State of Iowa v. Breack Allen Bradford

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1518
Filed December 17, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

BREACK ALLEN BRADFORD,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Thomas P. Murphy,

Judge.

A defendant appeals his conviction for second-degree sexual abuse.

AFFIRMED.

Erin M. Carr (argued) of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert (argued), Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

Heard at oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and

Langholz, JJ.
2

BADDING, Judge.

This appeal presents the first opportunity for our appellate courts to consider

the constitutionality of Iowa’s newly enacted outcry statute: Iowa Code

section 622.31B (Supp. 2022). The appellant, Breack Bradford, was convicted of

sexually abusing his minor daughter. At his jury trial, the district court allowed a

child protective worker to testify about the victim’s initial disclosure of the abuse.

Bradford claims this violated his federal constitutional right to confront his accuser.

We reject that challenge because the victim—as required by the statute—testified

at trial. We also reject Bradford’s claim that the court erred by allowing the victim

to testify outside his presence and his claim that there was insufficient evidence to

support the jury’s guilty verdict.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

In April 2022, eleven-year-old L.B. was sent to the school counselor’s office

for making inappropriate sexual comments and gestures to her classmates. When

asked why she was making those comments and gestures, L.B. told the counselor

that her father, Breack Bradford, had been showing her “videos of adults having

sex” on his laptop and cell phone. The counselor reported the child’s allegations

to the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services.

The department sent Sadie Bruce—a child protective worker—to the school

to talk to L.B. The child told Bruce that her father had been showing her videos of

“sex stuff” because “there were things that boys would want to do to her when she

was older.” L.B. said that this started before she was nine years old but eventually

stopped. When Bruce asked, “What made this stop?” L.B. responded that her

father “began touching her body and showing her on her body what . . . boys would
3

do to her.” She told Bruce that her father grabbed and sucked on her breast,

rubbed his penis against her vaginal area, put his penis in her mouth, and made

her rub his penis. L.B. said that these things would happen in her bedroom and in

her parents’ bedroom.

A police officer met Bruce at the school, and they arranged for L.B. to be

interviewed the next day at the Blank Children’s Hospital STAR Center. After the

interview, Bruce and law enforcement officers met L.B.’s mother at the family’s

home. Using a black light, officers found stains on a My Little Pony rug in L.B.’s

bedroom. Three of those stains were positive for seminal fluid. The DNA profile

developed from one stain was too weak for a conclusive analysis, but the profile

developed from the other two matched Bradford’s known profile. Bradford was

arrested and charged with second-degree sexual abuse of his daughter.

As Bradford’s trial approached, the State filed a motion under Iowa Code

section 622.31B notifying Bradford that it intended to have Bruce testify about

L.B.’s initial disclosure of the sexual abuse. Bradford resisted the State’s motion,

arguing that Bruce’s testimony was hearsay and impermissible bolstering of the

child’s potential testimony. He also argued the statute violated his Sixth

Amendment right to confrontation. After a hearing on the motion, the district court

denied Bradford’s objections and ruled that “if the child victim testifies at trial,” then

her statements to Bruce would be admissible under the statute. The court also

granted the State’s motion under Iowa Code section 915.38 to have the child testify

outside Bradford’s physical presence.

L.B. was the last witness called by the State at Bradford’s trial. She

provided some of the same details about the sexual abuse that she had disclosed
4

to Bruce. She also testified that Bradford had “pulled my pants down, and he pulled

his down, and he put his penis inside my vagina.” L.B. explained that Bradford

referred to “the white stuff that came out of his penis” as “milk.” She testified that

the white stuff went onto her floor and described how “[h]e would always, like, use

my clothes to wipe it up. And I would get mad at him, because I don’t want my

favorite clothes to be all dirty and stained.” L.B. testified that these things

happened after she stopped going to daycare, which her mother said was in

February 2020.

Bradford did not testify, but he called two of L.B.’s past daycare providers,

both of whom testified that she acted in a sexually inappropriate manner when they

cared for her. They also testified that she was dishonest and that she sometimes

made up stories to get out of trouble. L.B. acknowledged on cross-examination

that she had “gotten in trouble for the lying” before. But on redirect, she testified:

Q. All right. And have you done your best to—when
somebody would ask you a question about what happened—to do
your best to be truthful in your answer? A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And when we talk about or when you told us about
all of the different things that your dad did to you, did he do those
things to you? A. Yes.
Q. Are you making any of that up? A. No.

After hearing this evidence, the jury found Bradford guilty of second-degree

sexual abuse in violation of Iowa Code section 709.3(1)(b). He appeals.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Although Bradford presents his claims in a different order, we address his

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence first. See State v. Sievers, 20

N.W.3d 203, 207 (Iowa 2025) (addressing a sufficiency challenge first because if

successful, the defendant “would be entitled to a remand for entry of acquittal, and
5

the remaining issues seeking a new trial would be moot”). We review this

challenge “for the correction of errors at law, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State.” Id. “Our review is highly deferential to the jury’s verdict,

and we affirm the jury’s verdict when the verdict is supported by substantial

evidence.” Id. (cleaned up). Evidence is substantial when “it can convince a

rational jury that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation

omitted).

Bradford argues that L.B.’s testimony was so inconsistent that no

reasonable juror could have found it credible. He points to L.B.’s history of lying

to avoid consequences and emphasizes that neither L.B.’s mother nor her brothers

were aware of the abuse—facts he claims undermine her statement that the abuse

would take place when other family members were at home. Bradford also

contends the State failed to present any physical evidence to corroborate L.B.’s

testimony. He theorizes that L.B. could have learned about the sex acts she

described at trial “from anywhere, such as school or from any number of other

sources.” In sum, Bradford’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge is an attack on

L.B.’s credibility and lack of corroborating evidence. We reject this attack for three

reasons.

First, our supreme court has held that “[a defendant]’s argument that [the

child victim]’s testimony is not credible enough to convince a rational fact finder of

his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is unavailing for sufficiency of the evidence

purposes.” State v. Donahue, 957 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Iowa 2021). Although defense

counsel’s cross-examination of L.B. brought out some inconsistencies, “this does

not require the jury to conclude that the victim is not credible or that there is
6

insufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict.” Sievers, 20 N.W.3d at 207

(cleaned up). Such “[i]nconsistencies and lack of detail are common in sexual

abuse cases.” Donahue, 957 N.W.2d at 11. Thus, L.B.’s inability to provide an

exact timeframe for the abuse or the number of times it occurred is not fatal to the

State’s case. As an expert witness explained to the jury, “a child’s concept of time

is very different than an adult’s.” According to that expert, “a lot of times a child

will say, you know, ‘a long time ago’ and mean yesterday. Or another child could

say ‘a long time ago’ and mean six months ago.”

Second, Iowa law has long “rejected the requirement of corroboration for a

sex-offense conviction.” State v. Hernandez, 20 N.W.3d 502, 507 (Iowa Ct.

App. 2025). “A sexual abuse victim’s testimony alone may be sufficient evidence

for conviction.” Donahue, 957 N.W.2d at 10–11; see also State v. Mathis, 971

N.W.2d 514, 518 (Iowa 2022) (“The victims’ testimony itself is sufficient to

constitute substantial evidence of [a defendant’s] guilt.”). L.B. was asked on direct

and cross-examination about the truthfulness of her account. And the jury was

free to believe or disbelieve her. Sievers, 20 N.W.3d at 207.

Third, there was physical evidence corroborating L.B.’s testimony. The My

Little Pony rug that was stained with Bradford’s semen substantiates L.B.’s

account of seeing “white stuff” come out of her father’s penis and drop onto the

floor of her bedroom. To try to counter this evidence, Bradford suggested at trial

that L.B. carried the rug around the house with her. But L.B., her mother, and the

oldest brother testified the rug never left L.B.’s bedroom—a room that Bradford

told a detective that he never went into.
7

In the end, “all of these disputed fact issues were for the jury to resolve, and

they did resolve them,” adverse to Bradford. Mathis, 971 N.W.2d at 519. Because

it is not our place to reweigh the evidence or resolve questions of credibility, we

reject Bradford’s sufficiency challenge. See id. (“Appellate review of the jury’s

verdict is not the trial redux.”).

III. Iowa Code section 622.31B

We now turn to Bradford’s claims based on Bruce’s testimony. Generally,

hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls within an exception in the rules of evidence

or a statute. Iowa R. Evid. 5.802. A recent statutory exception was created by

Iowa Code section 622.31B, which took effect July 1, 2022. See 2022 Iowa Acts

ch. 1095, § 2. This statute provides that in a prosecution for a sex offense against

a child, certain evidence “shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule,”

including “[t]estimony by another concerning an out-of-court statement, whether

consistent or inconsistent, made by the victim that is an initial disclosure of an

offense charged for physical abuse or a sexual offense against the victim.” Iowa

Code § 622.31B(2)(b). Among other admissibility requirements for the out-of-court

statements, the statute mandates that the child testify at the trial. Id.

§ 622.31B(3)(c).

The court in Sievers resolved a question of first impression about what

constitutes “an initial disclosure” of abuse under the statute. 20 N.W.3d at 208.

That issue is uncontested here.1 Instead, Bradford challenges the admission of

1 Bradford acknowledges that while the school counselor “was the first person L.B.

reported being shown pornography to, it was Ms. Bruce who L.B. first reported the
sexual abuse to.”
8

the child protective worker’s testimony about L.B.’s out-of-court statements on

three other grounds: (1) the statute violates the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth

Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) the statute conflicts with

established precedent by permitting bolstering of a witness’s testimony; and (3) the

district court erred in finding the statements contained sufficient safeguards of

reliability as required by section 622.31B(3)(b).

“We review claims of constitutional violations de novo.” State v. Dessinger,

958 N.W.2d 590, 597 (Iowa 2021). However, rulings on the admissibility of

hearsay are reviewed for the correction of errors at law. Sievers, 20 N.W.3d

at 208. “The State, as the proponent of the evidence, bears the burden of proving”

the exception in section 622.31B applies. Id. (citation omitted).

A. Confrontation Clause

“The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the

States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: ‘In all criminal prosecutions,

the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against

him.’” Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844 (1990) (alteration in original). This

right rests on two key principles: “a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial

and the right of cross-examination.” State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 24 (Iowa 2006)

(citation omitted). The fundamental purpose of the clause “is to ensure the

reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous

testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.” Craig,

497 U.S. at 845.

Although the hearsay rules and Confrontation Clause often operate

together to protect criminal defendants, there are instances where the
9

Confrontation Clause excludes evidence that would otherwise be admissible under

a hearsay exception. State v. Castaneda, 621 N.W.2d 435, 444 (Iowa 2001).

Specifically, the Confrontation Clause prohibits testimonial hearsay unless the

declarant testifies at trial or the right to confrontation is otherwise sufficiently

satisfied. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). Under these

principles, Bradford’s confrontation challenge fails from the start.2

In Crawford, the Supreme Court was careful to “reiterate that, when the

declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places

no constraints at all on the use of [the declarant’s] prior testimonial statements.” 3

Id. at 59 n.9. Because L.B. testified at trial—as required by Iowa Code section

622.31B(3)(c)—and was subject to cross-examination, there is no Confrontation

Clause issue. See id.; State v. Tompkins, 859 N.W.2d 631, 640 (Iowa 2015).

Bradford acknowledges this problem, but he argues that cross-examining “a third-

party witness about someone else’s statements . . . is an insufficient substitute for

one’s right to confrontation.” The trouble with this argument is that the

“Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-

examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to

whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Tompkins, 859 N.W.2d at 640 (quoting

2 Bradford seems to assert both a facial challenge and an as-applied challenge to

section 622.31B, arguing that it is unconstitutional as written and as applied. See
State v. Woods, 23 N.W.3d 258, 263 n.2 (Iowa 2025) (distinguishing between the
two). While the State takes issue with how Bradford’s challenges are framed, we
“need not dwell on the distinction” between the two because section 622.31B is
constitutional as applied to the facts of Bradford’s own case. Id. (noting that a
facial challenge “requires a defendant to establish that no set of circumstances
exists under which the Act would be valid” (cleaned up)).
3 We assume without deciding that L.B.’s statements to the child protective worker

were testimonial.
10

United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988)). Bradford was afforded that

opportunity. Accordingly, his Confrontation Clause claim fails.

B. Impermissible Bolstering

Bradford next argues that admitting L.B.’s statements through the child

protective worker’s testimony “constituted impermissible bolstering” under our

supreme court’s decision in State v. Elliott, 806 N.W.2d 660 (Iowa 2011).4 The

court in Elliott was concerned with whether the erroneous admission of hearsay

evidence prejudiced the defendant’s substantial rights. 806 N.W.2d at 672–73. It

concluded that because “the outcome of the case depended entirely on the

credibility of” three witnesses who admitted lying to police, “it is evident the sole

purpose the State could have had for introducing [the] hearsay testimony was to

bolster” those witness’s credibility, which prejudiced the defendant. Id. Thus, the

evidentiary error in that case was grounds for a new trial. Id. at 675.

Unlike Elliott, the State’s entire case did not turn on L.B.’s credibility;

instead, the State also presented forensic evidence matching Bradford’s DNA

profile to the semen found on the My Little Pony rug. And, as discussed below,

the hearsay evidence was properly admitted under section 622.31B. Because we

need not reach the question of prejudice where hearsay is properly allowed, the

court’s discussion in Elliott about impermissible bolstering does not apply here.

C. Sufficient Safeguards of Reliability

Section 622.31B(3) establishes a three-part test to determine the

admissibility of third-party testimony regarding a child’s out-of-court statement:

4 We elect to bypass the State’s error-preservation concern and reject this claim

on its merits. See State v. Taylor, 596 N.W.2d 55, 56 (Iowa 1999).
11

(1) the adverse party must be notified of the intent to offer the statements; (2) the

court must find that the timing, contents, and circumstances surrounding “the

statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability,” and (3) the declarant is a

person with an intellectual disability, a cognitive impairment, a developmental

disability, or a child. Iowa Code § 622.31B(3)(a)–(c). Bradford contests the

second element, arguing that the district court erred in determining that the outcry

testimony satisfied the statutory reliability requirement.

Bradford first points to the timing of the disclosure, highlighting that L.B.

referred to the abuse in the past tense and could not recall the last time it occurred.

He argues this undermines the reliability of her statements to the child protective

worker. Bradford also focuses on perceived inconsistencies in the content of the

child’s statements. Finally, he questions whether L.B.’s statements were

improperly prompted by adults investigating the allegations.

The district court rejected these arguments, finding:

The child’s first statement was made at a time when she was
being questioned about sexual information that the child had. She
then stated that she learned the sexual gestures from videos and/or
photos shown to her by the Defendant. The content of the remainder
of her initial disclosures came in response to open-ended, non-
leading questions asked to her by Sadie Bruce. Further, the
questions were not fashioned to prompt the child to fabricate
allegations of sexual abuse. The child provided fairly detailed
allegations of sexual abuse perpetrated by the Defendant including
a description of ejaculate from the Defendant and his name for it.
Such details should have been beyond the knowledge of a child of
eleven years. During the deposition, the child was questioned
regarding how many naked males she had seen and she testified
that she had not seen anyone other than the Defendant to gain such
knowledge. Additionally, the child has maintained her allegations
and has not recanted. The Court finds that the statements provide
sufficient safeguards of reliability.
12

We agree and affirm the district court’s finding that the outcry testimony satisfied

the statutory reliability requirement.

IV. Iowa Code section 915.38

Finally, Bradford claims that the district court erred in prohibiting his

presence in the courtroom during L.B.’s testimony under Iowa Code

section 915.38,5 which codifies the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses.

See Craig, 497 U.S. at 860 (finding the Federal Constitution does not prohibit the

use of “a one-way closed circuit television procedure for the receipt of testimony

by a child witness in a child abuse case”).

We review the court’s application of section 915.38 “for correction of errors

at law. Under this standard of review, we are bound by the district court’s well-

supported factual findings but not its legal conclusions.” State v. Gomez Medina,

7 N.W.3d 350, 356 (Iowa 2024) (cleaned up). To the extent Bradford is arguing

“that the Sixth Amendment could provide more protection than the statute,” we

review that claim de novo.6 Hernandez, 20 N.W.3d at 510 (citation omitted).

5 Although the statute provides that the minor will testify outside the courtroom

through closed-circuit equipment when its requirements are met, Iowa Code
§ 915.38(1)(a), the parties agreed to deviate from this procedure and have L.B.
testify in the courtroom while Bradford sat in another room. This procedure is not
challenged on appeal.
6 While this appeal was pending, the Iowa Supreme Court decided State v. White,

9 N.W.3d 1, 9 (Iowa 2024), which held that the Iowa Constitution was violated
when two child witnesses were allowed to testify at trial from the judge’s chambers
through a one-way closed-circuit television system. Even though he did not raise
a state constitutional argument in the district court proceedings, Bradford’s reply
brief invokes the court’s decision in White to argue that his confrontation rights
under article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution were violated. Because
Bradford “did not raise or obtain a ruling on his state-constitution claim of error,”
and because he raises this issue for the first time in reply, we grant the State’s
motion to strike that portion of his reply brief. See Hernandez, 20 N.W.3d at 509
(finding the defendant’s confrontation argument under the state constitution was
13

Iowa Code section 915.38(1)(a) provides:

Upon its own motion or upon motion of any party, a court may
protect a minor, as defined in section 599.1, from trauma caused by
testifying in the physical presence of the defendant where it would
impair the minor’s ability to communicate, by ordering that the
testimony of the minor be taken in a room other than the courtroom
and be televised by closed-circuit equipment for viewing in the
courtroom. However, such an order shall be entered only upon a
specific finding by the court that such measures are necessary to
protect the minor from trauma. Only the judge, prosecuting attorney,
defendant’s attorney, persons necessary to operate the equipment,
and any person whose presence, in the opinion of the court, would
contribute to the welfare and well-being of the minor may be present
in the room with the minor during the minor’s testimony. The judge
shall inform the minor that the defendant will not be present in the
room in which the minor will be testifying but that the defendant will
be viewing the minor’s testimony through closed-circuit television.

As we recently explained in Hernandez, this “statutory text, using nearly

identical language to” the Supreme Court’s decision in Craig,

implements that case’s requirement the court find: (1) closed-circuit
testimony is “necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child
witness who seeks to testify”; (2) “it is the presence of the defendant
that causes the trauma,” not “the courtroom generally”; and (3) that
the trauma or emotional distress inflicted on the child “is more than
de minimis, i.e., more than mere nervousness or excitement or some
reluctance to testify,” such that it impairs the child’s ability to
communicate.

Hernandez, 20 N.W.3d at 510 (quoting Craig, 497 U.S. at 855–56). Bradford

argues the State failed to prove the last two requirements. We disagree.

At the hearing on the State’s motion, L.B.’s therapist for the past year

testified that it would be traumatic for the child to testify in front of Bradford.

Although this court has recognized that manifestations of trauma “are not limited

not preserved where it was not raised in or decided by the district court); Villa
Magana v. State, 908 N.W.2d 255, 260 (Iowa 2018) (“Generally, we will not
consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief.”).
14

to outward expressions of fear,” id. at 512, those expressions were present here.

The therapist explained that L.B. becomes visibly afraid at the mention of Bradford.

She described how L.B. would cry when asked questions about Bradford, and

“quite often she will curl up in the fetal position, put her head down, and sometimes

change the subject.” When asked to clarify whether “afraid” meant more than

being nervous, the therapist answered,

No, she’s—she’s scared. She has said, “I don’t want to be in
the same room with him.”
Q. So it’s more than nervous, it’s more than just being excited
and reluctant to tell others about what happened to her? A. Yep.

The therapist testified that in her professional opinion, forcing the child “to

testify in court in front of her father [would] cause her serious emotional distress,

such that she could not . . . reasonably communicate.” She explained that L.B.

“doesn’t understand this whole system. She thinks if somebody is going to go to

jail, it is either Dad or her. So if she is in trouble, in her words, then she’s going to

go to jail if she doesn’t say whatever . . . she believes people want to hear.” The

therapist testified that if L.B. were forced to testify in front of her father at trial, “she

would regress, and I believe she would tell what she thinks her dad wants to hear.

And I believe that she might actually be untruthful for fear of herself going to jail.”

The therapist noted that “the closer we get to the court date the more you can see

and feel the trauma . . . that she’s experienced. She becomes reluctant to talk.

She becomes afraid to talk.”

We have found similar “difficulties in communication due to an abuse

victim’s ‘detached state’ were sufficient to satisfy the statute and Craig.” Id. at 513

(citing State v. Bailey, No. 01-0955, 2002 WL 31308238, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App.
15

Oct. 16, 2002)). “So too for the risk an abuse victim ‘might potentially shut down’

when facing their abuser in court.” Id. (citing State v. McDonnell, No. 08-0798,

2009 WL 1492839, at *3–5 (Iowa Ct. App. May 29, 2009)). As in Hernandez, we

conclude the district court’s fact-findings were supported by substantial evidence

and our precedent under Iowa Code section 915.38. Cf. State v. Richards,

No. 07-0916, 2008 WL 2042615, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 14, 2008) (affirming the

district court’s ruling that denied the State’s request for closed-circuit testimony

where an expert provided only general testimony “about what children who are

abused go through” (emphasis removed)). We accordingly affirm the court’s

closed-circuit ruling.

V. Conclusion

We affirm Bradford’s conviction for second-degree sexual abuse, finding

substantial evidence supported the jury’s guilty verdict. We reject his constitutional

challenge to Iowa Code section 622.31B and find the State satisfied the statute’s

reliability requirement. The State also met its burden to establish the statutory and

constitutional requirements to allow the minor victim to testify outside Bradford’s

presence at trial.

AFFIRMED.