State of Iowa v. Isaac Alexander Bachman

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0202
Filed June 10, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Isaac Alexander Bachman,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County,
The Honorable Christopher C. Polking, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Colin Murphy of Gourley Rehkemper Lindholm, P.L.C., West Des Moines,
attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ.
Opinion by Greer, P.J.

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GREER, Presiding Judge.

Jury instructions direct a jury in their duty to apply the law to the facts,
but Isaac Bachman contends that the jury that convicted him could only fail
in that effort given the instructions provided. After a jury convicted him of
murder in the first degree, a class “A” felony, Bachman requests we grant him
a new trial. His issues center on the jury instructions given—that jury
instruction number 19 did not include the State’s burden to prove that
Bachman acted without justification and that jury instruction number 21
permitted the jury to infer malice, premeditation, and specific intent to
commit a murder from Bachman’s deliberate use of a firearm, which goes
against his right to bear arms. Bachman asserts the cumulative effect of these
two instructions is that the jury could infer Bachman was guilty of murder in
the first degree before it considered the defense of justification. Bachman
also urges that his case presents substantial issues of first impression.

Arguing we need only apply established legal principles, the State takes
the position that the instructions did not misstate the law and the jury was
properly instructed on the issues presented. Likewise, it contends that any
error was harmless because the video footage showed Bachman shooting the
victim four times without any evidence of justification.

We find no error in the jury instructions submitted to the jury,
rejecting Bachman’s constitutional arguments as well. We affirm Bachman’s
conviction.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Over several hours starting the evening of June 16, 2024, Bachman and
a minor were arguing on a messaging application, which included name-
calling and threats to fight. Bachman dared the minor to come to his house.

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After one heated exchange, Bachman got up, got a rifle, and went out to the
backyard, rifle in hand. Although it is disputed who did what, the video
footage from a neighbor’s security camera shows the minor running
alongside Bachman’s fenceline. When the minor reached the gate to the
backyard, it appears Bachman threw it open, but then the minor shoved it
back, hitting Bachman. Bachman again opened the gate, and as the minor
came into view, Bachman shot him multiple times in the neck and torso. The
minor died; the autopsy showed four bullets entered the minor’s left side,
specifically in his neck, chest, and abdomen.

Bachman called 911. When law enforcement arrived, Bachman told
them that he had shot the minor in self-defense because the minor “was
trying to break into his house and slammed a gate in his face, and so he shot
him.” The witnesses who were at Bachman’s house that day supported this
story until Bachman’s trial. The two witnesses in Bachman’s backyard,
Destiny Holloway and Elijah Hunt, both testified that Bachman told them,
“Let’s say that it was self-defense.” At trial those witnesses testified that
they felt pressured to report Bachman’s version. Hunt also heard Bachman
after the shooting tell his girlfriend, “I will kill anyone for you.” Part of the
ongoing fight in the messages between the minor and Bachman involved the
girlfriend. Video footage of the incident was played to the jury.

Bachman offered various versions of the events leading up to the
shooting to law enforcement, including that he opened the gate with the
intent to have a fist fight with the minor. He also described how the bolt-
action rifle he used required that he manually pull the bolt to cycle a new
round into the chamber before each of the four shots that he fired. But his
descriptions of how he held and used his gun before and during the shooting
did not match what could be seen on the video footage. Likewise, Bachman

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downplayed the aggressive messages he sent the minor. Yet, even as
Bachman sat in jail after he was charged with first-degree murder, he sent text
messages to people that suggested he was the aggressor and was bragging and
laughing about the murder.

After a trial, the jury convicted Bachman of first-degree murder and he
was sentenced to life in prison without parole. In Bachman’s motion for new
trial, he asserted that he
[sought] a new trial pursuant to Rule 2.24(2)(b)(5), when . . . the jury was
improperly instructed in a material matter, including but not limited to,
issuing instruction to the Jury that [Bachman] would be guilty if the
elements of alleged crimes are met, without requiring additional element
regarding justification, as well as instructing the jury that premeditation
and malice and specific intent to kill could be inferred from use of a
dangerous weapon. Said improper instructions resulted in confusing
instructions and instructions that violate [Bachman’s] rights, including his
right to bear arms under both the U.S. and Iowa Constitutions, and his
right to a fair trial under the same.

The district court denied the motion and Bachman appeals.

II. Standards of Review.

Review of a ruling on the failure to give or not give certain jury
instructions is for correction of errors at law. See State v. Kraai, 969 N.W.2d
487, 490 (Iowa 2022). Errors related to jury instructions are presumed
prejudicial unless the record shows no prejudice existed. State v. Murray, 796
N.W.2d 907, 908 (Iowa 2011).

“[W]hen a jury instruction implicates a constitutional right, our
review is de novo.” State v. Green, 896 N.W.2d 770, 775 (Iowa 2017).
Bachman raises both federal and Iowa constitutional challenges.

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III. Analysis.

Bachman contends the trial court erred in overruling his objection to
(1) the marshaling instructions that did not include lack of justification as an
element of each offense and (2) a jury instruction on the permissive inference
of malice or intent from a person’s use of a dangerous weapon to cause death
after an opportunity to deliberate, which violated his constitutional right to
bear arms under article I, section 1A of the Iowa Constitution. Further he
asserts that the cumulative effect of these errors was prejudicial to him in his
quest for a fair trial. We start with the justification instruction.

A. Marshaling Instruction 19 and the Justification Defense.
Bachman filed a notice of justification and proposed jury instructions that set
out the justification defense and the applicable burden of proof. “The
justification defense is built on the notion that one is justified, and thus
shouldn’t be held criminally liable for, using reasonable force to protect
against an imminent threat or harm.” State v. Johnson, 7 N.W.3d 504, 508
(Iowa 2024). Bachman proposed the following marshaling instruction
explaining murder in the first degree:
The State must prove all of the following elements of Murder in the
First Degree:

1. On or about June 17, 2023 Isaac Bachman shot [the minor].

2. [The minor] died as a result of being shot.

3. [Bachman] acted with malice aforethought.

4. [Bachman] acted willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly and with
a specific intent to kill [the minor].

5. [Bachman] acted without justification.

If the State proved all of the elements listed above, [Bachman] is
guilty of Murder in the First Degree. If the State has failed to prove any

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one of the elements, [Bachman] is not guilty of Murder in the First Degree,
you will then consider the charge of Murder in the Second Degree in
Instruction No. ____.

(Emphasis added). Instead, the district court instructed that:
As to Count I of the Trial Information, the State must prove all of the
following elements of Murder in the First Degree:

1. On or about June 17, 2023, [Bachman] shot [the minor].

2. [The minor] died as a result of those gunshot wounds.

3. [Bachman] acted with malice aforethought.

4. [Bachman] acted willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly and with
a specific intent to kill [the minor].

If the State has proven all of the elements, [Bachman] is guilty of
Murder in the First Degree, unless you find the acts justified as set forth later
in these instructions. If the State has failed to prove any one of the elements,
[Bachman] is not guilty of Murder in the First Degree, and you will then
consider the charge of Murder in the Second Degree explained in
Instruction No. 23.

(Emphasis added).

Directing us to these jury instructions, Bachman asserts the trial court
shifted the burden of proof related to the justification defense to him.
“Improper allocation of the burden of proof constitutes reversible error.”
State v. Lawler, 571 N.W.2d 486, 491 (Iowa 1997). As it should work, once
Bachman produced sufficient evidence to support the justification
instruction, the burden shifted to the State to prove lack of justification
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Kuhse, 937 N.W.2d 622, 628 (Iowa 2020).

When Bachman raised his issue in the motion for new trial, the trial
court found no error and stated that “[t]he clause in each marshaling
instruction made clear that even if all the elements of the crime were met,

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the defendant was not guilty if the acts were justified as set forth in later
instructions.” To that point, the State agreed with the court and maintained
that lack of justification is not an element of first-degree murder and need not
be treated as one. See Iowa Code §§ 707.1–.2 (2024).

From his perspective, Bachman asserts that the jury was never
instructed “to consider the defense of justification whatsoever.” And he
claims the instructions were silent on the State’s burden to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Bachman acted without justification:
Nor is the jury told to find Bachman not guilty if the State fails in its proof.
From the plain language of the instruction, the jury would logically believe
that justification was an affirmative defense, which impermissibly shifts the
burden of proof to Bachman only after the jury found him guilty of murder.

But as the State asserts “justification is an affirmative defense rather
than an element.” See State v. Delay, 320 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Iowa 1982)
(emphasis added); see also White v. Harkrider, 990 N.W.2d 647, 656
(Iowa 2023) (listing cases describing justification as an affirmative defense).
Reading the first degree murder marshaling instruction provided to this jury,
the court listed the elements of the charge as set out in the statute, but then
clarified: “If the State has proven all of the elements, [Bachman] is guilty of
Murder in the First Degree, unless you find the acts justified as set forth later in
these instructions.” (emphasis added). And instruction 45 provided a detailed
definition of justification confirming that “[t]he State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that [Bachman]’s use of force was not justified.” “Jury
instructions are not considered separately; they should be considered as a
whole.” State v. Fintel, 689 N.W.2d 95, 104 (Iowa 2004).

Kuhse discussed the lack of any reference to an element as a defense or
to a “cross-reference” to a defense the State is required to prove. 937 N.W.2d
at 630–31 (finding the jury properly considered the justification defense after

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reviewing the instructions as a whole, further supported by the closing
arguments explaining the application of the defense). Returning to the
instructions given here, there was a cross-reference in the marshaling
instruction that specifically told the jury that proof of justification could
mean that Bachman was not guilty of the charge. Even more, like Kuhse, in
this case there was an instruction defining justification and the burden of
proof, followed by six more instructions related to the justification defense.
Id. at 630 (“Instructions twelve through nineteen covered the justification
defense. Instruction twelve on justification concluded with the following
stand-alone sentence: ‘The State must prove the Defendant was not acting
with justification.’”).

Further, in closing arguments, both the State and Bachman directed
the jury to review the justification defense. The State urged:
The defense, it’s clear it’s justification, it’s self-defense, and it’s all
coming down to that one little moment. Every time they tell you that it’s
justification, I want you to keep in mind these two notions: [Bachman] did
not have a reasonable belief that it was necessary to use force to prevent an
injury or loss or [Bachman] used unreasonable force under the
circumstances. Hold their claim to that scrutiny. Because I can tell you
what, it wasn’t a reasonable belief and he used unreasonable force. He
brought the gun to the fist fight with his friend that he encouraged to come
over.

In response, Bachman emphasized to the jury that:
But if you want to go to the justification, I’ve highlighted it here,
even if they have you considering those, then unless you find the acts
justified—Because a justification is an entire defense. Justification is a
legal means of saying you’re not guilty of this crime. And importantly,
again, that’s proving the negative. The State has to prove he did it. That
his force was not justified.

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I did not have to prove to you it was. I talked to you about that in
jury selection in opening. It is very possible that you look at [Bachman]
and you’re not happy with what happened, that you disagree with the
actions taken. But the State has to prove that it was not justified under the
law.

Bachman continued and applied the facts to the legal ramifications of
justification, asking the jury to consider “whether it was reasonable for
[Bachman] to think a person was going to come into that gate and hurt
[Bachman], and whether it was reasonable to think when that gate opened,
that person was going to hurt [Bachman].”

“The court is not required to give any particular form of an
instruction; rather, the court must merely give instructions that fairly state
the law as applied to the facts of the case.” State v. Booth-Harris, 942 N.W.2d
562, 581 (Iowa 2020) (cleaned up). On our review of the instructions
submitted to Bachman’s jury, we do not find that the jury was misled or that
the instructions materially misstated the law. See Johnson, 7 N.W.3d at 508.
In fact, as the State asserts, the jury would have considered the cross-
reference to the justification defense in every marshaling instruction
presented; “thirteen times.” But Bachman points out that many of the cases
involving the justification defense followed his suggested instruction that
included a reference to the defense in the list of elements to prove. Even if
that is a format seen regularly in the practice, we still would note that “an
incorrect or improper instruction can be cured if the other instructions
properly advise the jury as to the legal principles involved.” Kraai, 969
N.W.2d at 490 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also State
v. Trotter, No. 19-1019, 2021 WL 594559, at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2021)
(“There is . . . no argument the instructions failed to properly instruct the
jury of the applicable law. Even though no cross-references to the
justification defense [were] included with the marshaling instructions” as the

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other instructions addressing the defense still required that “[t]he State must
prove [the defendant] was not acting with justification.”).

In sum, here the complained-of jury instruction, judged in the context
of the other instructions, sufficiently instructed the jury about the legal
principles involving the justification defense. We find no error in the
submission of these instructions. We turn to Bachman’s other jury
instruction challenge.

B. Instruction 21 and the Dangerous-Weapon Inference. In
instruction 21, the district court instructed the jury that: “If a person has the
opportunity to deliberate and uses a dangerous weapon against another
resulting in death, you may, but are not required to, infer that the weapon was
used with malice, premeditation, and specific intent to kill.” Bachman
objected to the instruction arguing that the recent “Iowa Constitutional
Amendment article I, section 1A, regarding the right to keep and bear arms,
possessing a firearm is now a fundamental right and must be considered
under strict scrutiny.” Bachman continued in his objection to assert that the
“stand your ground”1 change in the law now means “there is no longer a
proper inference of malice or any of the other inferences regarding a

1
In State v. Davis, 988 N.W.2d 458, 465 (Iowa Ct. App. 2022) (internal citations
omitted), a panel of our court explained:

In 2017 the Iowa legislature amended the justification statute to
include new stand-your-ground provisions. The amendments expanded
the defense of justification by deleting existing language regarding
alternative course of action and adding provisions “for the erroneous
estimation of the danger presented and force necessary as long as there is
a ‘reasonable basis for the belief’ and the person acts ‘reasonably in the
response’ to a perceived threat.” “Significantly, the amendment provides
a person does not have a duty to retreat as long as a person ‘is not engaged
in illegal activity’ and is in a place where they were ‘lawfully present.’”

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dangerous weapon in this case. Therefore, [Bachman requested] that all
inferences based on the use of a dangerous weapon be stricken and not
considered by the jury.” The State contended that the constitutional
amendment only reiterated existing federal constitutional rights and did not
overrule prior settled law in Iowa concerning the dangerous-weapon
inference. But Bachman urges “now that the right to bear arms is a core
constitutional right in Iowa, due process and fundamental fairness prohibit
any adverse inference against the accused in a criminal trial arising from the
exercise of this right.” So, under his reasoning, the State must use other
evidence, not Bachman’s use of a gun, to prove malice, premeditation, and
specific intent.

We reject this reasoning. First, it goes against our current caselaw and
we have not been instructed differently from our supreme court. “Our first-
degree murder cases have long held that the use of a deadly weapon supports
an inference of malice, and when accompanied by an opportunity to
deliberate, also supports an inference of deliberation and premeditation.”
State v. Reeves, 636 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 2001) (citing cases involving the use
of a gun as a deadly and dangerous weapon). Second, as an essential element
of the offense of murder, the State must prove malice aforethought to the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt, which “is a term of art used to describe a culpable
state of mind.” Green, 896 N.W.2d at 780. And our courts have noted that
“it is often impossible for a jury to determine a defendant’s state of mind
without the aid of inference.” Id. Thus, the court is permitted to use an
instruction to inform the jury as to one “straightforward example of how the
State might prove the defendant’s culpable state of mind.” Id. Finally, we
are unaware of any authority that reads the second amendment right to bear
arms extends “to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of

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confrontation.” See State v. Breen, No. 13-1478, 2015 WL 1546355, at *5
(Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2015) (citation omitted).

On our de novo review, we find no constitutional violation and the
district court correctly overruled Bachman’s objection to the instruction on
the dangerous-weapon inference.

C. Harmless Error. Even if we found that there was an error in the
instructions given to the jury, that error would be harmless here because of
the strong evidence supporting the verdict. The harmless error standard
provides:
Error in giving or refusing to give a jury instruction does not
warrant reversal unless it results in prejudice to the complaining party.
When a court erroneously gives or refuses a jury instruction, we presume
prejudice and reverse unless the record affirmatively establishes there was
no prejudice. When the error is not of constitutional magnitude, the test
of prejudice is whether it sufficiently appears that the rights of the
complaining party have been injuriously affected or that the party has
suffered a miscarriage of justice. The presumption of prejudice is
overcome when the jury received strong evidence of a defendant’s guilt.

Kraai, 969 N.W.2d at 496–97 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). We borrow from the district court’s ruling on the motion for new
trial describing the overwhelming evidence against Bachman:
[Bachman] acknowledged the [application] messages moved to the point
where it was anticipated that the parties would fight each other at
Bachman’s residence. The audio messages that occurred very close in
time to the shooting, while not made directly to [the minor] from Bachman,
showed that [Bachman] was in a hostile, agitated state of mind. And those
would tend to provide proof of a deliberate, fixed intent to do injury to [the
minor].

Although [Bachman] says that what was expected was a fist fight,
he went into his house, armed himself in the advance with the rifle, came
back outside, locked an alternate point of entry to the fenced-in backyard,

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and sat waiting armed and facing the only remaining entrance to the yard.
It can be presumed that the person intends the natural consequences of
their act when [Bachman] shot [the minor] four times at the gate. He had
time to deliberate both before [the minor] arrived at the house and before
he used the dangerous weapon, testifying that after locking eyes for a
second with the victim at the gate, he took the time to pull the charging
handle, turn the safety off, and raise the weapon before pulling the trigger.
While there was much controversy about the seconds at the gate and what
exactly happened, there is credible evidence from the video that Bachman
appears at some points to try to push the gate open while [the minor] or
someone on the other side is trying to push the gate back shut.

Immediately after the fact, [Bachman] stated, to paraphrase, “I’m
on that, he wouldn’t shut up.” That supports the shooting was done with
malice aforethought, deliberately, premeditatedly, and with the specific
intent to kill, influenced by the parties’ [messaging application] argument
leading up to the shooting.

In addition, [Bachman] sent messages from the jail that could
credibly be interpreted as after-the-fact evidence of his state of mind at the
time of the shooting, being malicious, premeditated, and with the intent to
kill.

Finally, “Iowa’s justification defense does not authorize citizens to use
a gun in a fistfight.” See State v. Howard, 14 N.W.3d 763, 768 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2024). Here, the jury had a front row seat to the events leading up to
the shooting. The evidence established the aggressive posturing of Bachman
before the shooting. Even more, the jury saw Bachman act deliberately,
premeditatedly, and willfully in bringing his gun to the fist fight.

Any prejudice to Bachman from an alleged error in the instructions is
overcome by the strong evidence of Bachman’s guilt.

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IV. Conclusion.

Having found no error in the instructions, we affirm Bachman’s
conviction.

AFFIRMED.

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