In re the Marriage of Sorensen

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-1025
Filed May 27, 2026
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In re the Marriage of Katherin Sorensen and Eric Sorensen
Upon the Petition of
Katherin Alanna Sorensen,
Petitioner–Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

And Concerning
Eric Sorensen,
Respondent–Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Montgomery County,
The Honorable Jennifer Benson Bahr, Judge.
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AFFIRMED ON APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL
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Krisanne C. Weimer of Weimer Law, P.C., Council Bluffs,
attorney for appellant.

Kyle E. Focht of Focht Law Office, Council Bluffs, attorney for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Badding, J.

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BADDING, Judge.

Eric Sorensen appeals, and Katherin Sorensen cross-appeals, from the
dissolution of their twenty-four-year marriage. Both focus on the district
court’s award of traditional spousal support to Katherin—a stay-at-home
mother of four children. Eric challenges the length of the award, while
Katherin challenges the amount. Based on our de novo review of the record,
we conclude the court’s spousal support award was equitable. See In re
Marriage of Owen, 29 N.W.3d 6, 10 (Iowa 2025). We accordingly affirm on
Eric’s appeal and Katherin’s cross-appeal.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

The Sorensens married in January 2001 when Katherin was nineteen
years old and Eric was twenty. During the early years of their marriage, while
they were trying to have children, Katherin pursued a college education and
worked part-time. She eventually earned a bachelor’s degree in
communications in 2009 and obtained full-time employment at a church.
Katherin stayed at that job for about a year and a half, quitting when their first
child was born in 2011. Because they had been hoping for children so long,
the couple decided they “wanted a parent to be able to be with them full-
time.”

For the next twelve years—during which they welcomed three more
children—Katherin was responsible for their care. She homeschooled the
children and oversaw their daily routines, transportation, medical and dental
appointments, and extracurricular activities. Between these duties, she
earned a small income from part-time doula work. But she stopped providing
those services about five or six years before the parties’ divorce because it
was too difficult coordinating childcare while she attended births.

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With Katherin’s focus on the children, Eric concentrated on providing
income for the family. He started working in the construction industry after
graduating from high school. Since then, he has advanced his career at several
companies—most recently at JE Dunn Construction, where he has worked
since 2018. During his time with that company, Eric worked his way up from
a mechanical superintendent to his current position as general
superintendent. His salary increased with each promotion, going from
$129,149 in 2020 to more than $200,000 by 2024. Eric’s annual bonuses also
increased from $8,300 in 2020 to $21,000 in 2024. He typically worked more
than fifty hours per week during the marriage, often fielding calls in the
evenings and on weekends.

Sadly, the parties’ marriage deteriorated in 2023 when they were both
in their early forties. Katherin testified that she started looking for jobs
because she “knew that things were not going well” between her and Eric.
After submitting around 150 applications, she was hired in September 2023
as a prevention specialist at a behavioral-health organization. She earns $19
per hour and has a flexible schedule that accommodates the children, who are
now attending public school. She also earns some income as a piano
accompanist at the children’s school and through a life-coaching practice that
she started in 2023. Between these three jobs, Eric calculated that Katherin
was on track to earn $48,246.70 in 2024.

Katherin petitioned to dissolve the parties’ marriage in January 2024.
Before the dissolution trial that December, the parties agreed their four
children should be placed in their joint legal custody and Katherin’s physical
care, with visitation for Eric. They also agreed that Katherin should remain
in the marital home with the children to avoid further disruption for them.

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But they disagreed on the division of their other property and debts, as well
as child support and spousal support.

The district court resolved those disputed issues in its March 2025
decree, dividing the parties’ property and debts nearly equally. As the parties
agreed, Katherin received the house, valued at $327,550, along with its debt
of $274,129—although Eric was ordered to pay a loan of $16,883 for roof
repairs. The court also ordered Eric to pay Katherin $2,949.01 per month in
child support, plus $3,000 per month in traditional spousal support. And the
court awarded Katherin $5,000 in trial attorney fees.

In a post-trial motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2),
Eric asked the district court to reconsider its spousal support award, arguing
that it should be reduced in both amount and duration, if not eliminated. The
court partially granted the motion, finding “it appropriate to amend Eric’s
monthly spousal support obligation to $2,000.” The court reasoned that its
prior award failed to fully account for Eric’s child support obligation.1 But
given the still “substantial disparity in the parties’ incomes,” the court found
that its amended award would “help ensure Katherin’s financial stability,
mitigate the imbalance in disposable income, and enable her to maintain a

1
Neither the dissolution decree nor the court’s order on Eric’s motion to
reconsider complied with Iowa Court Rule 9.5(1)(a)(1). Under that rule, “[i]f spousal
support is to be paid in the pending matter, whether temporary or permanent, it will be
determined first and added to the payee’s income and deducted from the payor’s income
before child support is calculated.” Iowa Ct. R. 9.5(1)(a)(1) (emphasis added). The court
instead added Eric’s child support obligation to Katherin’s net monthly income and
deducted it from Eric’s when reconsidering the amount of spousal support that should be
awarded. Because neither party challenges this deviation from the child support
guidelines, we do not address it on appeal.

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standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the
marriage.”

Eric appeals, and Katherin cross-appeals, from the spousal support
award.

II. Standard of Review

“Because we are in equity, we review the district court’s order
concerning spousal support de novo.” Owen, 29 N.W.3d at 10. Despite that
de novo review, we give the district court “considerable latitude,” disturbing
its ruling only “when there has been a failure to do equity.” Id. (cleaned up).

III. Analysis

Whether to award spousal support “is a matter of discretion and not a
matter of right,” and the decision “depends on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case.” In re Marriage of Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d 530, 537
(Iowa 2022) (citations omitted). “The legislature has not authorized Iowa
courts to employ any fixed or mathematical formula in applying spousal
support.” Id. at 538 (citation omitted). Instead, “courts are to equitably
award spousal support by considering the criteria listed in Iowa Code section
598.21A(1).” In re Marriage of Sokol, 985 N.W.2d 177, 185 (Iowa 2023)
(cleaned up).

A. Eric’s Appeal

Eric claims that in awarding Katherin traditional spousal support, the
district court failed to consider the following factors in section 598.21A(1):
paragraphs “b” (age and health), “c” (property distribution), “d”
(educational level), “e” (earning capacity of party seeking support), and “f”
(feasibility of party seeking support to become self-supporting). He argues

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that when those factors are “properly considered and evaluated . . . this case,
at best, supports an award of rehabilitative spousal support” of $2,000 per
month for ten years. We disagree.

“An award of traditional spousal support is equitable in marriages of
long duration”— generally those lasting twenty years or more—“to allow the
recipient spouse to maintain the lifestyle to which he or she became
accustomed.” Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 185. “[I]n marriages of relatively long
duration,” like this one, an award of traditional spousal support “is primarily
predicated on need and ability.” In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 411
(Iowa 2015) (citation omitted). The yardstick for determining need is “the
ability of a spouse to become self-sufficient at ʻa standard of living reasonably
comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage.’” Id. (quoting Iowa Code
§ 598.21A(1)(f )). As for the ability to pay, awards of both spousal support
and substantially equal property distribution have been affirmed in long-term
marriages, “especially where the disparity in earning capacity has been
great.” Id. (citation omitted).

In determining the spousal support issue, the district court considered
Katherin’s need for support and Eric’s ability to pay—as well as the other
factors that Eric contends were overlooked—finding:
Throughout the marriage, Katherin primarily focused on
homemaking and raising the couple’s four children, homeschooling them
for over a decade. This absence from the workforce significantly impacted
her career opportunities and earning potential. While she has taken steps
to re-enter the job market, her current earning capacity remains
substantially lower than Eric’s. Economic sacrifices made by a spouse who
prioritizes domestic responsibilities justify spousal support.

Conversely, Eric was able to advance his career without
interruption. He has maintained stable, increasing earnings and now holds
a high-level position at JE Dunn, with substantial salary growth, bonuses,
and career prospects. While Katherin is pursuing further training and

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certifications, there is no reasonable likelihood that she will achieve
financial self-sufficiency at the marital standard of living. When a
dependent spouse’s financial future is uncertain, courts may award
indefinite support to maintain a comparable standard of living.

....

Eric has the financial capacity to provide support without undue
hardship. His salary, bonuses, and retirement assets place him in a strong
financial position. Courts have consistently awarded spousal support in
cases with substantial income disparities, such as this one.

The Court must also consider long-term financial projections.
Katherin is pursuing certifications in trauma recovery coaching and
considering further education in counseling, but there is no evidence that
her earnings will significantly increase. Meanwhile, Eric’s income is
expected to continue rising.

(Internal citations omitted.)

We agree with these findings on our de novo review of the record.
Once the parties’ first child was born, they agreed that Katherin would quit
her job and stay at home. That arrangement enabled Eric’s career growth
while restricting Katherin’s long-term earning capacity. See Gust, 858
N.W.2d at 410 (“[P]articularly in a traditional marriage, when the parties
agree a spouse should stay home to raise children, the economic
consequences of absence from the workplace can be substantial.”). Although
Eric points to Katherin’s doula training and marketing degree as evidence of
her earning capacity, the court reasonably found those qualifications
insufficient to allow her to achieve a standard of living comparable to that
enjoyed during the marriage—especially considering that she remains the
children’s primary caregiver. See Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)(e) (considering the
earning capacity of the party seeking support, including “responsibilities for
children under either an award of custody or physical care”).

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And while Eric lacks a college degree, that has not impacted his
earning capacity, as he seems to assert on appeal. He built a highly successful
career in the construction industry through on-the-job training and
experience, earning an income that exceeds what Katherin has been able to
achieve despite her degree. There was no evidence of reeducation, retraining,
or any defined plan that would allow Katherin to become self-supporting. See
Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 186 (“Without a showing that the recipient spouse seeks
reeducation, retraining, or some discrete period of time to increase earning
capacity to become self-supporting, rehabilitative spousal support is
inappropriate.”). In this context, the comparison Eric draws between formal
educational credentials is immaterial.

We have also considered Eric’s assertion that he will have to
“dramatically change his standard of living” because of the spousal support
ordered by the district court. That assertion carries little weight considering
that he has not challenged the amount of the award—just its length. And, as
our supreme court has recognized, “it may be that neither party will be able
to maintain their marital lifestyle” because “two households are inevitably
more expensive to maintain than one.” Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 415; accord Owen,
29 N.W.3d at 8. Katherin seemed to recognize this, testifying that she tried
“to live as cheaply as possible” by buying the children secondhand clothes
and off-brand food. She was prepared to cut additional expenses after the
divorce, including by reducing her entertainment and gift budget. Under
these circumstances, Eric’s push for rehabilitative spousal support fails. We
accordingly affirm on his appeal.

B. Katherin’s Cross-Appeal

As for Katherin’s cross-appeal, we reject her challenge to the amount
of spousal support awarded by the district court. Focusing on the gap

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between her net monthly income before child support and household
expenses, Katherin contends that “if there is any inequality” in the spousal
support award, it should be in her favor because she is “the party responsible
for all the children’s expenses” and the one “most likely to find herself in
need of additional funds.” The court considered these issues in its post-
decree order granting Eric’s motion to amend and reducing the amount of
his spousal support obligation. 2 In doing so, the court discussed the parties’
reported monthly expenses and net monthly incomes, along with Katherin’s
continued role as the children’s primary caregiver, lack of liquid assets, and
her receipt of $2,949.01 per month in child support. After balancing those
considerations, the court found it was equitable “to amend Eric’s monthly
spousal support obligation to $2,000.” We agree.

Although our review is de novo, “we afford deference to the district
court for institutional and pragmatic reasons.” Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 182
(citation omitted). That deference “counsels against undue tinkering with

2
The court’s order on Eric’s motion to enlarge, amend, or reconsider was
captioned “ORDER (Post-Trial Motions)” and discussed legal principles under Iowa
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2). However, in the decretal portion of the order, the court
stated the dissolution decree was “amended nunc pro tunc.” Seizing on that phrase,
Katherin argues the court “erred in granting Eric’s motion to enlarge in the form of a nunc
pro tunc order.” We reject that argument because it is clear the court was ruling on Eric’s
motion under rule 1.904(2) and not issuing a nunc pro tunc order.
Katherin relatedly claims the court erred in “retroactively modifying the
dissolution decree” through a nunc pro tunc order that reduced Eric’s spousal support
obligation to “$2,000 per month, effective as of the date the Decree was entered.” But
the court’s order did not contain an effective date for the reduction, and neither party
asked the court to address that issue. As a result, we find that error was not preserved. See
In re Marriage of Dauterive, No. 20-0382, 2021 WL 1017121, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 17,
2021) (finding error was not preserved on a challenge to the effective date for a revised
child support obligation where the court’s ruling “did not mention the issue”).

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spousal support awards.” Id. Because we find no “failure to do equity” with
the amount of spousal support awarded by the court, we affirm on Katherin’s
cross-appeal. See id. at 182–83 (noting that “when appellate courts unduly
refine these important, but often conjectural, judgment calls, they thereby
foster appeals in hosts of cases, at staggering expense to the parties wholly
disproportionate to any benefit they might hope to realize” (cleaned up)).

Finally, we deny Katherin’s request for appellate attorney fees, which
“are not a matter of right, but rather rest in this court’s discretion.” In re
Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 270 (Iowa 2005). Given the relative
merits of the parties’ appeals, we conclude that each party should be
responsible for their own attorney fees. See id. Costs on appeal are assessed
equally to each party.

AFFIRMED ON APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL.

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