In the Interest of J.E., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1890
Filed February 5, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF J.E.,
Minor Child,

S.E., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Gary P.

Strausser, Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her son.

AFFIRMED.

Esther J. Dean, Muscatine, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Natalie Hedberg, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Jean Pfeiffer, Muscatine, attorney and guardian ad litem, for minor child.

Considered by Chicchelly, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ.
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LANGHOLZ, Judge.

A one-year-old boy was taken to the hospital after suffering a head injury.

While there, his treating physicians observed that his injuries contradicted his

mother’s version of events. The son was placed with his grandmother. And for

the next fifteen months, he remained out of his mother’s custody.

During this time, the mother made little progress toward caring for herself

or the son. Indeed, she struggled with keeping herself healthy—refusing

medication, skipping medical appointments, and failing to treat lice and fleas for

prolonged periods of time. She also had trouble meeting her son’s needs, often

relying on others to provide housing or supplies. And because of the mother’s

sporadic participation in services, she never progressed beyond fully supervised

visits. So the juvenile court eventually terminated her parental rights.

The mother appeals, and we affirm. The juvenile court properly denied her

request for six more months to work toward reunification, as she offered little

evidence showing she could make the necessary progress to eliminate the need

for removal by the end of that period. From there, the mother concedes that,

absent that extra time to make progress, the son could not be returned to her

custody. So termination was appropriate under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h)

(2024). As for the son’s best interest, the mother only makes a passing reference

to this issue in her petition on appeal, so we find it waived. Similarly, the mother

never advocated for a permissive exception during the termination hearing, and

we cannot consider the issue for the first time on appeal. We thus affirm the

termination of the mother’s parental rights.
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I. Factual Background and Proceedings

In March 2023, the mother1 took her one-year-old son to the hospital after

he suffered a head injury. Although she reported he fell three feet from his bed,

the treating physicians noted that the resulting injuries—a subdural hematoma and

retinal hemorrhages—were inconsistent with that kind of fall and more likely

resulted from “non-accidental trauma.” So the hospital performed a child-abuse

assessment, which showed the son was also positive for methamphetamine. The

mother agreed to a safety plan placing the son with his grandmother. And the son

was later adjudicated in need of assistance and placed in his grandmother’s

custody.

Throughout the child-in-need-of-assistance proceedings, the mother

struggled to care for herself and the son. After moving into a new apartment, the

mother got head lice. She was provided with kits, sprays, and detailed instructions

and videos. But the mother reported she did not understand how to use the

products, so the issue persisted for over nine months. Her apartment also had a

flea infestation, and the son was observed with flea bites after his visits with the

mother. She was offered parenting training but was discharged for missing too

many sessions. And during the sessions she did attend, the mother had trouble

retaining the information.

The mother was referred for a psychological evaluation. During that

evaluation, the mother reported suffering from several mental-health conditions but

1 We avoid using the parties’ names to respect their privacy because this opinion—

unlike the juvenile court’s order—is public. Compare Iowa Code § 232.147(2)
(2024), with id. §§ 602.4301(2), 602.5110.
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also that she “does not believe in medication” and fears it will cause her to gain

weight. The evaluator also found the mother’s cognitive abilities were on the

“extremely low range of intellectual functioning.” The evaluator expressed concern

that, while the mother “has the potential to be able to learn basic care of her child,”

it would be hard for her to grasp “how her life decisions will indirectly impact her

child and her child’s safety.”

Despite the mother’s belief that therapy—rather than medication—was

better for her, she skipped many mental-health appointments. She was later

discharged as a patient by her healthcare provider for missing too many

appointments. While visiting the son, the mother would sometimes be distracted

or on her phone. And she could not always provide for the son’s needs during

those visits—relying on her mother or others for help providing diapers or snacks.

After roughly a year of little progress toward reunification, the State

petitioned to terminate the mother’s parental rights. After a hearing, the juvenile

court terminated the mother’s rights under paragraphs “d,” “h,” and “i” of Iowa Code

section 232.116(1). The juvenile court emphasized the mother’s inability to keep

herself, and thus her son, safe and healthy. Indeed, it was unlikely the mother

would ensure the son’s medical needs were met, as she herself rarely attended

appointments. The court also noted the mother’s lack of progress in caring for the

son—her discharge from the parenting training, her inattentiveness during visits,

and her reliance on others to meet the son’s needs. Significantly, the mother

continued to offer shifting explanations for how the son’s initial head injury

occurred, none of which the court found credible. And so, because the son had
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been out of his mother’s care for over a year and the mother had not shown any

meaningful improvement, termination was appropriate. The mother appeals.

II. Additional Time for Reunification

The mother first argues that the juvenile court should have granted her six

more months to work toward reunification rather than terminating her rights.

Juvenile courts may “deny termination and give the parent an additional six months

for reunification only if the need for removal ‘will no longer exist at the end of the

additional six-month period.’” In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Iowa 2021)

(quoting Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b)). As with other issues within termination

proceedings, our review is de novo. Id. at 322.

The mother never progressed beyond fully supervised visits, many of which

were outside her home because of lice or flea concerns. While the mother believes

she could make progress if given more time, she offered no evidence during the

hearing to show how she would approach services, appointments, and caring for

the son differently going forward. Indeed, she testified she believed she was

prepared for visits with her son, met his needs, and was not at fault for missing

appointments or failing to complete the parenting training.

While the law demands “patience” with parents, our “full measure of

patience” is reserved for those “who attempt to remedy a lack of parenting skills.”

In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Iowa 1987). As we often emphasize, “the crucial

days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment with ways to

face up to their own problems.” Id. (cleaned up). At the time of the hearing, the

son had been removed from his mother’s care for fifteen months. During that time,

the mother made little progress in caring for herself or the son and has given us
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no basis to find that she will improve going forward. And we share the juvenile

court’s concern about her shifting explanations for the son’s initial head injury.

Without that accountability, or other evidence showing the mother was close to

reunifying with her son, the juvenile court correctly denied her request for additional

time.

III. Termination Merits.

Our three-step termination framework is well established. First, the State

must prove by clear and convincing evidence one or more grounds for termination.

See Iowa Code § 232.116(1). Second, the State must similarly prove that

termination is in the son’s best interest. See id. § 232.116(2). And third, the parent

carries the burden to show that one or more permissive exceptions should

preclude termination. See id. § 232.116(3). Across our de novo review, we give

due weight to the juvenile court’s factual findings. W.T., 967 N.W.2d at 322.

On the first step, the mother argues the juvenile court erred in terminating

her rights under paragraphs “d,” “h,” and “i” of Iowa Code section 232.116(1). Yet

the mother concedes all elements of paragraph “h,” including that the son could

not have been returned to her custody at the time of the hearing. See Iowa Code

§ 232.116(1)(h); see also In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 111 (Iowa 2014). Because

we have already found that the mother was not entitled to six more months, and

she agrees that without that extra time the son could not be returned to her

custody, we affirm termination under paragraph “h.” See In re L.H., 949

N.W.2d 268, 270 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020) (explaining when one ground for termination

is supported, we need not consider other grounds).
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Moving to the second step, the mother’s petition on appeal makes only a

passing reference to termination not being in the son’s best interest. The mother’s

single buried sentence—not separately stated as one of “the legal issues

presented for appeal”—without any further argument as to why termination is not

in the son’s best interest does not properly present the issue for our consideration.

Iowa R. App. P. 6.1401—Form 5. Because we cannot “craft an argument on her

behalf,” we find the mother has waived any best-interest challenge. In re L.F.,

No. 24-1141, 2024 WL 4620507, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2024).

Finally, the mother argues that termination should have been avoided

because the son was in the custody of a relative. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(a).

But our review of the hearing record does not show the mother argued for a

permissive exception, nor did the juvenile court address this exception in its ruling.

Because the doctrine of error preservation protects interests beyond the State’s, it

matters not that the State does not contest it here. See Top of Iowa Coop v. Sime

Farms, Inc., 608 N.W.2d 454, 470 (Iowa 2000). And when a parent does not argue

for a permissive exception during the termination hearing, the parent may not do

so for the first time on appeal. See In re J.R., No. 24-0942, 2025 WL 52738, at *2

(Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2025) (en banc). So we do not consider this permissive

exception. And we thus affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED.