State of Iowa v. Scott Chase Barnum

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1702
Filed March 11, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Scott Chase Barnum,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (North) County,
The Honorable Joshua P. Schier, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Kent A. Simmons, Bettendorf, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Chicchelly, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Buller, J.

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BULLER, Judge.

Scott Barnum appeals from his discretionary sentence following a
guilty plea to performing sex acts on a fifteen-year-old girl. He challenges
whether the court properly considered his statements regarding his
knowledge of the victim’s age and whether the court was required to accept
his expert’s testimony at face value. We affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In an oral plea colloquy, Barnum admitted that, in October 2021, he
performed sex acts on a minor victim while she was fifteen years old and he
was fifty-two. He agreed the court could look to the minutes of testimony for
a factual basis. And he ultimately pled guilty to one count of sexual abuse in
the third degree, a class “C” felony in violation of Iowa Code section
709.4(1)(b)(2)(d)1 and 709.4(2) (2021). The State dismissed a second count
of sexual abuse in the third degree, and the parties agreed to open sentencing.

Before sentencing, Barnum told the pre-sentence investigator that he
met the victim on an adult website and believed she was eighteen until he
“began talking sexual to the victim and learned at some point she was fifteen
years old.” He said they then met in a park where they had intercourse.

At sentencing, Barnum presented testimony from a forensic
psychologist, Dr. Christina Pietz. Pietz interviewed Barnum and reviewed

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The State’s trial information and the district court’s judgment erroneously list
the code section as 709.4(1)(b)(3)(d). But Iowa Code section 709.4(1)(b) was amended in
July 2021, moving the charged offense to section 709.4(1)(b)(2)(d) without substantive
change relevant here. The correct subsection is listed in other portions of the record, and
the elements Barnum pled guilty to matched section 709.4(1)(b)(2)(d). Neither party
raises the numbering as an issue on appeal, and we discern no prejudice to Barnum, so we
take no action on this clerical error.

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court records, including the minutes of testimony, before testifying. She
discussed her assessment of Barnum’s risk of recidivism and said that he
appeared to be “extremely remorseful” and “extremely embarrassed” when
speaking with her. She opined, based on actuarial instruments, that Barnum
was at a “low” or “below average” risk of re-offense compared to a
population of other known offenders.

On cross-examination, the assistant county attorney questioned Pietz
about Barnum’s remorse. For example, he asked Pietz to compare Barnum’s
statement he “didn’t know [the victim’s] age” to another of Barnum’s
statements, that “the police showed [him] that she said [she was] fifteen.”
Both of these statements were direct quotes from Barnum and appear in
Pietz’s report, which Barnum filed to the district court docket. Pietz also
independently confirmed that Barnum said “twice that he thought [the
victim] was fifteen.” And Pietz confirmed that the minutes of testimony
reflected the victim telling Barnum she was fifteen, which she considered
when rendering her opinion.

Through counsel, Barnum requested a deferred judgment,
emphasizing his age and perceived prospects of success on probation. The
presentence investigation report (PSI) writer recommended a suspended
sentence and probation. And the State requested incarceration based on the
harm to the victim, Barnum’s culpability, and Barnum’s minimization or
failure to accept responsibility.

The court sentenced Barnum to prison. It acknowledged his age, lack
of criminal history, family supports, attempts to treat his mental health, and
Pietz’s testimony and risk assessment. It emphasized Barnum’s inconsistent
statements regarding whether he knew the victim’s age, indicating the court
believed the statements reflected a failure to accept responsibility. And it

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considered the nature of the offense, the harm to the victim, and the need to
protect the community. Barnum appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular sentence
within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor,
and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of
inappropriate matters.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002).
“[O]ur task on appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the district
court, but to determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable
grounds.” Id. at 725. To show an abuse of discretion, a defendant bears the
burden to affirmatively show that the district court relied on improper factors
or clearly untenable reasons. State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 759, 762
(Iowa 1998).

DISCUSSION
Barnum advances two claims: a challenge concerning whether his lack
of remorse (as evidenced by inconsistent statements about knowing the
victim’s age) was properly before the court and an argument that the
sentencing court was bound to accept Pietz’s testimony about recidivism and
sentence him to probation.

I. Lack of Remorse

Barnum first urges that his statements about whether he knew the
victim’s age were not properly before the sentencing court and should not
have been considered, in part because knowledge is not an element of the
offense. In response, the State argues that the information was properly
before the sentencing court either through the PSI or through the cross-

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examination of Pietz. Based on our independent review of the record, we find
this information was properly considered.

First, “[a] court has a right to rely on the information in the PSI when
the defendant fails to object to the information contained in the PSI.” State v.
Gordon, 921 N.W.2d 19, 24 (Iowa 2018). Here, Barnum objected to some
portions of the PSI, but he did not object to the court considering admissions
he made to the PSI writer, including that “he began talking sexual to the
victim and learned at some point she was fifteen years old.” We think this was
a sufficient basis for the district court to consider Barnum’s knowledge of the
victim’s age. See State v. Longo, 608 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Iowa 2000) (“[W]hen
a challenge is made to a criminal sentence on the basis that the court
improperly considered unproven criminal activity, the issue presented is
simply one of the sufficiency of the record to establish the matters relied
on.”).

And second, even if the PSI alone did not supply an adequate basis,
Pietz’s cross-examination put the information before the sentencing court in
at least two respects. First, Pietz admitted she considered the minutes of
testimony and was cross-examined about the very content Barnum complains
of on appeal. Second, she testified that Barnum admitted to her twice that he
knew the victim was fifteen rather than eighteen; she even cited this as a
partial basis for her opinion that he had admitted his conduct rather than
denying or minimizing it. Barnum cannot complain about the court
considering information placed in the record through testimony of his own
expert. Cf. State v. Fetner, 959 N.W.2d 129, 136 (Iowa 2021) (finding
sentencing consideration proper when defense counsel placed the disputed
fact at issue). Even in proceedings bound by the rules of evidence, it is well-
established that calling an expert witness risks admission of facts relied on in

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forming an opinion on cross-examination. Iowa R. Evid. 5.705; cf. State v.
Tensley, 249 N.W.2d 659, 662 (Iowa 1977) (“We believe it would be unfair to
permit the defense to elicit favorable aspects of the [defendant’s]
communications [to an expert witness] without permitting the prosecution
an opportunity to elicit unfavorable aspects.”). And here, we have little
trouble concluding that calling an expert to testify that a defendant is
remorseful opens the door to questions about the materials relied on to form
that conclusion.

Last, we broadly observe that lack of remorse and failure to accept
responsibility are proper, pertinent sentencing considerations. State v. West
Vangen, 975 N.W.2d 344, 355 (Iowa 2022); State v. Knight, 701 N.W.2d 83,
87–88 (Iowa 2005). “It is not an abuse of the court’s discretion to consider
defendant’s truth and veracity in determining the defendant’s character and
propensities and chances for rehabilitation.” State v. Bragg, 388 N.W.2d 187,
192 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986). Nor is such a consideration limited to the elements
of the offense. See State v. Rasmussen, 7 N.W.3d 357, 363–64 (Iowa 2024)
(affirming consideration of defendant mocking the victim’s injuries, despite
the non-criminal nature of that speech). We discern no abuse of discretion or
improper consideration.

II. Expert Testimony

We last tackle a recurring issue, which the defendant frames as his
request we “adopt a rule that a sentencing court cannot contradict an
unchallenged and unimpeached, reasonable forensic psychological opinion
with its own foray into psychology.” Although we might quibble some with
the framing, we have rejected the core of this claim on multiple occasions
before, nixing the notion “that a sentencing court is bound by a hired defense
expert’s re-offense assessment.” State v. Campie, No. 24-0902, 2025

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WL 1824640, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 2, 2025); see also State v. Van Fossen,
No. 24-2063, 2026 WL 44642, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2026) (“[W]e
have previously held that a sentencing court need not accept recidivism-
experts’ opinions at face value.”). Consistent with those decisions, we
discern no abuse of discretion here.

As a matter of first principles, review of sentencing decisions is for an
abuse of discretion, and we expect the district court to deploy its common
sense and independent judgment to fashion a sentence appropriate for the
individual offender and the specific offense at issue. See, e.g., Formaro,
638 N.W.2d at 724; State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Iowa 1979);
see also Iowa Code § 901.5. A rule that compels a court to adopt any party’s
expert testimony would rob the court of the very discretion we entrust to it.

Second, a district court at sentencing is like any other trier of fact—
free to adopt all, some, or none of the evidence presented to it. Cf. Crow v.
Simpson, 871 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2015) (“[T]he jury is free to accept or
reject any testimony, including uncontroverted expert testimony.”). As the
supreme court has long recognized, a “court as trier of fact . . . is not obliged
to accept opinion evidence, even from experts, as conclusive.” State v.
Farnum, 397 N.W.2d 744, 750 (Iowa 1986) (cleaned up). And there is no
reason to think this principle does not apply to a sentencing court.

Third, the rule proposed by Barnum plainly invites gamesmanship and
sentencing-by-ambush. Unlike trial, there is no requirement under the rules
of criminal procedure that either party disclose expected witnesses in
advance of sentencing. Under Barnum’s rule, either the State or the defense
could bring a surprise witness to sentencing and bind the court if the other
side lacked its own expert. This inevitable consequence is untenable and
inconsistent with the pragmatic sentencing scheme set forth by the General

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Assembly in chapter 901. It also rankles separation of powers, depriving the
district court of a core judicial function.

In short, we hold again that sentencing courts are not bound to accept
any testimony at face value, whether from an expert or lay witness, and
whether rebutted or not. E.g., Campie, 2025 WL 1824640, at *3; Van Fossen,
2026 WL 44642, at *3. The weight to be given such evidence, and the
persuasive value it carries in any particular case, is a decision solely for the
factfinder. We conclude the district court here did not abuse its discretion
when it considered Pietz’s testimony but nonetheless sentenced Barnum to
prison based on other appropriate considerations.

AFFIRMED.

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