State of Iowa v. Luttreal Dwayne Allen

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-0559
Filed May 13, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Luttreal Dwayne Allen,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
The Honorable Linda M. Fangman, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Erin Carr of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant
Attorney General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Schumacher, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Vogel, S.J.
Opinion by Vogel, S.J.

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VOGEL, Senior Judge.

Luttreal Allen entered into a plea agreement with an agreed-upon
sentence. The court accepted his plea, entered judgment, and sentenced
Allen in accordance with the agreement. Allen now appeals, arguing the
district court imposed an illegal sentence when it failed to merge his
convictions. On our review, we conclude Allen has good cause to appeal, but
his convictions do not merge. For that reason, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On March 7, 2022, in the parking lot of a grocery store, Allen punched
I.L. in the face one time, causing I.L. to fall backward and hit his head on the
pavement. I.L. sustained serious injuries from the assault, eventually leading
to his death several months later. Allen was charged with murder in the
second degree under Iowa Code section 707.3(1) (2022), a class “B” felony,
later amended to include Allen’s status as a habitual offender under
section 902.8. A second amended trial information added a charge of willful
injury causing serious injury under Iowa Code section 708.4(1), also as a
habitual offender.

On March 20, 2024, Allen entered a guilty plea to one count of
involuntary manslaughter in violation of Iowa Code section 707.5(1), a class
“D” felony, and an Alford1 plea to one count of willful injury causing serious
injury in violation of Iowa Code section 708.4(1), a class “C” felony, both as
a habitual offender. During the plea colloquy, regarding involuntary
manslaughter, Allen admitted he recklessly assaulted I.L., and that the assault
unintentionally caused I.L.’s death. Regarding willful injury causing serious

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North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (allowing a criminal defendant to
plead guilty without admitting guilt).

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injury, Allen agreed that, based on the minutes of testimony, the State would
be able to prove the elements of the offense.

The sentencing hearing was held the same day, after Allen waived his
right to file a motion in arrest of judgment. The parties agreed that Allen
would be sentenced to two consecutive indeterminate terms of incarceration
not to exceed fifteen years each, with a mandatory minimum of three years
on each conviction. Allen was sentenced in accordance with the plea
agreement. He now appeals asserting his sentence was illegal.

II. Standard of Review.

We review an assertion of an illegal sentence for lack of merger for
correction of errors at law. State v. Greenland, 17 N.W.3d 347, 351 (Iowa 2025)
(citation omitted).

III. Analysis.

A. Appellate Jurisdiction. Before we may consider the merits of
Allen’s appeal, we must first determine whether we have jurisdiction over the
appeal. “Iowa appellate courts lack jurisdiction to review a sentence
pursuant to a plea agreement unless the defendant is being sentenced for a
‘class “A” felony’ or there is ‘good cause’ to do so.” State v. Hidlebaugh, 32
N.W.3d 783, 790 (Iowa 2026) (citation omitted). Allen “bears the burden of
establishing good cause to pursue an appeal of [his] conviction based on a
guilty plea.” State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Iowa 2020).

Our courts “have defined ‘good cause’ as a ‘legally sufficient reason.’”
Hidlebaugh, 32 N.W.3d at 790 (citation omitted). “A legally sufficient reason
is a ground that potentially would afford the appellant relief.” Id.; see also
State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 109 (Iowa 2021) (“[G]ood cause exists to

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appeal from a conviction following a guilty plea when the defendant
challenges his or her sentence rather than the guilty plea.” (citation
omitted)).

Allen alleges that the district court imposed an illegal sentence when
it failed to merge his convictions for involuntary manslaughter and willful
injury causing serious injury. Because a failure to merge is a ground that
potentially would afford Allen relief, he has established good cause to appeal.
We next consider the merits of his argument.

B. Merger. Allen argues that the district court’s failure to merge the
two convictions resulted in the imposition of an illegal sentence.

Regarding merger of convictions, Iowa Code section 701.9 provides,
No person shall be convicted of a public offense which is necessarily
included in another public offense of which the person is convicted. If the
jury returns a verdict of guilty of more than one offense and such verdict
conflicts with this section, the court shall enter judgment of guilty of the
greater of the offenses only.

Section 701.9 prohibits a person from being convicted of the same
offense twice, “but it does not apply when there are separate offenses.”
Greenland, 17 N.W.3d at 351. If the statute applies and the court fails to merge
the convictions, an illegal sentence results. State v. Love, 858 N.W.2d 721,
723 (Iowa 2015).

We look at the elements of the two offenses to decide “whether a
defendant has been convicted of a public offense that is necessarily included
in another public offense within the meaning of the statute.” Greenland, 17
N.W.3d at 351. In reviewing the elements of the two offenses, “we ask
whether the first (greater) crime includes every essential element of the
second (lesser) crime.” Id. (cleaned up). The legal elements test is “purely

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a review of the legal elements and does not consider the facts of a particular
case.” Krogmann v. State, 914 N.W.2d 293, 325 (Iowa 2018) (citation
omitted).

If a defendant cannot commit the greater offense “without also
committing the lesser offense, the lesser is included in the greater, and the
convictions merge under section 701.9.” Greenland, 17 N.W.3d at 351
(cleaned up). “Stated differently, the greater offense must completely
overlap the lesser offense to require merger under section 701.9.” Id. at
351–52 (cleaned up).

Our analysis begins with the elements of the greater offense, willful
injury causing serious injury. To be guilty of such, a person must: (1) “do[]
an act which is not justified,” which is (2) “intended to cause serious injury
to another.” Iowa Code § 708.4. If a defendant causes serious injury, he is
guilty of a class “C” felony. Id.

Allen was also convicted of involuntary manslaughter as a class “D”
felony under Iowa Code section 707.5(1)(a). That section provides that a
person commits involuntary manslaughter when the person:
(1) “unintentionally causes the death of another person”; (2) “by the
commission of a public offense other than a forcible felony or escape.” Our
courts have held “that recklessness is an additional element that must be
proven to sustain a conviction for involuntary manslaughter.” State v. Miller,
874 N.W.2d 659, 662 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (cleaned up). For that reason,
“[t]he underlying public offense must be committed recklessly in order to
form the basis of involuntary manslaughter.” State v. Ayers, 478 N.W.2d 606,
608 (Iowa 1991).

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When comparing the elements of the two offenses, the convictions do
not satisfy the legal elements test because the greater offense can be
committed without also committing the lesser offense. Involuntary
manslaughter requires proof that Allen recklessly committed an act that
unintentionally caused I.L.’s death. Willful injury causing serious injury
requires proof that Allen intentionally assaulted I.L. to cause serious injury.
The two offenses differ in the mental state necessary to commit the offense.
Similarly, involuntary manslaughter requires a death, while willful injury
requires only serious injury. Because the lesser offense requires proof of facts
that the greater does not, the offenses do not overlap, the legal elements test
is not satisfied, and the convictions do not merge.

We reach the same conclusion even if we consider “whether the
legislature intended multiple punishments for both offenses.” State v. Brown,
996 N.W.2d 691, 699 (Iowa 2023) (citation omitted). There is a presumption
that “in the absence of a clear indication of contrary legislative intent the
legislature ordinarily does not intend cumulative punishment.” Id. (cleaned
up). That said, if the legal elements test is not satisfied, “there is a
presumption that multiple punishments can be assessed.” Id. (cleaned up).
“[W]hen discerning legislative intent, we consider the available punishments
for each offense.” Id. “[I]f the greater offense has a penalty that is not in
excess of the lesser included offense, then a legislative intent to permit
multiple punishments arises.” Id. (cleaned up).

While Allen agrees that under the legal elements test, willful injury is
not a lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter, he makes no
specific argument that would indicate legislative intent. He does, however,
cite State v Walker, 610 N.W.2d 524 (Iowa 2000), claiming it is “against the
interests of justice to punish [him] for a single action” he committed under

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two different code sections. The State counters by quoting Gamble v. United
States, and noting double jeopardy “protects individuals from being twice put
in jeopardy ‘for the same offence,’ not for the same conduct or actions.” 587
U.S. 678, 683 (2019) (citation omitted).

The State also notes that Allen was sentenced on both charges as a
habitual offender. For that reason, both convictions carried an increased
penalty of not more than fifteen years in prison. See Iowa Code § 902.9(1)(c).
Therefore, under these specific facts coupled with the habitual offender
enhancement, the penalty for the greater offense, willful injury, did not
exceed that of the lesser offense, involuntary manslaughter. Moreover, the
purpose of the two statutes weighs in favor of multiple punishments, as
involuntary manslaughter seeks to criminalize reckless behavior causing the
death of another, while willful injury causing serious injury criminalizes the
intentional act of seriously injuring another. Because a person can intend to
cause serious injury—the greater offense—without recklessly causing the
death of another—the lesser offense—we conclude that the legislature
intended multiple punishments.

Because these offenses do not merge, and the legislature set forth
separate punishments for each offense, Allen’s claim fails. For those reasons,
we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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