Rodney Lee Borushaski v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1073
Filed January 28, 2026
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Rodney Lee Borushaski,
Applicant–Appellant,
v.
State of Iowa,
Defendant–Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable Karen Romano and The Honorable Christopher Kemp,
Judges.
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AFFIRMED
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Gary Dickey of Dickey, Campbell, & Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines,
attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Ahlers, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Bower, S.J.
Opinion by Bower, S.J.

1
BOWER, Senior Judge.

Rodney Borushaski appeals from the district court’s denial of his
second application for postconviction relief (PCR). Upon our review, we
affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Bob and Marilyn Blewer were murdered in their trailer at the Iowa
State Fair in 1996. The Blewers’ daughter, Jamie; her husband, Rodney
Borushaski, and Jeremy Sneed were charged with the murders.[ 1
Following a jury trial, Rodney Borushaski was convicted of two counts of
murder in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Borushaski v. State, No. 01-1683, 2003 WL 183284, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.
Jan. 29, 2003). This court affirmed Borushaski’s convictions on direct
appeal, rejecting his challenges to the district court’s submission of a felony-
murder instruction and refusal to permit a defense witness to testify about
Sneed’s statements to Marilyn Blewer during an argument a few days before
the murders. State v. Borushaski, No. 97-0266, at *5–13 (Iowa Ct. App.
Sept. 30, 1998). Procedendo issued in December 1998.

In 2000, Borushaski filed a PCR application, raising claims of
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and newly-discovered
evidence. Following a hearing, the district court denied Borushaski’s claims.
Borushaski appealed, and this court affirmed. Borushaski, 2003 WL 183284,
at *1–3.

In 2018, Borushaski filed a second PCR application,2 raising claims of
ineffective assistance of PCR counsel, newly-discovered evidence, and actual

1
Jamie and Sneed were also found guilty of the Blewers’ murders.
2
Borushaski amended his application several times.

2
innocence. In short, Borushaski maintained he was not involved with the
murders, relying on affidavits from various people recounting statements
made by Jamie or Sneed which he alleged supported his claims. The State
moved to dismiss Borushaski’s application as time-barred under the three-
year statute of limitations in Iowa Code section 822.3 (2018). The State
further argued the record did not support Borushaski’s claims of newly-
discovered evidence and the claims were previously litigated in his first PCR
action. In two orders,3 the district court dismissed Borushaski’s claims. He
appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We generally review postconviction proceedings, including summary
dismissals of postconviction-relief applications, for errors at law.” Moon v.
State, 911 N.W.2d 137, 142 (Iowa 2018). When the district court dismisses an
application for postconviction relief prior to trial, see Iowa Code § 822.6, we
apply summary judgment standards on review, Moon, 911 N.W.2d at 142.

DISCUSSION
Iowa Code section 822.3 requires PCR applications to “be filed within
three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of
an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued.” Borushaski
acknowledges his application was filed outside the three-year deadline.
Instead, he relies on the statute’s exception to its limitation period:

3
A hearing took place in September 2018, after which the court entered an order
dismissing most of Borushaski’s claims but finding a claim of actual innocence survived
summary judgment. Following a second hearing in May 2024, the court dismissed the
surviving actual-innocence claim, as well as additional claims Borushaski had raised since.

3
“However, this limitation does not apply to a ground of fact or law that could
not have been raised within the applicable time period.” Iowa Code § 822.3.

For this exception to apply, there must be a nexus between the asserted
ground of fact and the challenged conviction. Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d
509, 520 (Iowa 2003). “This additional requirement is based on the common
sense conclusion that it would be absurd to toll the statute of limitations
pending the discovery of a trivial fact that could not possibly affect the
challenged conviction.” Id. An exonerating ground of fact must therefore be
relevant to that conviction. Id. at 521. “By ‘relevant’ we mean the ground of
fact must be of the type that has the potential to qualify as material evidence
for purposes of a substantive claim under section 822.2.” Id.

Borushaski challenges the court’s dismissal of his claims relating to the
following alleged new grounds of facts and/or newly-discovered evidence:

• Affidavit from his son, Gunnar Borushaski, stating Gunnar
visited Jamie in prison “approximately three years and one half
years ago,” at which time Jamie said Borushaski “was
innocent.”

• Affidavit from his daughter, Samantha Borushaski, attesting
Jamie “answered ‘yes,’ that she had admitted” to Gunnar “that
she was involved, and that my dad, Rodney Borushaski, was
innocent.”

• Affidavit from Rhett Nelson, who had been “involved in an
intimate relationship with Jamie,” stating Jamie “confessed”
Borushaski “had nothing to do with the murders.”

4
• Affidavit from his father, Dan Borushaski, stating in 1996, his
wife Linda informed him she overheard “two of the members
seated on the jury” discussing Borushaski’s criminal trial in the
restroom and one of the jurors said “I don’t know who to
believe”; Dan “took this information to [his son’s attorney,
who instructed him, “Shut up. . . . This is not gonna end in a
mistrial.”

• Affidavit from his stepmother, Linda Borushaski, attesting to
overhearing the above-mentioned conversation between two
jurors in the restroom.

• Three affidavits from his mother, Sharon Scritchfield: attesting
to overhearing the above-mentioned conversation between two
jurors in the restroom; stating Jamie declared immediately after
learning Borushaski had been arrested he “had nothing at all to
do with the murders of her mom and dad”; and attesting to a
letter she found, addressed to Jamie, from Sneed’s former
cellmate, stating Borushaski “was not at fault” for the murders
and Sneed said Borushaski “was innocent.”

• Affidavit from his brother, Doug Borushaski, stating Jamie
“wanted [her parents dead” and she planned to kill them and
take their money “so she could use it when she left
[Borushaski ” and “[a t one point she supposedly admitted to
my mother that she knew the real story and that [Borushaski
was innocent . . . .”

• Affidavit from Sneed’s cellmate, Jeff Sawvel, stating Borushaski
was not involved with the murders.

5
After two hearings, the PCR court denied relief to Borushaski. As the
PCR court noted, the record from Borushaski’s criminal trial establishes
Jamie denied Borushaski had any involvement with the murders; for
example, when she was asked, “Were you ever aware of any plan or intent on
the part of your husband, Rodney Borushaski, to do anything to hurt your
parents?” she responded, “Absolutely not.” We further observe by the time
of the hearing on his first PCR application in 2001, Borushaski recounted
“newly discovered evidence,” which included “Jamie admitting to people
that, hey, you know, she was involved in it, that I wasn’t”; Sneed requesting
Borushaski to be “let go because I was not involved in this”; and additional
details about Jamie’s relationship, conversations, and written
correspondence with Sneed.

Upon our review, even viewing the record in the light most favorable
to Borushaski, his claims fail. As the PCR court noted, although Borushaski’s
claims “create[ additional layers of nebulousness,” “both sides accurately
argue the record is devoid of information as to when Borushaski learned of
the ‘newly discovered’ evidence and proof that it could not have been raised
earlier.” Moreover, the evidence is not “of the type that has the potential to
qualify as material evidence for the purposes of a substantive claim under
section 822.2.” See Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 520. Indeed, on Borushaski’s
direct appeal of his underlying convictions, this court highlighted his
“confession to [a fellow inmate ,” as well as “four witnesses who testified to
[his desire to have the Blewers killed and to his planning of the murders,”
observing “[t here was overwhelming evidence presented at trial to support
that [he planned the Blewers’ murder and robbery.” Borushaski, No. 97-
0266, at *11, 13.

6
In short, the evidence Borushaski now challenges has either been
previously considered, is unlikely to change the result of trial, or was based
on historical information available to him if he looked. See, e.g., Borushaski,
2003 WL 183284, at *3 (rejecting a claim of newly-discovered evidence
“consisting of letters between his wife, Jamie, and Jeremy Sneed, and
statements made by Jamie after Borushaski’s trial”); Tooson v. State, No. 24-
0854, 2025 WL 2407598, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2025) (“Tooson does
not provide information or evidence that supports any merit to this claim.
[He provides only information that was available to Tooson if he looked.”).
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Borushaski’s
second PCR application.

AFFIRMED.

7