In re Marriage of Walker

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-0109
Filed May 10, 2023

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF BRIDGET JO WALKER
AND TERRY CHARLES WALKER

Upon the Petition of
BRIDGET JO WALKER,
Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning
TERRY CHARLES WALKER,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Tama County, Mary E. Chicchelly,

Judge.

Terry Walker appeals the economic provisions of the decree dissolving his

marriage to Bridget Walker. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

Andrew B. Howie of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese, P.C., West

Des Moines, for appellant.

John J. Hines of Dutton, Daniels, Hines, Kalkhoff, Cook & Swanson, P.L.C.,

Waterloo, for appellee.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Badding, JJ.

Chicchelly, J., takes no part.
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BADDING, Judge.

“I work every day, and so can she,” said Terry Walker at the trial to dissolve

his nearly twenty-five-year marriage to Bridget Walker, who was seeking spousal

support from him. But Bridget had spent most of that marriage helping Terry run

his lawn care business—work she could no longer do after their separation and

her move to Florida, where she was employed full time at a resort. In its dissolution

decree, the district court granted Bridget’s request for spousal support and, after

finding Terry “rather lacking in credibility,” mostly adopted her proposed property

division. Terry appeals.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Terry and Bridget Walker married in 1997. They had two children together,

though only one was still a minor at the time of trial.1 About two years before their

marriage, Terry started a lawn care business called Turf-Pro. Bridget began

working for the business about a year later. The parties grew the business together

during the marriage, with both working for it on a full-time basis. Bridget handled

mowing, data entry, and bookkeeping. While Terry’s duties were not spelled out

at trial, he testified: “I am the business.”

The parties separated in July 2019. Bridget and the minor child moved to

Florida and began living in a one-bedroom condo the parties bought in 2018 for

$172,000.00. To pay for the condo, they took out a $30,000.00 loan, secured by

a mortgage on their marital home in Iowa. The rest came from some marital funds

Bridget said she saved over the years, along with an inheritance of $57,521.46

1Legal custody, physical care, child support, and any other matters related to the
child are not at issue in this appeal.
3

from her father’s estate and roughly $20,000.00 in cash that Bridget testified she

found in her parents’ home after the estate closed. The loan was paid off before

Bridget and the child moved into the condo in 2019.

When the parties separated, Bridget took a 2018 Chevrolet Equinox with

her to Florida. That vehicle was destroyed by Hurricane Sally, leaving Bridget

without a vehicle for some time. Bridget and the parties’ minor child were also

without health insurance for several months after Terry canceled their policy in

April or May 2020. Bridget petitioned for divorce in July, following which she

applied for temporary spousal support and the insurance proceeds that Terry had

received for the totaled Equinox. The court granted both requests. Despite this

order, Terry withheld $2000.00 from the proceeds he was ordered to pay to

Bridget.

For tax year 2020, Terry issued Bridget a 1099-NEC form, stating she had

received $22,002.61 in nonemployee compensation. Terry at first testified this was

for Bridget’s work in preparing “the taxes and mowing statements in 2020,” even

though Bridget testified that she did not work for Turf-Pro at all that year. On cross-

examination, Terry agreed that he just “total[]ed up all payments that were made

on what [he] considered [Bridget’s] behalf,” for things like the health insurance

premium for her and the child, to arrive at that amount. The parties’ tax returns

show that in previous years, Bridget never received a 1099 approaching that

amount. In another first, Terry claimed that in 2020, he paid his father $20,000.00

in rent for a building where Turf-Pro’s equipment and chemicals were stored. But

Bridget testified they had been using that building for more than twenty years and

never paid Terry’s father any rent.
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By the time the case went to trial in December 2021, Bridget was fifty-two

years old and, according to Terry, in good health. She graduated high school but

did not pursue any post-secondary education or training. Her work experience

was limited to Turf-Pro until the parties separated, when she began working full

time at a resort in Orange Beach, Alabama. She earns $12.74 per hour, plus tips

that in 2020 totaled $2374.00. Bridget testified her income was pretty standard for

the tourist industry where she lives and works. Terry was fifty-one years old and

also in good health at the time of trial. He continues to run the Turf-Pro business,

but the slim record does not reveal much else about him. The district court found

Bridget’s gross annual income was $28,000.00, while Terry’s was $86,000.00,

which the court said translated into a net monthly income of $2000.00 for Bridget

and $4682.34 for Terry. Neither party disputes those figures.

Bridget explained the parties lived comfortably during the marriage. They

went on vacations, didn’t “penny pinch,” and always drove nice vehicles. Bridget

testified that she could not meet her ongoing monthly expenses of $3332.00 on

her income and the stipulated amount of child support ($700.00 per month). In

contrast, Terry went on several vacations after the parties separated—Hawaii, the

Virgin Islands, Las Vegas, Nashville, and Chicago—though he said they were

“business related trips” for “turf specialists” and “[l]awn care people.” Bridget

requested $600.00 per month in spousal support until she reached retirement age

and could claim Social Security. But Terry believed Bridget was underemployed,

testifying: “She’s a bookkeeper. She ran the mowing crew, so she’s a manager.

She has a lot of skills.” As a result, Terry testified he shouldn’t have to pay her

spousal support.
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Although Terry touted Bridget’s bookkeeping skills, he questioned her

valuation of Turf-Pro. Bridget estimated the business was worth $150,000.00

based on its established nature, loyal customer list, equipment, and income. But

according to Terry, the business was worth nothing without him—though he

acknowledged its equipment was “worth something.” Yet neither party specified

what equipment was owned by the business. Both listed a 2017 Ford F-350, two

2013 Ford F-250s, and a 2013 Jeep on their proposed property distributions.

Bridget, however, listed those vehicles separately from the business while, as

noted, Terry did not value the business at all. He also failed to include his hunting

and fishing equipment, a Polaris side-by-side, or a Camaro that Bridget said he

owned, and he removed a camper and four-wheeler that had been on an earlier

affidavit of financial status. For her part, Bridget did not value jewelry that she said

Terry gave her during the marriage.

The district court did what it could with these bare-bones facts. In its

spousal-support analysis, the court found that Bridget needed spousal support

because she had a budget deficit of roughly $1300.00 before child support was

factored in. As for Terry, the court found that while he claimed $3170.00 in monthly

expenses from his net monthly income of $4682.34, most expenses were covered

by the business. Adding in Terry’s ability to take multiple vacations since the

parties’ separation, a luxury Bridget had not enjoyed, the court found he had an

ability to pay spousal support. Overall, the court explained:

Because of the lengthy term of this marriage, the fact that
Bridget was previously employed for most of the marriage in the
family business and has not had any post-secondary schooling, and
because Bridget now resides in a geographical area where the pay
for her skill level is not high, the Court finds that Bridget’s request for
6

permanent alimony is reasonable under the circumstances of this
case. Moreover, the imposition of an award of alimony will serve to
provide Bridget with a standard of living that is more commensurate
with the standard of living she enjoyed during the course of the
parties’ marriage.

The court accordingly awarded Bridget monthly spousal support of $600.00 until

the first of either party’s death, Bridget’s remarriage, or Bridget reaching the age

of sixty-five.

As for property division, the parties agreed before trial they had “each

received the property they want, including real estate and investments as well as

most personal property.” But they disagreed about the value of some of that

property, including Turf-Pro, the condo in Florida, and some miscellaneous items

like the side-by-side, hunting and fishing equipment, the Camaro, and Bridget’s

jewelry. After hearing from both parties, the court questioned Terry’s candor and

found “Bridget’s overall approach and testimony to be more believable.” Those

findings led the court to adopt most of Bridget’s valuations, which resulted in the

court requiring Terry to make an equalization payment of $95,784.14 to Bridget.

Terry appeals, challenging both the property-distribution and spousal-

support provisions of the dissolution decree.

II. Standard of Review

We review dissolution proceedings de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; see In

re Marriage of Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d 530, 537 (Iowa 2022). While we give weight

to the factual findings of the district court, especially when considering the

credibility of witnesses, we are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g);

In re Marriage of Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 2007). The district court’s
7

decree will be disturbed only upon a failure to do equity. In re Marriage of

Hansen, 886 N.W.2d 868, 871 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016).

III. Analysis

A. Property Distribution

Marital property is to be divided equitably, considering the factors in Iowa

Code section 598.21(5) (2020). In re Marriage of McDermott, 827

N.W.2d 671, 678 (Iowa 2013). “Courts determine what is fair and equitable based

on the particular circumstances of the parties.” In re Marriage of Keener, 728

N.W.2d 188, 193 (Iowa 2007). “Although an equal division is not required, it is

generally recognized that equality is often most equitable.” Id. (quoting In re

Marriage of Rhinehart, 704 N.W.2d 677, 683 (Iowa 2005)).

Terry claims the district court’s property division was inequitable because

the court improperly (1) “considered business assets twice,” (2) “excluded marital

funds from its determination of the Florida condominium value and undervalued

the property,” (3) “included non-marital personal property and misvalued marital

personal property,” and (4) “did not include Bridget’s jewelry.”

Before digging into these claims, we observe that the evidence on property

and its valuation was as slim as it was contradictory. In our view, all of the claimed

errors on appeal result from Terry’s lack of candor with the district court and his

attempts to conceal assets, which we keep in mind as we review the court’s

distribution. See In re Marriage of Hanson, 475 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Iowa Ct. App.

1991) (“Since it is apparent it was [the husband’s] machinations and deviousness

which created the very problem he complains of, he may not now assert the trial

court’s ruling is inequitable.”); see also In re Marriage of El Krim, No. 16-1620,
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2017 WL 2465806, at *9 (Iowa Ct. App. June 7, 2017) (finding a husband “gains

nothing by exploiting his own failure to come forward with accurate information

about his assets”); In re Marriage of Wenner, No. 03-0647, 2004 WL 1853922, at

*1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 14, 2004) (“Concealing assets not only affects credibility, it

also may be considered in determining an equitable division of property.”).

1. Business assets and vehicles

Terry argues the district court “wrongly considered business assets twice in

determining property division.” Beginning with the 2018 Equinox, Terry submits

that, while “it is unclear whether the court consider[ed] the Chevy Equinox’s value

when determining the value of Turf-Pro,” it is safe to assume it was considered in

valuing the business. But there is no indication in the court’s decree that it

considered the Equinox, or the insurance proceeds from it, as an asset of the

business. The court simply noted the vehicle was owned by the business, it was

totaled, and the proper funneling of the proceeds for that vehicle was already

resolved, save for Terry’s failure to pay Bridget all of the proceeds.

Moving on, Terry’s main complaint is that the court “double-counted” certain

vehicles by considering them in its valuation of the business and then assigning

them values independent of the business in its property-distribution ledger. For

relief, he requests removal of the three Ford trucks and the 2013 Jeep awarded to

him as individual assets. Terry also claims that the “court counted a 2018 Ford

F250 that does not exist.” Bridget responds that the court did not double-count or

misidentify these assets, but was instead just “simply stating a summary of the

evidence the Court reviewed from the documents submitted by the parties.” We

agree with Bridget.
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The district court “was placed in the unenviable position” of determining the

value of Turf-Pro without help from expert testimony. See Keener, 728 N.W.2d

at 194. The court recognized this quandary in observing that it was “at an obvious

and significant disadvantage in valuing” the business, which it determined was

worth $100,000.00 after examining the parties’ tax returns. “Because of the

difficulty surrounding valuation, appellate courts give much leeway to the trial

court.” Id. As a result, we will not disturb a trial court’s valuation “when it is within

the range of evidence.” We also defer to those “valuations when accompanied by

supporting credibility findings or corroborating evidence.” Id.

The court followed the parties’ lead in valuing the three Ford trucks and the

2013 Jeep separately from the business. Only two of those vehicles specifically

appear in both the court’s discussion of business value and then again as

individual items on the property ledger, those being a 2017 Ford F-350 and the

2013 Jeep, together worth $24,187.98. So, assuming these two vehicles were

“double-counted,” the question is whether the distribution was inequitable to Terry.

We conclude it was not, considering the additional equipment the court suspected

the business must own but was not disclosed by Terry.

The court’s suspicions were supported by the depreciation and amortization

report attached to Terry’s February 2021 financial affidavit, which listed a number

of business assets that were not separately valued by Terry anywhere else,

including a building, office equipment, a lift, mowers, a blower, spreading and

spraying equipment, power tools, a tractor, a trailer, a snowplow, a 1999 Ford F-

250, and an F-250 placed into service in 2018 (likely the one that Terry claims

does not exist). Given these other pieces of equipment, plus Bridget’s testimony
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that her valuation of the business included not just its equipment but its loyal

customer base and income,2 we conclude the court’s valuation of the company at

$100,000.00 was well within the range of evidence. See id.; see also In re

Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 703 (Iowa 2007) (“In ascertaining the value

of property, its owner is a competent witness to testify to its market value.”).

2. Florida condo

Terry next argues the court incorrectly excluded marital funds from the value

of the Florida condo. He contends the court “was in error” in accepting Bridget’s

claim that she found the $20,000.00 in her parents’ home, arguing instead that the

“money likely came from the parties’ joint bank account, as testified by [him].” But

the court found Bridget “credibly testified that this . . . money was found in closets,

behind dressers, in decorative tins, and in boxes in a crawl space.” In contrast,

Terry presented no financial documentation to support his claimed version of

events. With a record plagued by Terry’s lack of candor, and the court’s adverse

credibility findings against him, we have no trouble rejecting this claim. See

Keener, 728 N.W.2d at 194.

Terry also argues the court undervalued the condo because it did not accept

his higher valuation. The only evidence about how much the condo was worth

came from the parties’ testimony. Bridget placed its value at $225,000.00 based

on what a neighboring unit had sold for. In contrast, Terry testified the condo

should be valued at $371,000.00 because an unspecified “Texas firm” was calling

him “at least three times a week . . . wanting to purchase” it for that much. While

2 The record shows that from 2016 to 2020, the business averaged gross profits
of $360,000.00.
11

Terry said that he had emails from that firm, he did not present them as evidence.

The court was not entirely convinced by either’s position, instead finding a value

of $250,000.00, “somewhere in between both parties’ valuations,” was equitable.

Though the evidence was informal and lacking in substance, this value was within

the range of the evidence and should not be disturbed. See id.; see also In re

Marriage of Meints, No. 21-0172, 2022 WL 244433, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App.

Jan. 27, 2022) (“While the evidence was somewhat dicey, the court’s valuation

was within the range of evidence, so we decline to disturb it.”).

3. Side-by-side, hunting and fishing equipment, and Camaro

Beginning with the side-by-side, Bridget testified that Terry posted a side-

by-side on social media, he told their son he had one, and he just traded the old

one in for a newer one. Terry, however, testified the side-by-side is owned by his

girlfriend and titled in her name, although he gets to use it sometimes. So he

contends that it should not have been included in the marital estate. Terry did not,

however, produce that title as evidence. Given his exclusion of other assets from

his financial affidavits and proposed property distribution, the court found Terry’s

credibility to be “rather lacking” on this point. Deferring once more to the court’s

credibility finding, we reject this complaint. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Baker,

No. 14-1293, 2015 WL 4163351, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 9, 2015) (detailing

appellate courts’ deferential approach to credibility findings, noting, among other

things, “only in rare instances would we substitute our own credibility

determinations for those of the district court”).

Next, Terry argues the court misvalued his hunting and fishing equipment

at $6000.00, which he submits was not worth more than “a couple thousand
12

dollars.” He complains Bridget “was unable to identify exactly what he had” and

provided only “estimates and guesses to the court.” But the record shows Bridget

provided an exhaustive list of Terry’s equipment,3 while Terry provided no details

about what he has. She also testified that, contrary to Terry’s assertions otherwise,

“very little” of this property was gifted to him. Because the court’s credibility

determination as to the side-by-side extended to the equipment, and its valuation

fell within the range of the evidence, we affirm on this issue as well. See id.; see

also Keener, 728 N.W.2d at 194.

Turning to the Camaro, Bridget testified that Terry posted it for sale on social

media, with comments on the post indicating that he could “get close to 30k” for it.

Bridget explained that Terry purchased the vehicle as a shell about thirteen years

earlier for “right around $14,000.” Over the years, Terry put roughly $60,000.00

into the car in developing it into a drag racer. With these figures in mind, Bridget

valued the car at $20,000.00. But at trial, Terry claimed that he was only a one-

third owner of the car, despite having posted it for sale. Again, the court did not

find that claim credible, noting that “like all of the Turf-Pro equipment, this vehicle

was not listed in Terry’s financial affidavit at all” and, even though ownership of a

vehicle is easy to prove, “Terry brought forth no title document” to support his claim.

Like a record on repeat, we defer to these credibility findings. See Keener, 728

N.W.2d at 194.

3She testified that he had three assault rifles, “at least one handgun if not two,
several shotguns and rifles,” fishing tents, Vexilar depth finders, decoys, ice
augers, fishing poles, bows and arrows, tree stands, and a blind.
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4. Jewelry

Finally, Terry argues the court erred in awarding Bridget’s jewelry to her but

not including its value in the equalization ledger. Bridget testified that she has

jewelry consisting of necklaces Terry bought her for Christmas over the years,

which she estimated was worth a total of about $2000.00. Following the theme of

this litigation, Terry testified Bridget bought her jewelry for herself.

Iowa Code section 598.21(5) excludes gifted property, interspousal or not,

from the marital estate so long as exclusion does not result in an inequity. See In

re Marriage of Fenton, No. 09-1948, 2010 WL 2925907, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App.

July 28, 2010). In the grand scheme of things, we see no inequity to Terry by

excluding the value of this gifted jewelry.

B. Spousal Support

For his final claim, Terry argues the spousal support award in favor of

Bridget is “too much for too long,” given “Bridget’s good health, her share of the

marital property, extensive experience and work history in the lawn care industry,

and her deliberate choice to be underemployed following her move to Florida.”

The district court is given “considerable latitude” in spousal support

decisions. In re Marriage of Mills, 983 N.W.2d 61, 67 (Iowa 2022) (citation

omitted). “The institutional deference afforded the district court in determining

spousal support counsels against undue tinkering with spousal support awards”

unless “there has been a failure to do equity.” In re Marriage of Sokol, 985 N.W.2d

177, 182 (Iowa 2023) (citation omitted). After considering the factors listed in Iowa

Code section 598.21A(1), the court may grant an award of spousal support in an

amount and duration that is “tailored to achieve the underlying equitable purpose
14

of the spousal support award.” See id. at 185. Here, the court stated its purpose

in awarding Bridget spousal support was to provide her with “a standard of living

that is more commensurate with the standard of living she enjoyed during the

course of the parties’ marriage,” which is the goal of a traditional spousal support

award. See id.

We find such an award was warranted given the nearly twenty-five years

the parties were married, Terry’s higher income, and his receipt of all the income-

producing assets of the marriage. See Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)(a), (c). Terry does

not really challenge these factors. He instead asserts that Bridget has “extensive

work history in the lawn care business” and that “she could earn a significant higher

income” if she returned to that field where she lives. The evidence does not

support that assertion.

Bridget testified her income is reasonable in her geographic area, and Terry

offered no evidence to dispute that. He only testified: “I work every day, and so

can she.” But Bridget is employed full time, just like Terry. And there was no

evidence that she could earn more doing lawn care in Florida based on her

experience. See In re Marriage of Kreuder, No. 13-0776, 2014 WL 1714486, at *3

(Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2014) (affirming award where “there was no evidence that

she was earning below her earning capacity”); In re Marriage of Wasson,

No. 12-1033, 2013 WL 2637576, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. June 12, 2013) (rejecting

challenge to spousal support award where “no evidence was offered as to any

possible full[-]time positions that were available and appropriate for [wife]’s skill

set”); In re Marriage of Schriner, 695 N.W.2d 493, 501 (Iowa 2005) (affirming

spousal support award where “there was no evidence in this case that [wife]’s
15

earnings were not commensurate with her earning capacity.”); cf. Pazhoor, 971

N.W.2d at 542 (noting “[t]he court of appeals correctly measured [wife]’s earning

capacity [as minimal] because ‘[n]o evidence was presented concerning any full-

time employment [she] could obtain’” and finding “[t]his factor weighs heavily in

favor of support”) (third alteration in original).

Indeed, the evidence shows that Bridget was not compensated much for

her work at Turf-Pro before the parties’ separation. The tax return for the last full

year Bridget worked for the business as a “laborer,” in 2018, shows Bridget’s net

profit from the business was only $6000.00, while Terry’s was $83,907.00. Those

figures did not change much in the 2019 return, although they drastically changed

in 2020 after Bridget filed for divorce, with Terry’s net profit somehow shrinking to

$43,457.00 and the business issuing Bridget a 1099-NEC form showing

nonemployee compensation of $22,002.61. This historical record supports

Bridget’s testimony that her earning capacity is much less than Terry’s, which also

supports an award of spousal support. See Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)(e).

Finally, we have factored in the parties’ comfortable lifestyle during their

marriage—vacationing, driving nice vehicles, and not worrying about spending

money. Since their separation, only Terry has continued to live that life. Bridget

suffers a budget deficit, while Terry enjoys a surplus, even ignoring the fact that he

uses the business to cover most of his personal expenses. Because Bridget

“cannot support herself at a standard of living comparable to the lifestyle she

enjoyed while married,” this factor also warrants spousal support. Pazhoor, 917

N.W.2d at 542; accord Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)(f).
16

While there are some factors that cut against spousal support, like the

parties’ ages, good health, and similar education levels, see Iowa Code

§ 598.21A(1)(b), (d), the ones that we have discussed above convince us that the

court’s award was equitable, both in its amount and duration. Granting Bridget’s

request for $600.00 per month until she reaches retirement age equitably balances

out her budget deficit, while still leaving Terry well in the black. Indeed, Terry does

not argue he is unable to pay. By the time Bridget turns sixty-five and spousal

support ends, Bridget will be better able to maintain a standard of living

comparable to that she enjoyed during the marriage by using retirement benefits

and assets. For these reasons, we affirm the spousal support awarded to Bridget.

C. Appellate Attorney Fees

In the conclusion of her brief, Bridget asks that the court award her

$4000.00 in appellate attorney fees. An award of appellate attorney fees is not a

matter of right but rests within the appellate court’s discretion. In re Marriage of

Berning, 745 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). The court considers “the needs

of the party seeking the award, the ability of the other party to pay, and the relative

merits of the appeal.” In re Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 270 (Iowa 2005).

Given the income disparity between the parties and the merits of Bridget’s

appeal, we find her request for appellate attorney fees should be granted. But

because she did not submit an affidavit or fee itemization to support her request,

we remand the issue of appellate attorney fees to the district court to determine a

reasonable award. See In re Marriage of Heiar, 954 N.W.2d 464, 473–74 (Iowa

Ct. App. 2020) (“[W]e are unable to determine a reasonable award without more

specific details of how the fees were incurred for this appeal.”).
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IV. Conclusion

We affirm the decision of the district court and remand for the determination

of an award of reasonable appellate attorney fees in favor of Bridget.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.