In the Interest of C.C., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1924
Filed April 9, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF C.C.,
Minor Child,

B.C., Father,
Appellant,

C.L., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Cynthia Finley, Judge.

A father and a mother separately appeal the termination of their parental

rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

David R. Fiester, Cedar Rapids, for appellant father.

Allison C. Ackerman of Nidey Erdahl Meier & Araguas, PLC, Cedar Rapids,

for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Michael Lindeman, Cedar Rapids, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor

child.

Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Langholz and Sandy,

JJ.
2

GREER, Presiding Judge.

A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental

rights to their child, C.C., who was born in late 2018.1 Both parents argue the State

failed to establish a statutory basis for termination. The father continues, arguing

the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) did not

make reasonable efforts and termination is not in the best interests of the child.

He asks this court to apply an exception for termination, citing the close

relationship he has with the child. After our de novo review, we affirm the

termination of parental rights of both the mother and the father.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

At birth, C.C. tested positive for cocaine exposure. She was first

adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA) less than a month after her birth,

on January 18, 2019. Later that same year, she tested positive for cocaine via hair

sample. This first CINA was closed in July 2021, but during those proceedings

C.C. was out of her parents’ custody for approximately ten months until mid-2020.

After some months, the parents’ behavior came to the Department’s

attention again. On September 6, 2022, the father was arrested for possession of

heroin. One week later, on September 13, C.C. was removed from her parents’

care. Upon investigation, both the mother and the father were alleged to be using

heroin or other illicit substances while their children were in their care and custody.

After an arrest for driving violations, the mother admitted that she was no longer

1 There are two older siblings (born in 2010 and 2007) that were adjudicated
children in need of assistance before C.C.’s birth, but they are not involved in this
appeal. There are also other older children who have been involved with the Iowa
Department of Health and Human Services, dating back to 2005.
3

sober and that she was ingesting fentanyl and unprescribed Xanax. C.C.’s siblings

reported the mother was engaging in prostitution in the home and the parents

doing drugs in front of them. On September 21, C.C. was, once again, adjudicated

a CINA. Two days after the CINA proceedings, C.C.’s test results for illicit

substances returned; she tested positive for opiates and cocaine.

With the institution of services, both the mother and father showed progress

in 2023. Emblematic of progress, the mother and father gained stable housing at

a transitional housing program, moving from the homeless shelter where they

previously resided. As a result of stable housing and progress towards sobriety,

reunification remained the goal in October 2023, and the juvenile court extended

the permanency review for an additional six months. And a trial home placement

was granted starting on November 6. From late October to January 2024, both

parents contend there was a lapse in coordination from the Department as their

assigned social worker took leave. The father and mother assert they asked the

Department if they should take a drug test but were told it was not necessary. In

early 2024, progress halted when a new social worker assigned to the family

required the mother, father, and child to report for a drug test. The mother tested

positive for cocaine, as did C.C. The father’s hair was too short to test. With this

development, the trial home placement ended February 1 and fully supervised

visits were reimposed.

The situation did not improve. On May 8, the mother again tested positive

for cocaine. On May 21, the mother tested positive for fentanyl. Thus, on May 23,

the Department filed a petition for termination of parental rights.
4

In the wake of the termination proceedings, both parents tested negative for

illicit substances but have tested positive for alcohol—the mother on August 29

and the father on May 29, August 30, and October 10. At a few of the supervised

visits during this period, the parents fell asleep. The Department’s documents

report that the father had slow or sluggish speech and at one point smelled of

alcohol, although a subsequent urinalysis came back negative.

At the November termination trial, the Department social worker supervisor,

a family support specialist, and both parents testified. The supervisor

recommended the juvenile court terminate parental rights. Both the father and the

mother argued that sufficient progress had been made for the juvenile court to find

C.C. could return to the parents’ custody. Both parents discussed the status of

their sobriety and their use of alcohol. But the family support specialist questioned

the parents’ honesty related to their usage. Starting with C.C.’s birth almost six

years prior, the child had been involved in CINA proceedings for almost four and

a half years of her life and removed from their custody for almost three years by

the time of the termination hearing. After the trial, the juvenile court terminated

parental rights for both parents under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2024).

Both the mother and father appeal.

II. Standard of Review.

We review termination of parental rights de novo. See In re A.B., 815

N.W.2d 764, 773 (Iowa 2012). “We give weight to the juvenile court’s factual

findings, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, but we are not

bound by them.” Id. (citation omitted). “The paramount concern in termination
5

proceedings is the best interests of the child.” In re D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 465

(Iowa Ct. App. 2011).

III. Discussion.

“Termination of parental rights under chapter 232 follows a three-step

analysis.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010). First, the court must

determine if there is a statutory basis for termination, under section 232.116(1).

Id. “The State must show reasonable efforts as a part of its ultimate proof the child

cannot be safely returned to the care of a parent,” directly related to the fourth

element of section 232.116(1)(f). In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000).

Second, if a statutory basis exists, the court must then decide whether termination

of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 706–07.

Finally, “the court must consider if any statutory exceptions set out in

section 232.116(3) should serve to preclude termination of parental rights.” Id.

at 707.

The juvenile court terminated both the father and mother’s rights under

section 232.116(1)(f), which allows termination when all the following occurred:

(1) The child is four years of age or older.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of
assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or
for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home
has been less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present
time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents
as provided in section 232.102.
6

Both the mother and father contest only the fourth element of section 232.116(1)(f),

which incorporates section 232.102. The pertinent portion of section 232.102

states:

Whenever possible the court should permit the child to remain
at home with the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian. Custody of
the child should not be transferred unless the court finds there is
clear and convincing evidence of any of the following:
(1) The child cannot be protected from physical abuse without
transfer of custody.
(2) The child cannot be protected from some harm which
would justify the adjudication of the child as a child in need of
assistance and an adequate placement is available.

Iowa Code § 232.102(4)(a). The father raises other claims in his appeal, arguing

termination is not in the best interests of the child and the Department did not make

reasonable efforts.

Although we address the father’s and mother’s claims separately, we note

that at the time of termination, the father and mother lived together in Iowa City.

“We recognize each parent has their own rights to and relationship” with C.C. See

In re G.B., No. 22-0439, 2022 WL 1657190, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 25, 2022).

“[I]n termination of parental rights proceedings each parent’s parental rights are

separate adjudications, both factually and legally.” In re D.G., 704 N.W. 2d 454,

459 (Iowa 2005). But “[w]e cannot ignore reality and the extent these parents’ lives

are intermixed when deciding their respective legal challenges.” G.B., 2022

WL 1657190, at *4. We will not return the child to a dangerous or harmful home

environment. See Iowa Code § 232.102(4)(a).

A. Mother’s Appeal.

The mother’s sole claim on appeal is that the juvenile court got it wrong

when the court determined C.C. could not return to her mother on the day of the
7

termination hearing.2 On our review, we agree with the juvenile court and find clear

and convincing evidence that C.C. could not be returned to the mother’s custody

at the time of the termination hearing, satisfying the fourth element of the statutory

framework for termination under section 232.116(1)(f).

We do not have to look far to support this conclusion. The mother testified

at the termination hearing and although she argued she made sufficient steps in

her sobriety for over six months, specifically in avoiding illicit drugs, she admitted

during her testimony that there was “progress” but not such progress that C.C.

could be immediately returned to her. Instead, she advocated for “six more months

to try to get [C.C.] back in [her] life.” Based upon the history and the mother’s own

concession, we find there was clear and convincing evidence that C.C. could not

be returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing. See In

re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 111 (Iowa 2014) (explaining that the issue is whether

child could be returned “at the time of the hearing”).

And in any event, the record tells a different story; the mother has struggled

for years to maintain sobriety. Although she has participated in a bevy of inpatient

and outpatient treatment, the mother’s drug testing results show she still struggles

with drug use. In 2024, she tested positive for cocaine on January 26 and May 8,

2 In the “nature of the case and relief sought” section of her brief, the mother

mentions in passing that the juvenile court should have granted her an additional
six months to achieve reunification, but there is no developed argument beyond
that reference. We do not consider this See Iowa Rs. App. P. 6.201(1)(d)
(requiring petitions on appeal to “substantially comply with rule 6.1401--Form 5”);
6.1401—Form 5 (“[S]tate what findings of fact or conclusions of law the district
court made with which you disagree and why, generally referencing a particular
part of the record, witnesses’ testimony, or exhibits that support your position on
appeal: . . . Include supporting legal authority for each issue raised, including
authority contrary to appellant's case, if known.”).
8

and for fentanyl on May 21. And once she made progress by testing negative for

illegal drugs, she tested positive for alcohol. Setbacks in the year prior to

termination, including the use of alcohol and cocaine, show the mother is willing to

compromise her sobriety when supervision lapses. See In re K.V., No. 19-1775,

2020 WL 110439, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020) (“Even assuming the mother

has managed six months of sobriety, a short period of sobriety is not a reliable

indicator of her ability to remain sober when considered in light of her history, which

includes ten years of substance use and several prior failed attempts at sobriety.”).

We commend the mother for reaching six months of sobriety. But,

ultimately, we must conclude that six months of sobriety is inadequate to show that

the mother will maintain sobriety in the long term. Here, along with the mother’s

concession related to all the elements of section 232.116(1)(f), we agree that the

State proved this ground for termination. See In re A.H-G., No. 24-1616, 2025

WL 402015, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2025) (holding that the mother’s

concession over all the statutory grounds for termination, along with the inability to

progress past supervised visits because of unsafe parenting, met the clear and

convincing evidence standard).

Because the mother does not challenge any other grounds in the three-step

process, see In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010), we affirm the termination

of the mother’s parental rights without further analysis.

B. Father’s Appeal

The father appeals the juvenile court’s assessment that

section 232.116(1)(f) provides a statutory basis for the termination of his parental

rights and that reasonable efforts were made by the Department, it is in the best
9

interests of the child to terminate parental rights, and no exception applies to

preclude termination of his rights. We evaluate each argument in turn.

i. Statutory Basis.

The father argues the State failed to show that C.C. could not be returned

to his custody at the time of the termination trial. After review, we find the father

has unaddressed alcohol issues and has failed to consistently attend drug testing.

These issues, in conjunction with an unsafe living environment, lead us to agree

with the juvenile court that C.C. could not be returned to the father at the time of

termination, fulfilling the father’s only contested element of section 232.116(1)(f).

Throughout the proceedings, the Department raised concerns about the

father’s struggle with alcohol consumption. As summarized by the social worker

supervisor at the termination hearing, the father’s criminal history also was

concerning: “He’s got child endangerment, possession charges, charges for

prescription drugs, robbery, unwillful injury. Interfering with official acts,

intoxication. Assault.” In 2023, the father appeared at a scheduled court matter

intoxicated and was charged with contempt. The alcohol consumption continued

to raise concerns, as the father tested positive for alcohol three times in the months

leading up to the termination hearing, on May 29, August 30, and October 10. He

claimed these positive tests were from “three to four drinks” the night before. At

the termination hearing, the father denied any alcohol issue, stating he had a

limited number of drinks with coworkers on any occasion he tested positive for

alcohol. But the social worker supervisor testified to concerns over an individual’s

use of alcohol when they suffer from substance abuse.
10

In tandem with the Department’s concerns, the father’s behaviors at visits

with C.C. were suspect for substance use. In a May 22, 2024 affidavit submitted

to the juvenile court, the social worker case manager stated:

a. During the reporting period of December 2022, It was reported that [the
father] seemed sluggish during visits.
i. [The father] seemed sluggish at his visit on 11/25/22.
ii. [The father] seemed sluggish on his visit on 12/2/22.
iii [The father] was talking slow at a visit on 12/4/22.
b. On January 5th, 2023, [the father] was observed to be fairly sluggish in
his speech and mannerisms during a visit with [C.C.].
....
g. On a visit on 3/9/24, [the father] struggled to stay awake

The father fell asleep during at least two additional visits—on June 8 and July 27,

2024. A visit on the Friday immediately preceding the termination hearing, a

department employee and a substance abuse counselor reported the father

smelled of alcohol. The father was asked to take an urinalysis test, which came

back negative. And the family support specialist, employed by Families First, did

acknowledge that the father might have been tired from working.

Historically, the father has struggled with illicit substances, although the

father has shown progress. At the start of the underlying CINA, in 2022, the

department alleged he was using illicit substances. The father was prescribed

methadone and started taking the medication. At some point since 2022, the father

discontinued use without consulting a physician. To his credit, he has not tested

positive for illicit substances since 2022, but the juvenile court confirmed in its

review orders that the father needed to continue drug testing, including alcohol

testing, and follow through substance-use treatment. Yet the father testified that

he did not have a problem with his alcohol use and stated, “I understand that the
11

Court or [Department] might feel that alcohol . . . may lead to other drugs, but I

don’t feel it, I don’t know.”

The juvenile court noted the father’s lack of a positive drug test but pointed

to his discontinuing the methadone program without medical supervision, his

choice to keep his hair too short so that testing to determine chronic usage was

not possible, and his choice to ignore his role in achieving sobriety as not boding

well for long-term sobriety. We qualify the father’s success in not testing positive

for illicit drugs with the fact that the father has failed to consistently attend

drug-testing obligations; in the months before the termination hearing, the

Department offered twenty-nine tests and the father missed eight drug testing

calls. And the social worker case manager noted in her affidavit that over the

course of these proceedings, the father only tested 52% of the time for the

Department.

Finally, we note that the father currently resides in an unsafe environment

for a child; the father lives with the mother, who has a long history of illicit drug use.

Although we adjudicate the mother’s and father’s rights separately, the decisions

each makes in the shared living environment inextricably impact the other. See

G.B., 2022 WL 1657190, at *4. Illicit drug abuse by a parent, in the home or in

front of the child, may be sufficient to find a child in need of assistance or terminate

parental rights. See, e.g., A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 777 (“We have long recognized

that an unresolved, severe, and chronic drug addiction can render a parent unfit to

raise children.”); In re J.S., 846 N.W.2d 36, 37 (Iowa 2014) (concluding“[a] parent’s

methamphetamine addiction by itself can result in ‘harmful effects’ to the child,

thereby justifying state intervention to protect the child” but addiction, by itself, is
12

not sufficient to establish risk of physical injury). Section 232.102(4)(a) mandates

that we do not return a child to an environment where “[t]he child cannot be

protected from some harm which would justify the adjudication of the child as a

child in need of assistance . . . .”

Because the father has unaddressed alcohol issues, inconsistently appears

for drug testing, and resides in an unsafe environment, the State met its burden to

prove each element of section 232.116(1)(f), including showing the child could not

be returned to the father’s custody at the time of termination, in accordance with

section 232.102(4)(a)(2).

ii. Reasonable Efforts.

The father claims the Department did not make “every reasonable effort” to

reunite him and the child because the Department did not offer a reunification plan

for the father as an individual, instead of punishing him for the mother’s relapses.

But the Department offered services tailored to the concerns of the father’s ability

to parent and, thus, made reasonable efforts to reunite C.C. with her father. If the

father wanted a different plan, it was his responsibility to make that request to the

juvenile court. See In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2022) (“[I]f a parent fails

to request other services at the proper time, the parent waives the issue and may

not later challenge it at the termination proceeding. . . . [T]he parent must make

such challenge at the removal, when the case permanency plan is entered, or at

later review hearings.” (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added)). And nothing

prohibited him from not allowing the mother to remain in his home once he was

aware of the safety issues surrounding her presence.
13

Iowa law requires the Department to “make every reasonable effort to return

the child to the child's home as quickly as possible consistent with the best

interests of the child.” C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 493 (quoting now Iowa Code

§ 232.102(6)). In determining if the Department has made every reasonable effort,

the court considers “[t]he type, duration, and intensity of services or support offered

or provided to the child and the child’s family.” Iowa Code § 232.102A(1)(a)(1).

The concept of reasonable efforts includes “visitation designed to facilitate

reunification while providing adequate protection for the child” when the child is out

of the home. C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 493.

Following the August 2024 permanency hearing the juvenile court

summarized the reasonable efforts as follows:

The Court finds that [the Department] has made reasonable
efforts to reunify the family during this review period, as documented
by the written reports and the case permanency plan. Those efforts
include: Family-Centered Services, substance abuse evaluation,
substance abuse treatment, methadone treatment, drug testing,
residential drug treatment, mental health evaluation, medication
management, individual therapy, protective daycare, assistance with
transportation, and The Way Home housing assistance. Further, no
party has requested additional services or assistance.

No other requests for additional or different services were requested. These

services addressed elements of the case plan, in large part, assisting the mother

and father in remaining sober. The services were designed to “make it possible

for the child to safely return to the family’s home.” Iowa Code § 232.102(4)(b). We

reject the father’s argument that the Department did not make reasonable efforts

toward reunification.
14

iii. The Parent-Child Bond.

In both his best-interest challenge and his request for a permissive

exception to termination, the father points to the bond he has with the child as the

reason the juvenile court should not have terminated his parental rights. So we

look to whether that bond is such that the father’s parental rights should not be

terminated under the statutory parameters involved with each challenge. First, in

addition to meeting the statutory requirements for termination set forth in

section 232.116(1), the termination must be in the best interest of the child. See

D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 706–07. “Thus, termination is not mandatory upon finding

the requisite elements in section [232.116(1)].” In re C.W., 554 N.W.2d 279, 282

(Iowa Ct. App. 1996). “In making the best-interests determination, we give primary

consideration to the child[]’s safety, the best placement for furthering their long-

term nurturing and growth, as well as their physical, mental, and emotional

condition and needs.” In re A.H., 950 N.W.2d 27, 41 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020); see

Iowa Code § 232.116(2). “Insight for the determination of the child’s long-range

best interests can be gleaned from evidence of the parent’s past performance for

that performance may be indicative of the quality of the future care that parent is

capable of providing.” C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 495 (cleaned up). “[A] child’s safety

and his or her need for a permanent home [are] the defining elements in a child's

best interests.” In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring

specially).

The father argues that termination is not in C.C.’s best interests because

the “bond between the child and [her] father.” Recently, this court clarified a

parent-child bond may be considered in the best-interest analysis. See In re L.A.,
15

No. 24-2086, 2025 WL 855764, at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2025). But, the

best-interests test requires we look at more than a child’s bond with a parent. A

child deserves safety and stability. Consistent with “defining elements” of the best-

interests analysis, we look to the safety and stability of the child when determining

if a placement is in the child’s best interests. See J.E., 723 N.W.2d at 802

(Cady, J., concurring specially). “We do not gamble with the child[]’s future by

asking them to continuously wait for a stable biological parent, particularly at such

tender ages.” D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707 (cleaned up). The father’s home has

proved to be an unsafe place for C.C., a child too young to self-protect from illicit

substances. Excluding the positive drug test at the child’s birth, there have been

two other times this child tested positive for illicit drugs while in the parents’ care.

C.C. has been removed from the custody of the mother and father for about four

and a half years of her nearly six years of life. As safety concerns appeared over

the course of these proceedings, the father still had only minimal contact with the

child and did not comply with the testing that was mandated by the Department or

maintain sobriety. According to the social worker supervisor, C.C. is doing well in

her current foster placement. The father has not established that his bond with the

child outweighs these safety concerns.

Focusing only on the bond between them, it is the father’s burden to

establish a permissive exception to prevent termination of his parental rights. See

In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 475–76 (Iowa 2018). And he has failed to show

termination would be harmful to the child because of the closeness of their

relationship. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c); In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 225

(Iowa 2016). “[T]he existence of a bond is not enough. The law requires clear and
16

convincing evidence that ‘termination would be detrimental to the child at the time

due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.’” In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162,

169 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c)).

Again, we do not doubt the father loves his daughter, but an exception to

termination requires the parent-child bond outweigh the inability for the parent to

meet the child’s needs. See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 709 (“[O]ur consideration must

center on whether the child will be disadvantaged by termination, and whether the

disadvantage overcomes [the parent]’s inability to provide for [the child]’s

developing needs.”). The child has reached stability in her current placement; the

GAL stated, “[C.C.] likes to live with her foster parents and told me she wants to

stay there.” Severing any relationship has the potential for trauma, but we do not

find the closeness of this parent-child bond outweighs C.C.’s need for permanency

and a safe home environment.

The State proved a statutory basis for termination and that termination is in

the child’s best interests. Reasonable efforts were made by the Department. The

father failed to show any permissive exception to termination applies. We affirm

the termination of the father’s parental rights.

IV. Conclusion.

We affirm the termination of both the mother’s and father’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.