stating judicial proceedings are to be public unless otherwise

provided by statute or agreed to by the parties), with Iowa Code § 21.5(5)(b)(1)

(providing that a the closed session recording “shall be sealed and shall not be

public records open to public inspection”). Until the district court made its final

ruling, it could not make the closed portion of the trial public without risking the

possibility that it may be publicizing records not permitted to be opened to public

inspection. Section 21.5(5)(b)(1) generally prohibits release of closed recordings

to the public. And until the district court ruled otherwise, the recording remained a

record of a closed session.

But since we reverse the district court’s order in respect to its ruling on the

Council’s decision to hold the closed session, we remand to the district court to

ensure the city council makes the record of the closed meeting public. See Iowa

Code § 21.6(3)(c) (requiring the district court to “void any action taken in violation

of this chapter”). So the record of the closed session will nonetheless be made

available to the public.

We thus reverse the district court’s judgment with respect to its

interpretation of the closed meetings law and hold that the closed session should

have been reopened to the public upon the Council’s assessment that no needless

and irreparable injury would occur to Van Sloten during the interview. Accordingly,

we remand for the district court to assess any applicable defenses, and, if no

defenses negate Teig’s claim for damages, to determine such statutory damages.

We affirm the district court’s denial of Teig’s motion to reconsider insofar as it
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relates to the district court’s decision to close part of trial and seal the closed

meeting recording.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.