In the Interest of E.M., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
_______________

No. 25-1747
Filed January 28, 2026
_______________

In the Interest of E.M., Minor Child,
S.A., Mother,
Appellant.
_______________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County,
The Honorable Virginia Cobb, Judge.
_______________

AFFIRMED
_______________

Chira L. Corwin of Corwin Law Firm, Des Moines, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Natalie Hedberg, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.

Donna Schauer of Schauer Law Office, Adel, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor child.
_______________

Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Chicchelly, JJ.
Opinion by Greer, P.J.

1
GREER, Presiding Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to one child.1
On our de novo review, we conclude the State established the statutory
grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence and that
termination was in the child’s best interests. We decline the mother’s
request for an additional six months to remedy her situation.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The child was born six weeks premature in May 2024 and tested
positive for marijuana at birth. The mother admitted to using marijuana once
shortly before she went into labor. On May 17, the State filed a child in need
of assistance (CINA) petition.

The child was removed from the mother’s care in mid-June, after he
was discharged from the hospital. On June 26, the mother had a drug-testing
sweat patch applied, after which she tested positive for amphetamine and
methamphetamine.

When the child was born, the mother had three older children, all
adjudicated as CINA. All three of the children had been removed from the
mother’s care. In that combined case, the Iowa Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) pursued CINA adjudications due to the mother’s
substance-use and mental-health issues as well as concerns about her ability
to properly supervise the children.

1
The father initially appealed the termination of his parental rights but eventually
voluntarily dismissed his appeal.

2
On August 27, the child was adjudicated in need of assistance. The
same day, the mother’s parental rights to her three older children were
terminated.

During the course of these proceedings, a worker from Families First
Counseling Services (FCS) supervised visits between the mother and child.
In September, an FCS progress report noted that the mother “loves [the
child] very much” but does not “always use the best judgment.” For
example, the mother gave the child the wrong formula after being told the
correct formula to use, which led to the child becoming sick after visits.
Despite that, the report noted the mother had “been consistent with her
interactions with” the child.

In October, the mother began inpatient substance-use treatment.
However, she left after approximately four days. She then completed
admission to an outpatient treatment program, attending sporadically and
making minimal progress.

In November, the mother started inpatient substance-use treatment at
a different treatment program, successfully completing the program in
December. She did outpatient aftercare after completing the program but
tested positive for THC in December.

Next, the mother began a residential treatment program in January
2025 but left after one day. She originally intended to start there for
outpatient treatment, but she and the HHS social worker discussed the
possibility of the mother participating in the inpatient program and having
the child returned to her care. However, the social worker wanted to see her
in the program developing some stability before transitioning the child to her
care. The mother chose to exit the inpatient program instead.

3
HHS requested drug screens in January and February, but the mother
did not provide them as requested. However, the mother lived in a county
which only provided drug testing for one hour, once per week. Additionally,
throughout this case, the mother’s driver’s license was suspended, so she
was unable to transport herself to appointments. For that reason, she was
reliant on others to transport her to visits with the child and to meetings with
providers. The mother was saving money to be able to take the necessary
class to have her license reinstated.

Also in January, the mother completed a substance-use evaluation,
which recommended outpatient treatment. On February 20, the mother
tested positive for THC.

On March 6, the mother gave birth to another child.2 This child also
tested positive for THC at birth.

In April, the mother began outpatient services at the treatment center
that had last evaluated her for substance use. The mother also underwent a
mental-health evaluation, which “recommended weekly individual sessions
via zoom or in person.” There were some difficulties getting the mother to
schedule a mental-health therapy admission appointment, but she
accomplished this task by May 28. It was recommended the mother attend
weekly therapy sessions, and “[d]ue to [her] current obligations, stressors,
needs, and barriers she met the criteria to receive mental health services via
telehealth.”

In April and May, the mother had consistent attendance and excellent
participation at the treatment program. She also “participated in random

2
At the time of this termination hearing, the parties stipulated to the adjudication
and disposition of the younger child as a CINA.

4
drug screening [on April 15 and 29 and May 20] and tested negative for all
substances.” The progress report for April and May noted the mother
“appears forthcoming and motivated in seeking insight into her co-occurring
conditions,” yet she was not attending weekly therapy sessions as
recommended.

An FCS progress report from April noted that the mother’s visits with
the child had increased to two per week. The report also detailed seven
positive visits the mother had with the child from late-March through mid-
April.

There was a domestic violence incident between the mother and father
at the mother’s home on April 30. There is no information in the record
regarding what happened. However, an FCS progress report from this same
period noted that the mother called and reported the father to the police.

An FCS progress report from May documented that the mother was
attending parenting classes two times per week. The mother also reported
cleaning out her home to make it more appropriate for the child. She had
gotten a new job, seemed “sober and alert,” and was “ready to show [the FCS
worker] what she ha[d] accomplished from day to day.” The mother was
hopeful that HHS would “approve her home for interactions.” This report
also documented eight visits the mother had with the child from April
through May.

On May 27, HHS requested the mother participate in a drug screening.
The mother did not provide a sample to be tested.

A June progress report from FCS noted that the mother continued to
attend substance-use and mental-health counseling, and that she was
attending parenting classes once or twice per week. This report also noted

5
that the mother was preparing her home for the child and was “very pleased”
with the work she had put into the home. This report noted eight visits with
the child and noted that the mother “continues to attend interactions
regularly and confirms her interactions.”

The mother participated in the treatment program’s drug tests on June
17 and 24, testing negative for all substances. On July 1, HHS again requested
the mother provide a drug screen, but she did not comply. On July 8, the
mother participated in another treatment center drug test, testing negative
for all substances. A July 10 treatment program progress report noted that
the mother had consistent attendance and excellent participation and insight.

A July progress report from FCS noted that the mother “continues to
engage in services, by meeting with [the Family Support Specialist] each
week and attending all her interactions while being prepared with the correct
baby formula, snacks and a drink” for the child. The mother was meeting
her probation requirements, saving money to take a class to get her driver’s
license back, working every day, and working on the home to make it
appropriate for the child. This report noted that the mother requested visits
take place at her home, but that the HHS social worker said the travel would
be “too disruptive” for the child to travel that far twice per week for visits.
This report noted seven visits with the child from June through July.

Still, a July 16 progress report from the treatment program noted that
the mother had attended only three mental-health therapy sessions since her
admission on May 28 to the program. This report also noted the mother
“actively participates and engages while providing feedback” and that she
“appeared forthcoming and appears motivated to seek insight into her
mental health.” Yet the report confirmed that the recommendation was for

6
psychotherapy once a week. To that end, the counselor recommended
continued telehealth therapy appointments.

On July 22, the father assaulted the mother at the mother’s home. The
mother reported the assault to the police, and a no-contact order was issued.
The mother did not report this incident to HHS or the FCS worker.

The treatment program’s August 2 progress report noted that the
mother had consistent attendance for the month of July. The report also
noted: “The client has demonstrated increased awareness in her co-
occurring disorders through recognizing triggers and patterns of behavior.
The client continues to work on her treatment plan goals of completing
probation and [HHS] requirements.”

On August 9, the mother participated in a visit supervised by the
child’s foster placement. The foster placement observed that the child “was
scared and cried the whole time.” This weekend visit before the termination
trial was the only time the mother took advantage of the extra visitation time
that had been offered.

The court held the termination hearing on August 11. At the hearing
the court heard testimony from the HHS social worker and the child’s father.
The mother did not testify. The social worker and GAL recommended
termination of the mother’s parental rights.

The social worker testified that the mother continued to struggle with
the same issues that brought the family to HHS’s attention in the first place.
One of those concerns involved the mother’s living arrangements. The
mother was still living with her mother, who had her own mental-health
concerns. The social worker noted that one room of their home had been

7
cleared out to allow for supervised interactions, but the rest of the house was
in disrepair. The social worker believed the house would be unsafe for a child.

The mother provided the court with an email from her mental-health
therapist, who had taken over after the mother’s prior therapist went on
parental leave in May 2025. The mother attended her first session with the
new therapist on May 28 and had attended six sessions with that therapist.

When asked whether she thought a six-month extension would permit
the mother to regain custody of the child, the social worker testified: “I don’t
believe so.” She explained that the mother had yet to provide a drug screen
upon request on a random basis and that the mother’s “own provider
indicat[ed] that her insight level has gone from excellent to moderate.” The
social worker acknowledged the county’s difficult drug-testing schedule and
acknowledged there was a process for HHS to go to the mother’s home to do
the drug screens, but the social worker had not asked for that. In the social
worker’s view, “it needs to be approved ahead of time through certain
protocols, and my understanding is it’s very difficult to get that approved.”
The social worker did not explain why she did not attempt to have it
approved, but in any event, the mother had requested that the testing stay
local in her home county. Likewise, the mother did not explain why she never
submitted to the HHS drug testing requests.

When asked about the mother’s mental health, the social worker
recalled that, during two of the older children’s cases, the mother’s
“depression had basically paralyzed her to the point where she wouldn’t even
get out of bed.” Thus, the social worker took issue with the mother’s
decision to participate in telehealth therapy rather than in-person therapy
“due to the extensive history of mental health services, not fully complying
and—consistently; and to my knowledge, it’s not being attended in person

8
yet.” This was despite the mental-health provider’s recommendation for
telehealth visits, although the social worker contended there was
transportation available to the sessions if requested.

On October 3, the juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental
rights. The mother appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. In re M.W.,
876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016). “We are not bound by the juvenile court’s
findings of fact, but we do give them weight, especially in assessing the
credibility of witnesses.” In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014)
(citation omitted).

“We will uphold an order terminating parental rights if there is clear
and convincing evidence of grounds for termination under Iowa Code
section 232.116.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010). “Evidence
is clear and convincing when there are no serious or substantial doubts as to
the correctness or conclusions of law drawn from the evidence.” Id.
(cleaned up).

III. Analysis.

On appeal, the mother argues the State failed to prove the statutory
grounds for termination and that termination was not in the child’s best
interests. The mother also claims the juvenile court should have granted her
a six-month extension of time to have the child returned to her care.

We follow a three-step analysis to determine whether termination of
parental rights is appropriate under Iowa Code section 232.116 (2025). Id.
“First, the court must determine if a ground for termination under section

9
232.116(1) has been established.” Id. “If a ground for termination is
established, the court must, secondly, apply the best-interest framework set
out in section 232.116(2) to decide if the grounds for termination should
result in a termination of parental rights.” Id. at 706–07. “Third, if the
statutory best-interest framework supports termination of parental rights, the
court must consider if any statutory exceptions set out in section 232.116(3)
should serve to preclude termination of parental rights.” Id. at 707.

Here, the juvenile court terminated the mother’s rights under Iowa
Code sections 232.116(1)(e) and (g). We conclude the State proved by clear
and convincing evidence a ground for termination under section
232.116(1)(g). When the juvenile court orders termination of parental rights
on more than one statutory ground, we need only find grounds to terminate
on one of the sections to affirm. See In re J.B.L., 844 N.W.2d 703, 704 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2014).

A. Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g). To terminate parental rights
under section 232.116(1)(g), the State must prove the following:
(1) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance
pursuant to section 232.96.

(2) The court has terminated parental rights pursuant to
section 232.117 with respect to another child who is a member of the same
family or a court of competent jurisdiction in another state has entered an
order involuntarily terminating parental rights with respect to another
child who is a member of the same family.

(3) There is clear and convincing evidence that the parent
continues to lack the ability or willingness to respond to services which
would correct the situation.

(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that an additional period
of rehabilitation would not correct the situation.

10
The mother agrees that the State has proven the first two elements of
subsection (g), but she asserts that the State has failed to prove the final two
elements. So we address whether the State proved by clear and convincing
evidence that the mother lacks the ability or willingness to respond to
services and that additional time would not correct the situation.

Unlike other grounds for termination, under this ground, we focus on
the parent’s behavior in the past termination cases to decide if termination is
appropriate given the current parental behavior. See In re J.H., 952 N.W.2d
157, 167 (Iowa 2020). The juvenile court took judicial notice of the August
2024 termination of parental rights order related to the older three children.
With respect to those children, who were adjudicated CINA in August 2023,
the juvenile court noted:
To the knowledge of [HHS] there are no records of the mother
being involved in mental health therapy. The mother reportedly
completed a substance abuse evaluation and had an opportunity to
complete inpatient treatment two times and passed on both opportunities.
The mother was attending outpatient treatment, but only about half as
often as recommended.

Thus, the services needed to correct the long-standing situation
focused on substance-use and mental-health treatment. The substance-use
treatment component required that the mother submit to HHS-requested
drug testing to confirm no use. The mental health consideration required
attendance and work at therapy to know what issues to tackle. At the end of
the termination trial, the GAL addressed the mother’s mental-health
treatment concerns, noting:
this mother became involved with [HHS] back in January 3rd of 2023, with
two older daughters, and from that time to now the mother just recently
had an intake for mental health treatment in April of 2025. She has not
addressed anything with her mental health issues, which are clearly set
forth in all of the reports in all of these cases and which were also

11
highlighted by the State. . . . [S]ince her intake in April of 2025 she’s only
engaged in approximately six sessions. So it’s, again, . . . [an] 11th hour
attempt.

Here, the juvenile court confirmed in the earlier termination cases that
the mother was “unable to take the basic step of becoming involved in her
own therapy, in order to work toward resuming visits.” And fast forward to
the issues the mother faces in this proceeding, while considering her lack of
insight about her mental health in the earlier proceedings, the mother has
done too little too late. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 494–95 (Iowa 2000)
(concluding a parent’s efforts in the last two to three months before the
termination hearing were “simply too late” given the parent’s lack of
progress towards reunification in the eighteen months prior). Even though
the mother did attend some sessions after the April evaluation, she did not
comply with the recommendations to attend weekly therapy sessions. For
example, when the mother did attend inpatient substance-use treatment in
November 2024, she chose not to participate in individual therapy, and thus
she did not even begin individual therapy until late spring 2025.

The same situation exists as to her substance-use recovery. Although
she provided some drug tests to HHS, she failed to test in January, February,
May, and July leading up to the termination trial, which, by department
policy, resulted in positive findings for each missed test. As for substance-
use treatment early in the case, the mother left the recommended inpatient
care after four days, tested positive for THC within a month of completing
inpatient care elsewhere, and then left another residential treatment program
after one day. The most-recent outpatient treatment seemed to be going
better since April, but the counselor downgraded the characterization of the
mother’s insight from “excellent” in early July to “moderate” later that same
month.

12
The HHS social worker involved with the case described the ongoing
concerns that had not been remediated during the years of HHS involvement
as “concerns for ongoing substance use; meeting her mental health needs; a
safe, stable living environment; domestic abuse.” And while the mother had
submitted to drug screens with her current treatment provider, the social
worker noted that the drug screens were “not observed. They are collected
when she’s planning on attending therapy, so it’s a planned appointment.
And in the past, . . . according to a criminal report, she had had a vile of urine
on her possession, so that brings into question to me future UA drug
screens.” Even though the termination trial was on the horizon, the mother
did not complete the HHS random drug screens requested on May 27 and
July 1 or even respond to the social worker.

From April, when the mother underwent a mental health evaluation,
until July, the mother only attended three therapy sessions. And while she
did attend a few more sessions before the October trial, she was to have
attended sessions on a weekly basis over almost six months. In retrospect,
the request for mental-health services was made and not followed from the
time the mother began interactions with HHS in 2023. And as the social
worker opined, “she needs to be able to address her ongoing mental health
needs to allow her to progress with her substance abuse treatment to be able
to meet all of her needs to keep herself safe and healthy to be able to
effectively parent.”

The HHS social worker was concerned about the mother’s lack of
mental health treatment, including her failure to recognize the impact of
domestic abuse. Even though there were two incidents of domestic abuse by
the father against the mother during these proceedings, a month before the
termination trial the mother admitted that she “sees” and “talks” to the

13
father, even stating that she had withdrawn the no contact order and was
hoping he would get involved with visits. Given the fact that the mother did
not report the father’s domestic abuse to any professional in the case, there
were concerns that the mother had not processed the domestic abuse
therapeutically.

Based upon this evidence, we find the State showed by clear and
convincing evidence that the mother lacks the ability or willingness to
respond to services. As discussed above, we commend the mother for her
recent participation in mental-health treatment. But, like the State argued,
we cannot know if she will have long-term results in avoiding the substance-
use pattern that has existed throughout these CINA cases.

As for the fourth element, we further find the State showed by clear
and convincing evidence that an additional period of rehabilitation would not
correct the situation. 3 After years of services to remedy her issues with
substance use and address her mental health, there is still no indication that
any period of additional time at this point would correct the situation under
Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g)(4). Accordingly, like the juvenile court, we
find clear and convincing evidence to support termination of the mother’s
parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g). See J.H., 952 N.W.2d
at 171. The mother’s avoidance of HHS drug testing, the reconnection with
the father, and the lack of follow-through on the recommended extensive
mental health counseling all support the State’s assertions that the mother
lacked the willingness or ability to respond to services and that any additional

3
The mother had also requested an additional six months to work towards
reunification, but our reasoning here also supports the finding that the situation cannot be
corrected in six months. See In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Iowa 2021) (requiring a
showing that the need for removal will no longer exist at the end of the six months).

14
time would not correct the situation. For those reasons, we conclude the
State met its burden to prove grounds for termination under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(g).

B. Best Interests. In the best-interest analysis, we “give primary
consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the
long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and
emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). We
look to the parent’s past performance as it may indicate the quality of care
the parent might provide heading into the future. In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793,
798 (Iowa 2006). As of the termination hearing, the child had been out of
the home for sixteen months of his life. The bond between the mother and
child was described by the HHS social worker as not significant. As
observed, the child only occasionally sought out the mother for care or
comfort and most often played independently at visits.

When we focus on the child’s immediate and long-term best interests,
we find that the child deserves a sober and stable parent who has addressed
both the mental-health and substance-use concerns that have impacted the
family dynamics. The mother has not shown she is at that point in her
recovery. This young child deserves a placement that is stable and safe.

We find the termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best
interests of E.M.

IV. Conclusion.

Because we find that the State proved the grounds for termination by
clear and convincing evidence, and that termination of the mother’s parental
rights is in the best interests of the child, we affirm the termination of the

15
mother’s parental rights. We decline the request for additional time to
correct these long-standing issues.

AFFIRMED.

16