State of Iowa v. Devin Zachary Waters

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0719
Filed April 23, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

DEVIN ZACHARY WATERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Thomas P. Murphy,

Judge.

Devin Waters appeals his conviction and sentence for domestic abuse

assault causing bodily injury. AFFIRMED.

Gary Dickey of Dickey, Campbell, & Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, for

appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Langholz and Sandy,

JJ.
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SANDY, Judge.

Devin Waters appeals his conviction and sentence for domestic abuse

assault causing bodily injury, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.2A(1)

and 708.2A(2)(b) (2023). He argues the State presented insufficient evidence to

convict him, and the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for a

deferred judgment. Since substantial evidence supports his conviction and the

district court did not abuse its sentencing discretion, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

An officer from the Perry Police Department arrived at the home of Christy

Waters after being “dispatched to a disturbance call at th[e] residence” on

December 15, 2023. Upon the officer’s arrival, Waters and Christy, who is

Waters’s mother, were in front of the house.

The officer spoke with Waters and during that conversation he told the

officer he “punched” his mother over a drug dispute. The officer asked for

clarification as to “how he did it” and Waters responded by “demonstrat[ing] a

punching combination.” According to the officer, Waters “was coherent to what

was going on, and he seemed to understand my questions and had no issues

answering them. So he appeared to be in a normal state” and not confused. This

conversation was captured on body cam.

The officer then spoke to Christy, who “appeared to be in distress.” She

had a laceration “on her right cheek/cheekbone area—that was actively bleeding.”

The officer arrested Waters for domestic abuse assault. Waters was charged by

trial information with domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury and pleaded not

guilty.
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At trial, Waters argued he acted without the requisite intent under Iowa law.

Waters has been diagnosed with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, which he has

struggled to effectively manage with medication. His mother has advocated that

he use the “indica” strain of cannabis to assist him in staying calm, and she testified

that it had positive effects during his manic states.

On December 11, his mother had bought some cannabis without his

request to do so. Waters told her it did not help and made “things worse

sometimes.” His mother then left for her job as a truck driver and returned on

December 15. Shortly after her return, Waters again mentioned he did not want

the cannabis. After arguing with her over the topic, he retreated to his bedroom,

“slamm[ing] his [bedroom] door.” His mother testified she had not seen him act

like that before and asked if there was something they needed to discuss. Waters

told her he “hates” her, and she said in response that, “if you hate me, go

somewhere else and live. And he just came to punch me.” She added that he has

“never been violent before.” Water’s testimony largely corroborated this testimony.

Following trial, a jury found him guilty as charged, and the district court

sentenced him to one year in jail with credit for time served and one year of

probation.

Waters now appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review challenges of the sufficiency of evidence for corrections of errors

at law. State v. Serrato, 787 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Iowa 2010). “A guilty verdict must

be supported by substantial evidence.” Id.
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We review challenges to a district court’s sentence for abuses of discretion.

State v. Adams, 554 N.W.2d 686, 692 (Iowa 1996).

III. Discussion

Waters raises two issues on appeal. He argues the State presented

insufficient evidence to convict him, and the district court abused its discretion in

denying his request for a deferred judgment.

A. Sufficiency of Evidence

Waters contends the “evidence was insufficient to establish that [he] acted

with the required intent” under Iowa Code section 708.2A(1) and (2)(b). Domestic

abuse assault is a specific intent crime. State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260, 265

(Iowa 2010) (“[T]he crime of assault includes a specific intent element.”). Assault

“require[s] an action done with the ‘intent to achieve some additional consequence

so as to qualify as a specific-intent crime.’” Id. at 264 (citation omitted). That action

must be intended “to cause pain or injury to the victim.” Id. at 265.

The jury here was instructed on specific intent:

“Specific intent” means not only being aware of doing an act
and doing it voluntarily, but in addition doing it with a specific purpose
in mind.
Because determining Mr. Waters’ specific intent requires you
to decide what he was thinking when an act was done, it is seldom
capable of direct proof. Therefore, you should consider the facts and
circumstances surrounding the act to determine Mr. Waters’ specific
intent. You may, but are not required to, conclude a person intends
the natural results of his acts.

Waters argues he did not have specific intent because his mother testified that

when he hit her, “It didn’t look like [Waters]. It was, like, kind of like a blank stare.”

Based on his lack of prior violent acts, his mother surmised that “I don’t think he
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even realized what was happening.” Waters testified that his “emotion” caused

him to hit his mother.

We do not find Waters’s lack of visible emotion while assaulting his mother

to be helpful to his specific-intent argument. Waters mentions that he suffers from

schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, vaguely gesticulating that those conditions

prevented him from exercising specific intent—without ever expressly stating so.

But he fails to specifically describe how these conditions affected him in the

moment of the assault.

And the evidence of Waters’s specific intent comes from his own mouth.

On the night of the assault, he told the responding officer “[she] told me to get the

fuck out—I start swinging.” When asked what he meant by that, Waters clarified

“I punched her four times” and made four distinct punching motions. So, directly

after the incident, Waters could recall the specific conversation leading to the

assault, the specific words spoken by his mother to trigger the assault, the specific

number of times he punched her, and the specific method with which he punched

her. A reasonable trier of fact could have found the State presented sufficient

evidence of Waters’s specific intent.

B. Sentencing

Waters argues his lack of a significant criminal history and his mental health

issues necessitated the court’s grant of his request for a deferred judgment.

Iowa Code section 907.5(1) requires that, “[b]efore deferring judgment,

deferring sentence, or suspending sentence, the court first shall determine which

option, if available, will provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the

defendant and protection of the community from further offenses by the defendant
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and others.” In making that decision the court shall consider the defendant’s age,

“prior record of convictions and . . . deferments of judgment,” employment and

family circumstances, “mental health and substance use disorder history and

treatment options available in the community and the correctional system,” the

“nature of the offenses,” and other appropriate factors. Id.

Here the district court found the following:

I’ve considered Mr. Waters’[s] age, what little I know of his
prior record, his family and employment circumstances, and I’ve
considered the nature of the offense. I saw the testimony at trial, and
I saw the video at trial.
I must consider what I do in light of protection of the
community from further offenses by Mr. Waters, and the sentence
that provides Mr. Waters the maximum opportunity for rehabilitation.
I’ve considered that Mr. Waters needs some mental health
treatment.
I do not think a deferred judgment is warranted. It would
unduly depreciate the nature of the offense, in the fact that you knew
that you had a problem, Mr. Waters, and you chose not to take
medication.
So when you punched your mother, when she was trying to
do something nice for you, you were either mentally ill or you were a
born-again jerk. And I’m going to give you the benefit of the doubt
and attribute it to your mental illness. But you did not get so far as
to have an insanity or a defense where you’re incapacitated.

Waters cites his history of mental illness and lack of criminal history as mitigating

factors. But the court did expressly consider these factors and found them

mitigating—stating it was “giving [Waters] the benefit of the doubt.” But the

existence of mitigating factors does not deprive the district court of its substantial

discretion, which is “cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor.” State v.

Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). The district court considered all the

required factors when sentencing Waters and found that any mitigating factors
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failed to outweigh the seriousness of his assault on his mother. The district court

did not abuse its discretion in declining a deferred judgment.

AFFIRMED.