In re the Marriage of Ernst

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1379
Filed August 6, 2025

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF TODD LYNN ERNST
AND STACEY ANN ERNST

Upon the Petition of
TODD LYNN ERNST,
Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning
STACEY ANN ERNST,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Sac County, Ashley Sparks, Judge.

A former spouse appeals provisions of decree of dissolution of marriage

pertaining to the spousal-support award. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

Vicki R. Copeland of Copeland Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Jefferson, for appellant.

Lisa K. Mazurek of Law Office of Lisa K. Mazurek P.L.C., Cherokee, for

appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and

Chicchelly, JJ.
2

GREER, Presiding Judge.

Todd and Stacey Ernst were married thirty-five years before separating in

2023. The district court divided their marital assets and property, which are not in

dispute, and fixed a traditional spousal support payment that Stacey argues did

not take into account all of Todd’s annual earnings or her monthly expenses and

set her annual income too high. Neither party condones the district court’s method

for calculating spousal support. But Todd contends that while the method was

unorthodox, the actual determination of the amount was equitable. Both parties

ask for an award of appellate attorney fees.

After our review, we conclude the district court failed to consider Todd’s

actual base income. Additionally, while anticipated future bonuses could be

considered to establish Todd’s ability to pay, they could not be used to fund the

spousal-support obligation. Given those issues, the spousal-support award was

not equitable and minimized the needs of Stacey to continue the marital standard

of living. On our de novo review, we modify and increase Stacey’s monthly spousal

support award to $3862. We award Stacey appellate attorney fees of $7500.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Todd and Stacey were married in 1988, when Stacey was a senior in

college and Todd was a recent graduate. With no assets to their name, the couple

started as “broke college kids” and then transitioned into full-time wage earnings.

Todd entered the marriage with college loans, which the couple jointly paid off, and

Stacey was debt-free. Stacey worked in customer service and banking until

around 2013. Todd originally worked in the insurance industry as an adjuster but

left the field because of the stress. For the first twenty-three years of their
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marriage, until around 2011, Stacey was the primary breadwinner, which allowed

Todd to leave his stressful insurance job and work for less money. Ultimately when

the couple moved to be closer to family in 1997, Todd joined a company called V-

T Industries. When Stacey eventually left her position with a bank after an

acquisition, she also joined V-T Industries. Once Stacey left the banking industry,

Todd became the higher wage earner. In the last fifteen years, Stacey’s income

steadied while Todd’s income rose sharply. According to 2023 tax records, Stacey

reported yearly wages of $49,983 while Todd reported $140,102.1 But in the three

years before 2023, Todd’s earnings hovered just over $100,000.

Todd’s earnings reflected several increases that came as a result of two

promotions in 2023. The first occurred in January 2023, when Todd was given a

conditional promotion to Director of Inventory Control and Procurement, with a

base salary of $134,117.94. That base salary again increased in November to

$147,529.75, when he took the position without conditional status. As a result of

these promotions, Todd was allocated two bonuses, one for $55,000 and the

second $55,028, but the actual 2023 bonus paid was $110,974. In 2024, Todd

again received an increase in base earnings—this time to $162,545.76. Along with

the additional raise in base earnings, the bonus system was modified so that

Todd’s target bonus would be 30% of his base wage ($48,763.75) with a maximum

bonus potential of 175% the target bonus ($85,336.53).2 Conservatively, Todd’s

1 These numbers are shown on the tax return and from their W-2’s after allowable

deductions against income.
2 The new bonus offer noted:

The Target Bonus and the Maximum Bonus are based on team
members scoring 100% on their Performance Review. Team
members scoring more than 100% on their Performance Review are
4

total earnings for 2024 would be approximately $211,309, or gross monthly income

of $17,609, which is what Todd reflected as his gross income on his filed affidavit

of financial status.

While not earning as much as Todd, the district court attributed $56,773.90

as Stacey’s income as of the trial date, which included overtime worked. As the

wage exhibits admitted at trial showed, as an hourly employee, Stacey had minimal

overtime income that increased her salary of $52,353.60 ($25.17 per hour).

Stacey contended her overtime was not guaranteed but admitted she had received

between $1500 to $1700 in overtime income each of the two years before trial.

The couple separated in May 2023. Since that time, Todd lived in a rental

townhome and Stacey remained in the marital home, which she wanted to keep.

Stacey petitioned for temporary support in February 2024, and the parties agreed

to a support payment of $2500 a month and $30,000 lump sum, which was half of

the after-tax value of Todd’s bonus. Todd was to continue paying real estate taxes

and homeowner’s insurance, and he paid the registration fee on Stacey’s vehicle.

The parties proceeded to trial on July 9, 2024, and the district court filed its decree

of dissolution of marriage on July 30. After dividing the assets and debts of the

parties, the district court ordered Stacey to pay Todd an equalization payment of

$204,144.24.3 To resolve the spousal-support issue, the district court required

Todd to pay Stacey spousal support of $2600 a month plus 50% of any future

eligible for Bonus amounts greater than those referenced above, and
team members scoring less than 100% on their Performance Review
will have their Bonus adjusted accordingly.
3 With the equalization payment, each party received $643,224 in net assets.
5

gross annual bonus that is $15,000 or less, for a maximum annual lump sum

payment of $7500.

Stacey filed a motion to reconsider or amend and enlarge findings, arguing

the district court failed to equitably fix spousal support, which the district court

denied. Stacey appeals the district court’s determination of spousal support and

requests appellate attorney fees. Todd has also requested that Stacey pay his

appellate attorney fees.

II. Standard of Review.

Our review of spousal support awards is de novo. See In re Marriage of

Mann, 943 N.W.2d 15, 18 (Iowa 2020). “An appellate court should disturb the

district court’s determination of spousal support only where there has been a failure

to do equity.” In re Marriage of Sokol, 985 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Iowa 2023) (cleaned

up). “We give weight to the factual determinations made by the district court;

however, their findings are not binding upon this court.” Mann, 943 N.W.2d at 18

(cleaned up).

III. Discussion.

We first address the spousal-support award and then the requests from

each party for an award of appellate attorney fees and costs.

A. Spousal Support Award.

Stacey argues the district court’s determination of spousal support was not

adequate to support her standard of living and that the district court

underestimated Todd’s base income and expected bonus. She also contends the

district court should not have considered overtime in her earning capacity. Todd

disputes her contention that the district court’s award was inequitable.
6

Here, the parties agreed that Stacey should receive traditional spousal

support under Iowa Code section 598.21A (2023), given that Stacey and Todd

were married thirty-five years before they divorced. See In re Marriage of Stenzel,

908 N.W.2d 524, 533 (Iowa Ct. App. 2018) (“Iowa cases ‘emphasize that in

marriages of relatively long duration’—and all agree this thirty-two-year marriage

is of long duration—the imposition of and length of an award of traditional spousal

support is ‘primarily predicated’ on need and the ability to pay.” (citation omitted)).

Stacey has likely reached her maximum earning capacity, which is significantly

less than Todd’s. See In re Marriage of Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d 530, 543

(Iowa 2022) (“We focus on the earning capacity of the spouses, not their actual

income. With respect to ability to pay, we have noted that following a marriage of

long duration, we have affirmed awards both of alimony and substantially equal

property distribution, especially where the disparity in earning capacity has been

great.” (cleaned up)). Here, the district court found that “based on the facts of this

case,” an equal division of property was warranted. And, in that division, Stacey

received no assets that produce income, except for retirement accounts for later

use. See In re Marriage of Schenkelberg, 824 N.W.2d 481, 487 (Iowa 2012)

(awarding spousal support when “[wife] was fifty-seven years old at the time of the

dissolution. She received no assets that will produce a significant stream of

income to keep her in the lifestyle she had become accustomed to while married

to [husband]”). Instead, the property division added to Stacey’s monthly debt

obligations.

So, to determine if the spousal-support award is appropriate, we look at

Todd’s ability to pay and Stacey’s need for support. “The imposition and length of
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an award of traditional [spousal support] is primarily predicated on need and

ability.” In re Marriage of Wendell, 581 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998)

(en banc). Traditional spousal support “is normally payable until the death of either

party, the payee’s remarriage, or until the dependent is capable of self-support at

the lifestyle to which the party was accustomed during the marriage.” Pazhoor,

971 N.W.2d at 543 (citation omitted).

1. Ability to Pay.

Starting with Todd’s ability to pay, the district court stated that “Todd’s

current income is more complex given his base wage and salary” and “more

complicated given his bonuses.” To navigate around that concern and to arrive at

the amount of spousal support awarded, the district court ran a calculation using

the income and bonus averages for Todd and the income and overtime estimate

of $56,773.90 for Stacey:

If the parties’ annual incomes are added together, it results in a
household income of $175,716.20 [Toddy’s salary of $103,255.40 +
Todd’s bonus of $15,686.90 + Stacy’s salary of $56,773.90] or
$14,643.02 per month. The difference in incomes between Todd and
Stacey is $62,168.40 per year or $5,180.70 per month. To even out
the monthly income of the parties, Todd would have to pay Stacey
$2,590.35 per month in spousal support (Stacey’s monthly income
$4,731.16 (+) Todd’s monthly income $9,911.86 (=) household
monthly income $14,643.02; household monthly income $14,643.02
(*) 50% (=) $7,231.51; Todd’s monthly income $9,911.86 (-) half of
household monthly income $7,231.51 (=) spousal support offset
$2,590.35). Based on this information, the Court finds it fair to set
the base spousal support award at $2,600.00 per month (or
$31,200.00 per year).[4]

4 If the actual earning potential of Todd was factored into this same formula, the

spousal support obligation would be $6,438.95 to equalize the gross household
monthly income.
8

To arrive at the base wage, the district court looked back at the base wage income

from 2015 through 2024 and used the average wage of $103,255.40 in the “ability

to pay” consideration. But the evidence at trial confirmed that Todd’s base

earnings have steadily increased and were $162,545.76 annually at the time of the

dissolution trial. There was no reason to average the wages to address his ability

to pay spousal support. Plus, the district court was “not persuaded by Todd’s

argument that a bonus [was] unlikely given the consistency of his bonuses and his

recent promotions.” Yet the district court did the same thing with the bonuses,

excluding the full amount of the 2023 bonus of $100,9745 and averaging several

years of smaller bonuses, arriving at an average bonus of $15,686.90. Using past,

smaller bonuses to come up with an average was inequitable under these facts

because with Todd’s new role as a director starting in 2023, the bonus structure

results in a larger target bonus, with even greater potential should the metric be

met. So, we find including the lower bonuses paid prior to 2023 is not equitable,

yet we agree that the bonus of $100,974 is an outlier that should also not be

considered.

The formula employed by the district court did not address the factors that

are essential to setting the spousal-support obligation. “The legislature has not

authorized Iowa courts to employ any fixed or mathematical formula in applying

spousal support.” In re Marriage of Mauer, 874 N.W.2d 103, 107 (Iowa 2016).

5 The district court reduced this larger 2023 bonus to $48,763, the target bonus for

2024, but it did not remove from the bonus calculation the small bonus of $2048
due to COVID-19 issues that appeared to be an outlier on the low side.
9

Instead, without a prescriptive formula, courts must make determinations of

spousal support with the criteria listed in section 598.21A(1):

a. The length of the marriage.
b. The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.
c. The distribution of property made pursuant to
section 598.21.
d. The educational level of each party at the time of marriage
and at the time the action is commenced.
e. The earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance,
including educational background, training, employment skills, work
experience, length of absence from the job market, responsibilities
for children under either an award of custody or physical care, and
the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or
training to enable the party to find appropriate employment.
f. The feasibility of the party seeking maintenance becoming
self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that
enjoyed during the marriage, and the length of time necessary to
achieve this goal.
g. The tax consequences to each party.
h. Any mutual agreement made by the parties concerning
financial or service contributions by one party with the expectation of
future reciprocation or compensation by the other party.
i. The provisions of an antenuptial agreement.
j. Other factors the court may determine to be relevant in an
individual case.

The court considers “all” factors in section 598.21A when determining the equitable

amount of spousal support, Schenkelberg, 824 N.W.2d at 486, and “the various

factors . . . cannot be considered in isolation from each other,” In re Marriage of

Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015).

Spousal support is not intended as an equalization of income payment;

spousal support is intended to “maintain a standard of living reasonably

comparable to that . . . enjoyed in the marriage.” In re Marriage of Becker, 756

N.W.2d 822, 827 (Iowa 2008); see also In re Marriage of Hettinga, 574 N.W.2d

920, 922 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (“The purpose of a traditional or permanent [spousal

support] award is to provide the receiving spouse with support comparable to what
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he or she would receive if the marriage continued.”). “The standard does not

change simply because the payor’s income or financial condition improves after

the parties separate or after the marriage is dissolved. This standard of living

during the marriage sets the highest level of spousal support . . . .” Stenzel, 908

N.W.2d at 533.

While we consider the current base salary in the ability-to-pay analysis,

other than two notable outliers in Todd’s bonus history, $2048 in 2022 (before

promotion) and $100,974 in 2024 (after promotion), Todd’s bonuses since his

promotion were established by documentation from the company. And, contrary

to Todd’s testimony that the bonuses were not guaranteed, the company set those

targets, which Todd had met in his new role. With Todd’s substantial increase in

income, we think the average of his base wages and bonuses over the past ten

years is a poor metric for determining his ability to pay for the purposes of spousal

support. Instead, we think Todd’s most recent base income, $162,546, with an

expected bonus of $48,764, the low end of his target bonus range, for a total of

$211,310, is most representative of Todd’s earning potential.6

As to the difference in earnings from time of trial compared to pre-

separation, Todd argues that the future increases in his earnings are irrelevant “as

long as Stacey’s support at the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage

is satisfied.” We agree, but we clarify that once the standard-of-living expense is

established, the earning capacity of the payor must be taken into account to

6 In an exhibit admitted at trial, Todd used the current base salary and his target

bonus to reflect the impact of spousal support. He showed the calculations both
using the bonus and excluding the bonus.
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determine what is equitable for both parties. See id. Here, Todd can support both

his marital standard of living and supplement Stacey’s at the pre-separation

standard.

The court found Stacey was entitled to a portion of Todd’s bonus as “the

parties enjoyed Todd’s bonus for many years” and the bonus will “provide some

potential for additional support” for Stacey. Plus, we take into account the fact that

Stacey supported Todd when he needed to leave a better paying, more stressful

job early in the marriage. So while we consider his minimum future bonuses as

part of his annual salary for the purposes of determining the appropriate spousal

support, we disagree with the district court’s decision to award a percentage of

future bonuses in addition to the monthly spousal-support payment. See In re

Marriage of Hayne, 334 N.W.2d 347, 351 (Iowa 1983) (en banc) (noting it was

against “public policy” to award anticipated future income as spousal support).

Thus, we reevaluate what funds are necessary to support Stacey’s standard of

living enjoyed during the marriage.

2. Need for Support.

We pivot to Stacey’s ability to maintain her standard of living that she

enjoyed during the marriage. We look to her June 2024 paystub information, which

the district court used to calculate her 2024 annual income, finding that Stacey was

likely to earn $56,774, or a net income of $3793 per month. There was no evidence

of a pattern of other overtime being paid except for approximately $1500 in 2023.

Stacey testified that overtime was not guaranteed and she could not rely on it for

budgeting purposes. But Stacey did testify if there was a lookback over the last

five years, there might be a “variation” in her income because of overtime. Thus,
12

we use the earning capacity established by the district court. “It is appropriate to

exclude overtime income only if it is uncertain or speculative. History over recent

years is the best test of whether certain payments are expected or speculative.”

In re Marriage of Withers, No. 03-0753, 2004 WL 434128, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App.

Mar. 10, 2004) (internal citation omitted).

Next, we turn to Stacey’s need for spousal support while factoring in her

earning capacity to support her standard of living. To determine an appropriate

spousal-support award, we start by determining the costs of Stacey’s standard of

living within the marriage. As the court in Stenzel noted:

“Often in marriage dissolutions, incomes that were adequate
to support married couples . . . are stretched precariously thin in
order to cover the expense of maintaining two separate households.”
Moreover, if the same standard of living cannot be maintained,
support should not be fixed at the cost of the standard of living of the
payor. Ideally, the support should be fixed so the continuation of
both parties’ standard of living can continue, if possible.

908 N.W.2d at 534 (internal citations omitted). The district court noted that portions

of the parties’ submitted expenses from their filed financial status affidavits were

inflated. Todd points to Stacey’s estimation of her energy bill, which was

significantly greater than her most recent energy bills (Stacey claimed she had not

been running the air conditioner to save money); her newly added mowing and

snow removal services she did not have during the marriage; and the fact she no

longer rents a storage unit yet still included the expense. The district court

estimated that Stacey’s expenses were more likely in the $5000 to $6000 range

rather than the average of $7333 she claimed each month. We generally give

deference to the district court’s credibility assessments. See In re Marriage of

Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 703 (Iowa 2007) (“Although our review is de novo, we
13

ordinarily defer to the trial court when valuations are accompanied by supporting

credibility findings or corroborating evidence.”).

But here, Todd filed a financial affidavit that—on appeal he claims—

included his expenses “based on his projected budget requirement to reattain the

standard of living that he was enjoying during the marriage” with a total outlay of

more than $7976 each month.7 Those expenses included a mortgage payment of

$1900 for a $200,000 home he would be purchasing. Stacey’s reported expenses

totaled approximately $7333 per month but did not reflect the court-ordered

requirement that she pay Todd a lump-sum payment of $204,144.24. Financing

this lump-sum payment would require an additional mortgage payment of $1900

on top of the $700 per month she already owed her mother, for a total mortgage

payment of $2,600 each month.8 As a comparison, the district court correctly noted

that the 2022 joint net taxable income of the parties was approximately $120,000,

meaning the parties only had about $10,000 per month to spend; the range of

expenses for each post-separation should only be $5000–6000 per month. But

that suggests that the marital standard of living should be reduced by half. And,

while separation of the couple does often leave less for each to spend than if they

7 While Todd’s expense list included a monthly payment to their adult daughter of

more than $1000 that was set to sunset soon, we note that the parties had
supported their daughters at various times during the marriage. Stacey testified
Todd was still financially able to do so while she would be limited in making gifts
of that nature to their adult children post-dissolution.
8 Both parties signed a mortgage note with Stacey’s parents that required interest-

free payments of $700 per month until paid in full. The balance of the note at the
time of trial was $26,100, which—assuming normal payments—would not be paid
off for approximately thirty-eight months.
14

were a joint unit, here the $10,000 per month standard of living can be supported,

which complies with the statute.

With the view that they had $10,000 to spend, we observe that the couple

did not leave the marriage with much by way of savings, suggesting they spent

what they made. As a married couple, Todd and Stacey took vacations and were

members of a country club. While they described themselves as frugal, it is

reasonable to assume their standard of living would not be half of what they spent

as a couple. As a result, for our analysis, we accept that the reported expenses

might be inflated but because the parties both reported similar monthly expenses

of $7333.33 and $7976, we accept that range as defining the marital standard of

living. In doing so, we note that Stacey did not include many specific expenses,

such as a clothing allowance or the payment she will now add to her mortgage

obligation, so we split the difference between the parties’ reported estimates and

use $7655 per month as Stacey’s standard of living during the marriage, just short

of what Todd reported.

The district court determined that Stacey’s need could be met with a spousal

support payment of $2600 per month plus “50% of the gross of any bonus that is

$15,000.00 or less (maximum $7,500.00 annually).” Thus, if the bonuses pan out,

Stacey could expect spousal support of $3,225 per month ($2600 + $625).

Because we remove the requirement that future bonuses be paid in addition to the

monthly spousal-support award, we modify the decree to require Todd to pay
15

$3,862 per month ($7655 – $37939) with the conditions imposed by the district

court that the obligation will continue until Stacey dies, remarries, or cohabitates.

B. Attorney Fees.

“In determining whether to award appellate attorney fees, we consider the

needs of the party making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and

whether the party making the request was obligated to defend the decision of the

trial court on appeal.” In re Marriage of Hoffman, 891 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Iowa Ct.

App. 2016) (citation omitted). Stacey was successful in her appeal, and Todd has

a better financial ability to pay the fees. Thus, we find that Todd shall pay the sum

of $7500 towards Stacey’s requested appellate attorney fees of $15,342.50 and

decline to award Todd any of his requested attorney fees of $7575.

IV. Conclusion.

We modify the decision of the district court to provide that Todd shall pay

Stacey spousal support of $3862 per month. We also award Stacey appellate

attorney fees of $7500.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

9 Stacey’s net monthly income, without spousal support, as calculated by Todd in

his exhibit setting out spousal support options.