State of Iowa v. Ryan Matthew Allen

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0416
Filed March 19, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

RYAN MATTHEW ALLEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Gregg R.

Rosenbladt, Judge.

A defendant appeals his sentence. AFFIRMED.

Richard Hollis, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua Henry, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Langholz and Sandy, JJ.
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GREER, Presiding Judge.

Ryan Allen appeals his sentence after this court remanded for resentencing

because the district court did not use a validated risk assessment tool when

determining Allen’s mandatory minimum sentence. See State v. Allen,

No. 22-0152, 2023 WL 8069210, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2023) (noting

that Iowa Code section 901.11(3) (2021) required the sentencing court to base its

determination of the mandatory minimum term on a validated risk assessment).

Allen asserts the district court got it wrong again; this time by considering improper

and incorrect factors.

As part of his challenge, Allen contends the district court erred by

considering an improper score in the Iowa Risk Assessment Revised (IRR), which

classified Allen’s employment as “unsatisfactory, or unemployed, or

unemployable” even though he was employed in prison as a barber at the time of

resentencing. Allen makes other unpreserved claims that we do not consider,

including an argument that all these challenges amount to cumulative error.

Following our review, we find Allen failed to preserve error as to two of his three

challenges, and thus, we could not find any cumulative error. As to his IRR

employment challenge, we find the court properly exercised its sentencing

discretion when considering the IRR. We affirm Allen’s sentence.

Background Facts and Proceedings

On August 7, 2021, Ryan Allen broke into a Dairy Queen through its roof

and attempted to steal cash from the establishment’s safe. Our court previously

summarized the facts of Allen’s underlying offense as:
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“You know what, screw it. I’ve already broken the law, I’m
already here, I’m going to try to get into the safe.” That’s what Ryan
Allen thought after he broke through the Dairy Queen (DQ) roof and
dropped into the closed business. Allen told the jury it was an inside
job, that a former DQ manager gave him the safe code, but it didn’t
work. In desperation, he tried to pry open the safe with a hammer
and other tools he came across in the storage room. As he struggled
to access the cash, in walked A.P.—the DQ employee in charge of
opening that morning.
According to A.P., Allen threatened her and put her in fear of
serious injury. He denied it. The jury believed her, convicting Allen
of second-degree robbery. The district court imposed a prison
sentence not to exceed ten years with a sixty-five percent mandatory
minimum.

Id. at *1. On direct appeal, Allen argued there was insufficient evidence to support

his conviction and the district court erred when it imposed sentence without a

validated risk assessment, in violation of section 901.11(3). Id. This court found

sufficient evidence underlying his conviction but agreed with Allen that the district

court was to consider a validated risk assessment during sentencing. Id. at *2–3.

Ultimately, we remanded for resentencing. Id. at *4.

On remand, the district court ordered an amended presentence

investigation (PSI) report that was to include a validated risk assessment. The

Iowa Department of Corrections completed an updated Iowa Risk Assessment

Revised (IRR) for Allen on January 22, 2024. In an additional order, the district

court clarified an IRR was prepared and included as part of Allen’s PSI report, but

the sentencing court was “uncertain as to the meaning” of the assessment and

was then informed that the following information should have been included:

As a part of the PSI process, [Allen] was assessed using the
[IRR]. The IRR is an assessment tool with a focus on prediction of
new violent and/or property crime and is used to assign initial level
of supervision in the community. [Allen] scored in the low category
for probability of future violence and the moderate/high category for
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probability of future victimization. The assessment is attached to this
report.

But, at sentencing, Allen contended that the characterization of a moderate/high

category for probability of future victimization was flawed because the IRR showed

he was “unsatisfactory, or unemployed, or unemployable” when he had

employment in prison. The district court reviewed the PSI report and the IRR and

considered the nature of the offense, Allen’s age, family and employment history,

acceptance of responsibility, criminal history, protection of society, and

rehabilitation. The State argued for a mandatory minimum sentence of seventy

percent, and Allen advocated for a fifty percent mandatory minimum. The court

imposed a sentence of no more than ten years, with a mandatory minimum of sixty

percent, a five percent reduction from Allen’s initial sentence.

Allen appeals.

Standard of Review.

“We review sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion when the

sentence is within the statutory limits.” State v. Gordon, 921 N.W.2d 19, 24

(Iowa 2018). We assume that a sentence that falls within the statutory parameters

is valid. State v. Wickes, 910 N.W.2d 554, 572 (Iowa 2018). And that presumption

is only overcome by an affirmative showing of an abuse of discretion or

consideration of improper factors. See id. An abuse of discretion occurs when

“the district court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons that were

clearly untenable or unreasonable.” State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 918

(Iowa 2014). “To establish reversible error based on an improper sentencing

factor, the defendant is required to show that the court was not just merely aware
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of the factor, but that it relied on the factor in determining its sentence.” State v.

McCollaugh, 5 N.W.3d 620, 627 (Iowa 2024).

Discussion.

Allen challenges his sentence, arguing the district court erroneously

characterized his employment status, impermissibly considered offenses not at

issue in this matter, and failed to offset his current probation revocation against his

past early discharge from probation. He claims the cumulative effect of these

errors resulted in a more severe sentence than was warranted.

Unpreserved Challenges.

The State asserts that Allen did not preserve error on several of his

challenges and as to the one where error was preserved, the district court did not

consider any improper sentencing factors. Allen claims he preserved error as to

his three arguments because an illegal sentence may be challenged at any time.

See State v. Lathrop, 781 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Iowa 2010) (“[E]rrors in sentencing

may be challenged on direct appeal even in the absence of an objection in the

district court. Illegal sentences may be challenged at any time, notwithstanding

that the illegality was not raised in the trial court or on appeal”). But Allen’s first

two arguments do not challenge his sentence as imposed by the court; he

challenges information in the PSI report, which the sentencing court relied upon as

a sentencing consideration.

Iowa courts have explicitly recognized that challenges to information

included in the PSI report fall under a type of “exception from the exceptions”

regarding error preservation—most sentencing challenges need not comply with

traditional error preservation rules, but challenging information in the PSI report
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does. See State v. Chawech, 15 N.W.3d 78, 85 (Iowa 2024). “[I]f the defendant

fails to object to alleged defects in the [PSI] report prior to the entry of sentence,

the defendant will not be allowed to attack the sentence based on those defects.”

Id.

Allen failed to object to portions of the PSI report that make up the basis for

his second and third claims, thereby failing to preserve error. During sentencing,

Allen told the court he received and reviewed the amended PSI report before

sentencing. With advanced opportunity to do so, see Iowa Code § 901.4 (2024),

Allen chose not to formally object to elements of the PSI report in writing. See

State v. Martin, 2 N.W.3d 271, 276 (Iowa 2024) (“Despite receiving the [PSI] report

well in advance of the sentencing hearing, Martin presented no evidence to show

that the district court abused its discretion by considering the information in it.”).

During sentencing, the court asked if Allen had “any changes, objections, or

corrections to make” to the PSI report, which included the IRR incorporated into

the PSI report. Allen neglected to object to the point allocations in the IRR that

underpin his second and third claims on appeal—two points for “two or more

current counts,” when he was charged with one criminal count and a total of four

points for a two-decades-old probation revocation.

By not objecting to these particular sections, we find Allen did not preserve

error to his second and third claims. Accordingly, we also decline to discuss the

merits of his arguments or his assertion that all of the errors had a “cumulative

effect” on his sentence.
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Employment Risk Factor in the IRR.

As to his preserved challenge—the IRR assessment related to stability

factors—Allen objected to the IRR report’s classification of his employment status

as “unsatisfactory, or unemployed, or unemployable.” As Allen sees it, because

that inaccurate employment classification in the IRR made his score on the risk

assessment higher, the district court considered an “improper sentencing factor,”

which warrants resentencing. But as noted above, Allen had to “overcome the

presumption in favor of the sentence by affirmatively demonstrating the court relied

on an improper factor.” State v. Goble, 4 N.W.3d 700, 704 (Iowa 2024) (quoting

State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 106 (Iowa 2020)). And here, where the improper

factor relates to the risk assessment tool, Allen had to object to the factor and make

the appropriate record before sentencing to show the district court would abuse its

discretion by considering the information. See Martin, 2 N.W.3d at 275–76.

There are two problems with Allen’s challenge. First, while Allen objected

to the IRR employment classification, he failed to show how the IRR was

inaccurate. And second, Allen cannot show that the district court relied upon the

claimed improper factor in making the sentencing decision.

We start with the record made at the sentencing related to the employment

stability factor. As stated in the addendum to the PSI report, the risk assessment

is used to gauge and report the risk posed to the community so as “to assign initial

level of supervision in the community.” It follows then that the behavior of an

individual in the community and their employment history in the community would

be a focus of the risk assessment. Allen, by his own account, was unemployed

before incarceration and readily stole from others to pay his debts. From the record
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made at the resentencing hearing, the district court would not know whether the

employment information solicited by the IRR was designed to take into account

employment after the individual was removed from the community, during

incarceration. If all employment information, including employment in prison, was

to be included in the IRR, it was Allen’s burden to make an affirmative showing the

IRR was inaccurate. See id. at 275 (“The district court does not abuse its discretion

by considering risk assessment information in a [PSI] report where a defendant

has notice of the risk assessment and fails to present evidence exposing some

actual unsoundness in it.”). Without evidence to the contrary, we find the IRR,

incorporated into the PSI report and used during sentencing, is presumed to be a

proper sentencing consideration, consistent with the “strong presumption” the

sentence imposed by the court is valid. See State v. Schooley, 13 N.W.3d 608,

619 (Iowa 2024) (“Absent consideration of an improper factor, a district court’s

sentencing decisions are cloaked with a strong presumption in their favor. This is

a heavy burden.” (internal citation omitted)).

But even with concerns on how the employment factor was applied, we find

the district court carefully considered Allen’s position, in any event. During the

sentencing hearing, Allen clarified his employment in prison. First, included in the

PSI report was Allen’s then-current work schedule, “[Allen] currently works Monday

to Friday cutting hair for the men arriving at [the facility] and for the men who are

leaving. He works 96 hours every two weeks and is paid []58 cents per hour.”

General information was presented during sentencing; Allen’s counsel addressed

the employment issue to the court:
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DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I’m not sure how [the IRR
section describing employment status] fits in with the employment
and the notification that it was unsatisfactory or unemployed or
unemployable. I guess I take it that that means back then, because
certainly, in his current state, that’s not the case.
....
THE COURT: And that does indicate they’ve got a mark there
unsatisfactory or unemployed or unemployable, and if I remember
correctly, Mr. Allen’s original PSI [report] was done in jail. And then
when this risk assessment was done, he would have been
incarcerated in prison. And so I think that’s probably the—I’m not
sure why they check what they check, but I think that probably was
the status.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, the reason I bring it up is
because I believe that it would change the risk scores and make the
victimization much less, and so that’s why I think it should be
considered that he was employed or that he is employed now in
prison. He is doing the work there that he can do. So that would be
my objection to that number, that score, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Just so the court knows.
THE COURT: All right. So I’ll take that into consideration and
then you can make argument on that, but I think your comments have
clarified the situation there.

During Allen’s allocution, he told the court, “I've completed my barber

apprenticeship program, which consists of classwork as well as 2000 hours of on-

the-job training.” After arguments and allocution, when the court addressed

individual portions of the IRR, the court stated, “[E]mployment. [Counsel] talked

about that, and the Court is aware of your situation there regarding employment.”

In response, counsel interjected:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, before you do that, I
would point out that the next-to-the-last sentence in the addendum
above does say that the defendant scored in the low category for
probability of future violence and the moderate/high category for
probability of future of victimization. I would argue that it should be
the low-to-moderate category of future victimization because of the
employment.
THE COURT: All right. And that’s a good point,
[Counsel] . . . .
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The sentencing hearing, taken as a whole, shows the district court was aware of

Allen’s employment status and understood the employment classification’s effect

on IRR scoring. The court recognized the nuance of Allen’s situation before

determining sentence.

After the imposition of sentence, the court elaborated on its decision,

stating, “I’m also noting here I’m factoring in and was going to say it but I didn’t,

your allocution. And it sounds like you’ve been positive down there. So that is

going to cause me to lower the minimum somewhat, factor that in as well.” We

understand the district court’s final statement as a nod to Allen’s improvements in

prison, including his apprenticeship and employment. The positive connotation of

the district court’s final statement, which indicates the court took into account

Allen’s employment history, conflicts with Allen’s argument on appeal. See State

v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002) (“[T]he decision of the district court

to impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong

presumption in its favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or

the consideration of inappropriate matters. An abuse of discretion will not be found

unless we are able to discern that the decision was exercised on grounds or for

reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable.”). Allen failed to make this

showing.

We find the district court properly exercised its discretion in making the

resentencing decision and affirm the sentence imposed.

AFFIRMED.