In the Interest of B.K., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0494
Filed July 23, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF B.K.,
Minor Child,

A.E.,
Petitioner-Appellee,

R.K.,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Union County, Monty Franklin,

Judge.

A father appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights to

his child. AFFIRMED.

Chira L. Corwin of Corwin Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant.

Benjamin Folladori of Marberry Law Firm, P.C., Urbandale, for appellee.

Karen A. Taylor of Taylor Law Offices, P.C., Des Moines, attorney and

guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and

Buller, JJ.
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AHLERS, Presiding Judge.

A mother of two filed this action seeking to terminate the parental rights of

her younger child’s father1 after he pleaded guilty to and was sent to prison for

lascivious acts with a child (a class “C” felony). The victim of his crime was the

mother’s older child. The juvenile court terminated the father’s rights under Iowa

Code section 600A.8(9) and (10) (2023). The father appeals.

To terminate the father’s parental rights under chapter 600A, the mother

must prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) a statutory ground for

termination exists and (2) termination is in the child’s best interest. See In re

B.H.A., 938 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Iowa 2020). The juvenile court found that the mother

proved both.

On appeal, the father raises two issues. First, he contends the mother failed

to prove a statutory ground for termination because the evidence was insufficient

to show that he would not be released from prison within five years. Second, he

contends the mother failed to prove that termination of his parental rights was in

the child’s best interests. The first issue partly involves an issue of statutory

interpretation, which we review for correction of errors at law. See In re A.H.B.,

791 N.W.2d 687, 689 (Iowa 2010). The second issue and the remainder of the

first issue are reviewed de novo. See id. at 688–89.

I. Statutory Ground for Termination

As noted, the juvenile court terminated the father’s rights under Iowa Code

section 600A.8(9) and (10). When the court relies on more than one ground for

1 As the father of the mother’s older child is not at issue in this appeal, all references

to the father in this opinion refer to the father of the younger child.
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terminating a parent’s rights, we only need to find sufficient evidence supporting

one ground to affirm. See In re Q.G., 911 N.W.2d 761, 770–71 (Iowa 2018)

(declining to address other grounds for termination under chapter 600A after

finding one ground for termination); see also In re Z.M.H., No. 20-0897, 2020 WL

7021568, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2020). We choose to focus on section

600A.8(9).

Section 600A.8(9) authorizes termination if “[t]he parent has been

imprisoned for a crime against the child, the child’s sibling, or another child in the

household, or the parent has been imprisoned and it is unlikely that the parent will

be released from prison for a period of five or more years.” The father does not

contest the fact that he has been imprisoned for a crime against a child who was

his child’s sibling and/or who lived in his child’s household. Instead, he contends

the requirements for termination under section 600A.8(9) were not met because

his ten-year prison sentence carries no mandatory minimum term, and there is

insufficient proof that he will remain incarcerated for five or more years.

The father’s argument either misinterprets section 600A.8(9) or overlooks

part of it. The “or” in that section creates two different ways to terminate his rights.

See A.H.B., 791 N.W.2d at 689 (“Section 600A.8(9) details two different grounds

for termination as demarked by the provision’s use of the word ‘or.’”). If either way

is established, termination is statutorily authorized. Id. The father focuses on the

second way, but he overlooks the first. The first way only requires proof that “[t]he

parent has been imprisoned for a crime against the child, the child’s sibling, or

another child in the household.” Id. (quoting Iowa Code § 600A.8(9)). As noted,

the father does not contest this way of establishing a ground for termination—nor
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could he, as our de novo review of the record shows that the father has been

imprisoned for a crime against his child’s half-sibling who resided in the same

household. As such, a ground for termination under section 600A.8(9) has been

established, and we need not address termination under section 600A.8(10). See

Q.G., 911 N.W.2d at 770–71.

II. Best Interests of the Child

The father asserts that, even if a statutory ground for termination has been

established, the mother failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that

termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interests. In assessing the

best interests of the child under chapter 600A, we consider whether a parent has

actively assumed the responsibilities of parenthood. This includes evaluating the

parent’s fulfillment of financial obligations, demonstrated interest in the child,

efforts to maintain communication, and the extent to which the parent has

established and maintained a place of importance in the child’s life. Iowa Code

§ 600A.1(2). We also consider the statutory framework outlined in chapter 232,

which directs the court to “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the

best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and

to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Id.

§ 232.116(2); see A.H.B., 791 N.W.2d at 690–91 (finding it useful to apply the best-

interest framework of section 232.116(2) and (3) to the best-interest analysis under

chapter 600A).

In support of his argument, the father points to evidence of the mother’s

prior criminal history and the testimony of his witnesses attesting to his positive

involvement in his child’s life. The mother acknowledges that the father was active
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in the child’s upbringing. However, this evidence does not outweigh the serious

concerns arising from the father’s lascivious acts with the child’s half-sister and his

continued refusal to take responsibility for that abuse.

During the termination hearing, the father testified that he never sexually

abused his child’s half-sibling and that he lied to the judge when he admitted

committing lascivious acts with her when he pleaded guilty. Based on this

testimony, the juvenile court found the father was either lying when he pleaded

guilty or was lying now, so the court found the father’s testimony to be wholly

lacking in credibility, stating: “his credibility is nonexistent and his testimony in this

proceeding is not reliable and not persuasive.” Even with de novo review, we give

considerable weight to this credibility finding, see B.H.A., 938 N.W.2d at 232, and

we conclude that the father did commit lascivious acts with his child’s half-sibling

and refuses to take responsibility for his crime. His refusal to accept responsibility

for committing a sex-based crime against a minor supports the conclusion that

terminating his parental rights to his child is in the child’s best interests. See In re

J.S., 470 N.W.2d 48, 51 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (noting that a parent’s refusal to

accept responsibility for prior abuse is relevant in evaluating the parent’s future

ability to safely parent).

The child has also expressed a clear desire to refrain from communicating

with the father and his family, with the sole exception of the father’s other child (the

half-brother of the child at issue). This supports the conclusion that the father has

failed to maintain a place of significance in the child’s life and that termination of

his parental rights would be in the child’s best interests. Following our de novo

review, we agree with this assessment by the juvenile court:
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Children rely on their parents for all their care needs. A
parent’s ability and willingness to supply these needs are of the
utmost importance. The ability of a parent, however, is moot if that
parent is unwilling to recognize the child’s needs as being
paramount. . . . [The father’s] perverted, criminal actions and
behaviors clearly indicate that he made his needs and desires his
priority, above his relationship with [the child] and his availability to
meet her care needs.
[The father] indicates that he is [the child]’s father and wants
to be a part of her life. The Court agrees that [the child] should have
a father in her life, but only if that father is a positive part of her life.
As a result of his criminal behaviors, [the father] has failed to fulfill
his duties and obligations as a father to [the child] and has not been
able to maintain any significant and meaningful contact with [the
child] since July 5, 2023, when he last had contact with [her]. [The
child] has told everyone that she wants no contact whatsoever with
[the father] and does not want him to be a part of her life.
[The child]’s attitude towards [the father] is easily
understandable and is reasonable under the circumstances involved.
Requiring that [the child] have a relationship with [the father] would
cause [the child] significant distress and emotional trauma. It would
be in [the child]’s best interests to terminate [the father]’s parental
rights so that [the child] can be provided with the stability, security,
and permanency that she needs and that is in her best interests.

For these reasons, we conclude that the mother proved by clear and

convincing evidence that termination of the father’s parental rights is in the child’s

best interest.

III. Conclusion

The juvenile court correctly concluded that the mother established a

statutory ground for termination under section 600A.8(9) and that termination is in

the child’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of the father’s

parental rights.

AFFIRMED.