In re Detention of Antonio Riccardo Campbell

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0892
Filed August 20, 2025

IN RE DETENTION OF ANTONIO RICCARDO CAMPBELL

ANTONIO RICCARDO CAMPBELL,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Kellyann M.

Lekar (motions) and Andrea J. Dryer (trial), Judges.

An inmate appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss based on violation of

his right to a speedy trial. AFFIRMED.

Matthew C. Moore, Assistant State Public Defender, Special Defense Unit,

Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Chicchelly, P.J., Buller, J., and Doyle,

S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2025).
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DOYLE, Senior Judge.

Antonio Campbell appeals his civil commitment as a sexually violent

predator, claiming his right to a speedy trial was violated. Upon our review, we

affirm.

On May 22, 2023, the State filed a petition to civilly commit Campbell under

Iowa Code chapter 229A (2023) as a sexually violent predator. A probable cause

hearing was held on June 7, and trial scheduled for August 30. On August 24,

Campbell both waived the ninety-day deadline (from the probable-cause hearing)

for trial and reasserted his right to trial within ninety days under Iowa Code

section 229A.7(3) (2023), resetting the speedy trial deadline to November 22. Trial

was scheduled for November 20.

On November 17, the court continued the trial on its own motion because

“unfortunately there are no Judges available to hear it.” The State requested

enlarged findings “regarding the specific circumstances” of the judge unavailability.

The district’s chief judge issued an order on November 17 with enlarged findings

in support of good cause for a brief continuance, stating:

1. On November 20, 2023, the First Judicial District, [four] of
the [thirteen] District Court Judges in D1 have scheduled vacation
and [one] judge is out on scheduled extended medical leave. As a
result only [eight] District Judges are available to cover the [eleven]
counties of the First Judicial District on November 20, 2023.
2. On November 20, 2023, [three] District Court Judges and
[one] Senior Judge are needed to cover prescheduled court days in
rural counties in the District.
3. On November 20, 2023, [two] District Court Judge[s] are
need[ed] to cover heavily prescheduled order hour dockets in [two]
urban counties in the District. A Senior Judge is also being used to
meet these obligations.
4. On the basis of the foregoing, the [three] remaining District
Court Judge[s] are needed in Black Hawk County to cover
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prescheduled mixed criminal and civil dockets including pending
criminal cases where speedy trial has not been waived.
5. All attempts were made to cover this proceeding, however,
good cause exists to continue this matter for a brief period as no
District Court Judge or Senior District Court Judge is available to
cover the entire day necessary for this one day trial.

On November 28, Campbell filed a motion to dismiss alleging a violation of

his right to trial within ninety days. In the meantime, the trial was reset for

December 12. On December 4, the district court denied Campbell’s motion to

dismiss, explaining:

The specific issue on November 20, 2023, arose out of a unique,
non-recurring course of events which included a district court judge
on extended medical leave and a shortened holiday week resulting
in [four] district court judicial vacation leaves. The undersigned went
to great lengths to describe why the date of November 20, 2023, was
not just a congested docket but was, in fact, a unique, out of the
ordinary event wherein 40% of the district court judges of the district
were unavailable. Breaking that matter down to solely consider
Black Hawk County, 50% of the district court judges regularly serving
Black Hawk County were unavailable. For the seven district court
dockets that operate in Black Hawk County daily, the Court had
available only two district court judges and a senior judge. To meet
the minimal expectations of the County, each of these judges had to
carry multiple dockets on that date which included criminal matters
for which speedy had not been waived and civil matters such as
sexual abuse and domestic abuse actions that have statutory
timeframes. It is a specifically unique and out of the ordinary
situation for Black Hawk County to cover seven fully scheduled
district court dockets with two district court judges and a senior
district court judge. This District is normally able to meet the
expectations of a congested district-wide docket without bumping
cases and the undersigned does not take lightly the rescheduling of
a matter with speedy trial implications for good cause. Only a unique,
non-recurring course of events led to the rescheduling of this case.

The court went on to explain the trial’s expedient reset to within twenty days

of the deadline and that “any prejudice to [Campbell] in this matter was greatly

reduced by the efforts of the Court to find a place for this matter on the trial

calendar.” Trial remained reset for December 12. Campbell’s counsel then
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requested a continuance due to expert unavailability on the reset trial date.

Campbell again waived and reasserted the ninety-day deadline, and trial was

rescheduled again for January 12, 2024. After the January 2024 bench trial, the

court entered an order finding Campbell a sexually violent predator and committing

him for treatment under chapter 229A.

Campbell appeals, only challenging the court’s denial of his November 28

motion to dismiss. He asserts the events listed by the court in its orders on good

cause and his motion to dismiss “were not specific circumstances arising out of . . .

nonrecurring events which create a particular scheduling problem.” Rather, he

claims the events outlined in the court’s enlarged findings was more akin to chronic

court congestion and did not rise to the level of “good cause” for continuance under

Iowa Code § 229A.7(3). See State v. Bond, 340 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Iowa 1983).

The State responds that it was not chronic court congestion—the court

provided a unique, nonrecurring reason for the continuance; and the State further

asserts the court “was not actually required to provide good cause for the

continuance when it did so on its own motion.”

Section 229A.7(3) sets a ninety-day deadline from a section 229A.5

probable cause hearing for the court to hold trial. “The trial may be continued upon

the request of either party and a showing of good cause, or by the court on its own

motion in the due administration of justice, and when the respondent will not be

substantially prejudiced.” Iowa Code § 229A.7(3). “When we determine whether

good cause for a delay exists, we focus on only one factor: the reason for the

delay.” In re Det. of Fowler, 784 N.W.2d 184, 191 (Iowa 2010) (cleaned up). If the
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date of trial passes without a continuance or the showing of good cause, “the case

must be dismissed and the defendant released.” Id. at 192.

Here, the court clearly articulated the unique, non-recurring circumstances

giving rise to the need for a short continuance—including a long-term medical

leave and four other judicial absences in a very active judicial district with a

shortened holiday schedule. As the court observed, “It is a specifically unique and

out of the ordinary situation for Black Hawk County to cover seven fully scheduled

district court dockets with two district court judges and a senior district court judge.”

Such shortage of available judges is unique and non-recurring in the district. As

in Bond, we are satisfied that the minimal delay and absence of facts showing

prejudice to Campbell “satisfy us that the trial court did not abuse its narrow

discretion in finding good cause for the delay.” See 340 N.W.2d at 280. The court

did not err in denying Campbell’s motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. And

we leave for another day the State’s contention that a continuance on the court’s

own motion does not, in sexually-violent-predator cases, require a “good cause”

finding. See Iowa Code § 229A.7(3) (“The trial may be continued upon the request

of either party and a showing of good cause, or by the court on its own motion in

the due administration of justice, and when the respondent will not be substantially

prejudiced.” (emphasis added)).

AFFIRMED.