William M. Domino v. American Standard Insurance Company of Wisconsin

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0571
Filed April 29, 2026
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William M. Domino,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
American Standard Insurance Company of Wisconsin,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable Michael D. Huppert, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Brenda K. Wallrichs of Lederer Weston Craig PLC, Cedar Rapids, and
Jessica Ann Eglseder, Madison, Wisconsin, attorneys for appellant.

Shawn Shearer of The Shearer Law Office, P.C., University Heights,
attorney for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Ahlers, P.J., and Buller and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Buller, J.

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BULLER, Judge.

William Domino was involved in a motorcycle-and-automobile
collision in 2020. He carried an insurance policy with uninsured motorist
benefits, issued by American Standard Insurance Company of Wisconsin.
And the policy included three provisions relevant here (emphasis in original):
We may not be sued unless all terms of this policy are complied
with. . . .

....

Under the Uninsured Motorist and Underinsured Motorist
coverages, any suit against us will be barred unless commenced within two
years from the date of the accident.

....

We will pay under [the underinsured motorist] coverage only after
the limits of liability under any bodily injury bonds or policies have been
exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements.

In 2021, Domino sent a demand letter for the policy limit of his
underinsured motorist coverage. But Domino didn’t file this lawsuit until
2024—outside the policy’s two-year limitations period. So American
Standard moved for summary judgment, asserting the claim was time-barred.
Domino resisted, citing supreme court precedent and urging the limitations
period was unreasonable and unenforceable due to the exhaustion and
compliance provisions. The district court denied summary judgment by
written ruling, finding no disputed facts and that the policy’s limitations
period was unenforceable under Nicodemus v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance
Co., 612 N.W.2d 785 (Iowa 2000).

American Standard sought interlocutory review, which our supreme
court granted before transferring the case to us for disposition. We review for

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correction of errors at law. Robinson v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins., 816 N.W.2d
398, 401 (Iowa 2012).

In its brief,1 American Standard criticizes both the district court (for
applying Nicodemus) and the supreme court (for allegedly conflating concepts
in its case law). We understand the fight to be over which of two cases applies:
Nicodemus, 612 N.W.2d at 788–89 (which invalidated a two-year limitation
period in light of an accompanying exhaustion clause), or Robinson, 816
N.W.2d at 402–03 (which upheld a two-year limitation period when there was
not a comparable exhaustion clause). Notably, Robinson did not overrule
Nicodemus. See 816 N.W.2d at 403–04.

We, like the district court, conclude Nicodemus controls. As in that
case, the policy here contained an exhaustion clause that essentially required
prior litigation to conclude before the carrier had to pay—“We will pay under
[the underinsured motorist] coverage only after the limits of liability under
any bodily injury bonds or policies have been exhausted by payment of
judgments or settlement.” Cf. Nicodemus, 612 N.W.2d at 786 (“We are not
obligated to make any payment under this insurance until the limits of liability
under all bodily injury liability bonds or insurance policies applicable at the
time of the accident have been exhausted by payment of judgments or
settlements.”). At core, both the provision here and the provision in
Nicodemus provide that, until other litigation proceeds to judgment or
settlement, the insurer will not pay. We agree with the district court there is
essentially no daylight between this case and Nicodemus. And to the extent
American Standard wishes us to reimagine or view Nicodemus in a different

1
Domino did not file a brief on appeal. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(3).

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light, that is a task reserved to the supreme court. 2 See State v. Beck, 854
N.W.2d 56, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014).

Last, we recognize American Standard argues on appeal that,
Nicodemus aside, Domino concluded litigation against the tortfeasor in time
to file suit against American Standard (though we have no information
regarding the payment from that litigation as required under the exhaustion
clause). So, American Standard argues, even if the policy could be
unreasonable under certain circumstances, it was reasonable as applied to
Domino. But the district court did not rule on this issue, and American
Standard did not file a motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2)
or otherwise seek to obtain such a ruling. This claim is therefore not
preserved, and we do not reach it. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532,
537–41 (Iowa 2002).

AFFIRMED.

At least to some degree, American Standard recognizes this. It requested the
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supreme court retain this case on the basis there was a conflict in the case law “[o]nly the
supreme court can resolve.”

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