State of Iowa v. Jimmy Prophete

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1760
Filed December 17, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JIMMY PROPHETE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Justin Lightfoot, Judge.

A defendant appeals his sentences for attempted murder and willful injury

causing serious injury. AFFIRMED.

Webb L. Wassmer of Wassmer Law Office, PLC, Marion, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, Nicholas Siefert, Assistant Attorney

General, and Samantha Stewart, certified law student intern, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and

Langholz, JJ.
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LANGHOLZ, Judge.

Jimmy Prophete asked his ex-girlfriend—the mother of his unborn child—to

meet him early one April morning with the promise of cash for her medical bills.

When she agreed and he arrived at her apartment—with a credit-union envelope

stuffed with cut-up parts of a newsprint ad—he immediately pulled her outside,

strangled her, and pushed her to the ground. He then pulled out a knife and

stabbed her repeatedly. And he struck her in the head with a hammer twice. Her

screams awoke a neighbor who yelled at Prophete to stop—causing Prophete to

flee. A jury eventually convicted Prophete of attempted murder, willful injury

causing serious injury, and domestic abuse assault with intent to inflict serious

injury. See Iowa Code §§ 707.11(1)–(2), 708.4(1), 708.2A(1), (2)(c) (2023). It also

acquitted him of a fourth charge—going armed with intent. See id. § 708.8.

At sentencing—before the same district judge who presided at his trial—the

State argued for a twenty-five-year prison sentence with a seventy-percent

mandatory minimum on the attempted-murder conviction with lesser prison

sentences on the other two convictions—ten years for willful injury and two years

for domestic abuse assault—that would be served concurrently. Prophete agreed

that any “sentences should run concurrently” and asked the court “to impose the

minimum sentences possible” for each conviction. The court imposed the

sentences on each offense proposed by the State but decided to run the

attempted-murder and willful-injury sentences consecutively rather than

concurrently for a total sentence of thirty-five years. The court explained its

reasoning for deviating from the parties’ recommendations in detail:
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First, I recognize, as [the prosecutor] stated, that these counts
involve the same event and the same victim.
I also recognize, as [Prophete’s attorney] pointed out, the
defendant’s lack of criminal history.
But a person can commit attempted murder without also
committing the crime of willful injury causing serious injury; they are
separate things.
Defendant attempted to take the life of another person, but in
doing so caused serious injuries and harm to that person that have
been long lasting.
And I find that consecutive sentences for Counts 1 and 2 are
necessary based on the extremely violent and aggravating nature of
the offense.
The fact the defendant is not remorseful.
And just the vicious nature of the attack with multiple
weapons.
The harm to the victim.
And especially the fact that defendant lured the victim out with
the envelope of fake money.
To the Court, this shows premeditation and was not
something that happened in the heat of the moment.
Based on all of those factors, I believe the defendant presents
an ongoing danger and consecutive sentences are necessary to
achieve the goals at sentencing.

Earlier in the sentencing hearing—when explaining the factors it considered in

selecting the individual prison sentences imposed for each offense—the court

elaborated on its finding that the offenses were premeditated: “Based on the trial

evidence, it appears to me that the defendant intentionally put newspaper clippings

in a bank envelope to make it appear that there was cash to lure the victim out to

a spot where he could attack her.”

Prophete now appeals the sentences for attempted murder and willful injury

causing serious injury. He argues that the district court abused its discretion by

considering two impermissible factors in deciding to impose the sentences

consecutively. First, when the court reasoned that the two offenses “are separate

things” despite occurring in the same incident with the same victim. And second,
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when relying on factual circumstances showing premeditation despite the jury

acquitting the defendant of going armed with intent.

We review a district court’s discretionary sentencing decisions for an abuse

of discretion. See State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 862 (Iowa 2023). This

deferential standard of review recognizes that the court’s decision “to impose a

particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption

in its favor.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). And “our task

on appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the district court, but to

determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” Id. at 725.

The Nature of the Separate Offenses. Prophete first argues that the district

court’s rejection of the parties’ arguments that concurrent sentences were more

appropriate because the offenses involved the same victim and arose from the

same incident was untenable. According to Prophete, the court’s reasoning that

“a person can commit attempted murder without also committing the crime of willful

injury causing serious injury; they are separate things” conflicts with the factual

circumstances here because “the underlying factual basis for each Count is the

same in this case.”

We see nothing untenable in the court’s reasoning rejecting this argument

for concurrent sentences. For starters, it is a correct statement of the law. Even

Prophete concedes that imposing consecutive sentences for attempted murder

and willful injury does not violate double jeopardy or the merger doctrine. See

Krogmann v. State, 914 N.W.2d 293, 325 (Iowa 2018) (rejecting argument that

consecutive sentences should be prohibited under those doctrines where “under

the facts of [the defendant’s] case, he could not have committed attempted murder
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without also committing willful injury” because it was contrary to the longstanding

precent that we consider only “the legal elements” and not “the facts of a particular

case” (cleaned up)). And our supreme court has explained that otherwise,

consecutive sentences may be imposed for “[s]eparate and distinct offense[s]”

even if “the several offenses were committed in the course of a single transaction.”

State v. Criswell, 242 N.W.2d 259, 260 (Iowa 1976) (cleaned up). So it was not

untenable for the court to note that the nature of each offense is different—one

focused on trying “to take the life of another person” and the other on causing

“serious injuries and harm to that person”—and to decide that the commission of

both offenses thus warranted a longer sentence than only one. See Gordon,

998 N.W.2d at 862 (noting that, among other factors, “the court must consider the

nature of the offense” when selecting “the appropriate sentence” (cleaned up)).

Factual Circumstances Showing Premeditation. Prophete next argues that

the court’s reliance on the evidence from trial that the offense was premeditated

“is inconsistent with and ignores the jury’s verdict acquitting” Prophete of going

armed with intent. He contends—based on his view that other elements of the

offense “were definitely proven”—that the jury must have found that Prophete did

not have specific intent to use a weapon against the victim.

This argument also lacks merit. Even if we were to accept Prophete’s logic

that the acquittal on the going-armed-with-intent charge is inconsistent with the

court’s finding that he acted with premeditation in strangling the victim, stabbing

her with a knife, and striking her with a hammer, that does not prevent the court

from relying on the court’s contrary factual findings from the evidence it also heard.

State v. Longo, 608 N.W.2d 471, 474–75 (Iowa 2000) (“We are convinced that a
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sentencing judge is not required to deviate from the judge’s own characterization

of the nature of a crime committed based on sworn testimony simply because the

jury has characterized the offense differently.”). Sworn witness testimony and

exhibits introduced at trial supported the court’s findings that Prophete’s attack of

the victim was premeditated. So the court did not improperly consider unproven

criminal activity. See id.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive

sentences. We thus affirm Prophete’s sentences.

AFFIRMED.